

THEORY OF JUDGMENT  
IN EDMUND HUSSERL'S  
*Logical Investigations*

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<p>Tutkielma käsittelee fenomenologisen perinteen perustajan Edmund Husserlin kognitiivisen tai tiedollisen arvostelman teoriaa vuosina 1900–1901 julkaistuissa Loogisissa tutkimuksissa ja muissa samalta Husserlin ajattelun kaudelta peräisin olevissa kirjoituksissa. Tavoitteena on esittää tarkasti ja selvässä muodossa Husserlin teorian filosofiset pääpiirteet, teorian keskeisiin väitteisiin johtavat analyysit ja niitä ohjaavat teoreettiset pyrkimykset sekä asettaa Husserlin teoria laajempaan filosofiseen kontekstiin.</p> <p>Työssä on kolme päälukua, joista ensimmäinen on historiallinen katsaus erilaisiin arvostelman luonnetta koskeviin käsityksiin Platonista Brentanoon. Luvun keskeisin tulos on jaottelu kahden arvostelmaa koskevan teoriaperheen tai käsityksen välillä, joihin tässä työssä viitataan platonis-aristoteelisenä ja apprehensio–myöntämis-käsityksenä, ja joiden keskeisin erottava tekijä liittyy predikaation ja myöntämisen tai kieltämisen väliseen suhteeseen yleensä perustapauksena pidetyssä kategorisessa, ”S on p” -muotoisessa arvostelmassa. Platonis-aristoteelisen käsityksen mukaan myöntäminen ja kieltäminen ovat predikaation muotoja, kun taas kilpailevan käsityksen mukaan arvostelma edellyttää erillistä apprehensio- tai käsittämistä, johon predikoiminen sisältyy, ja arvostelmassa tällaisen käsittämisen kohteeseen suhtaudutaan hyväksyvästi tai hylkäävästi sen päälle rakentuvassa asenteessa. Luvun viimeisissä osioissa käsitellään lisäksi 1800-luvun arvostelmateorioiden keskeisiä kiistakysymyksiä ja erityisesti niiden filosofien teorioita, jotka vaikuttivat suoraan Husserlin omien käsitysten muotoutumiseen, ja joista keskeisimmät ovat Bolzano, Lotze ja Brentano.</p> <p>Toisessa luvussa tarkastellaan Loogisten tutkimusten laajempaa filosofista projektia, joka liittyi sen selvittämiseen, mikä on logiikan peruskäsitteiden rooli tiedossa, sekä arvostelman analyysien asemaa tässä projektissa. Huomion keskipisteenä on jännite kahden Husserlin ajattelua luonnehtivan perussitoumuksen välillä, joista ensimmäinen on käsitys logiikan objektiivisuudesta ja riippumattomuudesta psykologisista ilmiöistä ja toinen taas ajatus, että filosofisten peruskäsitteiden analyysissä tietoisuuden ilmiöiden kuvailemisella on olennainen rooli. Luvussa osoitetaan, että keskeinen ajatus näiden käsitysten yhteensovittamisen kannalta Loogisissa tutkimuksissa on Husserlin teoria merkityksistä ideaalisina aktilajeina, joiden instansseja yksittäiset intentionaaliset aktit kuten arvostelmat ovat. Luvun lopussa tarkastellaan lisäksi Husserlin intentionaalisuus-teorian yleisiä piirteitä erityisesti suhteessa Brentanon aiempaan teoriaan.</p> <p>Kolmas luku on työn temaattinen ydin, jossa keskitytään nimenomaisesti Husserlin analyysiin arvostelman luonteesta, rakenteesta ja suhteista objekteihin maailmassa. Luvussa tarkastellaan neljää toisiinsa läheisesti kytkeytyvää Husserlin teorian piirrettä, joita arvioidaan suhteessa Brentanon teoriaan ja ensimmäisessä luvussa esitettyyn historialliseen jaotteluun. Ensimmäinen näistä on väite, ettei arvostelmaan sisälly erotettavissa olevaa kokemusta, jossa sen kohde ainoastaan käsitettäisiin. Toinen on, ettei suoraviivainen arvostelman tekeminen ole sellaista myöntämistä, joka edellyttää edeltävää harkintaa ja kohdistuu harkinnan kohteena olevaan väitteeseen. Kolmas väite on, ettei Brentanon kuvailema pelkkä jonkin kohteen tietoinen esittäminen tai mieltäminen ole perustavampi tai rakenteellisesti yksinkertaisempi intentionaalinen aktityyppi kuin arvostelma, vaan jälkimmäisen ”modifikaatio”. Neljäs Husserlin teorian pääpiirre on monitahoinen käsitys arvostelmista ”propositionaalisina akteina”, jotka instantioivat ideaalisia propositioita ja suuntautuvat intentionaalisesti asiointiloihin maailmassa tavalla, joka Husserlin yksinkertaisimpana pitämässä tapauksessa rakentuu havaintokokemuksen pohjalle jäsentämällä havainnon sisällön subjekti–predikaatti-muodossa.</p> <p>Tutkielman keskeinen johtopäätös ensimmäisessä luvussa esitetyn jaottelun näkökulmasta on, että Husserlin arvostelmateoriaa voidaan oikeutetusti pitää kriittisesti uudelleenmuotoiltuna versiona platonis-aristoteelisestä käsityksestä, jossa kuitenkin huomioidaan apprehensio–myöntämis-käsityksen keskeiset käsitteelliset erottelut ja sisällytetään teoriaan erityistapauksina ne ilmiöt, joihin jälkimmäinen käsitys keskittyi. Erityisesti Husserlin teoriaa voidaan pitää sellaisen aristoteelisen perinteen jatkajana, jossa predikaation kaltaisten ajattelun loogisten rakenteiden ajatellaan olevan läheisessä suhteessa havaintokokemukseen ja tavallaan kasvavan tällaisen kokemuksen rakenteista.</p>			
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# Contents

Introduction	I
1 Historical Background: Conceptions of Judgment from Plato to Brentano	13
1.1 Plato and Aristotle on the Possibility of Error in Discourse and Thought	14
1.2 Apprehension and Judgment in Aquinas and Ockham	20
1.3 The Psychological Character of Judgment in Descartes and Hume	24
1.4 Logical and Psychological Views on Judgment from Bolzano to Brentano	32
1.4.1 Bolzano and Lotze in the controversy over the relation of logic and psychology	32
1.4.2 Brentano and the dispute about existential and impersonal judgments	38
2 Theory of Judgment in the Context of the <i>Logical Investigations</i>	48
2.1 From the Foundations of Arithmetic to Pure Logic	49
2.2 Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and Critique of Knowledge	55
2.3 Expression and the Ideality of Meaning	57
2.4 The Theory of Intentional Experiences	62
3 Husserl on the Nature, Structure, and Objects of Acts of Judging	68
3.1 Critique of the Conception of Judgment as a Composite Act	71
3.1.1 The question of the relation between an act and its ‘matter’ and ‘quality’	72
3.1.2 Analysis of perceptual illusions and critique of Brentano’s view	76
3.2 Assenting and Straightforward Judgments	83
3.2.1 Assent, deliberation, and fulfillment	84
3.2.2 The intentional structure of assenting judgments	93
3.3 ‘Mere Presentation’ as a Modification of Judgment	102
3.3.1 Positing and non-positing acts and the question of their relation	103
3.3.2 The theory of ‘qualitative modification’	106
3.3.3 Quasi-judgments and the primacy of belief	114
3.4 Judgment, Predication, and States of Affairs	122
3.4.1 Complexity and unity in meanings and intentional acts	124
3.4.2 The structure of a categorical proposition	134
3.4.3 Propositional acts and their objective correlates	144
3.4.4 The perceptual roots of predication	162
Conclusions	177
Bibliography	185

# Introduction

“What is called ‘theory of judgment’ is something viciously ambiguous.”

—EDMUND HUSSERL, *Ideas I*<sup>1</sup>

In the history of philosophy, ‘judgment’—and corresponding expressions in other languages, such as the Latin ‘*iudicatio*’ and ‘*iudicium*’, the French ‘*jugement*’, and the German ‘*Urteil*’—has been used in different ways to cover various parts of, and to name various landmarks in, the conceptual landscape of mind and cognition. Although it is difficult to characterize—let alone define—what judging consists in without taking a stand on disputed theoretical questions, some illustrative examples of common characterizations of judgment include: taking something to exist or not to exist, holding something to be true or false, affirming or denying something without outwardly voicing one’s views, and adopting or forming an opinion, conviction, or belief about some subject matter.<sup>2</sup> Many of the differences in the use of this notion as a term of art in philosophy, and corresponding theoretical differences in how the phenomenon itself is to be analyzed, seem to have either reflected or been reflected in its different uses in ordinary contexts outside the technical conventions and idiosyncrasies of philosophers. Indeed, philosophical treatments of judgment have often been guided either by explicitly held views or—more often—by tacit assumptions to the effect that in the range of phenomena ordinarily covered by the notion of judgment, some cases are to be considered paradigmatic and an appropriate theory should be modeled after those cases. Accordingly, in the interest of specifying the topic of this work, it is instructive to devote here some attention to a brief, preliminary survey of some relevant parts of the conceptual and historical surroundings of the word ‘judgment’.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hua3, 264.

<sup>2</sup> According to an assessment that one finds fairly often in the history of philosophy, the concept of judgment is primitive enough not to admit of a definition in terms of more simple or basic notions. See for example Reid’s statement in his 1785 *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*: “As it is impossible by a definition to give a notion of colour to a man who never saw colours, so its is impossible by any definition to give a distinct notion of judgment to a man who has not often judged, and who is not capable of reflecting attentively upon this act of his mind.” (Reid 1941, 313). For a more recent statement by a logician along a similar line, see Martin-Löf 1987: “What is a judgement? and, What is a proof of a judgement? When you are dealing with such basic notions, it is clear that there can be no question of reducing them to any other, more basic notion: rather, you have to satisfy yourself that these notions are the same as certain other notions that you use other words to express, and there can only be the question of revealing the structure into which these notions fit and finding the words for them which make most clear their nature.”

<sup>3</sup> It may be of some interest, given the current topic, to note that Husserl, in his 1905 lectures on theory of judgment, specifically rejects this kind of preliminary lexicographical-conceptual discussion as

In the first place, ‘judgment’ in both its ordinary and philosophical use is categorially ambiguous: in one sense it refers to an *act* or *action*, in another, to the *result* or *product* of an act, and in a third sense, to a *capacity*, *faculty*, or *ability* manifested in the performance of such acts.<sup>4</sup> Judgment considered as an act—the act of judging, of rendering or issuing judgments, where what is issued can be considered as the product or outcome of the act—is most obviously connected to the function of a *judge* in a court of law, and the legal image of a tribunal readily invites ideas about the nature of judgment that have figured prominently in many traditional accounts. Among such ideas are, for instance, the view of judgment as a decision, paradigmatically following a prior stage of deliberation, of hearing the testimony of various parties, weighing reasons for and against a view, and so on.<sup>5</sup> Emphasizing the salient aspects of this image has the tendency either to make judgment a fairly rarefied affair—a phenomenon found only in situations of careful critical scrutiny of possible alternatives—or to over-intellectualize the cognitive aspect of the ordinary human condition. Some pressure in the latter direction has been caused historically by the combination of this judicial image with the prevalence of the philosophical use of ‘judgment’ as an umbrella term covering a broad variety of cognitive phenomena ranging from a considered adoption of a stance on a question to the holding of an opinion or belief.<sup>6</sup> In another direction, ‘judging’ evokes the idea of *assessing* or *estimating* something, especially in the absence of clear and decisive grounds, as when one judges the distance between two things instead of measuring it. In this vein, Locke opposed judgment to *knowledge* and defined the former as taking

a starting point: “We shall not set out from the term ‘judgment’, but rather bring forward and illustrate to ourselves the scientific motives [...] from which the need for a ‘theory of judgment’ has arisen in psychology, logic, and critique of knowledge.” („Wir wollen nicht vom *Terminus Urteil* ausgehen, sondern es vorziehen, uns die wissenschaftlichen Motive zu vergegenwärtigen, [...] aus denen das Bedürfnis einer Urteilstheorie für Psychologie, Logik und Erkenntniskritik erwachsen ist.“) (HuaMat5, 7).

<sup>4</sup> Of these, especially the ambiguity between the first two senses, which is present also for instance in ‘perception’ and ‘experience’, has been often noted in philosophy. It was specifically analyzed in a 1911 paper by Twardowski, who used the words ‘function’ (*Funktion*) and ‘product’ (*Gebilde*) to draw the distinction; Twardowski notes also the third, dispositional sense of the word ‘judgment’ (see Twardowski 1999, 111). As another example, Sellars (1997, 54) talks of the “notorious ‘ing-ed’ ambiguity” of words such as ‘experience’. Like ‘judgment’, ‘experience’ has also a third sense, not covered by Sellars, in which the word is not used as a count noun, as in saying that someone has experience in some given field.

<sup>5</sup> As an example of an explicit mention of the analogy between cognitive and legal judgment, see Reid’s discussion in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*: “As a judge, after taking the proper evidence, passes sentence in a cause, and that sentence is called his judgment, so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or false, passes sentence, or determines according to the evidence that appears.” (Reid 1941, 314).

<sup>6</sup> For evidence of the prevalence of this broad use from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, see J. S. Mill’s remark, in his extensive editorial commentary to James Mill’s *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*: “Judgment, in its popular acceptation, is Belief resulting from deliberate examination, in other words, Belief grounded on evidence: while in its philosophical sense it is coextensive, if not synonymous, with Belief itself”. (Mill 1878, 342n).

a proposition to be true or false without demonstrative evidence.<sup>7</sup> ‘Judging’ also means assessing things in another, usually *evaluative* sense of appraising things, of distinguishing the good from the bad in some given respect, or more generally, discerning the things that fit some given criteria from those that do not. These senses correspond with judgment understood a capacity for making such assessments, in which sense someone can be said to have or show good judgment. This family of senses also fits together with commonly held philosophical views about the nature of judgment. Kant, for instance, defines the ‘power of judgment’ (*Urteilstkraft*) as the faculty of subsuming individual cases under general concepts, of assessing whether a given rule applies to such and such particulars.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, from the general sense of assessment it is easy to arrive at a parallelism between *cognitive* and *moral* judgment: if cognitive judgment is understood as the capacity, or the exercise of the capacity, to assess whether a claim is *true* or *false*, or whether some state of affairs obtains or does not obtain, then moral judgment can be viewed as involving the assessment whether something is in a moral sense *good* or *bad*, whether an action merits praise or blame, or whether some state of affairs ought to be realized or prevented from being realized.

Although analysis of the nature of judgment as a ‘mental act’ belongs largely to philosophical psychology, it does not constitute only a peripheral topic in one special area of philosophy but has broader significance, for both systematic and historical reasons. Many basic philosophical concepts—among others, epistemological and logical concepts such as those of truth, falsity, error, reasoning, knowledge, and justification, as well as metaphysical concepts such as reality, substance, and attribute—are intimately connected with that of judgment and its twin notion, belief, and the way such concepts are to be treated depends in large part on one’s theoretical outlook on the nature of cognitive judgment, its objects, and the relation between the two.<sup>9</sup> Historically, the con-

<sup>7</sup> See Locke 1975, 653: “The Faculty, which God has given Man to supply the want of clear and certain Knowledge in Cases where that cannot be had, is *Judgment*: whereby the Mind takes [...] any Proposition to be true, or false, without perceiving demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs.”

<sup>8</sup> See Kant 1997, A 132–3/B 171–2. Strictly speaking, this is the model of what Kant calls, in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ‘determining’ judgments, in which a general concept is given in advance, and a particular is to be subsumed under it; Kant distinguishes from these the converse case, where a range of individuals is given, and a general concept is to be found for them, which he calls ‘reflecting’ judgment. See Kant 2000, 66–7.

<sup>9</sup> Examples of assessments along these lines of the philosophical importance of the concepts of judgment and belief are not very hard to come by. For example, Russell writes in his 1921 *The Analysis of Mind* as follows: “Psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics revolve around belief, and on the view we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends.” (Russell 1995, 195) More recently, in his posthumously published 2005 *Truth and Predication*, Davidson includes the analysis of judgment as one of the interconnected aspects of the ‘problem of predication’ and writes: “[I]f we do not understand predication, we do not understand how any sentence works, nor can we account for the structure of the

cept of judgment has served in various roles in large-scale philosophical programs and occupied different positions in the architectural design of philosophical systems. For instance, in the order of exposition according to which textbooks of traditional syllogistic logic were commonly organized, judgment was the middle term of a tripartite distinction of intellectual operations—simple apprehension or understanding, judgment, and reasoning—that was considered as a psychological counterpart for the main elements of traditional logical theory—namely, terms, propositions, and syllogisms.<sup>10</sup> As another historical example, Kant—besides devoting the third of his *Critiques* specifically to judgments of beauty and purposiveness—gave a systematically central place to the task of a taxonomy of different ‘logical functions’ of judgment, from which he proposed to derive a system of ontological categories in what he called their ‘metaphysical deduction’ from those functions.<sup>11</sup>

From the point of view of the historiography of the major philosophical movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, at least two things are of interest to note about the changing position of theory of judgment in the philosophical programs pursued in such movements. *First*, the analysis of the nature of cognitive judgment was a formative concern in the early stages of both the phenomenological tradition that grew around Husserl’s work and the analytical tradition that is often viewed as stemming from the work of Moore and Russell.<sup>12</sup> *Second*, the early interest exhibited in both of these traditions toward judgment as a philosophical topic later waned in both of them for at least partly analogous reasons.

simplest thought that is expressible in language. [...] The philosophy of language lacks its most important chapter without such a theory; the philosophy of mind is missing a crucial first step if it cannot describe the nature of judgment; and it is woeful if metaphysics cannot say how a substance is related to its attributes.” (Davidson 2005, 77).

<sup>10</sup> For a clear statement of a view of this kind, see for example Kant 1998, A 130–1; B 169: “General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: understanding, the power of judgment, and reason. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with concepts, judgments, and inferences, corresponding exactly to the functions and the order of those powers of mind”. The traditional organization of expositions of logical theory into a theory of concepts, of propositions, and of syllogistic inferences in all likelihood originates in the Peripatetic ordering of Aristotle’s logical works, in which the three works placed first—*The Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*—concerned, respectively, individual words, statements, and syllogisms; in modern times probably the most important example of this kind of division is in the *Port-Royal Logic* (see Arnaud & Nicole 1992, 30). The tripartite distinction of intellectual operations was similarly at least inspired by Aristotle, but it was probably codified in a clear form sometime during the high period of Scholasticism, where it is present at least in Aquinas (see for example Schmidt 1966, 49f). For an illuminating discussion of this point, see Bell 1979, 1–4.

<sup>11</sup> See Kant 1998, B 159; for Kant’s view of the nature of the procedure and its relation to the Aristotelian theory of categories, see *ibid.*, A 80–1; B 107–8.

<sup>12</sup> However, for an influential statement of an alternative view of the origins of analytical philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of Frege over Russell and Moore and highlights the affinities with early phenomenology, see Dummett 1993, e.g. 25–6.

While a detailed account of these historical circumstances and developments cannot be undertaken here, at least some relevant points can be briefly outlined.

In early phenomenology and in the broader family of philosophical views with a shared historical origin in Brentano's program of descriptive psychology, questions concerning the nature of acts of judging and their relations to their objects were often used as a guiding thread in approaching topics in ontology, epistemology, and logic. Besides Husserl and Brentano, also for example Meinong and Marty made various contributions along these lines.<sup>13</sup> Among Husserl's students and early followers, Adolf Reinach wrote in 1911 a treatise focusing particularly on the interpretation of negative judgments, in which he argued for an ontological foundation for logic in relations obtaining between states of affairs and developed for that purpose an elaborate ontological framework for judgment including, for instance, negative states of affairs.<sup>14</sup> Heidegger also wrote his 1913 dissertation on various theories of judgment that were prominent at the time, criticizing them of confusing logical and psychological aspects of judgment on grounds at least partly adapted from Husserl's 1900 *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*.<sup>15</sup>

In a somewhat similar vein, Moore's and Russell's early philosophical projects were in large part motivated by a discontent with the idealistic tendencies prevalent in Britain at the time, and their rejection of those views was first signaled in print by Moore's 1899 paper "The Nature of Judgment", in which he criticized F. H. Bradley's account of judgment of conflating a psychological and a logical sense of 'ideas' or concepts as constituents of judgments and proposed a view of judgment as a relation of a judging subject to timelessly existing complex entities that he called 'propositions'.<sup>16</sup> Russell, for his part, formulated a series of theories of judgment, of which the first was presented in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* and centered around a notion of abstract propositions inspired by Moore.<sup>17</sup> It may also be pointed out that part of the impact Wittgenstein first made as a philosopher was in the area of the analysis of judgment, through initially

<sup>13</sup> See e.g. Meinong 1902; for an overview and critical assessment of Marty's ideas, see Husserl's 1904 review of a series of Marty's articles on 'subjectless sentences' in Husserl 1994, 280ff; Hua22, 236ff.

<sup>14</sup> See Reinach 1982; for a summary of Reinach's theory, see for example Smith 1987.

<sup>15</sup> See Heidegger 1978; for an overview and discussion, see Martin 2006, 103f.

<sup>16</sup> See Moore 1993. The similarity between the philosophical programs that Moore and Russell were pursuing with those of Meinong and Husserl, understood broadly as a defense of realism against idealistic 19<sup>th</sup>-century views, was noted by Russell, who wrote in a 1924 essay titled "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century" as follows: "with the year 1900 a revolt against German idealism began [ . . . ] Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, a monumental work published in 1900, soon began to exert a great effect. Meinong's *Ueber Annahmen* (1902) and *Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (1904) were influential in the same direction. In England, G. E. Moore and I began to advocate similar views." (Russell 1996, 53).

<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the different stages in Russell's views on this topic, discussed from the point of view of the problem of the 'unity of the proposition', see Gibson 2004, 21f.



unpublished, privately communicated criticisms of Russell's second, so-called 'multiple relation' theory of judgment, in response to which Russell devised a third theory that borrowed and adapted some of the ideas Wittgenstein later made use of in the *Tractatus*.<sup>18</sup>

While in the early stages of the phenomenological movement, considerations of the nature of judgment were generally viewed as an important part of many questions of philosophical interest, later developments tended instead toward viewing a theoretical focus on judgment as symptomatic of methodological prejudices favoring the cognitive and intellectual aspects of experience over something more fundamental. Views of this kind were often inspired by Husserl's later analyses of 'pre-predicative experience' (*vor-prädikative Erfahrung*), but the shift in the position occupied by the concept of judgment in the programs pursued by phenomenologists was largely due to the partly similar, critical attitudes towards that concept held by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.<sup>19</sup> From the mid-1920's onward, Heidegger argued that the predicative connection of a subject and a predicate in a categorical judgment—a centerpiece of most traditional accounts of judgment—is derived from an underlying 'hermeneutic' structure of understanding that is exhibited most clearly in the unreflective goal-directed use of tools, and condemned the very idea of a theory of judgment as superficial and philosophically distorting, a symptom of neglecting this more basic phenomenon.<sup>20</sup> Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, treated the notion of judgment mostly in a more specific context, in connection to his critique of 'intellectualism', a family of philosophical and psychological views about

<sup>18</sup> Russell's multiple relation theory dispensed, mostly in order to avoid postulating non-obtaining facts or what he called 'objective falsehoods' as objects of false judgments, with his earlier idea of independently unified abstract propositions and replaced them with the idea that the objects on which a judgment bears are united only through the act of judging, which is to be understood as a 'multiple relation'—that is, a relation with more than two terms—of the judging subject and the objects on which the judgment bears (see Russell 1992, 122). Wittgenstein's objection, found in unpublished 1913 notes on logic, in a letter to Russell from the same year, and later summarized in the *Tractatus*, was that this account did not require judgments to be fit for evaluation as to truth and falsity; that is, it could not rule out senseless judgments such as "This table penholders the book" without additional premises about how the objects judged about can be related in the judgment so as for the latter to be truth-evaluable (see Wittgenstein 1998, 95, 103, 122; 1974, 5.5422); and, adding such constraints for those relations that obtain independently of the act of judging would in effect reintroduce the idea of independently unified complex propositions or facts into the theory.

<sup>19</sup> Even in Husserl's later writings, the analyses of 'pre-predicative' experience are not disconnected from a theoretical concern with cognitive judgment and predication but are viewed as the first step of a comprehensive phenomenological theory of judgment; see Hua17, 185f; cf. EJ, 27f.

<sup>20</sup> See Heidegger 2010a, 154: "If the phenomenon of the 'as' is covered over and, above all, veiled in its existential origin from the hermeneutical 'as', then [the sound core of the Aristotelian analysis of statements] disintegrates into the analysis of λόγος in a superficial 'theory of judgment' ". Cf. Heidegger 2010b, 121–2: "Every act of having things before our eyes, every act of perceiving them, is held within [...] a disclosure that things get from a primary making-sense-of-things in terms of their what-they're-for [...] In short, it has the *as-structure*. [...] this 'as' is not the 'as' of predication *qua* predication but is prior to it in such a way that it makes possible the very structure of predication at all."

perceptual experience in which perception was understood as a combination of passively received, in themselves unstructured and meaningless sensory data with a structuring and meaning-giving intellectual act of judgment.<sup>21</sup> Although Merleau-Ponty did not reject outright judgment as a topic of philosophical importance, he argued that it is a secondary element in our relations to our surrounding world that presupposes, prior to the logical structures of predication, an articulation of the sensory givens according to an underlying ‘perceptual syntax’, and prior to explicit acts of affirming or denying, a perceptual ‘faith’ as a basic condition of our bodily ‘inhabiting’ of the world.<sup>22</sup> Much of what was traditionally approached in terms of judgment should, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, be viewed instead in terms of these more fundamental phenomena.

Likewise, in the later development of the analytical tradition, the idea of a theory of judgment underwent a fall from prominence, became associated with dubious views about philosophical method, and the underlying questions were either largely avoided or were reformulated in terms of substitutes that were deemed more acceptable. Much of these developments can be broadly attributed to the general shift in views in philosophical methodology that Gustav Bergmann was the first to characterize, in a synoptic 1953 essay on logical positivism, as the ‘linguistic turn’.<sup>23</sup> An important aspect of this shift was a general suspicion toward appeals to psychological notions in philosophy and the effort to redirect traditional philosophical concern with mental phenomena to various appropriately related parts of language and publicly observable linguistic behavior.<sup>24</sup> Following this pattern, many of the topics previously treated under the rubric of a theory of judgment were also reformulated in a linguistic guise, in large

<sup>21</sup> See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 34f.

<sup>22</sup> See *ibid*, 38: “[T]here is, prior to objective relations, a perceptual syntax that is articulated according to its own rules: the breaking up of previous relations and the establishing of new ones—judgment—only express the outcome of this deep operation and are its final report.” Cf. *ibid*, 358–9: “Beneath the explicit acts by which I posit an object out in front of myself [...] there is, sustaining them, a deeper function [...] a sort of ‘faith’, or ‘primordial opinion’”. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 28: “[B]eneath affirmation and negation, beneath judgment (those critical opinions, ulterior operations), it is our experience, prior to every opinion, of inhabiting the world by our body [that teaches us what the perceptual presence of the world consists in]”.

<sup>23</sup> Bergmann’s phrase was later popularized by its being taken up as the title of a well-known collection of essays on philosophical methodology first published in 1967 and edited by Richard Rorty, in which a truncated version of Bergmann’s essay is included. See Bergmann 1992.

<sup>24</sup> For a representative statement of this kind of view, see for example Putnam 1974, 14: “Concepts and ideas were always thought important [in philosophy]; language was thought unimportant, because it was considered to be merely a system of conventional signs for concepts and ideas (considered as mental entities of some kind, and quite independent of the signs used to express them) [...] But if having a concept is being able to use signs in particular ways, or if this is even a major part of the story, then all the attention that was traditionally accorded to matters of introspective psychology more properly belongs to the ways in which we use signs. Moreover, this has the advantage of being a public study, and more in the spirit of modern social science.”

part following two lines of analysis. Along one of these, the direct treatment of psychological phenomena—being associated with questionable introspective methods—was substituted by an oblique treatment through an analysis of sentences used to *report* or *attribute* mental states, events, and episodes. In this way, the analysis of judgment, belief, and other so-called ‘propositional attitudes’ was reformulated as an analysis of reports made about such attitudes, for example, in the form “*S* judges that *p*”. These analyses inherited, in particular, much of the ontological issues that Russell still considered part of a theory of judgment, now approached in the form of the question of the right ontological framework for a semantic theory of sentences of this kind—the question, that is, what kinds of entities have to be postulated in an account of the meaning of these sentences.<sup>25</sup> Secondly, following another line of thought, the suspicion toward mental phenomena as objects of legitimate philosophical analysis led to focusing instead on various public analogues for those phenomena. In the case of cognitive judgment, the obvious overt counterparts are to be found in acts of *stating* or *asserting* something. Accordingly, while one traditionally prevalent view conceived of asserting as an outward expression of the more basic, private mental act of judging, theoretical appeals to such acts were argued to be mistaken and the public acts of asserting were instead taken as the conceptually more basic phenomenon.<sup>26</sup>

The main theme of the present work is the theory of cognitive judgment formulated by Edmund Husserl in the work that, following Husserl’s own description, is often characterized as the ‘breakthrough’ of the phenomenological method and movement,

<sup>25</sup> A usual point of controversy in these debates was whether structured, abstract entities such as the propositions of Moore and the early Russell, or Frege’s partly similar *Gedanken*, have to be assumed to account for the semantics of propositional-attitude sentences, or whether a nominalistic ontology—traditionally favored by empiricists since Locke—without *abstracta* of this kind can give a satisfactory account of them. Carnap and Quine, for example, argued for the opposing view that ‘*S* believes that *p*’ involves simply *S*’s acceptance of the sentence ‘*p*’, an item in some specific language, rather than a relation to an abstract proposition, an identical meaning shared by and expressible in different languages. See Carnap 1947, 53f; Quine 1956. A third family of analyses of sentences of this kind was later formulated in terms of sets of ‘possible worlds’; see for example Hintikka 1969. For a good discussion of these analyses in relation to theory of judgment, see Bell 1979, 5–7.

<sup>26</sup> For a clear programmatic statement of such a view, see Dummett 1973, 362: “We have opposed throughout the view of assertion as the expression of an interior act of judgment; judgment, rather, is the interiorization of the external act of assertion.” For another analysis of assertion developed on the basis of a similar view, see Brandom 1983; 1994, 167f. Illustrative examples of the broader theoretical suspicions toward the idea of an intellectual act of judging are also found in Ryle’s 1949 *The Concept of Mind*, in which he ridicules conceptions of belief as a disposition occasionally to go through “some unique proceeding of cognizing, ‘judging’, or internally re-asserting, with a feeling of confidence, [for instance,] ‘The earth is round’ ” (2009, 32); Ryle argues that the only sensible meaning of ‘making a judgment’ is in reporting the conclusions of one’s investigations about some subject matter, and recommends refraining “from talking as if a separate antecedent act of making this judgment had occurred as part of [one’s] investigations” (*ibid*, 272).

the two-volume *Logical Investigations*, first published in 1900 and 1901.<sup>27</sup> The aim here is not only to present the outcomes of Husserl's analyses in the form of a series of logically interconnected claims, but to discuss them in a way that brings out in a clear form those analyses themselves, the associated argumentation, and the underlying philosophical motivations. These aims are pursued mainly in four different ways: *first*, by following in detail and reconstructing Husserl's analyses of different aspects of judgment; *second*, by discussing the position these analyses occupy in the general philosophical project of the *Investigations*; *third*, by clarifying the historical background of Husserl's views, especially by relating them to the theories to which Husserl directly responds or from which he adopts some of his ideas; and *fourth*, by placing Husserl's views in a broader historical context of different larger families of conceptions of judgment. The approach taken to Husserl's thought is chronological: in addition to the *Investigations* themselves, several other writings from the same period are treated as presentations of substantially the same theory of judgment; these writings comprise Husserl's written notes for his lecture courses, the 'research manuscripts' in which Husserl usually worked out his ideas, letters, as well as reviews of the work of other philosophers. Here, some preliminary remarks are in order about the way in which the period in question has been defined for the purposes of the present work and about the reasons for taking this broader textual approach in discussing Husserl's views.

Analysis of the nature of judgment was a persistent concern of Husserl's thinking from the early 1890's at least to the late 1920's<sup>28</sup>, and the development of his views on this topic both influenced and reflected the development of his broader theoretical and methodological views. Of these broader developments, some are especially important for the theoretical framework and basic philosophical commitments of the *Investigations*. Among Husserl's major publications, the *Investigations* stand between the early *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, published in 1891, and the 1912 first volume of the *Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, and the beginning and end of what can reasonably be called the 'period of the *Logical Investigations*' in the development of Husserl's thought can be dated by tracing the chronological origin of the main theoretical differences between the views whose most authoritative statements are

<sup>27</sup> For Husserl's statements about this 'breakthrough', see LI, 3; Hua18, 8; cf. Hua3, 2.

<sup>28</sup> Husserl's earliest analyses of judgment date from around 1893 (see Hua40, 1ff; 31ff), and the latest work in which the notion of judgment was a central concern is the 1929 *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Husserl's most extensive late treatment of topics relating to theory of judgment was a work posthumously published in 1938 with the title *Experience and Judgment*, which was edited by Husserl's assistant Ludwig Landgrebe, largely from research manuscripts and lecture notes written in the 1920's.

found in these works. Two such developments are particularly notable, the first distinguishing the views held in the *Investigations* from those of *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, and the second marking the onset of the later period epitomized by the *Ideas*. The *first* was Husserl's adoption in the mid-1890's of an objective or Platonistic view about the objects of pure logic, which was first given an extensive treatment in his 1896 lectures on logic, and the ensuing rejection of what he later called logical 'psychologism'.<sup>29</sup> The *second* was Husserl's transition in the years leading up to the *Ideas* to a view about phenomenology as a form of transcendental philosophy and to a form of transcendental idealism.<sup>30</sup> In this regard, the most prominent landmarks were the development of the method of 'phenomenological reduction', first given an explicit formulation in Husserl's 1906–7 lectures on theory of knowledge, and connected ideas on how the objects of experience are to be considered after the performance of such reduction, which ideas were first developed in detail in lectures held in 1907 with the title "The Idea of Phenomenology" and later codified in a definitive form in the concept of the 'noema' in the *Ideas*.<sup>31</sup>

The period of the *Investigations* can therefore reasonably be viewed as the decade between Husserl's adoption of a Platonistic outlook on logic around 1896 and the first formulations of the phenomenological reduction around 1906. The texts written during this period form a relatively closed, coherent philosophical doctrine, despite vacillations on many questions of detail, as opposed to the large-scale theoretical differences that separate the *Investigations* from the *Ideas*; this provides a basis for treating these additional writings as belonging to substantially the same doctrine as that formulated in the *Investigations*. On the other hand, the minor vacillations within this period on how exactly a detail in a given analysis is to be fleshed out, as well as various considerations not included in the *Investigations* themselves, often provide important context to and clarifications of the canonical discussions in that work; this is the main rationale for adopting the broader textual approach. However, these chronological criteria have an important ramification that is worth mentioning here. The first edition of *Logical Investigations* was published in two volumes, respectively, in 1900 and 1901. A second edition of the

<sup>29</sup> For Husserl's 1896 discussion of the 'objective content' (*objektiver Gehalt*) of acts of thinking, see HuaMat1, 43f. The views presented in the *Investigations* and their connections to Bolzano and to Lotze's form of Platonism are treated in some detail in the second chapter of the present work.

<sup>30</sup> Husserl started explicitly identifying his views as a form of transcendental idealism only later, but the central idea, according to which the existence of the world is a 'correlate' of possible experience, is present in the *Ideas*. See Hua3, 91f; cf. e.g. Hua1, 116f.

<sup>31</sup> For the 1906–7 discussion of the 'phenomenological reduction', see Hua24, 211f. For the discussion in the 1907 lectures of what remains after such reduction, see Hua2, 45f. For the introduction of the notion of the 'noema' in the *Ideas*, see Hua3, 180f.

first volume and of the first part of the second volume was then issued in 1913, in which Husserl made several revisions that reflected many of the changes of his views during the intervening years. Because this second edition falls outside the chronological limits given above, the focus in this work is on the *first* edition of the *Investigations*. However, changes made in the second edition often reflect ideas that are found in written form in the additional writings considered here; where this is the case, reference is made to those writings rather than to the second-edition *Investigations*.<sup>32</sup>

The main body of the work divides into three chapters. The *first* chapter outlines part of the broadly construed historical background for various ideas about the nature of judgment that Husserl either criticizes or endorses. The chapter takes the form of a series of snapshots of historical developments in conceptions of judgment, where the various theories are presented in the context of at least some of their underlying, more general philosophical interests. For the purposes of the later chapters, an important result of these historical considerations is a distinction between two traditionally widespread, broad conceptions of the nature of judgment, which are here called the Platonic-Aristotelian conception and the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception. On the former, the nature of judgment was tied to *predication*, understood as combining some simpler elements in a way that results in affirming something of an object; on the latter conception, judgment was viewed as *assenting to* or *dissenting from* something that has to be first apprehended, and which was often understood as having a sentence-like or propositional structure. The latest parts of this historical survey then, furthermore, consist of those theories that form the proximal background for Husserl’s analyses, the theories—of which the most important are Bolzano’s, Lotze’s, and Brentano’s—in relation to which Husserl explicitly frames his views.

The *second* chapter positions Husserl’s analyses of judgment in the general project of the *Logical Investigations*, the project of an ‘epistemological clarification’ of logical concepts. Husserl’s views are discussed in terms of a tension between an objective or Platonistic conception of pure logic and a broadly descriptive-psychological methodological approach to the philosophical analysis of logical concepts; it is argued that the basis for Husserl reconciliation between these is the theory of meaning developed in the *Investigations*, according to which objective, shareable meanings are universals or ideal species instantiated in particular intentional acts. Some general aspects of Husserl’s the-

<sup>32</sup> In addition, references to Husserl’s writings outside of the period so defined are occasionally made in the footnotes, mostly in commenting how Husserl’s views on a topic develop later or how some idea is fleshed out in more detail in later writings.

ory of intentional experiences are then discussed, specifically those aspects in which it differs from Brentano's theory, and in a way that leads to some of the main questions guiding Husserl's analyses of judgment.

The *third* chapter is the thematic core of the present work, the part specifically focused on Husserl's theory of judgment in and around the *Investigations*. The discussion is framed in terms of four interrelated ideas in Brentano's theory of judgment which form a polemical contrast for Husserl's analyses: the ideas that acts of judging are built upon neutral acts of 'merely presenting' something; that judging consists of assenting to or dissenting from what is so presented; the idea of a foundational relation between these two, with presentations as the more basic kind of mental phenomena; and Brentano's rejection of sentence-like syntactic articulation, in particular subject-predicate structure, in judgments. In terms of the historical distinction drawn in the first chapter, the three first of these ideas essentially reformulate the conceptual core of the apprehension-assent conception of judgment in Brentano's own theoretical framework, while the fourth constitutes Brentano's most radical departure from traditional views about judgment. Against these views, Husserl will be seen to argue that acts of judging do not consist in superimposing an optional element of acceptance on underlying or prior acts of merely entertaining something, but in the simplest case relate straightforwardly to the world in what Husserl calls a 'positing' manner which, furthermore, has a certain conceptual primacy over the attitude of merely entertaining something. Moreover, in a case that Husserl considers as basic, this takes place in articulating in a subject-predicate form—in 'propositional acts' intentionally directed at states of affairs as their objects—elements of one's perceptual surroundings. The resulting view, it will be argued, is in effect a form of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of the nature of judgment: affirming something in a predicative judgment is not something in addition to predication, but in the basic case takes place *in* predicatively articulating perceived things and characteristics in a mode of belief in which they are from the outset encountered as existing inhabitants of one's surrounding world.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> A similar view on Husserl's views on the nature of judgment has been proposed in a short but illuminating article by Richard Cobb-Stevens (2003), who proposes that Husserl's analyses are not meant only as a critique of Brentano but also of Frege, and in general of the modern idea of judgment as an appraisal or taking of a position to a presented 'content', and as a defense of an Aristotelian understanding of judgment as involving the articulation in syntactic forms of a perceptual situation. Another similar treatment of Husserl's theory is found in Staiti (2015), where Husserl's views are mainly contrasted with the neo-Kantian Henrich Rickert, but also placed in the context of a broader historical development.

# I Historical Background: Conceptions of Judgment from Plato to Brentano

It is often the case that some of the motivations underlying a philosophical doctrine are most readily apparent in its historical *origin*, while others afford a firmer grasp in view, rather, of the vicissitudes of its historical *becoming*. Accordingly, in the interest of rendering transparent some of the central conceptual background of Husserl's theory of judgment, this chapter traces certain salient lines of development in the history of philosophical theories of cognitive judgment from their origin in Antiquity up to Husserl's immediate predecessors in 19<sup>th</sup>-century logic and psychology.

To start with, the discussion in the *first* section sets out by elucidating the basic philosophical motivation underlying Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of the structure of judgment or belief (δόξα)—or, in the corresponding linguistic form, of statement (λόγος, λόγος ἀποφαντικός)—in the attempt to demonstrate the possibility of and circumscribe the minimal conditions for distinguishing between truth and falsity in both rational discourse and thought, against Sophistic arguments purporting to show their impossibility. Here it is shown that both Plato and Aristotle tie the possibility, in particular, of *error* and *falsity* to a kind of structural complexity characteristic of judgments and statements, this idea forming the historical origin for the idea of the *categorical judgment* as the logically privileged, elementary unit of thought.

In the *second* section, two contrasting attitudes are pointed out in the reception of this conception in the high Scholasticism of the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries: the positive appraisal and further elaboration represented by Aquinas, and a revisionist line of thought exemplified by Ockham. It is shown that Ockham's critical observations lead to the establishment of an alternative conception of judgment, centered on three ideas: *first*, the dissociation of the previously identified logical functions of combining ideas and affirming or denying something; *second*, the assignment of these functions to two different mental acts, apprehension and assent or dissent; and, *third*, the view of the act of assenting as founded on that of merely apprehending a complex, propositional content (*complexus*).

In the *third* section, further developments and reactions to this conception of judgment—called here the 'apprehension–assent' conception—are explored, with an emphasis on the views of Descartes and Hume. It is shown how newfound general epistemo-



logical concerns, characteristic of the early modern period, about the relation between the mind and the world served as a background for the early-modern analyses of judgment. The focus here is on Descartes' and Hume's conceptions of the psychological character of the assenting attitude, which Descartes takes to be an act of *will*, whereas Hume rejects the view that assent is a distinct mental item attached to an 'idea'. Furthermore, it is shown that Hume initiates a further stage in dismantling the traditional view of the categorical judgment as the most elementary form by arguing that simple *existential* judgments or beliefs do not involve a combination of different ideas, but only a specific mode of conceiving of an object.

The *fourth* section turns to the intersections of these historical lines of development in 19<sup>th</sup>-century debates concerning the logical and psychological structure and content of judgment, these forming the proximal background for Husserl's own analyses. The focus is on two debates which framed the formulation of theories of judgment during the century: *first*, the debate concerning the scientific status and subject matter of *logic*; and *second*, the disputes surrounding the theoretical treatment of *existential* and *impersonal* judgments. Particular attention is given to the three of the foremost influences on Husserl's theory—namely, Bolzano's theory of 'propositions in themselves' (*Sätze an sich*) as the objective counterparts of acts of judgment, Lotze's analysis of such objective contents of thought through an interpretation and revival of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, and Brentano's descriptive-psychological analysis of judgment as distinguished by a characteristic mode of the 'intentional relation' to its immanent object.

## 1.1 Plato and Aristotle on the Possibility of Error in Discourse and Thought

For reasons germane both to the matters themselves and to the historical contingencies of the development of philosophical ideas, theories of cognitive judgment have always been intimately intertwined with considerations of the role played by *statements* in human linguistic practices. Whatever the precise nature of the mental 'acts' of judgment, there is an intimate connection—or, as has usually been argued, a relation of dependence, one way or the other—between the function they perform in the private tribunals of the 'internal court' (*forum internum*) of thought and epistemic conscience, and the part overt statements have in the 'external court' (*forum externum*) of public discourse.<sup>34</sup> As

<sup>34</sup> For the traditional distinction between the two *fora*, associated in modern times mostly with Hobbes—who evoked it in both *De Cive* (1642) and the *Leviathan* (1651) to distinguish, among obligations incurred on the basis of natural law, between those which oblige one only in conscience and

is to be expected, the historical roots of traditionally prevalent views on these matters reach back to analyses initially pursued by Plato. The immediate background for Plato's interest in what might be called the 'logical functions' of statements and judgments is formed by Sophistic arguments against the very possibility of false beliefs. Such arguments often took their departure in a theoretical maxim originating in Parmenides, according to which one ought not talk of nonexistent things as if they existed, or to claim that "non-being is" (εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα).<sup>35</sup> Since both illusory appearances and falsity seem to in some sense 'partake' (μετέχειν) in what does not exist, Parmenides' principle provided ample grounds for the Sophists to argue that neither of these is ultimately possible.

While Plato usually associates such ideas precisely with the Sophists<sup>36</sup>, perhaps the most prominent variant of such line of argumentation is often attributed not to the Sophists themselves, but to Plato's rival Socratic disciple Antisthenes, whom Diogenes Laertius credits as having been the first to make an effort at giving a definition of a statement (λόγος) (*D. L.*, 6.3). Antisthenes argued against the possibility of one statement contradicting another by trying to show that, given two putatively contradictory statements, either these would concern different things altogether, or else one of the statements would be meaningless. This view was based precisely on Antisthenes' conception of the function of statements in discourse. In Antisthenes' view, a statement simply discloses some object, or "sets forth what a thing was or is" (τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν) (see *ibid*). That is, making a statement amounts, in essence, to *naming* some specific object by an expression accurately describing it—by giving its "proper definition" (οἰκειος λόγος).<sup>37</sup> The structural simplicity of this account of statements has as its consequence that any statement which does not give the "proper definition" for an object will *ipso facto* not concern that object, and thus will either present something else, or fail to say anything at all. Thus, both *error* and *interpersonal disagreement*—both of which presuppose the possibility of talking about something in terms which do not correctly apply to it—are ruled out by Antisthenes' account.

those which oblige one also publicly before others—see for example Hobbes 1998, 53–4.

<sup>35</sup> See Parmenides' fragment 7, the relevant passage of which is translated by Taran (1965, 73) as follows: "For never shall this be forced: that things that are not exist; but do you hold back your thought from this way of inquiry" (οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα, / ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα). Plato quotes Parmenides' hexameter adage twice in the course of his *Sophist*, first in 237a, and again in 258d, both times in full but in slightly different forms.

<sup>36</sup> For example, in *Euthydemus* Plato attributes the view somewhat vaguely to "the followers of Protagoras" (οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν) and "others even before his time" (οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι) (*Euthydemus* 286c).

<sup>37</sup> See Aristotle's characterization of Antisthenes' doctrine in the fifth book of *Metaphysics* (*Met.* V, 1024b30).

Plato's usual approach is to argue that the Sophistic rejection of the possibility of error and falsity is ultimately both pragmatically self-defeating and internally incoherent. *First*, the Sophists' conversational aim is to refute views held by their interlocutors, which requires demonstrating that the latter are mistaken<sup>38</sup>. *Secondly*, if false statements are taken to be impossible on the grounds that every meaningful statement concerns things that exist, then clearly the Sophist's claims about falsity are themselves vacuous, amounting to no meaningful statements at all.<sup>39</sup> In the *Sophist*, however, Plato attempts to counter the Sophistic conclusion in a more constructive manner, by developing a rudimentary account of statement and belief or opinion (δόξα), the latter being conceived as derivative of the former, as an 'internal' statement made in silent soliloquy, the "conversation of the soul with itself" (τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος) (*Soph.* 263e; cf. *Theaet.* 189e).

The discussion in the *Sophist* sets off from the observation that the view held by the Sophists yields a simplistic picture of the structure and functions of statements: merely naming (ὀνομάζειν) or calling something by name does not yet contribute to discourse in the manner of a statement. In addition, one has to make some claim or "reach a conclusion" (περαίνειν) about the thing named. These two functions are reflected in the linguistic form of what Plato takes to be the elementary form of a declarative sentence—the "first and shortest form of discourse" (τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος) (*Soph.* 262c)—in which a single noun (ὀνόμα) standing for a thing is combined with a verb (ῥῆμα) indicating action. Plato takes it that it is *by* combining the terms that one claims or 'concludes' something of the subject of the sentence and that it is this combining which constitutes an *affirmation* (φάσις) or *negation* (ἀπόφασις).<sup>40</sup> This basic distinction between the functions of determining what a statement is about—its logical subject—from what is affirmed or denied of it provides Plato with the requisite

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, *Euthyd.* 287e–288a, where Plato has Socrates ridicule his interlocutor Dionysodorus: "Do you say I was mistaken or not? If I was not, then you will not refute me, with all your skill, and you are at a loss how to deal with the argument; while if I was mistaken, you are in the wrong there, too, for you assert that there is no such thing as making a mistake[.]" (πότερα φῆς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὐδ' ἔχεις ὁ τι χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ. εἰ δ' ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν.)

<sup>39</sup> In this vein, Diogenes Laertius recounts an anecdote about Antisthenes informing Plato that he is writing about the impossibility of contradiction, whereupon Plato responds by asking how it is then possible to write on the subject at all (*D. L.* 3.35).

<sup>40</sup> See *Soph.* 262d: "[The one making a statement] does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns [...] and therefore we gave to this combination the name of statement" ([...] οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥέματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι [...] καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον). For the notions of affirmation and denial, see *Soph.* 263e; *Theaet.* 190a.

conceptual material for countering the Sophistic argument: even taking for granted worries about the Parmenidian principle, such false statements are possible in which something that is “other than the facts” (ἑτέρα τῶν ὄντων) is stated about an existing subject (*Soph.* 263b).<sup>41</sup> For instance, assuming that Theaetetus exists, but does not currently sit and is instead standing, while someone else does sit—or else, the activity of sitting exists in some other, ‘uninstantiated’ manner—then the statement ‘Theaetetus sits’, though false, involves no reference to non-existent entities. Thus, Plato takes it that the possibility of error and falsity lies in the fact that both things and ideas are connected in relations of sameness and difference—that “in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not” (πολλὰ [...] ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα) (*ibid.*)—which can be exhibited in the linguistic combinations characteristic of statements.<sup>42</sup>

Whereas Plato’s analysis still has the tentative character of a cursory, initial treatment of a notion, Aristotle’s further elaboration gives these themes the definite form of a complete theory, in which the Platonic thesis about the structural preconditions of error and falsity is developed—in interrelated and complementary forms—in *linguistic*, *psychological*, and *ontological* terms. In each case, Aristotle takes up and elaborates the idea that the distinction between truth and falsity depends on linguistic items, psychological elements, or objects being united or divided in some way. What underlies this view is a refined version of Plato’s conception of the manner in which claims are made in judgments and statements about how things stand in the world.

In *On Interpretation*, Aristotle develops an account of statements or *propositions* (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) as the species of sentences which can “have truth or falsity in them” (τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν) (*De Int.* 17a3). While Plato took the public dialectical situation as his primary analytic focus, and conceived of judgments as an internalized form of their overt linguistic counterparts, Aristotle tends to give a logical priority to the mental acts—the “affections in the soul” (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθηματα)—of

<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, Plato states that falsity does ‘partake in’ non-being, but not in the sense of what does not exist—the ‘opposite’ (ἐναντίον) of being—but what is merely ‘otherwise’ (ἑτερον) with respect to something else (see *Soph.* 258b). As for the possibility of talking meaningfully about non-existent things, in the *Sophist* Plato does not make a definitive judgment one way or the other, but rather circumvents it as irrelevant for the purposes of the dialogue (see *Soph.* 258e–259a). In *Theaetetus*, Plato treats in a similar vein false belief as mistaking one thing for another, or “interchanged opinion” (ἀλλοδοξείν) (see *Theaet.* 189b).

<sup>42</sup> Thus Plato holds it that an atomistic view of the world as a collection of disjoint pieces would amount to “the utterly final obliteration of all discourse” (ἀφάνισις τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων), since the latter depends on the “interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another” (τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκήν) (*Soph.* 259e).

which linguistic statements are outward signs (σύμβολα) (*De Int.* 16a4; cf. 24b2). Aristotle adopts and refines Plato's noun-verb analysis of the elements and corresponding functions of elementary declarative sentences, where the noun stands for something (σημαίνει τι) and the verb is an indication of tense (χρόνον) and of "something being claimed of something" (καθ' ἕτερον λεγομένων).<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, the basic role of a statement is to either affirm or deny *something of something* (τινος κατά τινος, τινος ἀπό τινος).<sup>44</sup> Aristotle takes it, following Plato, that it is only by both naming a thing and claiming something of it that one's locutions can count as candidates for truth and falsity. Therefore, the possibility to distinguish between the two depends, on the linguistic level, on the combination of terms playing the two functions.<sup>45</sup>

This analysis corresponds, on the psychological level, with the account formulated in *On the Soul* of the possibility of perceptual error. Aristotle divides perceptual experiences into a hierarchy of three different operations, the posterior ones presupposing the prior, and each having their characteristic objective correlates: the perception of 'proper objects' (ἰδία), of attributes (συμβεβηκότα), and of 'common sensibles' (κοινὰ) such as motion, numerical magnitude, and shape.<sup>46</sup> Since the perception of what bears directly on some individual sense—such as color in the case of vision—involves no combination, or claiming 'something of something', the perception of proper objects permits no more error than using a name outside the context of a full declarative sentence.<sup>47</sup> Error becomes possible only in the latter two forms of perception, where something is not only perceptually present, but is presented *as* something, as having some specific attribute (see *De An.* 428b19). Likewise, in all cognitive activity or thinking (νοεῖν) in general, error and falsity are possible only where the mind judges or *decides* (κρίνειν)—on some

<sup>43</sup> However, whereas Plato focused on sentences of the schematic form "S φ's" such as "Theaetetus sits", Aristotle favors the "S is p" form, such as "Socrates is mortal", where the 'is'—what became after Abelard known as the copula (see Menne 1976)—"implies a synthesis" (προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσιν τινα) (*De Int.* 16b25). Indeed, in *Met.* V, 1017a31 Aristotle claims that the positive and negative copula, 'is' and 'is not', express that a statement is true or false. It seems reasonable to suppose that this favoring is connected to the centrality of the question about the different senses of 'to be' in Aristotle's general philosophical project (cf. *Met.* IV, 1003a32; *Met.* VII, 1028a10).

<sup>44</sup> See *De Int.* 17a25: "We mean by affirmation a statement affirming one thing of another; we mean by negation a statement denying one thing of another." (Κατάφασις δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις τινος κατὰ τινος. ἀπόφασις δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος.)

<sup>45</sup> See *De Int.* 16a12, where it is stated that in speech as in thought, "combination and division are essential before you can have truth and falsity." (περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές); cf. *Cat.* 2a5.

<sup>46</sup> For Aristotle's account of common sensibles as intersensory attributes perceivable 'by movement' (κινήσει), see *De An.* 425a14ff.

<sup>47</sup> To be sure, calling some perceptually present person by a name permits errors—namely, by using the wrong name for *that* person; such cases are not treated by Aristotle, but presumably they would be taken as involving the attribution of a name to the person seen, where indeed complexity is present.

at least putatively rational basis<sup>48</sup>—things to be in a certain way, and such judging in Aristotle’s view always implies the combining or separation of different thoughts.<sup>49</sup>

Finally, the linguistic and psychological accounts are tied in with Aristotle’s ontology by the theory of *predication* and the *categories*. In his *Categories*, Aristotle enumerates the different ways in which something can be said of something, and adopts as an umbrella term encompassing all of these the Greek expression for public accusation, *κατηγορεῖν*—which was then passed on in the later philosophical tradition in Latin translation as a term of art, *praedicatio* or ‘predication’.<sup>50</sup> In Aristotle’s view, the differences between forms of predication are not of merely linguistic import, but directly reflect ways in which the things themselves can be combined with one another, as well as different basic classes of things predicable in such and such a manner, that is, the different *categories* (*κατηγορία*). Thus, in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle concludes that the possibility to distinguish between the truth and falsity of a judgment or statement in which something is predicated of something has a basis also in the *ontological* combinatory structures found in the world—it “depends, in the case of the objects, upon their being united or divided” (τοῦτο δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρηθῆσθαι) (*Met.* IX, 1051b2). That is, the distinction between truth and falsity presupposes the possibility of things belonging to appropriate categories—or, predicable in the appropriate manner—being in fact combined in a manner conforming with the relevant form of predication.<sup>51</sup> Thus, both Aristotle and Plato put forward a view that involves a harmony between the structures of our *thoughts* and *experiences*, the structures of *language*, and those of the *reality* about which we think and speak.

<sup>48</sup> In *De An.* 428a23, Aristotle suggests a fine-grained analysis of different aspects of judgment, which involves (i) holding an *opinion* (δόξα); (ii) *trusting* or *relying* on something (πίστις)—presumably, in the exemplary case, one’s *senses* as a basis for the opinion; (iii) being *persuaded* (πεπεισθαι) by something—in discourse, by the arguments provided, and in perception, by the sensible appearance of the object; and finally, (iv) an overarching character of rationality or *reason* (λόγος).

<sup>49</sup> See *De An.* 427a3, where Aristotle characterizes the faculties “by which we judge (καθ’ ἣν κρίνομεν) as those in which we “are either right or wrong” (ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα), and the assertion in 430a27 that “where truth and falsehood are possible there is implied a compounding of thoughts into a fresh unity” (ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσις τις ἡδὴ νοημάτων ὥστερ ἐν ὄντων).

<sup>50</sup> Thus the technical meaning of ‘predication’ appears to be based on the juridical sense of accusing a person of an action—or attributing (responsibility for) that action to the person—in a trial of law. Trendelenburg (1846, 2–3) reports that ‘κατηγορεῖν’, while its usual meaning was ‘accusation’, was occasionally used in a broader sense of stating, explaining, or demonstrating something by Plato and already by Herodotus. For the history of the notion of predication, see Weidemann (1989). For an extensive treatment of Aristotle’s theory of predication, see Bäck (2000).

<sup>51</sup> One immediate consequence of this view is that the distinction between truth and falsity cannot be applied, as such, to simple or non-composite objects (τὰ ἀσύνθετα); with respect to these, as for the proper objects of senses, it is not possible to err, but only either to apprehend them directly—to ‘be in contact’ (θιγεῖν) with them—or otherwise simply remain ignorant (ἄγνοεῖν) about them (*Met.* IX, 1051b17ff; cf. *De An.* 430a26).

## 1.2 Apprehension and Judgment in Aquinas and Ockham

The Platonic-Aristotelian conception of judgments and statements largely determined the general theoretical orientation of the later tradition. Although various significant extensions and revisions to Aristotle's account were proposed already during Hellenistic times—in particular, in the rich logical works of the Stoics<sup>52</sup>—many of the developments most clearly formative for modern conceptions of judgment have their origin in the medieval, Scholastic reception of the Aristotelian doctrine. For the present purposes, it suffices to sketch out certain prominent parts of this reception. The focus here will be on the contrasting attitudes of Aquinas and Ockham, the first of whom formulates a theory of judgment emphasizing, in an Aristotelian spirit, the conceptual and abstractive articulation of the perceptually given, while the latter raises doubts concerning the Aristotelian conception of affirmation and denial and adopts a different view.

Aquinas develops his account in various writings—including his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (1256–59), *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate* (ca. 1261), and the *Summa Theologica* (1265–74)—by considering what ‘operations of the intellect’ (*operationes intellectus*) are required for the empirical acquisition of knowledge by the finite capabilities of the human mind.<sup>53</sup> The starting point of this account is the Aristotelian idea according to which empirical knowledge requires that the mind both passively undergo experiences in which it is in a sense ‘moved’ by the external object, and actively articulate these experiences in a certain manner. This idea is developed in terms of the jointly necessary contributions of the mental faculties of sense perception and the intellect. Aquinas divides the requisite kinds of operations or acts in two, and refers to

<sup>52</sup> The Stoics seem to have been, for example, the first to question Aristotle's identification of affirmation and negation with combining and separating thoughts or ideas, and to propose a distinct mental operation of what they called—as reported by Sextus Empiricus—“assent to [an] apprehensive presentation” (καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις) (see *M VIII*, 396). Stoic philosophers also developed, as part of their theories of language and logic, an intricate theory of what they called ‘sayables’ (λεκτά), these constituting the ideal or ‘incorporeal’ (ἀσώματον) contents of different kinds of linguistic expressions. The Stoics conceived of logical relations as holding between such ideal contents rather than between linguistic utterances or psychological attitudes; this view is easily understood as a precursor to the views on propositions in 19<sup>th</sup>-century logic from Bolzano to Frege and Husserl (but for a dissenting opinion on such an interpretation, see Nuchelmans 1973, 85–7). Stoic sayables comprised propositions (ἀξιώματα), but also for example questions and commands; thus, the Stoics rehabilitated as objects of philosophical and logical interest the uses of language not directly concerned with truth and falsity, these having been deemed to belong only to the realm of rhetoric by Aristotle (see *De Int.* 17a6). For the Stoic theory of sayables, see Frede (1994).

<sup>53</sup> Aquinas frames his discussion in terms of a characteristically Scholastic theological contrast with ‘angelic and divine intellects’ (*intellectus angelicus et divinus*) which are capable of immediate, perfect knowledge of the natures of things (*Summ. theol.* 1.85.5)

them as *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) and *judgment* (*iudicatio*).<sup>54</sup> The general outlines of the account are as follows: the mind first simply ‘grasps’ the object in apprehension in terms of its perceptually presented characteristics, and thereupon proceeds to make a judgment about it, by combining and dividing what has been apprehended.<sup>55</sup> A fundamental presupposition in Aquinas’ theory, adopted from Aristotle, is that the mind can be in relation to objects outside it only by virtue of the presence of something similar in the mind itself; accordingly, that by virtue of which the mind perceives external objects is a perceptual ‘image’ (*phantasma*) or ‘likeness’ (*similitudo*) yielded by the senses.<sup>56</sup> Aquinas takes some care to argue that such images are not the *objects* of perceptual experience, but *that by which* external objects are perceived. If this were not the case, the mind could only know its own impressions, and—since every empirical judgment would only concern such impressions—it would never err (*Summ. theol.* I.85.2). The perceptual likeness of the object is both the necessary starting point of knowledge and the ‘foundation of intellectual activity’ (*fundamentum intellectualis operationis*) on which the subsequent mental operations are built (*Boet. De Trinit.* 3.6.2).

However, Aquinas argues that acts of judgment do not directly bear on what is given by the senses as such, but presuppose some kind of conceptual articulation of the characteristics of the perceived object. Aquinas analyzes such conceptual articulation in terms of abstracting general features from the varying perceptual appearances of the object. Here, the intellect plays both an active, formative role, and a passively apprehending one: *first*, in its function as an ‘active intellect’ (*intellectus agens*) it abstracts from the perceptual likeness an ‘intelligible species’ (*species intelligibilis*) in which some characteristics of the object are presented in a conceptual form or universally (*in universali*); *second*, in its role as a passive or ‘possible intellect’ (*intellectus possibilis*), it is then able to apprehend intellectually the perceptual image itself in the light of these universal characteristics by means of the intelligible species.<sup>57</sup> In line with his Aristotelian hylomorphic

<sup>54</sup> See *De verit.* 10.8: “For knowledge, it is necessary that two [operations] concur: namely, apprehension, and judgment about the thing apprehended.” (*Ad cognitionem enim duo concurrere oportet: scilicet apprehensionem, et iudicium de re apprehensa*); cf. *Boet. De Trinit.* 3.6 a.2; *Summ. theol.* I.85.5.

<sup>55</sup> See *De verit.* 1.3: “[B]ut the intellect judges about the thing apprehended when it says something is or is not, which is the intellect combining and dividing.” (*tunc autem iudicat intellectus de re apprehensa quando dicit aliquid esse vel non esse, quod est intellectus componentis et dividensis*). Cf. *Boet. De Trinit.* 3.5.3; *Summ. theol.* I.85.5.

<sup>56</sup> For Aristotle’s use of the notion of a ‘mental image’ (*φάντασμα*), see e.g. *De An.* 431b3, where it is stated that “the thinking faculty thinks the forms in mental images” (Τὰ [...] εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ).

<sup>57</sup> See *Summ. theol.* I.85.2: “our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the image, insofar as it considers the natures of things universally; and also understands these natures in the image” (*intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatis, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali*;



metaphysical framework, Aquinas treats as paradigmatic the abstraction of form from matter, for instance the shape of a statue from its material.<sup>58</sup> In an act of judgment, the intellect is then able to relate what is thus conceptually apprehended, as a form, to the concrete object and predicate it as a property or accident of the latter (*Summ. theol.* I.85.5).<sup>59</sup> Following Aristotle, Aquinas takes it that to each such ‘composition of the intellect’ (*compositio intellectus*) accomplished in judgment, there has to correspond a ‘real composition’ (*compositio reale*) on part of the objects (*ibid*; cf. *Boet. De Trinit.* 3.5.3). This view, furthermore, is motivated by Aquinas’ view of predication: since in every affirmative statement the subject-term signifies one or many concrete things, while the predicate-term signifies a formal characteristic abstracted of these things and attributed to them in the statement, any such statement can only be true given that such a form is actually to be found inhering in the things.<sup>60</sup>

A prominent example of a contrasting, revisionist attitude towards the traditional Aristotelian conception of the psychological and logical constitution of judgment is that adopted by Ockham. In the prologue to his *Ordinatio* (1318), Ockham adopts the distinction employed by Aquinas between the intellectual operations necessarily involved in knowledge—namely, those of apprehension (*actus apprehensivus*) and judging (*actus iudicativus*). However, Ockham departs from the Thomistic definitions of these acts, where apprehension was conceived as the simple grasp of either a concrete sensible object or an abstract characteristic thereof, and judgment as the combination of elements so apprehended. Instead, Ockham takes apprehension to relate to “everything that can be the term of an act of the intellective power, whether this be something complex

*et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus*). Thus, the intelligible species functions for the intellect as a kind of higher-order ‘conceptual image’, as that by which it understands the perceptually given. See *Boet. De Trinit.* 3.6.2: “images are connected to the intellect as objects in which it observes everything it observes” (*phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit*).

<sup>58</sup> See e.g. *Boet. De Trinit.* 3.5.2: “the intellect knows by abstracting from matter and the conditions of matter” (*intellectus cognoscit abstrahendo a materia et a condicionibus materiae*). Aquinas tends to treat as the elementary forms of abstraction the abstraction of form from matter and of universals from particulars (see *ibid*).

<sup>59</sup> See *Summ. theol.* I.16.2, where it is stated that the intellect judges “by composing and dividing, for in every proposition it either applies or removes a form signified by the predicate to or from the thing signified by the subject” (*componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea*).

<sup>60</sup> See e.g. *Summ. theol.* I.16.2: “[W]hen [the intellect] judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it knows and apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth.” ([*Q*uando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum). The view according to which predication amounts to the attribution of forms or properties to things, and accordingly presupposes for its truth the existence of such properties, is often called the ‘inherence theory’ of predication, as opposed to an ‘identity theory’ held, among others, by Ockham. See e.g. Weidemann 1986.

or non-complex” (*cuiuslibet quod potest terminare actum potentiae intellectivae, sive sit complexum sive incomplexum*) (*Ord.* I.I.I). Thus, what the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception took to be the defining characteristic of acts of judgment—the composition and division of simple elements into affirmative or negative propositions—is taken to be itself a function of apprehension. The reason for this revision is straightforward: instead of affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, it is always possible only to conceive of such predication, for instance when one understands but does not yet assent to what someone else claims.<sup>61</sup> Acts of judgment proper are then defined by Ockham as those in which the mind not only apprehends some propositional complex (*complexus*), but also gives its assent or dissent to it (*assentit vel dissentit*) (*ibid.*).

Aquinas had taken acts of perceptual apprehension to be foundational for all cognitive mental acts in the sense that they provide the image which the conceptual articulations necessary for judgments take as their material. Ockham proposes a different, twofold foundational relation between apprehension and judgment: *first*, judgment with respect to a proposition presupposes a prior apprehension of that proposition; *second*, every judgment presupposes a non-complex ‘acquaintance’ (*notitia*) with each of the terms (*ibid.*). Formulated in this way, the first of these theses is likely to give the impression that according to Ockham every judgment presupposes directing one’s attention towards a *proposition*, rather than the *things* about which something is claimed to hold in the proposition. To circumvent such a view—which would assimilate all affirmative judging to judgments *about* propositions, to the acceptance of something proposed, rather than simply an attitude toward the world—Ockham later distinguishes, in *Quodlibeta Septem* (ca. 1327), two different forms of knowledge, corresponding to two kinds of assenting acts (*actus assentiendi*): *first*, acts in which it is known that one thing pertains to another, and *second*, acts in which it is known “that an act of knowledge refers to something” (*quod actus sciendi referatur ad aliquid*) (*Quod.* III.8.). The first type of assent, characteristic of simple predicative judgments about things in the world, does not presuppose the apprehension of a propositional complex—in the sense of taking it as the object of one’s judgment—but only its ‘formation’ (*formatio*) in the intellect.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>61</sup> See *Ord.* I.I.I: “It is possible that someone apprehends a proposition, but nevertheless gives neither assent nor dissent to it; this is clearly true, for instance, of indifferent propositions” (*quia aliquis potest apprehendere aliquam propositionem et tamen illi nec assentire nec dissentire, sicut patet de propositionibus neutris*).

<sup>62</sup> As Ockham notes, when a layman judges that a stone is not a donkey, he “knows nothing of propositions, and consequently does not assent to propositions” (*nihil cogitate de propositione, et per consequens non assentit propositioni*) (*Quod.* III.8.). However, Ockham retains the foundational thesis proposed in *Ordinatio* by distinguishing between apprehension as the formation of a content by which something is

Only in the second type, where one judges that something actually corresponds to what is claimed in a proposition, the object of one's judgment is that proposition itself (*ibid*). Such judgments can be either judgments where one simply assents to an apprehended propositional complex, or judgments of *truth*, where a proposition takes the place of a logical subject, and truth is predicated of it.<sup>63</sup> Thus, *accepting judgments* and *judgments of truth* are taken to be, in Ockham's view, higher-order attitudes taken towards propositional intermediaries between the mind and the world, and not, as in ordinary judgments, towards things in the world *simpliciter*.

In a sense, Ockham's theory occupies a transitional position in the history of theories of judgment in that it still retains the idea that ordinary judgments involve a direct cognitive relation to things in the world, rather than towards some kind of intermediary, but nonetheless held it that such intermediaries—in Ockham's case, the propositionally articulated *complexus*—indeed figure as the objects of our cognitive attitudes in certain circumstances, paradigmatically in contexts of *critical evaluation* of the contents of prior beliefs. In the following section, it will be shown how skeptical considerations historically tied with the development of the modern sciences contributed to the view of judgment as *always* having an indirect relation to things in the world, where judgment bears directly on intra-mental intermediaries rather than such things themselves, as in the Aristotelian view. Anticipating the discussions of the later chapters, one might suggest that in this respect modern epistemological theories and the psychological conceptions accompanying them projected back onto our straightforward—and, so to speak, epistemically naïve—dealings with the world the structures of critical reflection that originally grow from the former and refer back to it.

### 1.3 The Psychological Character of Judgment in Descartes and Hume

Regardless the departure from the received, Aristotelian conception of judgment that one finds exemplified in Ockham's theory, the traditional identification of the two log-

thought, and as the cognition of that content itself: "[A]pprehension divides into two kinds: one which is composition and division of propositions, that is, formation (*formatio*); another which is the cognition of the propositional complex already formed" (*duplex est apprehensio; una quae est compositio et divisio propositionis sive formatio; alia est quae est cognitio ipsius complexi iam formati*) (*Quod.* 5.6)

<sup>63</sup> See *Quod.* IV.16: "Another kind is that of assenting acts which assent to something to the effect that an assenting act refers to something [...] Not only assenting to propositions such as this: 'This proposition, "man is an animal" is true', in which 'This proposition, "man is an animal"' is the subject, but assenting to this proposition, 'man is an animal' in itself and absolutely" (*Alius est actus assentiendi alicui, ita quod actus assentiendi referatur ad aliquid [...] Et non solum assentio huic propositioni 'haec propositio "homo est animal" est vera', ubi 'haec propositio "homo est animal"' est subiectum, sed assentio huic propositioni 'homo est animal' in se et absolute*).

ical functions of the categorical judgment—of combining and separating ideas on the one hand, and affirming or denying something, on the other—retained a widespread influence for centuries after Ockham. The view was still prevalent enough at the time of Antoine Arnauld’s and Pierre Nicole’s so-called “Port-Royal Logic”, *La Logique ou l’art de penser* (1662), that they could take for granted the central tenets of the old theory: *first*, that the essential difference between what Arnauld and Nicole call the ‘mental operations’ (*actions de l’esprit*) of merely conceiving (*concevoir*) something and judging (*juger*) it to be or not to be the case amounts to the fact that in the former, the mind is concerned only with a single idea, whereas the latter joins together a number of ideas; and *second*, that it is *in* this joining of ideas that the mind affirms or denies something.<sup>64</sup> Increasingly, however, theories of judgment shifted towards the view that the *essential* function of judgment lies in giving or withholding assent, and that this function is logically independent from that of predicatively combining ideas. As already seen in the case of Ockham, this idea was standardly developed by distinguishing two different mental *acts*—apprehension of something already articulated in the form of a claim, in the usual case in subject–predicate form, and judgment as giving one’s assent to it.

A broad distinction can therefore be drawn between the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of judgment and its historical inheritors, in which the logical functions of predication or of combining ideas and of affirmation or denial were identified with one another, and an alternative conception that can be called the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception, in which these functions were separated both conceptually and by assigning them to different mental acts. Accordingly, a new analytic focus in early modern theories of judgment centered on a question that naturally arises on the apprehension–assent model: the question about the psychological nature of the acts of assenting or dissenting. Here it suffices to take note of two views, those of Descartes and Hume, the first of whom views assent as an act of will similar to practical decisions to act, while the latter reduces assent or affirmation to a qualitative character of liveliness or intensity of

<sup>64</sup> See Arnauld & Nicole (1992), 30: “The simple view we have of things that present themselves to our mind is called *conceiving* [ . . . ] and the form by which we represent these things to ourselves is called an *idea* [ . . . ] That action of our mind by which, joining together diverse ideas, it affirms of one that it is the other, or denies of one that it is the other, is called *judging*[.]” (*On appelle concevoir, la simple vue que nous avons des choses qui se présentent à notre esprit . . . et la forme par laquelle nous nous représentons ces choses s’appelle idée [ . . . ] On appelle juger, l’action de notre esprit par laquelle, joignant ensemble diverses idées, il affirme de l’une qu’elle est l’autre, ou nie de l’une qu’elle soit l’autre[.]*) In addition, Arnauld and Nicole list as logically pertinent the mental operations of reasoning (*raisonner*), understood as combining individual judgments into syllogistic patterns, and the ordering (*ordonner*) of ideas, judgments, and inferences concerning related subject matters into convenient wholes by means of an appropriate method (*méthode*) (*ibid.*).

ideas and therefore ends up departing from a core element of the apprehension–assent conception.

By the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, it was clear that the image of the world gradually unveiled by the natural sciences and their mechanistic philosophical interpretation did not cohere in any obvious manner with the way in which the world is presented in ordinary perceptual experience. In philosophy, these historical circumstances brought with them newfound doubts about the straightforward picture of the relation between the mind and the world, particularly as it was conceived in the broadly Aristotelian tradition. In this vein, Descartes opens his *Traité du monde et de la lumière* (1629–33) by stating that although everyone tacitly assumes that “the ideas we have in our mind are wholly similar to the objects from which they proceed” (Descartes 1985, 81), there is no ground for supposing that this is the case—for instance, the perceptual idea of sound is completely dissimilar to its physical reality as a vibration of molecules in the air. Accordingly, if perception presented us only with a true likeness of objects, we would not hear sounds but perceive motions of particles striking the eardrum (*ibid*, 82).<sup>65</sup> The doubts motivated by such discrepancies between the scientific and the everyday conceptions of the world had the effect that the view, still emphatically upheld by Aquinas, according to which the mental ‘image’ of a thing is not the immediate object of our experience, but only a transparent *medium*, was largely superseded by a view according to which internal ideas are the proximate objects of experience—and moreover, the *only* objects which can be immediately known with certainty.<sup>66</sup> In Descartes’ theory of judgment, this seems to have motivated the view that every empirical judgment has the form of the second type of Ockham’s assenting acts—that is, an affirmation of the existence of something corresponding to one’s internal ideas.<sup>67</sup> In order to understand Descartes’ analysis of the

<sup>65</sup> In both *Le Monde* and *La Dioptrique* (1637) Descartes provides other examples, such as the dissimilarity of written and spoken words to their referents, perceptual illusions, and the pictorial representation of depth in a flat picture, as well as the representation of perspective (see Descartes 1985, 81–82; 165–166). Haugeland (1989, 28ff) and Brandom (2000, 27–29) suggest that Descartes’ rejection of views of representation based on similarity is at bottom motivated by his discovery of analytic geometry, where the algebraic symbols and equations used to represent spatial geometrical objects have no resemblance with the latter.

<sup>66</sup> To be sure, similar views were defended by skeptics already in Hellenistic times; thus, Sextus Empiricus argues against the idea that it is possible to know external objects on the basis of their similarity to perceptual ‘affections’ (πάθη) of the senses: “For how is the intellect to know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has not itself encountered the external objects, and the senses do not inform it about their real nature but only about their own affections [ . . . ]?” (πόθεν γὰρ εἴσεται ἡ διάνοια εἰ ὁμοιά ἐστι τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, μήτε αὐτῇ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐντυγχάνουσα, μήτε τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῇ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν δηλουσῶν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐαυτῶν πάθη) (*PH* 2.74)

<sup>67</sup> This view can be seen in Descartes’ characterization, in his *Principia*, of withholding judgment,

psychological character of such assent, it is instructive to consider the overall project in which it is situated, and the requirements of that project.

The account of judgment outlined in the fourth of Descartes' *Meditationes* (1641), recapitulated in largely the same form in *Principia Philosophiae* (1644), is motivated by the general epistemological concern for establishing an absolutely secure foundation for all knowledge. Namely, Descartes attempts to frame the possibility and source of error and erroneous beliefs in such a way as not to render unintelligible the possibility of apodictic knowledge based on clear and distinct perception (*clara et distincta perceptio*).<sup>68</sup> Descartes rejects the view according to which judging amounts to simply combining ideas<sup>69</sup> and adopts a view with the general shape of the apprehension–assent conception by dividing the acts involved in making a judgment into two: perception—in a broad sense that encompasses sensory perception, imagination, and ‘pure understanding’—and affirmation or denial. However, Descartes departs from the usual understanding of these acts by taking only the former to pertain to the intellect, whereas assent is, according to Descartes, an operation of the *will*, a ‘volition’.<sup>70</sup> That is, just as in the sphere of action a decision rendered by the will presupposes that the mind has first conceived of a possible course of action, similarly in making a judgment some idea has to be first perceived or conceived by the intellect and thereupon affirmed or denied in a distinct, founded mental operation by the will.<sup>71</sup> In the light of this analysis, Descartes is able to argue

where “the mind merely contemplates ideas within itself and does not affirm or deny the existence of something resembling them” (1985, 197).

<sup>68</sup> Descartes’ explicit framing of the problem in both works is in terms of a kind of epistemological theodicy: supposing that our cognitive faculties are given to us by a benevolent God, how is it possible that they can lead us to error? For the present purposes it seems sensible to abstract from this theological aspect of Descartes’ theory, which relies on Scholastic metaphysical views about the nature of privations and ‘perfections’, a Platonistic conception of finite beings as ‘partaking in non-being’ (see Descartes 1984, 38), and—as was already noted among Descartes’ contemporaries by Antoine Arnauld and Marin Mersenne—appears to involve a circular justification for the certainty yielded by clear and distinct perceptions (for Arnauld’s criticism, see e.g. *ibid.*, 150).

<sup>69</sup> Thus, in *Discours de la méthode* (1637), Descartes assigns the function of combining ideas to *imagination* and writes that “we can distinctly imagine a lion’s head on a goat’s body without having to conclude from this that a chimera exists in the world” (Descartes 1985, 131).

<sup>70</sup> See Descartes 1984, 204: “All the modes of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be brought under two general headings: perception, or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will. Sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding are simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are various modes of willing.” Cf. 1985, 39–40. Similarly, in *Les passions de l’âme* (1649), Descartes divides all thoughts into perceptions and volitions, the former constituting the class of the ‘passions of the soul’ passively undergone by it, while the latter consist of its ‘actions’, the thoughts originating in the mind itself (see Descartes 1984, 335).

<sup>71</sup> See *ibid.*: “In order to make a judgment, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgment we can make. But the will is also required so that, once something is perceived in some manner, our assent may then be given.” Descartes’ use of ‘perception’ does not distinguish the simple perceptual grasp of an object from the consideration of things in terms of complex, predicative relations.

for the possibility to avoid error in both a negative and a positive manner. *First*, since assent can always be voluntarily withheld, rather than being compelled by what the intellect presents us, error can always be circumvented by refraining from judgment<sup>72</sup>. *Secondly*, this analysis makes it possible for Descartes to claim that our mental faculties *as such* do not lead us astray, but only their improper use.<sup>73</sup> The possibility to err in one's judgment's is, Descartes claims, explained simply by the fact that "the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect" (1985, 40). Accordingly, it is possible not only to circumvent error, but also to gain indubitable knowledge, by restricting one's assent to what is clearly and distinctly given in each idea.

The skeptical doubts conceived by Descartes as a methodological initiation to rigorous philosophical inquiry defined in large part the general outlook of much of modern philosophy. Such Cartesian influence is particularly striking in the new orthodoxy according to which the mind can attain at most only an indirect access to the world in its experiences. Thus, by the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, Hume could proclaim with confidence, in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), that "'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion" (Hume 2007, 49).<sup>74</sup> Unlike Descartes, Hume endorses the skeptical consequences raised by such a view, and states outright that

<sup>72</sup> Strictly speaking, Descartes thinks that the will is able to refrain from judgment only in relation to what is perceived obscurely (*obscura*) rather than clearly, or at least confusedly (*confusa*) as opposed to distinctly; when something is clearly and distinctly perceived—as in realizing, from the fact that one is thinking, that one exists—"a great light in the intellect [is] followed by a great inclination in the will" (Descartes 1984, 41). That is, clear and distinct perception *compels* assent. However, since Descartes takes it that freedom requires only the absence of *external* compulsion, whereas here assent is compelled only by the 'natural light' (*lumen naturale*) intrinsic to the mind itself, such internally compelled assent is in his view a "wholly free" act of will (*ibid*, 40).

<sup>73</sup> That Descartes takes the volitional conception of judgment to be intimately connected to the possibility of avoiding error methodically, and not only by chance—rather than being of interest merely as to the theological justification of the possibility of error in view of the purported divine origin of our mental faculties—is clear in his reply to Pierre Gassendi, who questioned the idea that we voluntarily choose what we believe in (see Descartes 1985, 220). Descartes writes, concerning the possibility to guard against errors: "If [the will] is determined by the intellect [to put forward a judgment], then it is not the will that is guarding against error; all that occurs is that, just as it was previously directed towards a falsehood set before it by the intellect, now it happens, purely by chance to turn towards the truth, because the intellect presents the truth to it." (*ibid*, 260).

<sup>74</sup> For other influential statements of this orthodoxy, dating already from the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, compare for example Malebranche's assessment in his 1674–75 *De la recherche de la vérité* that "I think everyone agrees that we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves [...] our mind's immediate object when it sees the sun, for example, is not the sun, but something that is intimately joined to our soul, and this is what I call an *idea*" (Malebranche 1997, 217); and closer to Hume, Locke's similar statement in his 1689 *Essay* that "'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them" (Locke 1975, 563).

in all of our experiences and thoughts “we never really advance a step beyond ourselves” (*ibid.*). What Hume’s account amounts to is an *internalization* of the mind’s relation to external things, as conceived in the Aristotelian view, into a relation obtaining between different mental items. While—as seen above—in Aristotle’s psychological theory, and especially in its Thomistic development, the mind’s access to external objects was explained by the resemblance of mental images to those objects, Hume takes such mental images—what he calls *ideas*—to have a likeness only to the *impressions* yielded by the senses. That is, rather than having the likeness of *things*, our ideas are merely ‘faint images’ or ‘copies’ of the effects of sensory excitations, these being themselves mental items or, in Hume’s preferred umbrella term, ‘perceptions’ (*ibid.*, 7). On the other hand, what in the extra-mental world corresponds to or causes such impressions themselves—or, more specifically, elementary sensory impressions<sup>75</sup>—is itself unknown (*ibid.*, 11). Ideas differ, in Hume’s view, from sensory impressions only as to their intensity—or what Hume calls their ‘force’, ‘liveliness’, or ‘vivacity’ (*ibid.*, 7).

These theoretical presuppositions determine the general outlines of Hume’s analysis of judgment. The analysis, presented in a largely similar form in both the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), is framed in terms of the familiar attempt to distinguish judgment or belief as an ‘operation of the mind’ from that of a “simple conception of the existence of an object” (*ibid.*, 66). The question of the correct understanding of this psychological difference, Hume claims, constitutes “one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho’ no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it” (*ibid.*, 68). The upshot of Hume’s analysis is the view that belief is distinguished from conceiving only in terms of a greater degree of intensity, this being transferred from some related sensory impressions through the operations of association.<sup>76</sup> The argument leading up to this conclusion is composed as a successive exclusion of possibilities conceivable within Hume’s general psychological scheme. Moreover, the argument is clearly intended in large part as a criticism of Descartes’ views, which are reformulated in Hume’s language.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Hume distinguishes between impressions of *sensation* and of *reflection*, the latter of which include the impressions of, for example “desire, aversion, hope and fear”. Hume provides a psychological account for the origin of impressions of reflection as follows: initially a sensory impression, for example of pleasure, arises in the mind, and is then copied into an idea which can outlast the impression; this idea itself can then act on the mind, which brings about higher-level impressions, such as desire, which Hume thus conceives as a reflective representation of the idea of pleasure (attaching to the idea of an object); furthermore, these impressions can then themselves serve as the basis for corresponding ideas (see Hume 2007, 11).

<sup>76</sup> See e.g. Hume 2007, 68: “[B]elief is a lively idea produc’d by a relation to a present impression”.

<sup>77</sup> The form of Hume’s reasoning is most explicitly articulated in the Appendix to the *Treatise*, but the



The overall course of Hume's argument is as follows. *First*, since the conception of an object is in Humean parlance an idea, Hume argues that what distinguishes belief can only be either another idea joined with it, or "merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment" accompanying or qualifying the idea (*ibid*, 396). Hume's primary reason against the former view is based on a principle which he takes to be self-evident—that of the "*liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas*", that is, the unconditioned ability to join and divide any ideas drawn from experience (*ibid*, 12). Hume notes that if belief were an idea distinct from that of the object, the imagination could always conjoin it with any other idea, and "it wou'd be in man's power to believe what he pleas'd" (Hume 2007, 396; 1999, 47). Contrary to Descartes' claims, Hume argues that belief is not something upheld voluntarily—presumably, even in the negative, Cartesian sense of being *suspended* at will—but is always determined by a particular experiential situation (*ibid*, 125).

*Second*, Hume argues against the possibility of taking belief to consist in a distinct *impression* accompanying the conception of an object. This position can again be viewed as the Humean translation and generalization of Descartes' view: the kind of relation between psychological items that Hume has in mind is the way in which *willing* or *desiring* something is joined with the mere conception of something as good or pleasurable (see Hume 2007, 397). Hume puts forward several arguments against this suggestion, of which it suffices here to focus on one.<sup>78</sup> Hume argues on descriptive grounds that no such distinct impressions can be found in our ordinary cognitive attitudes. For example, in hearing a familiar person's voice from the next room, no two-layered experience takes place in which the presence of that person would be initially only conceived and only then joined with a distinct impression that would characterize belief (*ibid*). However, Hume points out a special case in which such distinct impressions are present: the experience of settling doubts about some subject matter. In such cases, Hume writes, the "passage from doubt and agitation to tranquillity and repose, conveys a satisfaction

formulations in the main text as well as the *Enquiry* appear to be based on essentially the same argument, apart from certain mostly terminological reservations concerning the notions of 'force' and 'vivacity' explained in the Appendix (see Hume 2007, 400–401); accordingly, I treat the different formulations here as instances of the same argument.

<sup>78</sup> The other arguments are based on comparing the explanatory virtues and vices of the two alternatives: Hume argues, *first*, that since belief in any case is characterized by a "more steady conception" than fictions, there is no need to appeal to any further feature of the experience; *second*, that the causes of each firm conception can be explained by appealing to the connection of the idea to present impressions, whereas any further impressions would have no such explanation; and *third*, the functional role of belief in eliciting emotions and actions can be fully explained in terms of the forcefulness of the experience, so nothing more is needed (see Hume 2007, 398).

and pleasure to the mind” (*ibid*). But taking the feelings accompanying the resolution of a doubt as constitutive of belief would obviously be mistaken: *first*, not all beliefs are preceded by such doubts, and *second*, where they are present, the sense of satisfaction is occasioned by the formation of a belief rather than constituting it.<sup>79</sup> The argument can, then, reasonably be taken to be that such ‘two-element’ conception of belief is only invited by conflating belief itself with belief accompanied by a sense of achieving a goal following deliberation. Thus, having excluded both terms of the putatively exhaustive division of mental phenomena—impressions and ideas—as something whose addition to an idea would turn it into a belief, Hume concludes that belief can differ from conception and the ‘fictions of the imagination’ only in terms of its own intrinsic character. Hume also calls this character the distinct “*feeling* to the mind” of belief, which corresponds with how ‘vivid’ and ‘steady’ the idea of the object is (Hume 1999, 125; cf. 2007, 68; 397). Belief, then, is in Hume’s view not an additional item combined with an idea, but something that differs from ‘simple conception’, so to speak, only in the value of a parameter that is in some way analogous to, for instance, the brightness of light and therefore something admitting of differences in degree.<sup>80</sup>

Hume seems, moreover, to have been the first to question not only the sufficiency of combining distinct ideas for rendering a judgment, but also its *necessity*. In an extended footnote to the section of the *Treatise* discussing belief, Hume takes note of “a very remarkable error [...] universally receiv’d by all logicians”, a central part of which is the traditional conception of judgment as the predicative combining of ideas (Hume 2007, 67n).<sup>81</sup> Hume argues that in *existential* judgments, no other idea is present than that of the object; in particular, it is not the case that an idea of *existence* would be

<sup>79</sup> Thus, Hume in effect distinguishes the simple experiences of forming ordinary beliefs from the structurally more complex experiences involved in reaching conclusions following critical reflection; Descartes, for his part, due to starting from precisely such a critical epistemic attitude as the context of his reflections, was led to an unwarranted generalization by taking as a model of judgment the higher-order phenomenon of critical evaluation of beliefs.

<sup>80</sup> It is clear that, by ‘feeling’, Hume does not mean an affective or emotional experience, which would amount to the type of analysis rejected along the Cartesian one. Rather, ‘feeling’ means simply a qualitative characteristic pertaining to a certain type of experience and ascertainable reflectively in the first person (see e.g. Hume 1999, 125; 2007, 68). In the *Enquiry*, Hume does on one occasion say that the ‘feeling’ characteristic of belief is something “annexed” to an idea (Hume 1999, 124), which lends credibility to the view that what Hume has in mind is a separate mental entity. This seems to be simply a lapse on Hume’s part, since it would subject Hume’s theory to his own objections, and would be incompatible with the claim that belief differs from conception only in its intensity or liveliness—the intensity of a phenomenon (say, heat) is clearly not something separable from and merely ‘annexed’ to that phenomenon.

<sup>81</sup> The conception criticized by Hume encompasses the whole traditional division of mental operations into conception, judgment, and (syllogistic) reasoning, a classical formulation of which is Arnauld’s and Nicole’s, quoted above.

attached to the idea of the object. Hume bases this claim on his reductive analysis of the idea of existence, the conclusion of which is that it is “the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent” (*ibid*, 48). Accordingly, conceiving of something is *eo ipso* conceiving it as existent, and the only possible difference can concern the ‘forcefulness’ of the conception, which is what distinguishes believing something to exist from merely conceiving or imagining it as such. In this sense, Hume claims, all mental acts reduce to different ways of conceiving of objects (*ibid*, 67n).

#### 1.4 Logical and Psychological Views on Judgment from Bolzano to Brentano

If any period in the history of philosophy can be said to have granted the center stage—or at least, a position in its vicinity—in its characteristic debates to the theory of judgment, this can reasonably be said of the decades following the rapid decline of the grand systems of German idealism, beginning with Hegel’s death in 1831. During this period—which constitutes an important, although often-neglected stratum in the sedimented history of modern philosophical thought—the development of a sound *Urteilslehre* was a central task in the systematic efforts of most major philosophical figures, particularly in the German-speaking world. Here it is instructive to lay out, in a synoptic fashion, some of the overall context of these theories, while paying closer attention to the figures who exercised the clearest immediate influences on Husserl. In terms of such influence, two debates characteristic of the period stand out: *first*, the question about the relation between logic and psychology, and the role of judgment in them; and *second*, the disputes about the interpretation of non-categorical forms of judgment. In the first of these, the ‘objective’ conceptions of the subject matter of logic propounded by Bolzano and Lotze were most important ones for the development of Husserl’s view, while in the second, Brentano’s theory forms the immediate starting-point and polemical contrast for Husserl’s early analyses.

##### 1.4.1 Bolzano and Lotze in the controversy over the relation of logic and psychology

One of the distinctive disputes of the period in question concerned the nature and foundations of *logic* and its relation to other scientific disciplines—in particular, to *psychology* as a budding empirical science.<sup>82</sup> In its broad outlines, the dispute can be divided into

<sup>82</sup> For a thorough exposition of these disputes, commonly known at least since Husserl’s *Prolegomena*—which is itself a classical but partisan account of them—as debates surrounding logical ‘psy-

three relatively distinct, commonly upheld positions.<sup>83</sup> *First*, on a traditional view, logic was conceived of as a normative discipline dealing with general prescriptive principles for thinking. On this view, logical laws were usually taken to be independent with respect to empirical matters of fact due to their normatively binding character; in Kant's words, logic does not concern itself with "how we do think, but how we ought to think" (Kant 1992, 529). In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, this conception of logic as a kind of 'morals for thinking' (*Moral für das Denken*) was the basis of J. F. Herbart's opposition against any interference of psychological considerations with logic<sup>84</sup>, and it was widely held during the latter half of the century, partly due to the newly-found interest in Kant's thought and the rise of 'neo-Kantianism'.<sup>85</sup> *Second*, the empiricist program, initially outlined by Locke and Hume, for a naturalistic theory of the processes of reasoning, especially in terms of the operations of the so-called 'association of ideas'<sup>86</sup>, developed into a view of logical laws as nothing more than empirical generalities of human thinking. On this view, logic as a scientific discipline was taken to be subordinate to psychology. Perhaps the most renowned 19<sup>th</sup>-century defender of this outlook was J. S. Mill.<sup>87</sup> Finally, a *third* view emerged that conceived of 'pure logic' as an independent theoretical discipline with a distinct domain of objects in its own right—namely, a realm of immaterial, objective contents of thought, distinct from both the mental processes of thinking and the objects thought about. On such views, the independence of logic

chologism', see Kusch 1995.

<sup>83</sup> As is usual for distinctions between philosophical positions, this division should be taken with some reservation, as something of a distinction of *Idealtypen* which in reality intertwined in various ways; in particular, the normative and the objective conceptions outlined below often included characteristics of one another.

<sup>84</sup> See Herbart 1834, 68: "Therefore also here the logical must be kept apart from all interference of the psychological." („Daher muß auch hier das Logische von aller Einmischung des Psychologischen entfernt gehalten werden.“) The expression 'morals for thinking' can be found in Herbart's 1816 Lehrbuch zur Psychologie (Herbart 1816, 138).

<sup>85</sup> For example, Benno Erdmann, in his 1892 *Logic*, formulates the relation between logic and psychology in terms of an is-ought distinction: "Judgments, inferences, definitions, classifications are processes of consciousness [ . . . ] However, from this it does not follow that the object of logic is a part of the object of psychology. [ . . . ] [L]ogic does not investigate these processes with respect to the factual conditions of their origin, course, and connection, but dwells on the question how these ought to be" („Die Urteile, Schlüsse, Definitionen, Einteilungen u.s.w. aber sind Bewusstseinsvorgänge [ . . . ] Daraus folgt jedoch nicht, dass der Gegenstand der Logik ein Teil des Gegenstandes der Psychologie sei. [ . . . ] [D]ie Logik untersucht diese Vorgänge nicht nach den tatsächlichen Bedingungen ihres Ursprungs, Verlaufs und Zusammenhangs, sondern bleibt bei der Frage, wie dieselben beschaffen sein sollen“) (Erdmann 1892, 18).

<sup>86</sup> See Hume's enthusiastic characterization, in the *Treatise*, of the principles of association as mental analogues for Newton's universal gravitation: "Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms." (Hume 2007, 14).

<sup>87</sup> See Mill's proclamation in his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (1865) that logic, as a science, is "a part, or branch, of Psychology" whose "theoretical grounds are wholly borrowed from Psychology" (Mill 1979, 359).

from the empirical sciences was not primarily grounded in the normative character of the former, but in the *a priori* epistemic basis and special ontological nature of its subject matter. The foremost examples of such views in the first half of the century were those of Bernard Bolzano and Hermann Lotze, both of whom played formative roles in the development of Husserl's early thinking. Given this importance for Husserl's outlook on logic, it is useful to elaborate on Bolzano's and Lotze's views in some detail.

The objective conception of the subject matter of logic and mathematics was a central part of Bolzano's scientific outlook from the onset. Already in his early *Beyträge zu einer begründeter Darstellung der Mathematik* (1810), Bolzano proclaims that the primary aim of scientific investigation is not to advance some epistemic values such as certainty or confidence in the validity of empirical hypotheses, but to discover objective logical relations of ground and consequence that obtain in the 'realm of truth' (*Reiche der Wahrheit*) independently of our recognition of them (Bolzano 2006, 103). This view is more fully fleshed out in Bolzano's mature philosophical *magnum opus*, the four-volume *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837). Here, though, Bolzano initially gives a practical justification for logic conceived as the titular 'theory of science': because of the immense proliferation of scientific knowledge in modern times and the impossibility of any individual to form a comprehensive understanding of everything worth knowing, the need arises for a discipline distinct from the special sciences in order to divide the wealth of human knowledge into separate, systematically unified bodies of truths in such a way as to facilitate understanding what is essential in each given discipline (Bolzano 1973, 35–6).

Bolzano's views on the ontological underpinnings of logic emerge in the presentation of a foundational part of and a kind of propaedeutic to this practical task of logic—in the part of logical theory that Bolzano calls a 'theory of elements', which deals with the properties and constituents of propositions and truths as well as their relations of derivability and consequence (*ibid*, 42–3). At the center of this theory are Bolzano's notions of 'propositions and truths in themselves' (*Sätze und Wahrheiten an sich*) which are the primary bearers of these properties and relations. Bolzano distinguishes propositions in themselves—or, as he also occasionally calls them, 'objective' propositions—from propositions as either linguistic entities or as thoughts in the mind of a conscious being in terms of three characteristics. *First*, propositions in themselves are ontologically independent of being recognized or of occurring in thought or speech (*ibid*, 56). *Second*, unlike propositions occurring in thought or language, which presuppose either an author or a bearer and have real existence—as well as causal influence—in a mind or an episode of discourse, propositions in themselves do not possess 'actuality' or

‘real existence’ (*wirkliches Dasein*) and cannot directly stand in causal relations (*ibid.*).<sup>88</sup> *Third*, whereas mental and verbal propositions are numerically distinct in different instances, propositions in themselves are repeatable entities in the sense that the strictly identical proposition can be entertained by different people and at different times without being therefore ‘multiplied’ (*ibid.*, 78)<sup>89</sup>. Furthermore, propositions are complex entities with similarly objective ‘representations’ or ‘ideas in themselves’ (*Vorstellungen an sich*) as their constituents (*ibid.*, 167). Bolzano upholds, in essence, the traditional Aristotelian conception of the structure of a proposition: every proposition contains, at a minimum, three ideas: a subject-idea or ‘basis’ (*Unterlage*) establishing the extension of the proposition, a predicate-idea or ‘assertive part’ (*Aussagetheil*) determining what is ascribed to the objects, and a copula functioning as a ‘connective part’ (*Bindetheil*) indicating “that the objects considered in the proposition *have* the property cited in it” (*ibid.*, 170).

Bolzano’s theory of judgment is formulated with a view to accommodating this outlook on propositions. Every judgment, as an ‘act of our mind’ (*Handlung unseres Geistes*), is intimately connected with a corresponding proposition in itself in a manner which Bolzano expresses in various ways: judging involves ‘grasping’ (*auffassen*) an objective proposition (*ibid.*, 167); every judgment contains a proposition in itself as its ‘material’ (*Stoff*) (*ibid.*, 311); and a judgment is the ‘appearance’ (*Erscheinung*) of an objective proposition—in judging, Bolzano states, an “objective proposition appears before our mind” (*ibid.*, 313).<sup>90</sup> Although the precise nature of this relation is not definitively established by Bolzano, these formulations permit at least some clarification *per viam neg-*

<sup>88</sup> In his correspondence with Franz Exner, a Viennese follower of Herbart, Bolzano emphasizes that propositions in themselves are not independent of relations to minds and speakers only in the sense of being conceived of *in abstraction* from them, but are, rather, genuinely distinct entities (see Bolzano 1973, 377). Propositions in thought are what Bolzano calls ‘adherences’ (*Adhärenzen*), that is, dependent entities capable of existing only in some substance—in this case, a thinking mind (see *ibid.*, 307; 311). Propositions in themselves have no such dependence on something else; accordingly, Bolzano argues that, since merely considering an adherence in abstraction from any specific circumstances on which it might depend would not change its ontological character, a proposition in thought could not become a proposition in itself through abstraction (*ibid.*, 377).

<sup>89</sup> Bolzano himself uses the term ‘objective’ (*objectiv*) specifically for this characteristic of propositions and ideas in themselves (*ibid.*, 78).

<sup>90</sup> As for propositions occurring in language in the form of statements, Bolzano takes it that each such statement also relates to an objective proposition which constitutes its *meaning* (*Bedeutung*) (*ibid.*, 197). Following a traditional line of thought, Bolzano takes this relation to be derived of the mental reference to these meanings: the meaning of an expression is the “objective idea corresponding to the subjective idea that is supposed to be aroused by the idea of the sign” (*ibid.*, 308). Accordingly, the meaning of a statement, in Bolzano’s view, is the objective counterpart of a judgment or thought ‘supposed to be aroused’ by the statement in the mind of the hearer—that is, the proposition in itself which is grasped in a successful dialogue by both the speaker and the auditor.

*ativam*, by contrasting them with related notions. The idea of a proposition ‘appearing before our mind’ in judgment is misleading in that it invites an analogy with what ‘appears’ in, for example, perceptual experience—namely, the perceived *object* or, in the mediated conception prevalent in modern philosophy, a subjective representation through which the object appears. But according to Bolzano, the object of a proposition—in thought or in itself—is simply the object or objects falling under the subject-idea of the proposition (*ibid.*, 178). Moreover, the objective counterpart of a subjective idea is not in Bolzano’s view a *medium* ‘through which’ the latter would represent its object; rather, both subjective and objective ideas represent their objects by themselves (*ibid.*, 306).<sup>91</sup> As for the notions of ‘material’ and ‘containment’, these too easily lend themselves to a view that is foreign to Bolzano’s: since propositions in themselves are non-real entities, they cannot be contained in mental acts as parts. Rather, judgments as complex mental acts have as their parts the subjective ideas which constitute a proposition in the thinking mind, whereas objective propositions have as their ‘content’ (*Inhalt*) the corresponding ideas in themselves (*ibid.*, 167). Finally, judging is not only ‘grasping’ a proposition, since a proposition can be ‘grasped’ in simply considering whether or not something is the case. Accordingly, Bolzano adopts the apprehension–assent view of judgment as an act which “follows upon a prior mere *consideration of ideas*, and is dependent upon it” (*ibid.*, 65).

A different conception falling broadly under the same ‘objective’ outlook on the subject matter of logic is provided by Lotze. In his *Logik* (1843/1875), Lotze argues in favor of a view of pure logic as concerned with concepts, judgments, and syllogisms not as mental occurrences in individual minds, but independently of these as ‘ideal forms’ (*ideale Formen*) (Lotze 1884, 8).<sup>92</sup> The systematic weight of Lotze’s obviously Platonic choice of words becomes apparent in the third book of the work, in which Lotze formulates on the basis of an interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas or forms (Gr. *εἰδή*, Lat.

<sup>91</sup> Rollinger (2004, 259–60) proposes that Bolzano’s ‘appearance’ formulation be understood in the counterfactual sense that the proposition in itself is what *would* appear upon some kind of reflection on an act of judgment. The only alternative noted by Rollinger to such interpretation is to take the proposition as the object of judgment. For the reasons noted above, this latter idea seems misguided; as for the ‘reflective’ view, nothing in Bolzano’s writings seems to suggest it. Künne (1997, 210–11) simply disregards the ‘appearance’ and ‘grasping’ formulations as doctrinally unimportant, unfortunate turns of phrase and identifies Bolzano’s view, in essence, with Husserl’s view in *Logical Investigations*, against Frege’s explicit view of propositions—or ‘thoughts’, *Gedanken*—as objects of judgments.

<sup>92</sup> Lotze combines this ontological basis for pure logic with a traditional normative conception, and states that “logic only begins with the conviction [...] that between the combinations of ideas [...] there are forms to which these combinations ought to answer and laws which they *ought* to obey” (Lotze 1884, 8). Accordingly, one of Husserl’s criticisms of Lotze is that the latter confused the theoretical sense of logical ideality with the ideality of normative *ideals* (see Husserl 2001, 138; Hua18, 221).

*forma*) an ontological account of the the domain of logic—of the “world of our ideas in itself, without regard its agreement with an assumed reality of things outside its borders” (*ibid*, 434). Lotze initially characterizes ideas in terms of their distinct manner of being experienced or presented in thought: whereas the changing circumstances of empirical reality are experienced through affections of the senses that we merely undergo, ideas are actively presented or ‘ideally apprehended’ (*ideell gefasst*) by abstracting from the changing empirical contents features that are identical across different instances (*ibid*, 435). In the traditional debates on the ontological status of universals, Plato was associated with the view that ideas *exist* prior to and independently of individual objects—that is, they are in the usual Scholastic terminology *universalia ante rem*. Lotze, instead, argues that the core of Plato’s doctrine is that ideas and connections between them ‘hold’ (*gelten*) or have ‘validity’ (*Geltung*) regardless of their relations to real things. In particular, whereas judgments in the sense of mental events are ‘real’ or ‘actual’ (*wirkliche*)<sup>93</sup> when they *occur* at some determinate moment in a conscious mind, *propositions* as ideal contents of such mental occurrences can neither exist nor occur, but are actual only in the sense that each proposition “holds or is valid and that its opposite does not hold” (*ibid*, 439).<sup>94</sup> In line with this picture of Plato’s doctrine, Lotze’s takes the subject matter of pure logic to consists of ideal contents of thought, which (*i*) are valid independently of being thought of and of any relations to real, particular things; (*ii*) can be common to various individual experiences of thinking; and (*iii*) can be grasped on the basis of such experiences in an ‘ideal apprehension’ in which the same ideal content is in each case presented with an identical significance and with “eternally the same validity” (*ewige immer gleiche Gültigkeit*) (*ibid*, 435).

<sup>93</sup> In Lotze’s view, the traditional difficulties with universals are a consequence of the inability of philosophers to distinguish conceptually the different senses of actuality or reality (*Wirklichkeit*) peculiar to different basic ontological classes. Lotze lists four such classes: “For we call a thing real which is, in contradistinction to another which is not; an event real which occurs or has occurred, in contradistinction to that which does not occur; a relation real which obtains, as opposed to one which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition really true which holds or is valid as opposed to one of which the validity is still doubtful” (Lotze 1884, 439). Reality in general is what corresponds to the correctness or appropriateness of affirming something (*ibid*), and philosophical puzzles arise when, “under the persuasion that the object which we are considering must have some sort of reality”, this is conceived in terms of kind of reality foreign to the object; accordingly, in addition to the mistaken question about the existence of universals or ideas, analogous problems arise when a relation is conceived as a third existing *thing* alongside the objects.

<sup>94</sup> Despite his otherwise positive evaluation of Plato, Lotze finds Plato’s doctrine lacking in that it presents ideas “almost exclusively under the form of the isolated concept” (Lotze 1884, 448) rather than in the form of *propositions*. Lotze argues that, contrary to Plato’s view, propositions have a primacy with respect to simple ideas or concepts since “we can only say of concepts that they *mean* something, and they mean something because certain propositions are valid *of* them” (*ibid*).



#### 1.4.2 Brentano and the dispute about existential and impersonal judgments

Another central dispute in 19<sup>th</sup>-century theories of judgment concerned the interpretation of two forms of judgment that do not in an obvious way conform to the view that the categorical form is the most elementary one: *existential* judgments, such as ‘God exists’, and so-called *impersonal* judgments, such as ‘It is raining’. As seen above, Hume had claimed that existential judgments do not have a subject–predicate structure—nor, indeed, are they in Hume’s view composed of any multiplicity of distinct ideas. Similarly, Kant famously argued that existence is not a ‘real predicate’ (*reales Prädikat*), something signifying a ‘determination’ of a thing (see Kant 1998, A 599/B 627). Following these ideas, the 19<sup>th</sup>-century debates often had in their background the idea that existential judgments can be understood as lacking a genuine *predicate*, something attributed to a subject, while impersonal ones appear to have no distinct *subject*—there is nothing to which raining can be obviously attributed.<sup>95</sup> But if this were true, a full subject–predicate structure would not be needed to have a complete judgment. Accordingly, the disputes on how these forms should be understood led to various proposed revisions to the received view of the defining characteristics of judging as a mental act.

Kant, to whose views most 19<sup>th</sup>-century theories responded in one way or another, did not include existential judgments as a separate class in his official taxonomy of the forms and logical functions of judgment. However, his claim—the centerpiece of Kant’s criticism of the traditional ontological proof of God’s existence—that in the judgment ‘There is a God’, “I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only [ . . . ] posit the object in relation my concept” (A 599/ B 627)<sup>96</sup> suggested to many subsequent philosophers that existential judgments should be construed as differing in their logical function from categorical ones. It was up to Kant’s followers to make room for such judgments in their theories. Thus, J. G. Fichte argued, in his *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794/95), that in addition to the ‘synthetic’ (*synthetische*) forms of judgment analyzed by Kant, there are more basic ‘thetic’ (*thetische*) judgments in which something is ‘absolutely posited’ (*schlechthin gesetzt*) (Fichte 1982, 113). However, Fichte still inter-

<sup>95</sup> Of course, it is also not obvious that there is nothing to which rain *could* be attributed. In 19<sup>th</sup>-century debates, various possible subjects were entertained for impersonal judgments, among which were rain itself (‘Rain rains’), the weather (‘The weather is rainy’), and more extravagantly, in the case of another common example, Zeus (‘Zeus thunders’). See Herbart 1837, 79–82.

<sup>96</sup> It seems sensible to suppose that the first part of this claim is an adaptation of Hume’s similar remark in the *Treatise*, whereas the idea of ‘positing’ an object in relation to a concept appears to be original to Kant. Kant first discussed the concept of existence along these lines in a 1763 paper devoted to a putative proof of God’s existence, where the notion of ‘existence’ (*Sein*) is said to be identical with ‘positing’ something ‘in and for itself’ (*an und für sich setzen*) (see Kant 1992b, 119).

preted such judgments in terms of the categorical form, as simply leaving “the place of the predicate [ . . . ] indefinitely empty for its possible characterization” (*ibid*, 114).

In 19<sup>th</sup>-century theories of judgment, various kinds of general conclusions concerning the overall form of an adequate theory of judgment were drawn from the analysis of the existential and impersonal forms. Such responses can be classified broadly into three kinds, depending on whether the disputed forms were interpreted in terms of the old, added alongside them, or the old forms reinterpreted in light of the new ones. One line of response was to attempt to assimilate existential or impersonal judgments into a categorical or synthetic model. Thus, for example Julius Bergmann claimed in his *Allgemeine Logik* (1879) that whereas in ‘attributive judgments’ (*Attributiv-Urtheile*) an object is posited as having a certain property, by combining perceptual ‘marks’ (*Merkmale*) “in the unity of an object”, existential judgments posit an object as existing in general, by combining the *object* “with other objects in the unity of the world” (Bergmann 1879, 30)<sup>97</sup>.<sup>98</sup> Another reaction was to include the new forms as a class of judgments by their own right, alongside categorical ones; in this vein, Herbart adopted a version of the Kantian-Fichtean view of existential or thetic judgments by defining them—together with impersonal ones—as judgments in which a concept is ‘posited unconditionally’ (*unbedingt aufgestellt*). Herbart, unlike Fichte, insisted that they constitute a genuinely distinct class, rather than each such judgment involving an incomplete categorical form, “as if it expected another concept” (Herbart 1837, 80)<sup>99</sup>. Finally, a *third*, more radical family of responses took existential and impersonal judgments as a symptom of foundational problems in the traditional conception of judgment and called for a reconstruction of the whole edifice of the theory. Among these responses was Lotze’s, most

<sup>97</sup> “[J]udgment is the apprehension of an object either as existing in general (which [ . . . ] means as much as positing an object through combination with other objects in the unity of the world) or as [ . . . ] having a certain property (which [ . . . ] means as much as positing a mark through combination with other marks in the unity of an object” ([*D*]as *Urtheil sei die Auffassung eines Gegenstandes entweder als eines seienden schlechthin (was [ . . . ] soviel heißt wie Setzung eines Gegenstandes durch Verknüpfung mit anderen Gegenständen in der Einheit der Welt) oder als [ . . . ] eine gewisse Beschaffenheit habenden (was [ . . . ] soviel heißt wie Setzung eines Merkmals durch Verknüpfung mit anderen Merkmalen in der Einheit eines Gegenstandes).*) It should be noted that this conception makes existential judgments logically dependent on categorical ones, since the latter are presupposed for the availability of unified objects to be combined in the former.

<sup>98</sup> In essence the same view of existential judgments as involving a combination of an object with others “in the unity of the world” was held by William James, who construed them as representing an object as related to other concrete objects in “real space” (James 1983, 919n).

<sup>99</sup> “Namely, the predicate is now posited without a limitation, unconditionally. Not as a concept which should be based on another, as before, where it had a subject; nor as if it expected another concept[.]” (*Das Prädicat nämlich wird jetzt unbeschränkt, unbedingt aufgestellt. Nicht als ein Begriff, der an einen andern solle angelehnt werden, wie zuvor, da es noch ein Subject hatte; auch nicht als ob es einen andern Begriff erwartete[.]*)

extensively presented in the second edition of his *Logic* (1875). Lotze takes impersonal judgments as logically prior to categorical ones (*ibid*, 54) and argues for an elaborate reduction of categorical judgments to different kinds of judgments of *identity*.<sup>100</sup> Another prominent representative of reactions of this kind, that is, of attempts to translate the cornerstone of traditional syllogistic logic—the categorical judgment—to some logically preferable form, was Brentano’s theory, which proposed precisely such a reduction of categorical to *existential* judgments.<sup>101</sup> Before arriving at Husserl’s early treatment of judgment—which was developed explicitly by way of a reaction to and critical appropriation of some of Brentano’s central ideas—this theory and its background in Brentano’s broader theoretical pursuits will be outlined here.

Brentano’s theory of judgment lies at the intersection of his logical and psychological programs. In his lectures of logic, held a number of times from 1877 to 1886, Brentano defended a version of the normative conception of logic as a practical discipline dealing with means for the attainment of knowledge or ‘correct judgment’ (*richtige Urteil*). On Brentano’s view, both theoretical and practical disciplines—or sciences (*Wissenschaften*) and arts (*Künste*)—are collections of facts or truths joined together according to some principle which is different for the two. In theoretical disciplines, truths are ordered with respect to their ‘internal’ relations of kinship or affinity, such as proximity of the genera of the objects studied. In practical disciplines, on the contrary, the principle of organization is some external aim to which the truths relate as means (Brentano 1956,

<sup>100</sup> See Lotze 1884, 62: “[T]he numberless categorical judgments of this form [‘S is p’] which we make in daily life [...] are in fact identical judgments in the full sense required by the principle of identity.” Lotze arrives at this view by critically reviewing different candidate conceptions of the logical relation between the subject and predicate of a proposition; the conclusion Lotze draws from this review is that the only viable relation is that of strict identity; and, since the categorical judgment purports to connect two non-identical ideas, it is, if taken at face value, a “contradictory and self-destructive form of expression” (*ibid*, 59). Accordingly, Lotze construes the different types of categorical judgment as a ‘logical series’ in which “thought [...] tries to bring its categorical judgments into harmony with the law of identity” (*ibid*, 61). For example, the particular affirmative judgment ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ translates in Lotze’s scheme to the judgment of identity “The Caesar who crossed the Rubicon, [is identical with the Caesar who] crossed the Rubicon’ (*ibid*, 63).

<sup>101</sup> As a further example, also Frege’s theory of judgment can be taken as a revisionist outcome of these 19<sup>th</sup>-century debates. Frege’s contribution in this regard can be said to be twofold: *first*, a rejection of the traditional understanding of the relation of subject and predicate, and *second*, a rejection of the idea that the terms to be combined predicatively are intelligible antecedently of their figuring in a full proposition. Frege dispenses with the traditional subject–copula–predicate analysis, and replaces it with the mathematical model of function and argument(s). Thus, in Frege’s influential view, predicates are ‘unsaturated’ (*ungesättigte*) function expressions which, when ‘saturated’ by a characteristic number of arguments—ordinarily, referring expressions such as nouns—yield as a value either True or False. See Frege 1984, 137ff. The most renowned statement of the view that the constituents of a proposition are not meaningful independently of it can be found—here concerning *words* as elements of statements—in the 1884 *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, where it is first introduced as a methodological ‘basic principle’ and later stated as a truth (see Frege 1960, xxii; 73).

4–5; 1973, 1–2; cf. 1995a, 150). For instance, medicine as a practical discipline studies everything conducive to the desired aim of improving and sustaining health; similarly, the subject matter of logic in a broad sense encompasses everything relevant for the acquisition of knowledge, considered from a general point of view, and includes elements from various theoretical disciplines, including psychology, linguistics, and mathematics.

As opposed to the proponents of the objective conception of logic, Brentano rejects ontologically distinct contents of thought as the domain of logic and argues that mental acts—in particular, of judgment—are the primary bearers of logical relations. In consequence, a central part of the theoretical foundations of logic belongs to the realm of psychology. However, Brentano does not draw the conclusion of those psychologically-minded logicians advancing the naturalistic program who held that logical laws are simply empirical generalizations. Instead, Brentano distinguishes a ‘genetic’ part of psychology as the empirical discipline dealing with causal processes giving rise to conscious phenomena, and statistical regularities obtaining among them, from ‘descriptive’ psychology, an exact science aiming at a general description and classification of the domain of consciousness (Brentano 1995b, 4). Brentano uses the following analogy to explain the relation between these two disciplines: just as physiology as the study of the functions of bodily organs is dependent on a description of the elements and structure of the body provided by the more basic discipline of anatomy, Brentano argues that the empirical study of causal and statistical dependencies involving the mind has to be founded on the descriptive part of psychology (*ibid.*, 138). What logic as the art of correct judgment in Brentano’s view borrows from psychology does not consist in empirical matters of fact, but in a basic descriptive conception—so to speak, the anatomy—of thinking as a mental phenomenon.

Establishing the groundwork for such a discipline was a central aim of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), in which Brentano defines psychology as a science of ‘mental phenomena’ (*psychische Phänomene*)—in contrast to the traditional definition as a science of the soul, the substantial bearer of mental attributes. Mental phenomena, in Brentano’s view are graspable with certainty in inner perception, which gives descriptive psychology a more secure epistemic basis than that possessed by the intrinsically uncertain physical sciences (Brentano 1995a, 14).<sup>102</sup> In addition to their being

<sup>102</sup> By a ‘phenomenon’, Brentano means whatever appears in mental acts or states; in the *Psychology*, Brentano uses the term to distinguish a phenomenalist conception of any given scientific discipline from a realistic conception of it as the study of some kind of substantial entities. In Brentano’s use, physical phenomena contrast with physical bodies—that is, the substantial things existing in themselves—

directly accessible only in the first person through inner perception, Brentano gives as the defining mark of mental phenomena the “reference to a content [*Inhalt*], direction toward an object [*Object*] [...] or immanent objectivity [*Gegenständlichkeit*]” (*ibid*, 68). Famously, Brentano also uses for this purpose the Scholastic expression ‘intentional inexistence of an object’ (*intentionale Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes*) (*ibid*), and also talks simply of the ‘intentional relation’ (*intentionale Beziehung*) (*ibid*; Brentano 1956, 32; 1995b, 139).<sup>103</sup> What these formulations express is that, in Brentano’s view, every mental phenomenon or experience is related to some object in such a way that, on the one hand, the experience would not be possible without having such object, while on the other, this correlate is not something ‘real’ (*Reales*) and need not actually exist independently of the experience (Brentano 1995b, 139). This contrasts with physical phenomena, such as sensible qualities, which on Brentano’s view are possible only as appearing in mental ones—namely, as intentional objects.<sup>104</sup> Brentano’s view of the relation between experience and its objects, as presented in the *Psychology* and in his psychological lectures, clearly departs from a realistic conception of the mind being in contact with an independently existing world. Instead, Brentano’s formulations resemble the ‘internalized’ version of the Aristotelian view that was attributed above to Hume: *first*, perception and thought relate to their objects only by virtue of an ‘internal object-like thing’ (*innerlich Gegenständliches*) existing in, or as an only abstractly separable part of, these experiences themselves; *second*, however, the intentional relation does not extend through this internal object to something external—rather, even in the case of external perception, the object of an experience is simply the immanent object contained in it. Any possibly existing real physical counterpart for the immanent object,

whereas mental phenomena contrast with attributes of a substantial soul; in both cases, the existence of the phenomena cannot be doubted, while that of the substantial entity can. A basic claim underlying the theoretical framing of the *Psychology* is that for most scientific purposes the choice between these two interpretations makes no difference (see Brentano 1995a, 8; 13).

<sup>103</sup> According to a commonly accepted view, originally proposed by Herbert Spiegelberg in 1936, the Latin term *intentio* and its cognates—used prominently, for example, by Aquinas—were initially introduced in their technical use to Scholastic philosophical vocabulary as translations of the Arabic notions of *ma’qul* and *ma’na*, which played central roles in the theories of perception of Avicenna and Averroes; the word *ma’qul*, for its part, was Al-Farabi’s translation for νόημα, Aristotle’s term for a thought (see Spiegelberg 1981). Alternatively, G. E. M. Anscombe proposed that the technical philosophical sense of *intentio* was simply a metaphorical extension from the literal sense of *intendere* in the sense of ‘aim’, such as in the phrase *intendere arcum in*, ‘aim a bow at’ (Anscombe 1981, 4). The metaphors of aiming and shooting as used for thought have, for their part, a long history in philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s *Cratylus*, in which Socrates proposes as an etymology for the Greek word δόξα, ‘belief’, the shooting of a bow (τόξον) (see *Crat.* 420b).

<sup>104</sup> See Brentano 1995a, 70: “Color, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence.” In the first chapter of the *Psychology*, Brentano more clearly states that physical things and qualities do not exist independently of the mind as phenomena (see *ibid*, 14).

on the other hand, “absolutely does not take part in this intentional relation” (*ibid*, 24) and is as such unknowable (Brentano 1995a, 7).

In addition to yielding the criterion for demarcating mental from physical phenomena, the intentional relation gives Brentano a basis for a taxonomy of the fundamental classes of experiences on the basis of differences in the relation between an experience and its immanent object. Brentano distinguishes three basic classes: presentation (*Vorstellung*), judgment (*Urteil*), and a third class encompassing both the emotions and acts of will. The three classes are not, Brentano argues, on par with one another, but rather experiences of the two latter classes are founded on presentations. Whereas presentation involves an object simply appearing before the mind in some way—for example perceptually, in memory, in imagination, or through non-intuitive conceptual thought—in the case of judgment, feeling, and willing, a further intentional relation is built on such ‘presentative’ foundation. Without the underlying presentation, these other experiences would not be possible; as Brentano puts it, nothing “can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing” (*ibid*, 61). Brentano codifies this idea in a principle according to which all mental phenomena “are either presentations or they are based upon presentations” (*ibid*, 65). In Brentano’s lectures on psychology held in 1890–1, a terminological distinction is then introduced, according to which presentations are ‘fundamental acts’ (*fundamentale Akte*), while experiences of the other two classes are ‘superposed acts’ (*supra-ponierte Akte*), acts consisting of a presentation as a basis and another act superposed on the presentation and dependent on it (Brentano 1995b, 90). Another essential characteristic of the two other classes, in Brentano’s view, is that they come in two contrary forms. In the case of the emotions, Brentano calls the two opposites ‘loving’ (*Lieben*) and ‘hating’ (*Hassen*). Likewise, acts of judging involve a double intentional relation in which something is presented and an attitude of one of two contrary ‘qualities’ (*Qualitäten*) is taken up towards it, namely, affirmation (*Anerkennung*, *Bejahung*) or denial (*Verwerfung*, *Verneinung*) (see Brentano 1995a, 153–4).<sup>105</sup> While Brentano agrees about the existence of these two qualities of judgment, understood as a distinction between two different *acts* or *attitudes*, with the view passed down from Plato and Aristotle, he departs from various central tenets of traditional theories of judgment.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Brentano takes affirmation and denial to be contraries in the classical, Aristotelian sense—namely, one cannot affirm what one denies, nor contrariwise, but one need not affirm what one does not deny, nor *vice versa*; when in doubt, it is possible to merely entertain, that is, present something.

<sup>106</sup> Modern logic has largely dispensed with the idea of two qualities of judgment—mostly due to Frege,

Brentano's analysis of judgment takes the form of a polemic against previous theories which tended to analyze judgment not as a *sui generis* mental phenomenon but as a presentation qualified in some way or combined with other presentations.<sup>107</sup> Brentano rejects the Humean view that judgment differs from presentation—or, in Hume's preferred terminology, belief from conception—only as to its vividness or intensity.<sup>108</sup> Such a view, Brentano claims, conflates the phenomenal qualities of a presentation with the degree of rational 'confidence' (*Zuversicht*) in a judgment (*ibid*, 158)<sup>109, 110</sup>. The bulk of Brentano's polemical efforts, however, is directed against the view that judgment consists of a combination of presentations and differs from the latter in having a complex, structured content. To begin with, Brentano takes note, in the familiar manner, of the possibility to merely imagine or conceive of things as combined in a certain way (Brentano 1995a, 159; 1956, 98–99). But Brentano takes also a more radical step, which can be viewed as a generalization of the Humean analysis of judgments of existence: on Brentano's view existential judgments do not, as Hume held, constitute a narrow class lacking the ordinary categorical form; instead, Brentano argues that *all* judgments are reducible to existential ones. Moreover, this leads Brentano to reject the general idea of judgments being in some sense logically articulated in a propositional or sentence-

who rejected negative judgments by locating the logical place of a negation exclusively in the propositional content or 'thought' (*Gedanke*) held true in judgment (see Frege 1984, 384–85). However, formal systems incorporating the two contrary qualities have also been developed, notably by Jan Łukasiewicz, who expressly notes Brentano—his *Doktorgroßvater* through Kazimierz Twardowski—as a modern inspiration. Łukasiewicz adopts the Fregean assertion sign  $\vdash$ , and its inverted form  $\neg$ , respectively, for assertion and rejection, and formulates inference rules separately for the two. See Łukasiewicz (1972).

<sup>107</sup> Because Brentano considers judgment as a mental phenomenon of its own irreducible kind—in Latin, '*sui generis*', or in Greek, 'ἴδιον γένος'—it is sometimes called an 'idiogenic' theory, as opposed to 'allogenic' theories that analyse it in terms of mental phenomena of other kinds; this distinction was introduced by Brentano's student Franz Hillebrand, who used the etymologically incorrect expressions 'idiogenetic' (*idiogenetisch*) and 'allogenic' (*allogenetisch*), which derive from the Greek word for 'origin', 'γένεσις' rather than 'kind', 'γένος'; see Hillebrand 1891, 26f. This etymological point seems to have first been made in Polish discussions of Twardowski's theory, in which Hillebrand's distinction was also used; see Twardowski 1999, 99n.

<sup>108</sup> However, Brentano does not appear to attribute this view to Hume, whose theory he mistakes as conceiving of judgment as a feeling—in the sense of a positive or negative affective experience—accompanying a presentation (see Brentano 1966, 23). As was noted above, this is a false interpretation, rejected by Hume himself, although quite easily engendered by Hume's own choice of wording.

<sup>109</sup> However, Brentano later admits that in the first edition of the *Psychology* he himself gave too much weight on the supposed analogy between the intensity of feelings and the degree of confidence in a judgment (see Brentano 1966, 24).

<sup>110</sup> The difference between the vividness or liveliness of a presentation or idea and the confidence of a judgment was already noted by Bolzano (see Bolzano 1973, 65). The liveliness of an idea is an independently variable phenomenal characteristic of an experience, whereas the confidence of a judgment has to do with the perceived rational grounds for making the judgment (see *ibid*, 360); thus, a lively memory can bring about a high degree of confidence in judging about a past event, since vividly recalling something is generally a good reason to believe it happened, but the two are not equivalent, let alone identical (cf. Brentano 1995a, 158–59).

like way; rather, judgments in their elementary form are simply affirming or denying attitudes towards objects.

Brentano's arguments in favor of this view are mostly of two types. *First*, Brentano takes perceptions to be judgments: in ordinary perceptual experience, the belief in the existence of what is seen is not something in addition to the perceptual experience but a characteristic of that experience itself.<sup>111</sup> Perceptual experience, however, does not in Brentano's view exhibit a subject–predicate structure, but only a simple relation to the perceived object.<sup>112</sup> Therefore, in the central case of perceptual judgments, no propositional structure is present.<sup>113</sup> *Second*, Brentano argues that all forms of judgment recognized by the Aristotelian syllogistic can be transformed, “without any change in meaning”, into existential judgments (*ibid*, 165). For example, the particular affirmation “Some man is sick” translates into “There is a sick man”, while the universal affirmation “All men are mortal” translates into “There is no mortal man” (*ibid*, 166). These existential judgments, for their part, do not in Brentano's view attribute existence as a property to their objects, but are simply affirming or rejecting attitudes towards the objects.<sup>114</sup> In general, then, the content of a judgment is a simple or complex object appearing in consciousness in a logically prior act of presentation, which forms the ‘matter’ (*Materie*) of the judgment. Presentations, on Brentano's view, find their most appropriate linguistic expressions in *names* (see e.g. Brentano 1956, 46f). Since the content or matter of a judgment is the underlying presentation, it is therefore not in the form of a sentence, but in names or noun phrases that such content is most

<sup>111</sup> As Staiti (2015, 819) notes, the claim that perceptions are judgments is methodologically central for Brentano's psychological theory: namely, the methodological basis of the whole theory is the idea according to which inner perception is an infallible source of knowledge about mental phenomena. This, together with Brentano's view that knowledge consists of acts of ‘evident judgment’, necessitates taking perceptions to be judgments.

<sup>112</sup> See Brentano 1995a, 162: “[I]t is hard to think of anything more obvious and unmistakable than the fact that a perception is not a conjunction of a concept of the subject and a concept of a predicate, nor does it refer to such a conjunction. Rather, the object of an *inner* perception is simply a mental phenomenon, and the object of an *external* perception is simply a physical phenomenon”.

<sup>113</sup> Following Frege, modern logic has generally argued that dispensing with propositional contents would make compound forms of judgment, namely those containing sentential connectives, unintelligible; for Frege's classical presentation of this subject, see Frege 1984, 390–406). See Chisholm (1982) for an elaborate defense of Brentano's theory against such objections.

<sup>114</sup> Brentano gives the following two complementary arguments for rejecting the idea of existence being a predicate. First, affirming a whole—that is, a combination of attributes—requires affirming each part of the whole. Thus, affirming the combination of an object with the property of existence would require affirming the object itself, so that affirming it in combination with the supposed further property would make no difference. Second, rejecting a whole does not logically require rejecting each of its parts; thus, rejecting the idea of an object in combination with the idea of existence would not require rejecting the idea of the object itself; but, Brentano claims, “it is clear that this is precisely the sense of the proposition” (Brentano 1995a, 162).



fittingly expressed. Accordingly, in his lectures on logic, Brentano proposes as a minimal schematic form for expressing the elements of a judgment a combination of two signs, ‘A +’ or ‘A –’ for, respectively, affirming and rejecting judgments, where one sign stands for the matter, the underlying presentation, and the other sign for the quality, the attitude of affirming or rejecting what is presented (Brentano 1956, 97–98). The categorical form and other grammatical structures exhibited in sentences are, Brentano’s argues, merely accidental linguistic devices developed for the facility of expression; they do not reflect the logically pertinent structures of thinking (*ibid*, 169)<sup>115</sup>. It is not only that the subject–predicate distinction would not reflect the true ‘logical grammar’ of thought; on Brentano’s view, the whole idea of grammar is inessential in explaining the nature of judgment. The only form of complexity in a simple judgment is the twofold intentional relation to the object, as something both presented and accepted or rejected. Now, since what is of importance for logic is only the structure of the thoughts—that is, of judgments—and not their verbal expressions, it is in Brentano’s view advisable for logicians to dispense with the categorical form altogether.<sup>116</sup>

From the broader historical point of view of different conceptions of judgment outlined in this chapter, Brentano’s theory of judgment can be considered as an illustrative example of many of the developments that have led philosophers away from the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of the nature of judgments and statements. Indeed, Brentano’s theory can be viewed as a rejection of what was considered above as the basic premise of Plato’s response to the views of the Sophists and of Antisthenes—the idea, namely, that there is an essential structural difference between merely naming something, or referring to it by a name, and making a claim, a statement, or a judgment about it. In Brentano’s view, there is no such essential difference in how the content of, respectively, a name and a statement or a judgment are logically articulated. On this point, as a general view about the nature of judgment, Brentano finds few allies

<sup>115</sup> In his later work, Brentano qualifies this rejection of the psychological and logical significance of categorical judgments by developing a theory of ‘double judgments’ (*Doppelurteile*) which in effect rehabilitates categorical judgments into his theory. A double judgment consists of a composite of affirmations or denials: first, an object is affirmed, and thereafter some property is attributed to or denied of this object. Thus the grammatical subject of a proposition expressing a double judgment expresses already by itself a complete, existential judgment, and the predicate expresses a further, founded judgment (see Brentano 1956, 114). Thus the same grammatical structure or ‘syntax’ (*Syntax*) ‘S is p’ can serve to express either an existential judgment or a logically equivalent but psychologically different, composite judgment (*ibid*).

<sup>116</sup> Brentano claims that this reformulation of the theory of judgment leads to “nothing less than a complete overthrow” of traditional logic (Brentano 1995a, 179). However, despite this grandiose exaggeration, Brentano’s logical reforms amount, in fact, to a simplification of traditional syllogistic logic, by dispensing with most of the rules of inference included in the traditional lists. For Brentano’s revised list, see *ibid*.

in the tradition—although, as seen above, Hume held a similar view about existential judgments, considered as a special case, and some of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century analyses of what Fichte called ‘thetic’ judgments likewise took them to lack a subject–predicate structure. In other respects, however, Brentano’s theory exhibits in a clear form the main tenets of what was characterized above as the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception of judgment. The most important part of this conception was the view that the essential function of acts of judging does not consist in combining simpler elements into complex, structured wholes—analogously to the way single words are combined to form sentences—but in assenting to or dissenting from something that must already be made available in a prior or underlying act of apprehension, conception, or presentation—which apprehending is then, likewise, not to be understood on the basis of the opposition of the simple and the complex, as the apprehension of simple elements that are to be ‘combined’ in a judgment, but as a non-committal attitude of understanding something without taking a stand regarding it.

As already mentioned, Husserl’s analyses of judgment, especially in the period of the *Logical Investigations*, are largely carried out against the background of Brentano’s theory. In the following chapters, it will be seen that Husserl takes up in essence the diametrically opposed view in all the respects just noted: judgments in the sense most important for logic are articulated in sentence-like syntactic structures and therefore differ in an essential way from names; judgments are not built on underlying neutral experiences of ‘merely presenting’ something; judging in its basic form does not properly speaking consist of acceptance or rejection; and it is judgment or belief rather than presentation, in the Brentanian sense of conceiving of something without taking a stand on its existence, that is to be viewed as the basic phenomenon in our intentional relations to the world. From the broader point of view on different philosophical conceptions of judgment, it will eventually become clear in what follows that these aspects of Husserl’s theory can reasonably be viewed as amounting to a rejection of what has been called here the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception of judgment, and to a rehabilitation—in a form critically vindicated, or perhaps ‘*aufgehoben*’ in the Hegelian sense—of a version of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception as the more appropriate outlook of the nature of judgment. However, before these questions can be properly addressed, some of the more salient aspects of Husserl’s general project and theoretical framework in the *Investigations*—and the position that the notion of judgment occupies in them—will have to be discussed; this forms the topic of the next chapter.

## 2 Theory of Judgment in the Context of the *Logical Investigations*

This chapter provides an outline of the systematic position occupied by the theory of judgment in the main philosophical project with which Husserl was preoccupied around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—and, in a less dominant manner, for the rest of his career—the outcomes of which were to a large extent first presented in the *Logical Investigations*. The project in question was an attempt to clarify the nature of the basic concepts in formal logic and their role in knowledge. The focus here is on a tension between two characteristic features of Husserl's general theoretical outlook in this period: on the *one* hand, an objective conception—inspired by Bolzano—of the subject matter of pure logic as consisting of systematically united bodies of ideal propositions, that is, formal theories bound by relations of logical ground and consequence; and, on the *other*, the conviction—adopted from Brentano—that even in the realm of logic, the philosophical analysis of elementary concepts and the epistemological clarification of the possibility of knowledge are tasks to be carried out by the methods of descriptive psychology or phenomenology.

The *first* section outlines the path along which Husserl was led to questions about the foundations of logic from his early work on the philosophy of arithmetic. It is shown that Husserl's adoption of the view that the meanings of mathematical concepts derive from their role in axiomatic systems—rather by their direct or indirect reference to the intuitive presentation of multiplicity in mental acts of counting—led him to inquire into the general conditions of possibility of such systems and to endorse an objective conception of logic akin to Bolzano's. The general course of Husserl's critical and constructive argumentation in the *Prolegomena* is rehearsed in order to bring into focus the conception of 'pure logic' that underlies Husserl's early interest in the nature of judgment.

The *second* section provides a brief presentation of the general methodological outlook that Husserl initially adopted from Brentano, and of Husserl's later separation of phenomenology from Brentanian descriptive psychology in the period immediately following the publication of the *Investigations*. It is shown that Husserl's departure from Brentano consists largely of a more restrictive conception of what is strictly speaking 'given' in experience, or *as what* it is given. In particular, Husserl charges Brentano of

relying on a methodologically unwarranted interpretation—a ‘psychological apperception’—of mental phenomena that still implicitly relies on an ontological commitment to a world of real spatiotemporal things.

The *third* section gives an overview of Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of meaning. Here it is demonstrated how Husserl resolves the *prima facie* incompatibility between the broadly Bolzanian and Brentanian theoretical approaches by a theory of meaning—inspired by Lotze’s interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of ideas—which conceptualizes objective propositions as universals or ideal *species* instantiated in individual intentional acts. This Lotzean conception therefore provides Husserl with the conceptual link between logical concepts and intentional acts that serves as a theoretical justification for the methodological approach of elucidating the former through descriptive analyses of the latter. In such analyses various phenomena pertaining to acts of judgment then have prominent position.

The final, *fourth* section gives an outline of Husserl’s general theory of intentional experiences and of what Brentano called the intentional relation. Husserl’s views are discussed against the background of, first, those aspects of Brentano’s doctrine that lend themselves to the view that the object of an experience is always something contained in that experience, and second, Twardowski’s earlier critical reaction to such a view and his ensuing distinction between the notions of the ‘content’ and ‘object’ of an experience. Afterwards, Husserl’s distinction between the ‘matter’ and ‘quality’ of an intentional experience, a generalization of a distinction in Brentano’s theory of judgment, is briefly discussed in a way that sets up the questions guiding Husserl’s analyses of acts of judging in the *Investigations*.

## 2.1 From the Foundations of Arithmetic to Pure Logic

Husserl’s interest in the diverse family of philosophical topics which he occasionally bundles together under the title of the ‘problem of judgment’ (*Urteilsproblem*)<sup>117</sup> arose initially in connection with foundational questions in logic. The way Husserl arrived at such questions, and at the theoretical outlook under which he pursued them, can be briefly outlined here, by considering some aspects of Husserl’s early views on the foundations of arithmetic and of the questions about logic that arose from his doubts concerning those early views. In his 1887 *Habilitationsschrift* on the concept of number and in the 1891 *Philosophy of Arithmetic* expanded upon it, Husserl had attempted to

<sup>117</sup> See e.g. HuaMat5, 4; Hua22, 370.

provide a general epistemological foundation for arithmetic by following a two-stage analytic strategy. *First*, Husserl gave a psychological account of the nature and origin of basic arithmetical concepts—in particular, those constitutive of the concept of a *cardinal number*, such as ‘multiplicity’ and ‘combination’. Such concepts, Husserl argues, have their origin in mental acts of counting and collecting, in which phenomena falling under these concepts are grasped ‘authentically’ (*eigentlich*) and intuitively. *Second*, Husserl then set out to provide an account of the cognitively secondary ways of grasping numbers and numerical magnitudes ‘inauthentically’ (*uneigentlich*), in an intuitively ‘empty’ way by means of *signs*, especially mathematical symbols.

Already before publication, Husserl came to doubt a basic presupposition underlying these works: the view that all arithmetic has a foundation in cardinality and its associated concepts, and that the rest of arithmetical concepts can be explained on the model of representing indirectly, by means of symbols, the outcomes of counting. As Husserl writes in a letter to Carl Stumpf dating probably from early 1891:

The opinion by which I was still guided in the elaboration of my *Habilitationsschrift*, to the effect that the concept of cardinal number forms the foundation of general arithmetic, soon proved to be false. [ . . . ] By no clever devices, by no “inauthentic representing,” can one derive negative, rational, irrational, and the various sorts of complex numbers from the concept of the cardinal number. The same is true of the ordinal concepts, of the concepts of magnitude, and so on. And these concepts themselves are not logical particularizations of the cardinal concept. (Husserl 1994, 13; Hua21, 245).

Husserl now claims that ‘general arithmetic’, the whole area of mathematics concerned with numbers—for which Husserl also borrows Newton’s expression ‘*arithmetica universalis*’—and which includes also for instance differential calculus, is not founded on some shared basic concepts, such as those he argued in *Philosophy of Arithmetic* to be constitutive of the concept of whole number. Instead, Husserl now takes it, the system of signs and rules of calculation defined for them has a certain independence: once the rules of the system are set up in the right way, following them always gives true results, and questions about the interpretation of the signs used in the intervening steps of the calculation becomes irrelevant (see Husserl 1994, 15; Hua21, 247). The whole system of general arithmetic, Husserl argues, hangs together by virtue of the logical structure of the system of rules for calculating with the relevant signs. Husserl’s conclusion, then, is that “*arithmetica universalis* is no science, but rather a segment of formal logic” (Husserl 1994, 17; Hua21, 248). Formal logic, for its part, is in Husserl’s view—as presented here—a *practical* discipline, the general study of manipulating signs according to rules, or, as Husserl puts it, “symbolic technique” (*ibid*). Following Brentano,

Husserl takes it that formal logic in this sense is part of the more general task of logic as a ‘technology’ (*Kunstlehre*) of knowledge (see *ibid*). However, investigating the nature of formal logic conceived as a calculational technique of this kind eventually led Husserl away from Brentano’s logical views towards the objective conception of logical subject matter characteristic of Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre*. In this respect, an important step was Husserl’s adoption of the view that understanding the epistemic significance of any such technique—especially as formulated in the form of *prescriptions* to carry out certain procedures under certain conditions—requires some kind of theoretical foundation. In the case of the techniques of ‘symbolic calculation’ in logic, such theoretical foundation requires in Husserl’s view the idea of *theories* considered formally as systems of logically interconnected propositions, or as what Husserl calls ‘formal deductive systems’ (*formale deduktive Systeme*).<sup>118,119</sup> These ideas are extensively developed in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*.

The question of the theoretical foundations of logic constitutes the main theme of the first volume of the *Investigations*, the 1900 *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*. The work divides broadly into three parts, each serving to introduce or defend the idea of pure logic as an *a priori* theoretical discipline studying the essential properties and constituents of, and relations between objective, ideal propositions. In the *first* part Husserl sets out from a Bolzanian conception of logic as a general ‘theory of science’, a discipline studying from a general point of view the parts of the scientific method that directly bear on the rational justification or ‘validation’ (*Begründung*) of claims. In particular, a theory of science has as its subject matter those forms of justification that are, as Husserl puts it, normative standards for the idea of ‘valid science as such’ (*gültige Wissenschaft als solche*).

<sup>118</sup> Husserl explicitly lays out this motivation in the preface to the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, in which he notes the background of the analyses pursued therein in questions concerning the foundations of mathematics. As Husserl notes, difficulties in carrying out investigations on these questions led him to realize that the concept of quantity does not belong to “the most universal essence of the mathematical”, and instead pushed him towards a “universal theory of formal deductive systems” of which arithmetic forms a part (LI, 1; Hua18, 6).

<sup>119</sup> A terminological note is in order here: what in modern logic is usually understood by a ‘formal deductive system’ consists of a formalized system of deductive reasoning. Such systems standardly consist of, at least, the following elements: a finite set of symbols, including variables and logical constants, from which alone the formulas of the system are formed; a set of rules that define the way these symbols can be put together into well-formed formulas that can then serve as premises or conclusions of inferences; a set of such formulas that are taken to be valid without proof, that is, axioms; and a set of rules of inference (see e.g. Quine 1986, 101). Husserl, on the other hand, generally seems to mean by a ‘formal deductive system’ any formalized *theory*, a system of deductively interconnected propositions whose material terms have been replaced by variables. What speaks in favor of this view are Husserl’s examples of such systems: for instance, Euclidian geometry is in Husserl’s sense a formal deductive system (see LI, 158; Hua18, 253), and the so-called ‘formation rules’ and rules of inference are obviously not *part of* a geometrical theory.

Among these, Husserl counts ‘logical laws’ such as the principle of non-contradiction and formal rules of inference that have application across all scientific disciplines (see LI, 20–21; 25; Hua18, 33–34; 41). Considered this way, logic is a *normative* discipline—it formulates principles on the basis of which one can evaluate whether a given claim is well-justified or not. However, Husserl argues that every normative discipline is dependent on one or more *theoretical* disciplines. The former put forward principles and aims of practical conduct as normative standards and ends to be pursued, whereas the latter investigate these in abstraction of their normative character or desirability (see LI, 38; Hua18, 59–60). For example, medicine as a practical discipline—so to speak, the ‘art of correct medical treatment’—formulates prescriptions that have as their goal the improvement of a patient’s health; but these prescriptions rely on knowledge formulated in non-normative statements about what effects such and such treatments would have. Such statements, then, make up the ‘theoretical foundation’ of medicine as a practical discipline in Husserl’s sense. Likewise, Husserl argues, if logic is understood as giving general prescriptions for how one ought to reason—for instance, in order to guarantee that one does not end up with false conclusions from true premises—this normative guise of logic has as its theoretical presupposition a non-normative investigation of what properties such and such forms of reasoning have.

In the *second* part of the work, Husserl engages in an extended polemic against the defenders of what Husserl calls ‘psychologism’ (*Psychologismus*) who attempted to locate such a theoretical basis for logic in empirical psychology. Husserl argues against such views on various grounds: by accusing psychologistic logicians of conceptual confusions, by contrasting logical laws with the laws of empirical sciences, and by attempting to demonstrate that the psychologistic views inevitably lead to an unacceptable and self-defeating theoretical position. On the *first* point, Husserl’s basic contention is that the psychologist fallaciously infers from the fact that mental *acts* of judging and reasoning are governed by psychological, causal laws to the conclusion that therefore the *contents* of those acts—namely, the logical laws themselves—must likewise be of a psychological nature (see LI, 49; 52; Hua18, 77; 82). *Secondly*, Husserl argues that laws in the empirical natural sciences have an inexact and probabilistic character, are knowable only *a posteriori*, and imply the existence of entities governed by them; logical laws on the other hand are, Husserl takes it, exact, are known *a priori*, and have no such ontological implications—in particular, they do not imply the existence of thinking beings or psychological processes (see LI, 46–48; 51; Hua18, 72–76; 80). *Third*, Husserl argues that by anchoring logical laws in contingent features of human cognitive faculties, psychol-

ogism leads to a relativistic conception of these laws and, likewise, of truth. However, a relativistic conception of truth and of the basic logical principles is, Husserl argues, self-contradictory; and, since these concepts and principles constitute the conditions of possibility for both rational justification and for any intelligible theory, the ‘psychologist’ ends up in the self-defeating position of defending as rationally justified a theory which denies the necessary preconditions for both the justifications and for what they purport to justify (see LI1, 76; 82–83; Hua18, 119; 130).<sup>120</sup>

These introductory and polemical parts lead to the systematically central *third* part of the *Prolegomena*, in which Husserl provides the first attempt for a positive outline of the true theoretical foundations of logic as a theory of science. Husserl now argues that such foundation is provided by a distinct, *a priori* discipline of ‘pure logic’ (*reine Logik*), whose domain is in essence that of Bolzano’s propositions and ideas ‘in themselves’—that is, the constituents of the contents of scientific theories, taken independently of the attitudes of the scientists. Husserl introduces the idea of such a discipline by distinguishing between two senses in which sciences can be considered as ‘unities’ (*Einheiten*), wholes made up of some kind of elements: *first*, as an anthropological and psychological unity of the mental acts and processes in the consciousness of scientists, and various practical and institutional arrangements related to them; and *second*, as a unity of deductively connected truths or putatively true propositions. Accordingly, the conditions of possibility of the basic presupposition of a practical theory of science—namely, what was since Hermann Cohen often referred to as the ‘fact of science’ (*Tatsache der Wissenschaft*)<sup>121</sup>—can be investigated along two corresponding dimensions: in terms of the

<sup>120</sup> Husserl provides various arguments against relativism, many of which rest on the presupposition that the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle are partially constitutive of the concepts of truth and falsity; in addition, Husserl notes particularly in connection to ‘specific’ relativism, first, that if truth were relative to the constitution of a biological species, then without such species there would be no truth; second, that if truth is relative to what a species is by its cognitive constitution bound to think, then there could be a species-relative truth that no such biological constitution exists; and third, since truth and existence are necessarily correlative concepts—in the sense that nothing can exist in any way without there being a truth to the effect that it exists in that manner—a relative truth would make the reality of which the biological species is part similarly relative. See LI1, 79–81; Hua18, 125–28.

<sup>121</sup> In his influential 1871 book *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, Hermann Cohen argued for an epistemological interpretation of Kant’s theoretical project; in Cohen’s view, the central task of the program culminating in Kant’s first *Critique* was a reflection on the epistemic preconditions on the ‘fact’ (*Factum*, *Tatsache*) of Newtonian natural science, and the ‘transcendental method’ was the methodological basis for carrying out such reflection (Cohen 1885, 67). Cohen argues that Kant’s concept of ‘experience’ (*Erfahrung*) is more closely connected with Bacon’s and Newton’s ‘experimental’ notion than with the ‘sensualistic’ concept of British empiricism; accordingly, ‘experience’—whose legitimation is the theme of transcendental critical reflection—is a “comprehensive expression for all facts and methods of scientific knowledge” (*Gesamt-Ausdruck* [...] *für alle jene Facten und Methoden wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis*) (*ibid.*, 59). In his *Prolegomena*, Husserl connects his project with the Kantian program understood broadly in this manner, by arguing that ‘experience’ in Kant’s sense is a special case of the theoretical



‘subjective’ conditions of possibility of scientific *knowledge*, which Husserl refers to as ‘noetic’ (*noetische*) conditions; and in terms of the ‘objective’ conditions of possibility of the theories themselves as theoretical unities, as formal deductive systems (see LI, 149–52; Hua18, 238–44). It is these latter conditions which constitute the subject matter of pure logic: the objective, ideal conditions of the possibility of formal theory as a systematic unity of propositions connected deductively in relations of ground and consequence—which, Husserl argues, is the normative ideal of all scientific knowledge (see LI, 149; Hua18, 239).

Husserl distinguishes three tasks for this *a priori* discipline, the two first of which correspond more or less with Bolzano’s ‘theory of elements’. The *first* is the clarification of various groups of basic concepts, such as the formal concepts constitutive of the general idea of a theory—for instance, those of ‘proposition’, ‘truth’, and ‘hypothetical connection’ as its ‘purely ideal’ (*rein ideelle*) elements (see LI, 151; 153; Hua18, 242, 245)—and the correlative concepts formally articulating the idea of a domain of *objects* of a theory—for example, ‘unity’, ‘plurality’, and ‘relation’. The *second* task is the study of ‘analytic’ laws whose truth or falsity depends only on their formal structure (see LI, 154; Hua18, 247). The *third* is the elaboration of a theory of different *a priori* possible forms of theories, which Husserl calls a ‘pure theory of manifolds’ (*reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*) (see LI, 155; Hua18, 248). The theory of manifolds explicates formally the possibilities for consistent axiomatic systems, as well as the *objective correlates* of such systems, namely, what Husserl calls ‘manifolds’ (*Mannigfaltigkeiten*)<sup>122</sup> as domains of objects “uniquely determined by falling under a theory of such a form” (LI, 156; Hua18, 250). That is, a manifold in Husserl’s sense is something determined completely by the what is explicitly defined for it and therefore possessing only those properties that can be deductively drawn from the axioms of the theory.

unity whose foundations are investigated by pure logic (LI, 149; Hua18, 239). In his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment, Husserl explicitly frames his discussion in terms of Cohen’s notion by stating that “[t]he great problem of logic and critique of knowledge is the fact of science” (*das große Problem der Logik und Erkenntniskritik ist die Tatsache der Wissenschaft*) (HuaMat5, 7).

<sup>122</sup> Husserl’s notion of a ‘manifold’ is adopted and adapted to his own purposes from his colleague in Halle, Georg Cantor, and secondarily from Bernhard Riemann’s geometrical work. See e.g. Hua21, 95–96, where Husserl contrasts Cantor’s definition of a manifold from his *Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* (1883) as a ‘totality’ (*Inbegriff*) of elements ‘unified’ (*geeinigter*) according to some rule with the narrower concept of a Riemannian manifold as an ‘ordered’ (*geordneter*) and ‘continuously connected’ (*kontinuierlich zusammenhängender*) totality. Here Husserl appears to have in mind, more precisely, Riemann’s definition—in his 1854 inaugural lecture at Göttingen—of a *continuous* manifold as a collection of instances of a general concept between which there is a ‘continuous transition’ (see Riemann 2016, 32). In the *Prolegomena*, Husserl references the mathematical background of the notion somewhat vaguely by simply stating that a field of objects determined by a set of axioms is “known in mathematical circles as a *manifold*” (LI, 156; Hua18, 250).

## 2.2 Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and Critique of Knowledge

The objective, anti-psychologistic conception of the subject matter of pure logic that is emphasized in the *Prolegomena* stands in at least an apparent tension with *another* basic theoretical conviction which becomes more prominent in the second volume of the *Investigations*: the view that the philosophical content of pure logic has to incorporate epistemological considerations which have a basis in, or at least an intimate connection to, psychology. As mentioned above, already in the *Prolegomena* Husserl alluded to a possible subjective dimension of inquiry complementing the objective orientation of pure logic, namely, one pertaining to the necessary, ‘noetic’ conditions of possibility of logical *knowledge*. Husserl argues that in addition to the empirical preconditions of knowledge with a basis in the contingent features of the human cognitive capacities, there are more general, non-empirical conditions of possibility rooted in the ‘form of subjectivity as such’ (*Subjektivität überhaupt*) (LI, 76; HuaI8, 119)—that is, in the essential characteristics of cognitive experience. Moreover, the logical task of constructing formal theories is in Husserl’s view a task for mathematicians, not philosophers. Accordingly, Husserl proposes that in the division of labor between mathematics and philosophy in the domain of logic the role of the philosopher is to provide epistemological clarifications of the basic concepts involved in those theories. Such clarifications require taking into account the subjective conditions of logical cognition, and as such, lead away from a straightforward concern with the Bolzanian ‘realm of truth’ to the universal, essential structures of the subjective (see LI, 159; HuaI8, 255).

During the time of preparation of the *Investigations*, Husserl’s idea of the methodological basis for such epistemological clarifications was clearly influenced by Brentano. In the introduction to the first edition of the second volume of the work, Husserl argues that the task of a ‘critique of knowledge’ (*Erkenntniskritik*) concerning elementary concepts in logic as elsewhere is to be built on the foundation of descriptive psychology, for which he also borrows one of the synonyms used by Brentano in his lectures, *phenomenology* (*Phänomenologie*)<sup>123</sup>. Accordingly, at this point, Husserl characterizes the role of phenomenological analysis in line with Brentano’s distinction between genetic and descriptive psychology, and uses that distinction to justify the idea of incorporating

<sup>123</sup> For instance, Brentano’s series of lectures from 1888–89 were entitled “Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology” (*Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie*) (see Brentano 1995b, 137). However, Brentano himself was not particularly attached to the term ‘phenomenology’; a similar lecture course was held in 1890–91 under the title “Psychognosy” (*Psychognosie*) (see *ibid.*, 3).

a psychological foundation for the epistemological dimension of pure logic, regardless of the strict separation made between empirical psychology and pure logic in the *Prolegomena*. Namely, it is not the theoretical, explanatory part of psychology which yields such a foundation—which would lead to the kind of psychologism criticized in the first volume—but only “certain classes of descriptions which are the step preparatory to the theoretical researches of psychology” (LI, 176; Hua19/I, 24n). That is, in agreement with Brentano, Husserl argues that a basic descriptive conception of the structure of thinking is indispensable for the philosophical interests of logic, since it is only possible to understand the function of basic logical concepts in knowledge by considering them with a view to the mental acts of thinking whose ideal contents they are.<sup>124</sup>

Almost immediately after the publication of the second volume of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl came to qualify this assignment of the theoretical basis of epistemological clarification to Brentanian descriptive psychology. In a review of various German writings on logic from the 1890's, published in 1903, Husserl distinguishes the phenomenology of knowledge—which he considers the true basis for a critique of knowledge—from descriptive psychology on the basis that even where the latter is separated from the empirical interests of causal explanation, it still incorporates presuppositions pertaining to such interests.<sup>125</sup> Namely, in order for descriptive psychology to yield a theoretical foundation for genetic, explanatory psychology, the phenomena analyzed by it have to be understood in the same sense in which the latter scientific enterprise takes them up in its explanations and correlates with various physical, causal processes. Any descriptive science can serve as a theoretical foundation for an explanatory one only if it gives an account of the very things whose causal relations are dealt with by the latter. In this sense, Husserl argues that descriptive psychology depends on the interpretation or ‘apperception’ (*Apperzeption*) of its subject matter as belonging to a world of real spatiotemporal things—namely, as mental states inhering in real subjects located in space.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Indeed, Husserl argues that since such considerations of the subjective counterpart of objective logical contents are necessary, and since viewing this subjective dimension in empirical terms only in connection to the contingent psychological constitution of the human mind would lead to psychologism in the problematic sense, the latter “can only be radically overcome by pure phenomenology” (LI, 169; Hua19/I, 12).

<sup>125</sup> Accordingly, in the second edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl replaces the passage equating phenomenology and descriptive psychology with one in which the two are separated precisely on the basis that the latter makes statements about mental phenomena “to refer to the real states of animal organisms in a real natural order”, whereas phenomenology does not discuss such real states as such but only their essential characteristics and “excludes the natural performance of all empirical (naturalistic) apperceptions and positings” (LI, 175–7; Hua19/I, 23).

<sup>126</sup> See Husserl 1994, 250; Hua22, 206–7: “As physics, or natural science in the ordinary sense, is the empirical science of physical facts, so psychology is the empirical science (the natural science) of mental

Phenomenological analysis on the contrary focuses exclusively on what is *given* in experience “in the strongest of senses”<sup>127</sup>, independently of the ‘psychological’ apperceptions through which what is given is taken to belong to such a world of real things or correlated with a real psychological subject, whereas such apperceptions themselves belong to the domain to be clarified in the critique of knowledge by means of phenomenological reflection (see Husserl 1994, 251–2; Hua22, 207–8).<sup>128</sup>

### 2.3 Expression and the Ideality of Meaning

Regardless of these clarifications of the methodological basis of the critique of knowledge, an inherent tension remains between the two basic theoretical commitments underlying the *Investigations*: the view of logical subject matter as consisting of objective propositions, truths, and laws which “are what they are whether we have insight into them or not” (LI, 150; Hua18, 240), and the view of a descriptive analysis of subjective experience as the basis for clarifying the conceptual content and epistemic function of the former, even if such experience is to be considered only as to its essential aspects, and in abstraction from presuppositions concerning its relations to the causal nexus of spatiotemporal reality. Thus, during the period of preparing the work, Husserl was faced with the problem of framing the ontological nature of the objects of pure logic and their relation to experience in such a way as to justify this descriptive, phenomenological approach to logical concepts without losing sight of the objectivity and the exact and *a priori* character of the discipline concerned with them. Here it will be argued that Husserl’s solution to this problem was his theory of meanings as ideal species instantiated in individual intentional acts.

Since much of Husserl’s outlook on logic was inspired through his reading of Bolzano, it is relevant to note that the *Wissenschaftslehre* was not very clear on these questions.

facts. Both sciences proceed from the ‘world’ in the common, pre-critical sense of the word, with its division of facts into the physical and the mental. [...] [E]mpirical psychology [...] even where it merely describes, makes such suppositions”.

<sup>127</sup> See Husserl 1994, 251; Hua22, 207. Husserl’s formulation clearly echoes Brentano’s proclamation in the 1888–89 lectures on descriptive psychology that descriptive psychology focuses exclusively on “what is perceived by us in the strict sense of the word” (Brentano 1995b, 137), that is, mental phenomena presented in inner perception. Thus Husserl’s objection to Brentano amounts to the contention that Brentano misinterprets what is perceived ‘in the strict sense’ by implicitly attributing properties of real entities to it.

<sup>128</sup> Accordingly, the difference between pure phenomenology and descriptive psychology, Husserl argues, is in whether experiences are viewed in light of the psychological apperceptions, or in abstraction from them, and when these are included, phenomenological analysis acquires the character of descriptive psychology and “functions as the foundation for the theoretical explanations of psychology, the natural science of mental phenomena” (Husserl 1994, 252; Hua22, 207).

As noted in the previous chapter, in treating the relation between subjective and objective ideas and propositions, Bolzano relied on a number of different expressions—of the propositions ‘appearing’ (*erscheinen*), being ‘grasped’ (*aufgefasst*) in and constituting the ‘material’ (*Stoff*) of acts of judging—none of which were analyzed in any detail. Moreover, although Bolzano attributed various properties to them, the ontological status of propositions and ideas in themselves was never fleshed out in a clear manner. Thus, instead of Bolzano, Husserl found a basis for clarifying the relation of the subjective and the objective dimensions of logical thought in the work of Lotze, particularly in the latter’s interpretation of Plato.<sup>129</sup> Husserl took from Lotze, in modified forms, all the essential characteristics Lotze ascribed to Platonic ideas: their distinct manner of being presented in consciousness on the basis of individual experiences through an ‘ideal apprehension’, which Husserl also calls ideation or ‘ideational abstraction’ (*ideierende Abstraktion*)<sup>130</sup>; their validity rather than existence as the mode of ‘being’ pertaining to them; and the relation of a universal—or, in Husserl’s preferred Aristotelian term, a *species* (*Spezies*)—to individuals instantiating it as the model for conceiving of their connection to experiences of thinking.

These Lotzean views are developed particularly in the First and Second Logical Investigations, in which they take the form of a theory of meaning. Husserl’s interest here is to clarify phenomenologically that which remains identical when the ‘same’ judgment or statement is made by different persons or at different times, or what in Bolzano’s words is not ‘multiplied’ (*vervielfacht*) in the different individual occurrences.<sup>131</sup> The approach Husserl takes is to start from the observation that logical contents are ordinarily given linguistically or in a ‘grammatical clothing’ (*grammatische Gewande*), in the form of spoken or written statements; to formulate a descriptive analysis of the experiences by virtue of which such linguistic items are given as meaningful expressions rather than

<sup>129</sup> Thus, in 1903, in a review of a work by Melchior Palágyi, a Hungarian philosopher, who presented Husserl’s doctrine as nothing more than a restatement of Bolzano, Husserl emphasizes the influence of Lotze, and writes that only on the basis of Lotze’s interpretation of Plato he found a key to the “at first unintelligible” views of Bolzano, and particularly a cogent conception of the latter’s *Sätze an sich*, which without the support of Lotze appeared to be nothing but “mythical entities, suspended between being and non-being” (Husserl 1994, 201; Hua22, 156). In a 1913 sketch for a preface for the second edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl presents the two influences as mutually dependent, and writes that he was able to “demonstrate, step by step, the ‘Platonic’ interpretation simultaneously with Bolzano’s presentation” (*Schritt für Schritt* [...] *zugleich an den Bolzano’schen Darstellungen die ‘platonische’ Interpretation bewähren*) (Hua20/1, 297).

<sup>130</sup> Husserl directly alludes to Lotze’s expression for meanings as ‘ideally apprehended’ (*ideell gefasste*) contents in the introduction to the Fifth Investigation; see Hua19/1, 352; LI2, 79.

<sup>131</sup> See Bolzano, 78; cf. LI1, 229; Hua19/1, 105. As a terminological detail, although Husserl clearly alludes to Bolzano’s expression, he uses a slightly different term, *vervielfältigen* rather than *vervielfachen* for the ‘multiplication’ of experiences against a numerically identical meaning.

as mere physical things; and to distinguish and give an account of the relations between a ‘subjective’ and an ‘objective’ side to what is thereby expressed.

The basic descriptive starting point of Husserl’s analysis of experiences of *expression* (*Ausdruck*) is the observation that in linguistic expressions, something is meant ‘by’ something, which Husserl analyzes as involving two abstractly separable experiential functions: the perceptual or imaginary consciousness of a written or spoken word as a physical object serving as a ‘carrier of meaning’ (*Bedeutungsträger*)<sup>132</sup>, and a ‘meaning-conferring’ (*Bedeutungsverleihende*) act which accounts for the descriptive difference between the consciousness of a physical thing and that of a meaningful sign.<sup>133</sup> Husserl takes some care to argue against those theories—most commonly associated in modern times with the view propounded by Locke in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)—which likewise viewed meanings as expressions of something psychological but understood them in terms of mental imagery associatively connected with words.<sup>134</sup> As Husserl notes, while such images often do accompany expressions as ‘intuitive illustrations’ (*Veranschaulichungen*), their presence is not necessary and is nearly unintelligible for many expressions such as the abstract concepts of mathematics (LI, 206–7; Hua19/1, 67–9). Instead, Husserl argues that meaning-conferring acts are signitive or symbolic experiences in which a reference to an object is set up without intuitive content, and which is in a sense directed at a possible intuitive experience which would ‘fulfill’ (*erfüllen*) the by itself empty meaning (LI, 192; Hua19/1, 44).<sup>135</sup>

Husserl distinguishes various things which can be said to be ‘expressed’ by a meaningful expression, which fall broadly under ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects of meaning. In one sense, words express—in the sense of ‘giving voice to’ or ‘intimating’ (*kundgeben*)—particular mental items, namely the experiences or acts which render them mean-

<sup>132</sup> LI, 213; Hua19/1, 78. Cf. Hua26, 13: “[T]he verbal appearances (and more generally, verbal presentations) are bearers of acts of meaning.” (*Die Worterscheinungen (und allgemeiner die Wortvorstellungen) sind Träger von Bedeutungsakten.*)

<sup>133</sup> As Husserl notes, in a concrete experience of a meaningful sign such as a word, the two elements are only abstractly separable, since the word *itself* is experienced as meaningful rather than being connected with some separate meaningful item (LI, 193; Hua19/1, 45).

<sup>134</sup> To be sure, the basic idea that words are expressions of internal mental states or acts goes back at least to Aristotle’s definition of them as ‘symbols of affections in the soul’, quoted in the previous chapter. For Locke’s view, see the passage of the *Essay* where he states that the meanings of words consist in “the *Ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them” (Locke 1975, 422), and a previous passage in which ‘ideas’, as used by Locke, are characterized as “as it were, Pictures of Things” (*ibid.*, 366). However, for a defense of Locke’s theory of meaning against accusations of ‘mentalism’, see Landesman 1976.

<sup>135</sup> In this context, Husserl distinguishes meaningless (*bedeutungslos*) expressions such as ‘abracadabra’ and syntactically ill-formed expressions such as ‘green is or’ from senseless (*sinnlos*) expressions such as ‘square circle’, which have a meaning, but one that excludes *a priori* the possibility of meaning-fulfillment. See LI, 201–2; Hua19/1, 59–61.

ingful or give them intuitive content.<sup>136</sup> Each such intimated ‘act of meaning’ (*Akt des Bedeutens*) includes, as an abstractly separable constituent, a determinate ‘act-character’, to which Husserl also refers in the First and Second Investigations as a peculiar ‘coloration’ or ‘tincture’ (*Tinktion*) of the acts<sup>137</sup>, and which specifies the object it is directed at. On the objective side, on the other hand, words express their *meanings* which are strictly identical in each instance of a word or sentence and therefore cannot be contained in the individual acts as their ‘real’ (*reelle*) constituents. Against views which identified meaning with the *object* designated by an expression, and in agreement with others—such as Twardowski’s<sup>138</sup> and Frege’s<sup>139</sup>—Husserl distinguishes the two on the grounds that the same object can be referred to by expressions differing in meaning, such as in the case of the equivalent expressions ‘equilateral triangle’ and ‘equiangular triangle’ (LI, 197; Hua19/I, 53). Rather than the object itself, the ‘meaning’ of an expression is that *through* which it designates the object, a specific manner of referring to the latter (LI, 198; Hua19/I, 54).

Thus, in Husserl’s model each meaningful expression has its reference to an object by virtue of what it expresses, which for its part can be understood in the sense of an intimated meaning-conferring act or an objective meaning. Moreover, what is expressed in these two senses correspond with two notions of the ‘content’ (*Inhalt*) of the expressions: in a psychological sense, the content of an expression is a real part of the meaning-conferring act—namely, the act-character defining the designated object—whereas the logical content is a “self-identical intentional unity set over against the dispersed multiplicity of actual and possible experience” (LI, 228; Hua19/I, 102). On Bolzano’s conception, ideas ‘in thought’ and ‘in themselves’ constituted a pair of distinct, parallel entities—one a real ‘adherence’ in an individual mind, the other something non-real and independent of anything mental—each with their own reference to the same objects; Husserl instead takes up Lotze’s proposal and conceives of the relation between

<sup>136</sup> Husserl distinguishes, furthermore, a ‘narrower’ (*engeren*) and ‘broader’ (*weiteren*) sense of intimation. In the narrower sense, only the act which confers meaning on an expression is given voice to, whereas in the wider sense “*all* acts that a hearer may introject into a speaker on the basis of what he says” are intimated (LI, 189; Hua19, 40). For example, in stating that I see a table, the *judgment* “I see a table” in which the meaning to be apprehended by a listener is constituted, is intimated in the narrow sense, whereas the *perception* of the table is intimated only in the wider sense (*ibid*).

<sup>137</sup> See e.g. LI, 237; Hua19/I, 111.

<sup>138</sup> Twardowski primarily uses equivalent expressions as an argument for distinguishing between the content and object of a mental presentation (Twardowski 1977, 29); however, in Twardowski’s view, the meaning of an expression is the content of the mental presentation intimated by it (*ibid*, 9).

<sup>139</sup> For Frege’s distinction between *Bedeutung* as “what a sign designates” and *Sinn* as the “mode of presentation” of the designated object, see Frege 1984, 158.

the two as that of a universal—a *species*—to an instantiating particular. Thus, the relation between a meaning-conferring act and the corresponding ideal meaning is analogous to that between, for instance, the color red as a universal and a particular red object (LI, 237; Hua19, 111): an abstractly separable part in both the red object—the particular instance of red color—and the intentional act—its intentional ‘tincture’—instantiates what can be identically present in a number of such objects or acts. Likewise, the reference of an ideal meaning to an object is simply the relation between a meaning-conferring act and its object, considered universally or, as Husserl puts it, ‘*in specie*’.

Accordingly, meanings as ideal species are in Husserl’s view ‘universal objects’ (*allgemeine Gegenstände*). However, Husserl argues that this claim does not amount to a metaphysical doctrine but a “theory of knowledge which recognizes the ‘ideal’ as a condition for the possibility of objective knowledge in general” (LI, 238; Hua19/I, 112) and constitutes a central part of the theoretical basis for the rejection of psychologism and of the epistemological clarification of pure logic. Here again Husserl draws inspiration from Lotze for distinguishing a ‘metaphysical’ from an epistemological doctrine, and for outlining a descriptive basis for the experiences in which meanings can be presented in consciousness. *First*, Husserl argues against the ‘metaphysical hypostatization’ committed by those views, traditionally associated with Platonism, which conceived of ideas as having ‘real existence’ (*reales Sein*) in some kind of supersensible realm—in what Plato famously alluded to as a “region above the heaven” (ὑπερουράνιον)<sup>140</sup>. Husserl adopts Lotze’s view that the traditional hypostatizations resulted from mistaken attempts to assimilate all being to that of real spatiotemporal things (LI, 226; 230–31; Hua19/I, 99; 106). Instead of having such real existence, ideal objects exist only in the sense of being *valid* regardless of any relations to thought or to real things, or as correlates of something valid, in the sense in which—in Husserl’s paradigmatic arithmetical case—a number satisfying some specified conditions is the objective correlate of a valid mathematical proof of existence (Husserl 1994, 202; Hua22, 157). *Second*, whereas Bolzano had characterized ideas and propositions in thought as the ‘appearance’ of their objective counterparts, Husserl argues that meanings ‘appear’ in the sense of becoming objects of consciousness only through ideational abstraction based on reflection on the acts.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>140</sup> See *Phaed.* 247c. Cf. LI, 230; Hua19/I, 106.

<sup>141</sup> Husserl distinguishes ideational abstraction, through which an ideal species is meant, from abstraction in the sense of emphatic attention on an object or some part thereof, such as in the case of paying attention only to the color of an object. Husserl argues that traditional theories of abstraction, in particular, that of Locke, conflated the two, which in part led them to confuse the ideal from the real psychological contents of an experience (see Hua19/I, 218; LI, 308).



This analysis provides Husserl with the conceptual resources to give an account of the relation between the objective subject matter of pure logic and the subjective experiences that have the former as their ideal contents. Just as arithmetic is not concerned with the numerical magnitudes of any particular collections of objects, nor with mental presentations of such magnitudes in anyone's consciousness, but with numbers as universals which can be identically instantiated or presented in an infinite number of such collections and experiences, likewise the concepts, propositions, and inferences of pure logic form, as constituents of the objective content of possible theory, an "ideal fabric of *meanings*" in the sense of species of possible acts of meaning (LI, 226; Hua19/1, 100).<sup>142</sup> Since it is the descriptive character of those experiences—and in particular that abstractly separable character by virtue of which they are directed at their objects—which provides the basis for the abstractions in which the ideal meanings can themselves be grasped in the first place, the phenomenological analysis of the essential features of meaning-conferring experiences is a necessary precondition for the epistemological clarification of logical concepts.

In particular, since the dominant interest of pure logic is—as Husserl argued in the *Prolegomena*—in the *a priori* possible forms and structure of theory, a systematic unity of *propositions*, the central concern for such epistemological clarification is the analysis of those acts or complexes of acts which have propositions as their ideal contents, and which are ordinarily expressed linguistically in the form of declarative sentences. This leads Husserl, particularly in the Fifth Investigation, to enter into detailed analyses of different experiential phenomena traditionally associated with acts of judgment. Before getting to Husserl's analyses specifically concerning acts of judging, however, it is still important to consider some of the more general aspects in Husserl's theory of intentional experiences and of the nature of what Brentano called the 'intentional relation'.

## 2.4 The Theory of Intentional Experiences

As seen above, the Lotze-inspired theory of meaning provided Husserl with an essential conceptual link between intentional acts considered as particular occurrences in consciousness and the objective, ideal subject matter of pure logic. This link then served an important role in justifying the broadly Brentanian methodological approach of clarifying logical concepts by means of a descriptive-psychological or phenomenological

<sup>142</sup> For Husserl's comparisons between the domains of objects of arithmetic and pure logic, see e.g. LI, 109–11; Hua18, 173–77.

analysis of conscious experience, without the resulting view thereby falling into a psychologistic position of the kind rejected in the *Prolegomena*. An obvious *desideratum* for such an approach is a general philosophical theory and a conceptual framework for the analysis of conscious experience. The development of such a theory and framework forms the topic especially of the Fifth Logical Investigation. Here, among other things, Husserl sets out to investigate in detail the nature of the meaningful element on the basis of which an experience is directed at an object and which is the mental correlate of the ideal meaning with which pure logic is concerned. This interest leads Husserl to formulate a general descriptive analysis of *intentional experiences* (*intentionale Erlebnisse*) or ‘acts’ (*Akte*)<sup>143</sup> and of their general structure and basic constituent elements.

To begin with, Husserl distinguishes between three different concepts of consciousness, which he accuses Brentano of conflating with one another: *first*, consciousness as the “real phenomenological being of the empirical ego” in the Humean sense of a ‘bundle of perceptions’<sup>144</sup>; *second*, in the sense of *self-consciousness*, inner awareness or, roughly, Lockean ‘inner sense’; and *third*, as consciousness *of* something, that is, in the sense of the Brentanian intentional relation to an object (LI2, 81; Hua19/I, 356). As Husserl sees it, Brentano had tacitly assumed that everything belonging to consciousness in the first sense has both of the characteristics defining the two latter concepts, of being perceived—moreover, in an incorrigible, self-evident manner—in inner perception and exhibiting the intentional relation. Husserl agrees with Brentano on the first point but notes that not everything belonging to consciousness is intentionally directed to an object; in particular, sensations are as such not intentional but belong to consciousness in the sense of being elements of perceptual experiences (LI2, 97; Hua19/I, 382). Accordingly, Brentano’s thesis about the intentional relation demarcates only a special case of ‘mental phenomena’—that is, intentional experiences.

Already prior to Husserl, a common theme of discontent about Brentano’s theory revolved around his use of the Scholastic notion of intentional ‘inexistence’ and the

<sup>143</sup> Traditionally, the notion of mental ‘acts’ was associated with the active or spontaneous performances of the mind or the intellect, as in the Scholastic notion of *actus intellectus*, used, as seen in the first chapter, for example by Ockham (see *Ord.* I.I.1). Likewise, as noted previously, Descartes distinguishes the ‘actions’ of mind from its ‘passions’ on the basis of whether they originate in and are initiated by, or are merely undergone by the mind (see Descartes 1984, 335). In the introduction to the Fifth Investigation, Husserl expressly defines ‘acts’ in a way separated from this question of the activity and passivity of mind or consciousness, exclusively on the basis of the intentional direction to an object; thus, ‘act’ in the sense used in the *Investigations* designates simply an intentional experience (see LI2, 80; Hua19/I, 353).

<sup>144</sup> Husserl explicitly refers to the Humean notion of a ‘bundle’ (*Bündel*) of conscious experiences in the first edition of the Fifth Investigation and uses as another metaphor that of an ‘interweaving’ (*Verwebung*) of such experiences. See Hua19/I, 356n.

identification of the concepts of the ‘object’ (*Gegenstand*) and the ‘content’ (*Inhalt*) of an experience. Both terminological conventions seemed to imply that the object of an experience is contained in that experience itself. As was argued in the first chapter, this was indeed a tenet of Brentano’s doctrine, at least as presented in the phenomenalist methodological framing of the *Psychology* and in the psychological lectures from 1888 to 1891, in which the real physical counterpart of an immanent object of perception was expressly excluded from the intentional relation. In response, more realistic conceptions of the intentional relation were proposed by Brentano’s followers, most notably by Kasimir Twardowski in his 1894 book *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. Twardowski distinguished between the object and content of experience by arguing that there is an ambiguity in what can be said to be ‘presented’ (*vorgestellt*) in an experience, analogously to the two senses in which something can be said to be painted by an artist. Just as a painter in one sense paints, for example, a landscape, and in another, a picture in which that landscape is depicted, an experience likewise presents in one sense an object, such as a perceived external thing, and in another, an immanent content ‘through which’ that object is presented in the first sense (see Twardowski 1977, 1–2; 12–13).<sup>145</sup> This content is what is presented in an experience even where the real object does not exist, and what varies between different presentations of the same object, such as the presentations underlying different names for the same object (see *ibid*, 27–8).

In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl continues this line of critical modifications of Brentano’s view, although he disagrees with Twardowski’s analysis on various points.<sup>146</sup> Husserl argues against the idea that the objects of an experience are contained in the experience in the sense of elements partially constituting it, and distinguishes between

<sup>145</sup> Despite using this analogy between picturing and mental presentation as a heuristic device, Twardowski takes issue with the idea that the relationship between the content and object of a presentation would be one of an external object being depicted in a mental picture, which he calls a “primitive” psychological conception (Twardowski 1977, 64). In Twardowski’s view, the relation of a presentation to its object can be either one in which the object is conceived of as simple, that is, through a simple content, or one in which the object is conceived of as complex or having distinct constituents. In the simple case, Twardowski argues that the relation is conceptually primitive and cannot be further analyzed, while in the complex case it can only be analyzed on the basis of the simple relations of its elements (*ibid*, 76).

<sup>146</sup> In particular, already in an unpublished 1896 review of the book, Husserl charges Twardowski with psychologism on the basis that the latter did not distinguish between the content of an experience—and accordingly, the meaning of a corresponding expression—in the subjective, psychological sense and in the objective and ideal logical sense later emphasized in the *Investigations* (see Husserl 1994, 388–89n; Hua22, 349–50n). Accordingly Twardowski failed to pay attention to the sense in which the *same* content, rather than only the same object can be shared among different people, which becomes problematic if content is to be immanent to the individual experiences. These misgivings concerning Twardowski’s view are then recapitulated at the end of the Fifth Investigation (see LI, 175; Hua19/1, 527–8).

what he calls the ‘real’ (*reelle*) and the ‘intentional’ contents of experience, in addition to the ideal, logical contents analyzed in the First and Second Investigations. The real contents of an intentional act are the concrete and abstract parts of the experience itself, while the intentional content comprises those things which are ‘parts’ of the experience only by virtue of its being intentionally directed at an object, akin to the manner in which the subject of a picture is a part of that picture only by virtue of being depicted by it.<sup>147</sup> On the basis of this distinction, Husserl objects to the talk about inexistence and the ‘immanent objects’ of experience in the sense of objects belonging to the experience as its real contents. Husserl argues that in an intentional act, only the experience itself is really present in consciousness, and this experience has the ‘descriptive character’ (*deskriptiver Charakter*)—that is, a character demonstrable through phenomenological description of that experience—of directedness towards a certain object. The object of experience is not intended by way of an internal counterpart, which would constitute a real part of the experience, but simply by virtue of the experience having this character of intending or being directed to an object. Since the direction to an object is part of the internal, descriptive makeup of the experience rather than a genuine, ‘real relation’ (*reales sich Beziehen*) between objects, it is independent of whether the object intended exists (LI2, 98–9; Hua19/I, 386). On these grounds, Husserl argues that the ‘intentional’ and the ‘actual’ object of an act are identical, and distinguishing between the two would be “absurd” (LI2, 127; Hua19/I, 439)—namely, a consequence of the failure to draw the basic conceptual distinction between real and intentional content.<sup>148</sup>

In order to more precisely analyze those constituents of an experience by virtue of which it has its specific intentional direction, Husserl also takes up and generalizes the

<sup>147</sup> Like Twardowski, Husserl argues against what he calls the ‘image-theory’ of the relation between perception and its object. As Husserl notes, pictorial representation requires the perceptual presence of an object serving as an image of the depicted object, and therefore appealing to the pictorial model in explaining perception either sets off an infinite regress or tacitly presupposes a model of perception unmediated by images (see LI2, 125–6; Hua19/I, 436–7).

<sup>148</sup> Whether and to what extent this should be taken as a sign of a realistic outlook on Husserl’s part is not entirely clear. In a text from 1896 titled “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”—to which he later referred as a “first sketch of the *Logical Investigations*”, particularly of the Third and Fifth (see Husserl 1994, 491; Hua24, 443)—Husserl argues that the concept of a mind-independent object in the sense of a “objective unity of parts and properties [ . . . ] coexisting independently of our consciousness” does not belong to our ordinary conceptual scheme, but is the product of philosophical reflection. As Husserl claims, to ‘natural thought’ (*natürliche Denken*) the thing itself simply is a harmonious sequence of intuitive appearances in which the object is seen from all perspectives (Husserl 1994, 158; Hua22, 111). This suggests that already during the time of preparing the *Investigations* Husserl’s position included idealistic tendencies, contrary to a traditional view of the development of Husserl’s metaphysical outlook from the realism of the *Investigations* to transcendental idealism by the publication of the first volume of the *Ideas* in 1913; for a classic statement and defense of this latter view, see Ingarden (1975).

distinction, which Brentano had drawn for judgments, between the ‘matter’ (*Materie*) and the ‘quality’ (*Qualität*) of an act. As seen above, what Brentano called the matter of a judgment was that element—on Brentano’s view, an underlying presentation—which determined the object to which it is directed, while its quality consisted of the specific kind of intentional relation to that object—that is, one of *acknowledging* or *rejecting* its existence. Husserl broadens this distinction to cover all intentional acts. The matter of an act is that which determines both the intended *object* as well as the *manner* in which it is intended, that is, ‘as what’ it is grasped (LI2, 121–2; Hua19/1, 430–1). Husserl’s reason for attributing this double function to the matter of an act is the same as that for distinguishing the meaning of a linguistic expression from the object meant by it: just as different co-referring expressions differ in meaning while the object designated by them is identical, so also intentional acts can be directed towards the same object in terms of its different properties, or otherwise under different aspects, for instance from different perspectives. The *quality* of an act accounts for the different types of intentional direction to the same object in terms of the same characteristics, such as asking about, wishing for, and believing in it (*ibid*). Together, these two elements of any intentional act make up what Husserl calls the ‘intentional essence’ (*intentionale Wesen*) of the act, that is, those elements essential for determining its basic intentional characteristics. Moreover, as Husserl now claims, the intentional essence of an act—or, more precisely, the corresponding ‘semantic essence’ (*bedeutungsmäßige Wesen*) of an expressive act giving voice to it—is that which directly corresponds in a particular intentional act to the ideal content or meaning that is pertinent to the interests of pure logic (LI2, 122–3; Hua19, 431). That is, the intentional or semantic essence is that part of a particular intentional act by virtue of which it instantiates the corresponding ideal meaning.

Although Husserl’s distinction between matter and quality largely agrees with Brentano’s on this general level—or, as Husserl states in a text from 1903, is on a certain interpretation identical with it “from the formal point of view” (*formal betrachtet*) (Husserl 1994, 232; Hua22, 187)—he deems the latter to contain various misguided conceptual assimilations as well as a too simplistic descriptive analysis of the relevant experiential phenomena. Accordingly, much of the Fifth Investigation is devoted to painstaking descriptive considerations in the service of the attempt to formulate a correct account of this elementary structure of intentional acts. Husserl frames this discussion in terms of Brentano’s principle, mentioned in the previous chapter, according to which every mental act is either a presentation in which one is simply ‘presented with’—that is, is

conscious of—some object, or a composite or ‘superposed’ experience which necessarily includes a presentation as its basis and relates to its object in a twofold way. Husserl considers this principle from various perspectives by distinguishing between several senses of the word ‘presentation’ (*Vorstellung*), which Brentano in Husserl’s view failed to distinguish. The three most important of these are, *first*, ‘presentation’ in the sense of an act in which something is presented in a way that is indifferent as to whether the object exists; *second*, ‘presentation’ in the sense of the kind of intentional act underlying the reference of a *name*, that is, what Husserl calls a ‘nominal act’; and *third*, ‘presentation’ in the sense of what Husserl calls ‘objectivating acts’ (*objektivierende Akte*) in which something is simply presented as an object in consciousness without the presence of further attitudes towards it, such as the positive or negative evaluation characteristic of emotions.<sup>149</sup> These different concepts motivate different considerations of the nature of and relation between the matter and quality of intentional acts: according to Brentano, the matter of a judgment is an underlying presentation, which claim takes on different senses depending on what is meant by ‘presentation’. In the next chapter, Husserl’s analyses, in the *Investigations* and in other texts from the same period, of the nature of judgment—of the structural articulation of both the acts and their ‘contents’ as well as their relations to their objects—are discussed in detail, in part against the background of these aspects of Brentano’s theory, and in part from the broader point of view of different historical conceptions of judgment.

<sup>149</sup> For Husserl’s summary of the results of his conceptual disambiguations, see the final chapter of the Fifth Investigation (LI2, 171f; Hua19/1, 52of), where in addition to these three, several further senses of ‘presentation’ are distinguished.

### 3 Husserl on the Nature, Structure, and Objects of Acts of Judging

As was seen in the first chapter, modern theories of judgment for the most part took as their starting point the distinction between *judging* and merely *apprehending*, *conceiving* of, or *understanding* something without rendering a judgment about it. The basic motivation for these views was the idea that since it is possible to so ‘apprehend’ the same thing that could also be taken to be the case, judgment must be something in addition to a prior or underlying apprehension. This idea then naturally invited the conception of judgment as an act of *assenting to* or *dissenting from* what is grasped in the more basic act of apprehension. Consequently, this was characterized in the first chapter as the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception of the nature of judgment, which was distinguished from what was called above the Platonic-Aristotelian conception. On this older view, the starting point for an analysis of judgments and their linguistic counterparts, statements, was in distinguishing between, on the one hand, the structurally simpler acts or experiences of *naming* or straightforwardly *perceiving* something, and on the other, the making of a statement or judgment *about* the thing named or perceived. That is, on this view it was taken to be *predication*, usually understood on the psychological level as involving a ‘combining’ or ‘separating’ of ideas, that was taken as the essential function of acts of judging. On the views of Plato, Aristotle, and their philosophical inheritors, the affirmation or denial of something consists or takes place *in* predication rather than being something subsequently added upon it or to its result. To be sure, also on the competing conception, it was almost universally accepted in the tradition that predication is *necessary* for judgment, though perhaps not *sufficient*. One may then reasonably say that on the Platonic-Aristotelian conception, the two ‘logical functions’ of predication and affirmation were not clearly separated even *conceptually*, whereas on the apprehension–assent view they were separated so to say *in rebus*, by assigning them to two psychologically distinct mental acts.

When viewed against this historical background, much of Husserl’s analyses of the nature of acts of judging in the period of the *Logical Investigations* can be seen as a critical confrontation with the main tenets of the apprehension–assent conception, in particular in the form they took in Brentano’s theory. As was seen above, Brentano defended a view that exhibited all the central ideas of the apprehension–assent conception, although

formulated in his own conceptual and theoretical framework, and only rejected the aspect that was traditionally carried over from the Platonic-Aristotelian conception—the importance of the subject–predicate distinction, and the ‘categorical’ structure usually expressed in the formula ‘*S* is *p*’, for the philosophical and logical analysis of judgment. The theoretical core of Brentano’s views is codified in the principle, mentioned above, according to which all mental phenomena are either ‘presentations’ (*Vorstellungen*) or are based upon such presentations. In the case of acts of judging, this principle took the form of several interrelated ideas, which for the current purposes can be summarized in four parts. *First*, each judgment *contains* an act of ‘merely presenting’ the subject matter of the judgment in a way that leaves it open whether it exists, and furthermore, this element is what determines the direction of the intentional reference of the judgment, its ‘matter’ (*Materie*). *Second*, what is added to this underlying presentation consists in an act of *acceptance* or *rejection* of what is presented as existing, which form the two contrary ‘qualities’ (*Qualitäten*) of acts of judging. *Third*, there is a hierarchical relation between presentation and judgment, with the former being the structurally simpler and more elementary mental phenomenon. *Fourth*, a presentation in Brentano’s view is the kind of thing that finds its most appropriate expression in a *name*, and, since a presentation completely determines what is judged in a judgment, no additional structural articulation is brought about in the latter. In a word, there is in Brentano’s view no sentence-like syntactic structure on the level of what is philosophically fundamental, in the intentional structure of thinking and judging as mental phenomena.

In this chapter, Husserl’s analyses of the nature, structure, and objects of acts of judging are discussed against the background of these four ideas, considered both in the specific form in which Brentano held them and as reflecting or contrasting with the broader historical views distinguished above. As already indicated, Husserl on the one hand develops his views in a way that can in large part be seen as a critical appropriation of Brentano’s descriptive-psychological method and much of its conceptual framework, and on the other hand, ends up in a position diametrically opposed to Brentano’s in terms of the ideas enumerated above. Since Brentano accepted all the typical tenets of the apprehension–assent conception *except* the one also shared by the Platonic-Aristotelian view, Husserl’s diametrically opposed position on these points amounts—as will be argued below—in effect to a critical rehabilitation of this latter view. The chapter is structurally organized so as to discuss each of the four ideas in relative separation from the others, even if most of them are clearly connected with one another in one way or another; this occasionally results in rehearsing broadly speaking the same points several



times, but as viewed from different perspectives. A synoptic consideration is mostly left to the concluding chapter. The chapter divides, therefore, into four main sections as follows:

The *first* section focuses on Husserl's critique of the idea that judgments are composite or 'superposed' acts in Brentano's sense, that is, that there is an act of 'mere presentation' contained in each judgment as its matter. This point is situated in the context of Husserl's general reflections on the nature of and relation between the intentional matter and quality of an act, especially by outlining some relevant elements of Husserl's formal theory of part-whole relations. One of Husserl's central descriptively based arguments against Brentano's view is then considered in detail by discussing Husserl's analysis of the nature of experiences involved in revealed perceptual illusions.

The *second* section is concerned with Husserl's critical reflections on the view that the 'quality' of judgment consists in an act of assenting to or dissenting from something initially presented. The discussion here centers on Husserl's analyses of what he takes to be exemplary cases of assent or acceptance and of what are the constitutive features of the relevant experiential situations. Husserl's main conclusion here is that the characteristics of assent pertain to situations of *deliberation* or *critical assessment* of already available views and are absent from 'straightforward' judgments about the world, and therefore are inessential for the analysis of judgments as such. This view is considered, first, in terms of the relation of an 'assenting' judgment to a preceding stage of deliberation, and second, in terms of Husserl's views on the intentional structure of assenting judgments themselves.

The *third* section outlines Husserl's own positive views about the relation between the 'intentional qualities' of acts of judging and merely presenting something. The focus here is on Husserl's idea that mere presentations in Brentano's sense are not a more basic form of mental phenomena, but should be viewed as derivative of judgments, which idea Husserl codifies in the *Investigations* in a theory of what he calls the 'qualitative modification' of the so-called 'positing' acts. It is then argued that Husserl's critical reflections on the descriptive and theoretical credentials of this view lead, particularly in his 1905 lectures on theory of judgment, to a somewhat revised conception of the nature of the 'modification' in question, whose main tenet is the view that 'mere presentations' should be viewed as a form of *pretense*, as 'quasi-judgments'.

The *fourth*, final, and longest section treats in some detail several interrelated views that can be broadly understood as falling under the rubric of a theory of predication. At the center of these views is a conception of predicative judgments as 'propositional acts'

which, on the one hand, instantiate complex, structured *propositions* as corresponding ideal meanings and, on the other, correspond to *states of affairs* as similarly structured ‘categorical’ objects in the world. Husserl’s analyses of these topics are discussed in four stages: *first*, by outlining the general theoretical framework from which these views arise, with a focus on Husserl’s notion of ‘relations of foundation’ and its application to the analysis of intentional acts and meanings; *second*, by considering specifically in this framework the structure of a categorical proposition as a complex ideal meaning; *third*, by assessing Husserl’s reasons for the view that judgments have states of affairs for their objects; and *fourth*, by showing in what way the ‘categorical’ structures of predication—specifically, in simple cases of perceptual judgment—in Husserl’s view relate to, and as it were have their roots in, perceptual experience.

### 3.1 Critique of the Conception of Judgment as a Composite Act

One of the integral components of the traditional apprehension–assent conception of judgment was the idea of a neutral *actus apprehensivus* as something that must either precede chronologically or underlie each act of judging. In Brentano’s theory, the principle that appointed presentations to the position of a necessary basis for the other classes of mental phenomena appealed, in the first place, to just such an idea of conceiving of something without taking up an attitude of belief or disbelief towards it. Accordingly, Husserl’s critical assessment of this aspect of Brentano’s principle amounts, obliquely, to a confrontation with a centerpiece of one of the prominent traditional approaches to the nature of judgment. In this section, the focus is specifically on the idea that such experiences of ‘merely presenting’ are found as *constituents* or *parts* in acts of judging—that judgments are, as Brentano claimed, composite or ‘superposed’ acts with a basis in a presentation.

The discussion proceeds in two stages. In the *first* part, Brentano’s principle is discussed in more detail from the point of view of the distinction between the matter and quality of an intentional act, and some of Husserl’s more general reflections on this point are presented, leading to the question about what kind of ‘parts’ of an intentional act its matter and quality are, which question is prefaced by outlining some elements of Husserl’s general theory of parts and wholes. The *second* part consists of a discussion of some of Husserl’s central descriptive considerations—focusing on perceptual experiences, which Brentano had classified as judgments—against the Brentanian view that an act of ‘mere presentation’ is found as a basis for each intentional experience as the ele-

ment that determines its intentional direction; Husserl's argument and its conclusions are here reconstructed in a way that attempts to make explicit the reliance on ideas from his formal part-whole analyses. The main outcome of the analyses here under consideration is Husserl's view that the 'intentional matter' of an experience is an abstract or ontologically dependent constituent, not an underlying act of merely presenting something, which conclusion, in the case of acts of judging, leads to rejecting the composite conception of judgments as consisting of apprehension and assent; in the next section, the same view is then approached from the side of the nature of acts of assenting to or dissenting from something.

### 3.1.1 *The question of the relation between an act and its 'matter' and 'quality'*

Brentano had justified the attribution of a foundational role for presentations in all mental acts by noting that all such acts presuppose that one is in some sense conscious of the object—that is, as Brentano puts it, nothing “can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing” (Brentano 1995a, 61). Husserl takes it that in a certain sense this principle is “undoubtedly self-evident” (LI2, 131; Hua19/I, 447), even if it contains conceptual ambiguities which easily lead one—as they did, in Husserl's view, lead Brentano—to draw false conclusions from it.<sup>150</sup> As seen above, Brentano's view was that the element shared among different acts directed at the same object is an act of presentation; accordingly, every experience which is not itself a presentation is built upon and includes a presentation as a constituent part of that experience itself. Such 'superposed' acts exhibit a complex form of intentional relation, that is, they relate to their objects in a 'twofold manner' (*doppelt*)—as an object of presentation, and as the object of some further act bound with the presentation (see Brentano 1995a, 156). As Husserl notes, what is meant by 'presentation' in this context, especially when considered in contrast with acts of judgment, is a kind of distanced, noncommittal conception of an object—that is, a 'mere presentation' (*bloße Vorstellung*) from which is lacking what Husserl calls, with implicit reference to Hume, the 'character of belief' (*belief-Charakter*) (LI2, 130, 137; Hua19/I, 444, 458). Moreover, this character of belief

<sup>150</sup> In addition to being based on the conviction that Brentano's principle does, despite such shortcomings, have a sound theoretical core, Husserl's discussion it—and of the matter-quality distinction which he frames on its basis—has its roots in a soil of basic theoretical presuppositions, many of which it shares with Brentano's theory; in particular, Husserl takes it to be self-evident that the fact that many intentional acts of the same type can be directed at different objects, and likewise acts of different type at the same object, must be accounted for in terms of shared and differing elements *in* those acts themselves, rather than by appealing to something externally related to them, such as the causal circumstances of the experiences taken as real psychological phenomena (see e.g. HuaMat5, 104; cf. LI1, 132; Hua19/I, 450).

is interpreted by Brentano as an act of acknowledgment or rejection superposed on the underlying presentation and relating to the object thereby presented.

Thus, when viewed in light of the matter–quality distinction—that is, the distinction between the element that determines the object of an act and the element that, roughly speaking, specifies the type of the act or the kind of attitude one has towards the object—Brentano’s position can be taken to consist of two claims. *First*, the matter of every act is a complete act of presentation, that is, an independent experience which remains unchanged when further acts are built upon it. *Second*, all superposed acts are qualitatively complex and consist of acts of at least two different types, one of them always being a presentation. As Husserl notes, when formulated in these terms, this view runs into problems when applied to presentations themselves: since acts of presentation directed at different objects are alike in regard of what makes them presentations and differ only with respect to the objects to which they refer, the matter–quality distinction—which was introduced to codify terminologically precisely these two aspects of intentional acts—ought to be applicable to them. However, if their matter were again identified as an underlying act of presentation, this would immediately set off an infinite regress of presentations (HuaMat 5, 106). In order to circumvent this problem, a defender of Brentano’s theory might suggest that presentations do not admit of distinguishing, even abstractly, between matter and quality, and that different presentations relate to one another, rather, as coordinate intentional qualities, akin to the way different colors are related to each other (see LI1, 133; Hua19/1, 451; cf. LI1, 4; Hua19/1, 229–30). Presumably, the analogy here would rely on the idea that different colors are not related to each other by virtue of being composed of further disjoint parts, some of which would be shared by each color—so to say, a generic element of coloredness and a distinguishing element of, say, red—but by virtue of being determinations of the same determinable attribute.<sup>151</sup> Husserl objects to this solution for its *ad hoc* nature<sup>152</sup>, and for the ensu-

<sup>151</sup> See LI2, 4; Hua19/1, 229–30. Husserl treats differences of color as differences of coordinate species; however, there is a reason against this view. Namely, species in the classical Aristotelian model of classification are defined by a genus and a *differentia specifica* in the form of a predicate that can be used as a criterion for picking members of that species among those of the genus (see e.g. *Top.* 103b15). However, in the case of determining-determinable relations, no criterion can be given which does not directly or indirectly appeal to the name of the species for which it would serve as a criterion; for example, what distinguishes ‘red’ from other colors is simply that it is a red color—but clearly this would be vacuous as a *criterion* for being red. Husserl himself notes this, but treats it as an essential characteristic of the lowest specific differences which determine, in this case, the genus color (LI2, 18; Hua19/1, 254).

<sup>152</sup> More specifically, Husserl frames this objection from the point of view of the interest in providing a classification of types of intentional acts. Husserl argues that the solution of exempting presentations from a matter–quality distinction would render them an “unacceptable exception” in an Aristotelian taxonomy of the qualities of intentional acts (LI2, 134; Hua19/1, 453): namely, the *infimae species* under

ing, conceptually distorting assimilation of the different kinds of distinctions between intentional acts. Namely, in such a view the relation between the presentations of two different objects would be conceived as analogous to the relation between taking up two different attitudes to the same object, which seems to involve a conflation between two essentially different relations.

As already noted, Husserl's own proposition is to extend the matter–quality distinction indiscriminately to all acts—including ‘mere presentations’—which, on the pain of the above-mentioned regress, requires conceiving of the matter of acts in a way different from Brentano. The underlying conceptual basis for Husserl's solution is in a general analysis, outlined in the Third Investigation, of different types of and relations between parts and wholes.<sup>153</sup> These ‘mereological’ analyses, in addition to providing analytical tools for the following investigations, flesh out a central part of the ontological part of pure logic, as envisioned in the *Prolegomena*—that is, the formal articulation of the *a priori* structures of the objective correlates of any theory. Husserl adopts from Carl Stumpf a descriptive-psychological distinction, which the latter had introduced in his 1873 work *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*, between two types of contents of consciousness: ‘independent’ (*selbstständige*) contents which can be experienced separately, and ‘partial contents’ (*Theilinhalte*), such as the color and extension of a visually presented object, which are inseparable from one another, and have to be given together.<sup>154</sup> Whereas independent contents, when they are given together,

the genus of intentional qualities would include, separately, the presentations of this and that object, while all other types of acts would be themselves—that is, without reference to any particular object—lowest specific differences of qualities of intentional acts, since their determinate objective direction does not belong to their quality, but to their *matter*.

<sup>153</sup> Framing descriptive-psychological analyses in terms of such considerations was fairly commonplace among representatives of the ‘Brentano School’. Brentano himself made some efforts at clarifying different types of part-whole relations; for example, in his lectures on metaphysics, held in Würzburg in the late 1860s, and later in Vienna, Brentano distinguished between physical, logical, and metaphysical parts. *Physical* parts are the concrete elements of physical bodies; *logical* parts are the elements making up a definition; and *metaphysical* parts are aspects of a whole which are not genuinely distinct entities, but abstractions from a whole which is merely grasped, in the case of the former, in an ‘incomplete’ manner, such as when the color of a thing is considered in abstraction from its shape, without which it could not exist. In his psychological lectures, Brentano distinguishes elements of consciousness in terms of their different types of separability from one another: for example, superposed acts have a one-sided separability with respect to presentations, since the latter could exist without the former, but not *vice versa* (see Brentano 1995b, 15–17). For an overview of Brentano's part-whole analyses, see Baumgartner & Simons (1994).

<sup>154</sup> See Stumpf 1873, 108–9: “We divide contents [ . . . ] in two principal classes: *independent contents* and *partial contents*, and provide the following definition of and criterion for this distinction: *independent contents are at hand where the elements of a presentation-complex can by virtue of its nature be presented also separately; partial contents where this is not the case.*” (*Wir scheiden die Inhalte [ . . . ] in zwei Hauptclassen: selbstständige Inhalte und Theilinhalte, und bestimmen als Definition und Kriterium dieses Unterschiedes: selbstständige Inhalte sind da vorhanden, wo die Elemente eines Vorstellungscomplexes ihrer Natur nach auch*

are joined only in the sense of being simultaneously presented in consciousness, partial contents are presented together in a stronger sense, which Stumpf characterizes by saying that the contents ‘interpenetrate’ (*durchdringen sich*), or are presented ‘in’ one another.<sup>155</sup>

In the Third Investigation, Husserl develops Stumpf’s idea into a formal ontological distinction between types of parts, applicable across all material differences among objects—and thus, as a special case, independent of their relation to any conscious experience. Moreover, Husserl coordinates his distinction with the traditional distinction between the *abstract* and the *concrete*. In Husserl’s slightly revised terminology, a *dependent* or abstract part—or what Husserl also calls a ‘moment’ (*Moment*)—is one that is inconceivable apart from some whole encompassing it or, as Husserl also states, one that stands in a necessary connection with something else, without which it cannot exist (LI2, 6, 25; Hua19/1, 233, 267–8).<sup>156</sup> Following Stumpf, Husserl gives as examples of such relations those obtaining within an intuitive presentation between the color and extension of a surface, or in the auditive case, between the intensity and quality of a tone (LI2, 6–8; Hua19/1, 234–6). However, Husserl emphasizes that such psychological illustrations are special cases, while no reference to consciousness is required in the definition of dependence nor of the concepts of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’.<sup>157</sup> Furthermore, he insists—against the Humean view, to which the notion of a ‘necessary connection’ obviously refers<sup>158</sup>—that in genuine relations of dependence, the necessity of the existence of the supplementing part, given that of the part dependent on it, does not point merely to a subjective inability to think of the two apart from one another, but is an objective im-

*getrennt vorgestellt werden können; Theilinhalte da, wo dies nicht der Fall ist.)*

<sup>155</sup> See Stumpf 1873, 114: “One will easily note that in fact the ‘presenting together’ means here something more than mere temporal coexistence in the presentation. We present quality in the extension, extension in the quality, they interpenetrate one another.” (*Man wird jetzt auch leicht bemerken, wie in der That das ‚Zusammenvorstellen‘ hier etwas mehr als bloss zeitliche Coexistenz in der Vorstellung bedeutet. Wir stellen Qualität in der Ausdehnung, Ausdehnung in der Qualität vor, sie durchdringen sich.*)

<sup>156</sup> Husserl calls this relation one of ‘foundation’ (*Fundierung*), and accordingly a dependent moment of a whole is also defined as one that requires being founded on something else (LI2, 25; Hua19/1, 268).

<sup>157</sup> Indeed, Husserl’s first analyses of these questions, in the 1894 *Psychologische Studien über die elementarische Logik*, were polemically directed against theories which attempted to define the distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ through recourse of a specific mode of consciousness through which the former, but not the latter, can be given (see Husserl 1994, 146–7; Hua22, 99–100).

<sup>158</sup> See Hume’s analysis of the idea of a “necessary connexion” in the *Treatise* (Hume 2007, 105ff). Hume claims that occurrences of this idea can invariably be traced to the transition from the idea or impression of one object to that of another in accordance with the associative scheme of cause and effect; thus, Hume’s conclusion is that all necessity in the relations between ideas reduces to the ‘constant conjunction’ of the objects related by virtue of the mind’s characteristic facility in moving between the ideas of objects occurring regularly together (*ibid.*, 115; cf. 135).

possibility for the matters to be otherwise (LI2, 11–2; Hua19/I, 242–3).<sup>159</sup> Accordingly, the sense in which dependent parts ‘interpenetrate’—in the idiom which Husserl also adopts from Stumpf—is not a question of being necessarily presented together in consciousness, but of having no existence apart from one another. *Independent* or concrete parts—that is, ‘pieces’ (*Stücke*)—are contrariwise those for which such conditions do not hold, and which could exist apart from their association with other parts in a whole; the paradigmatic example here is a piece of physical object. Husserl considers several types of relations between dependent parts, of which it is useful here to mention the distinction between reciprocal and one-sided relations, according to whether or not the necessary relation between two parts is symmetric or ‘convertible’ (*umkehrbare*) and neither could exist without the other (LI2, 27; Hua19/I, 270). Importantly, Husserl also notes that standing in a necessary relation to something else means that a part is *eo ipso* dependent. As a special case, the *impossibility* of combination, or *incompatibility* of parts can only obtain where two objects are both dependent parts requiring the same thing to complete them, as two colors exclude one another only on the same surface (LI2, 18; Hua19/I, 255).

### 3.1.2 *Analysis of perceptual illusions and critique of Brentano’s view*

These formal ontological considerations underlie the analysis and argumentative strategy of the Fifth Investigation. Namely, Husserl subjects Brentano’s principle concerning the foundational role of presentations to a critique which is framed partially in terms of the results of the part–whole analyses. The course of Husserl’s argumentation is, in its outlines, as follows: *first*, Husserl raises the question whether the matter of an intentional act is an independent or a dependent part of it—in particular, whether in the case of perception and judgment it can be a complete act of neutral presentation; *second*, he argues on descriptive grounds that a neutral presentation is incompatible with an act with the character of belief directed at the same object; and *third*, he draws from this incompatibility the conclusions (i) that what determines the intentional direction of a judgment cannot be an act of mere presentation, (ii) that judgment cannot be analyzed as a superposed act in Brentano’s sense, and (iii) that matter and quality must be understood as jointly necessary and mutually dependent, only abstractly separable moments of intentional acts.

<sup>159</sup> Husserl explains this ontological necessity in the Lotzean-Platonistic terms characteristic of the *Investigations* by locating its source in *a priori* valid “laws of essence” governing objects by virtue of the universals or ideal species which they instantiate (LI2, 18; Hua19/I, 254–5).

In his psychological lectures, also Brentano had distinguished elements of consciousness in terms of their different types of ‘separability’ (*Ablösbarkeit*) from one another: superposed acts, for example, have a one-sided separability with respect to presentations since the latter could continue to exist if what is peculiar to the former were removed but not *vice versa* (see Brentano 1995b, 15–17). Husserl’s first misgivings about Brentano’s theory of judgment revolved around the application of this schema to acts of judgment. Already in one of his first treatments of the nature of judgment—in a manuscript dating probably from the winter 1893–94—Husserl notes that contrary to Brentano’s view he is unable to find any ‘duplicity’ (*Doppelheit*) in the acts in which one is not only presented with an object but—in a turn of phrase favoring Brentano’s analysis—‘also’, or ‘in addition to’ such presenting renders a judgment concerning it.<sup>160</sup>

These misgivings are fleshed out in a systematic form in the Fifth Investigation, following Husserl’s independent considerations of general types of separability of the parts of a whole in the Third Investigation. Here Husserl sets out to establish whether what determines the intentional direction of a judgment—its matter—could be separated from the judgment in the sense of occurring as an independent act without any intrinsic change. To begin with, Husserl notes that some experiences are clearly composite in this sense, that is, are composed of at least one-sidedly separable or independent elements: for example, emotional experiences with a definite object, such as the delight elicited by something currently perceived, are founded on a belief in the existence of that object in such a way that if the emotion were removed, the underlying experience would not change (LI2, 137; Hua19/I, 457).<sup>161</sup> This is a fact that can be ascertained, as Husserl puts it, ‘descriptively’, by considering any arbitrary situation, imagined or remembered, in which one ceases to be emotionally moved by something perceptually present, whereby what one is left with is a perception of the same object with the same phenomenal qualities, lacking only the emotional or evaluative attitude towards that object. Likewise, Husserl takes it that the extension of this model to acts of judgment is motivated by implicit descriptive presuppositions that at first sight appear to speak in favor of Brentano’s analysis, and whose justification can primarily be assessed by more

<sup>160</sup> See Hua40, 42: “Now Brentano could say here: in one case we merely present, in the other we also judge. But to this I would say: [...] for one thing, I find no duplicity in the second case[.]” (*Nun könnte Brentano hier sagen: Im einen Fall stellen wir bloß vor, im anderen urteilen wir auch. Aber da würde ich sagen: [...] Einmal finde ich im zweiten Fall keine Doppelheit[.]*)

<sup>161</sup> However, Husserl insists that such a relation of founding does not imply *reducibility*, and stresses that founded acts such as emotions have a distinct intentional character unique to them, and do not merely serve to attach, for example, an emotional quality on a presentation (see LI2, 110, Hua19/I, 408).



careful descriptive considerations.<sup>162</sup> Accordingly, Husserl attempts to make such considerations explicit by locating experiential situations in which a ‘mere presentation’ is given, and by assessing the view that in a transition to a corresponding judgment, a further intentional quality is superposed upon the presentation while preserving the original experience as a founding act serving as the matter of the judgment.

Husserl takes as his starting point the case of perception, which was in Brentano’s theory and taxonomy a central example of acts of judgment. The analysis is framed in terms of a reconstruction of a descriptive argument seemingly favorable for Brentano’s view and a closer descriptive scrutiny and theoretical consideration of the experiential circumstances appealed to in it. Husserl proposes as an example that seems to speak in favor of Brentano’s view the experience of a perceptual illusion: the argument is that when an initially convincing perceptual illusion vanishes, what one is left with is a perceptual presentation of the same object with the same characteristics, but one in which it is seen to only seem to be that way. Accordingly, the illusory presentation, when experienced as illusory, lacks only the character of belief which was present before the illusion was revealed. Further, the argument goes, this shows that the original perception itself can be analyzed as a composite act consisting of such mere presentation together with the superposed quality of belief or conviction (see LI2, 137; Hua19/1, 458). Since the underlying presentation remains unchanged regardless of the presence of the character of belief, and since it determines the intentional direction of the perception or perceptual judgment built upon it, it constitutes the matter of the latter act. Moreover, since in principle a convincing illusory counterpart could be imagined for *any* perception, the argument can be generalized so as to show that *every* perceptual judgment admits of analysis in terms of the ‘superposed’ structure postulated in Brentano’s principle.

What Husserl takes issue with in this argument is the claim that the ‘mere’ perceptual presentation experienced after the illusion is revealed also underlies, as a complete act, the original perception in the way in which a perception underlies the delight taken in what is perceived. Husserl sets up a closer description of the relations between these experiences in terms of an example of perceiving what at first seems to be a person but on a closer look turns out to be a wax figure. In analyzing this experiential situation, Husserl relies on a preliminary analysis of the structure of perceptual experience

<sup>162</sup> Husserl expresses this view explicitly in the 1905 lectures, where he states that although certain phenomena “seem to speak in favor of the Brentanian [...] conception [...] a more precise analysis [...] leads to a different conviction” (*scheinen sehr zugunster der brentanoschen [...] Auffassung zu sprechen [...] eine genauere Analyse [...] führt zu einer anderen Überzeugung*) (HuaMat5, 109).

given earlier in the Fifth Investigation. Here, Husserl's interest was in conceptually grasping the distinction between those elements of perceptual experience which can vary independently of one another, for example when an intricate ornamentation is suddenly identified as writing, without the perceptual appearance otherwise changing, or when an object and its visible characteristics are perceived as remaining unchanged while its appearance varies due to a change in lighting. According to Husserl's analysis, every perceptual experience has as its elements—more specifically, as mutually dependent parts—on the one hand, *sensations* (*Empfindungen*) or sensational contents—which, as noted above, are themselves neither intentional acts nor their proximate objects, but rather part of the real content of perceptual acts on the basis of which their intentional relation to an object is established—and, on the other, an 'interpretation' (*Deutung*) or 'apperception' (*Apperzeption*) by virtue of which those sensations are taken to present an object with some more or less determinate phenomenal characteristics (see LI2, 104; Hua19/1, 397).<sup>163</sup>

In the experience of the person revealed as a wax figure, there are two such apperceptions relating to the same sensational contents: the perceptual object is *seen* to be a wax figure, while merely *appearing* to be—or being 'merely presented' as—a person. It is important to keep in mind that Husserl's analysis focuses here on the way the *person* appears when the illusion has become apparent—and therefore when the perceiver no longer takes such a person to be really present at all—since this aspect of the situation is supposed to illustrate the putative foundational act of 'mere presentation' required by Brentano's principle. The two apperceptions both contribute to the perceptual 'mere presentation' of the person. If the perceptual interpretation of the object as being a person were missing, one would simply see the wax figure that is actually there rather than a person that merely appears to be so. Conversely, if the interpretation of it as a wax figure were lacking, there would be nothing in the experience breaking the illusion, so that one would have, as Husserl says, "a perfectly good percept" (LI2, 138; Hua19/459) as of a person and with the character of an unopposed belief in it as existing. As Husserl notes, it is only the conflict between the interpretations that as it were inhibits the inclination to interpret the perceived object as a person. That is, since it has become apparent that the object is in fact a wax figure, there is a perceptual experience with the

<sup>163</sup> In Husserl's view, both sensations and apperceptions can be made objects of intentional acts only by abstraction based on reflection upon complete perceptual experiences. In Husserl's expression, these elements of intentional acts "are [...] experienced, *but they do not appear as objects*" (*werden [...] erlebt, aber sie erscheinen nicht gegenständlich*) in ordinary perceptual experience (LI2, 105; Hua19/1, 399).

intentional quality of a judgment or belief and with a perceptual interpretation—of the object’s being made of wax—that is incompatible with the interpretation of the same object as a person.<sup>164</sup> The perceptual belief in the person is so to say ‘canceled’ or ruled out by the perceptual belief in the wax figure, since the two interpretations relate to the same perceived object, to which only one of them can apply.

While the two perceptual beliefs are in this manner incompatible, there is a one-sided dependence between the mere presentation of the revealed illusion and the genuine perception of the wax figure: it is possible to have a convincing putative perception that nonetheless lacks the character of belief only when there is something in the broadly construed perceptual situation that ‘cancels’ or speaks against things being as they appear. In the most straightforward case—the one Husserl focuses on—this involves the incompatible perception of things being some other way.<sup>165</sup> The illusory appearance of the person is not taken at face value as an existing person, but as something ‘merely presented’—which, Husserl argues, is here only due to the perceptual belief with an incompatible interpretation or ‘apperception’ of the same object. But from this it follows that the Brentanian view, according to which the mere presentation is contained in the perception—where the latter would then consist of a character of belief superposed on such presentation—would lead to an absurd conclusion: if the perceptual mere presentation of something, in the sense illustrated by the experience of the revealed illusion,

<sup>164</sup> In the second edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl expresses this more clearly by saying that in the experience of the revealed illusion, there are two perceptual apprehensions that “interpenetrate in conflicting fashion” (LI2, 138; Hua19/1, 459). Here, the appeal to the notion of ‘interpenetration’ (*Durchdringung*) explicitly connects the discussion to Husserl’s part-whole analyses. As seen above, ‘interpenetration’ was Stumpf’s term for the relation between mutually dependent contents of consciousness, and Husserl adopted it for his characterization of non-independent parts. The relevant sense of interpenetration of perceptual apprehensions is here the special case of a mereological *incompatibility*, which was also noted above: the interpretation of an object as a person is incompatible with the interpretation of that object as a wax figure under a specific mereological constraint—the constraint that the interpretations belong to the *same* intentional act with a quality of belief, analogously to the way two colors exclude each other only on the same (uniformly colored) surface. In the conceptual vicinity of this phenomenon, there is the incompatibility between two contrary or contradictory beliefs—that is, two *different* intentional experiences—as ‘held’ by the same person. These two seem not to be kept very clearly apart in Husserl’s discussion in the Fifth Investigation. Husserl’s later reflections on the latter type of rational incompatibility seem to have been one of the considerations that moved Husserl away from his broadly Humean early conception of the subject of consciousness; for Husserl’s later reflections on the connection of the possibility of the evaluation of rational consistency of beliefs and the identity of the subject holding those beliefs, see e.g. Hua4, 111f.

<sup>165</sup> In the 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment, Husserl extends similar considerations to related experiential circumstances, such as the case of perceptual uncertainty, in which we ‘waver’ (*schwanken*) between incompatible tendencies to take an object to be such and such, and the situation in which such wavering or fluctuation terminates in a “state of complete abstention from judgment” (*Zustand völliger Urteilsenthaltung*) to which the qualitative character of conviction could then be simply added. In all such cases, Husserl argues for the view that the mere presentation and the ‘decided’ perceptual experience differ in quality rather than in the presence of a new element in the latter experience (see HuaMat5, 109).

is dependent on a broader context in which one finds, in the simplest case, a perception that shows things to be otherwise than presented in the mere presentation, then the view that this same presentation is contained in the corresponding perception would entail that this perception is dependent on another, incompatible perception. That is, in the example above, in order to see the person, one would also have to see it as something else, such as a wax figure.

Accordingly, Husserl concludes that at least in the case of perception the claim that acts of judging—to which, again, perceptions belong in Brentano's taxonomy—are composite in this sense is descriptively indefensible. Since a perceptual mere presentation and the corresponding perception, on the one hand, share the same matter—present the same object under the same aspect—and, on the other, are mutually incompatible, the perception cannot contain the mere presentation. In particular, the latter cannot be the constituent of the former that determines its intentional direction, its 'intentional matter'. Here, it may be useful to spell out in what sense Husserl's argument is supposed to be *descriptive* in nature: a defender of Brentano's views could respond to Husserl's objection by simply postulating—for instance, as an *a priori* obvious assumption—a type of presenting experience that is of a nature that allows it to be present in the perception as a constituent, and therefore different from Husserl's construal of revealed perceptual illusions. But a guiding assumption in both Brentano's and Husserl's analyses is the view that one must be able to in a sense *point out* such phenomena in experience, to find examples in real or imagined experiential situations and to articulate conceptually their nature by means of a faithful description. Husserl's objection is that the most plausible such examples of 'mere presentations' in the case of perception—of experiences that differ from genuine perceptions *only* in lacking the putative element of superposed belief—are shown, on closer descriptive scrutiny, to provide grounds against rather than in favor of Brentano's conception.

In terms of the interpretation of the nature of the 'intentional matter' of an experience, Husserl draws from this the conclusion that, contrary to Brentano's view, it is not an underlying act of mere presentation, but an abstract or dependent moment that is completed in the two cases—a perception and the perceptual mere presentation—by different intentional qualities, which are then, likewise, dependent moments of the respective acts. The quality of belief is not something added to an underlying neutral presentation; instead, the relation between an act and its matter and quality is, Husserl argues, analogous to the relation of a uniformly colored thing and its surface and color. Likewise, then, the qualities of 'merely presenting' and believing are mutually incom-

patible moments of an experience; as Husserl puts it in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment, “decidedness and undecidedness on the same matter exclude one another like red and blue color exclude one another on the same surface” (HuaMat5, 110)<sup>166</sup>.

The reasoning leading to this conclusion can now also be given in a form that explicitly relies on the general principles that Husserl drew from the part-whole analyses of the Third Investigation. It was shown above that Husserl argued that there is a specifically ‘mereological’ form of incompatibility that can obtain only between two non-independent parts that are to be ‘completed’ by the same element—of which the case of two colors and the same surface was again the primary illustration. Now, Husserl’s analysis of the revealed perceptual illusion showed that, in this case at least, the quality of the ‘mere presentation’ is incompatible with the quality of belief regarding the same perceptual interpretation of the same object—that is, in an experience of the same object under the same aspect, these being the two elements in the definition of ‘intentional matter’. Conversely, two different intentional matters—in the case considered, conflicting interpretations of the same object—were shown to be incompatible when the quality of the act is one of belief. From these considerations, it follows that quality and matter in a belief or judgment are mutually dependent parts: when intentional matter is fixed, the two qualities are incompatible, and *vice versa*. A ‘mereological incompatibility’ of the kind noted in the Third Investigation obtains in both directions, from which the mutual or symmetric non-independence of the parts follows.

From the point of view of theory of judgment, however, it is relevant to note that, traditionally, the idea of a neutral act of ‘conceiving’ was not typically motivated primarily by implicit or explicit descriptive analyses of *perceptual* experience, but of the experience of *understanding* something—such as a statement made by someone else—without *assenting to* or *dissenting from* it, where this latter was then taken as the essential characteristic of the act of judgment. In the *Investigations*, Husserl’s assessment of this idea connects with another aspect of Brentano’s foundational principle: while the argument outlined above was mainly concerned with the nature of the *matter* of an act, the next section focuses on Husserl’s critical confrontation with Brentano’s interpretation of the *quality* of judgment as an acknowledgment or rejection relating to the underlying matter. Here, the emphasis is in Husserl’s view and the arguments supporting it, in the *Investigations* and in texts surrounding its publication, that Brentano’s interpretation—and

<sup>166</sup> “So wie also Rot und Blau aufgrund derselben Ausdehnung sich ausschließen, so schließen sich Entschiedenheit aufgrund einer Materie und Unentschiedenheit aufgrund derselben Materie aus”.

accordingly, the idea underlying most modern approaches to the theory of judgment—conflates two essentially different distinctions: that between a neutral conception and a corresponding belief, and that between a ‘simple’ and an ‘accepting’ or ‘assenting’ judgment.

### 3.2 Assenting and Straightforward Judgments

Beside the idea of a neutral act of ‘mere presentation’, the second constitutive element in what was called above the ‘apprehension–assent’ conception of the psychological constitution of judgment was the view that what in an act of judging is built upon or added to such an underlying experience is to be understood as an attitude of *assenting to* or *dissenting from* what is presented in the latter. In Brentano’s theory, this view was codified in the idea that while the matter of a judgment is an act of presentation, its quality consists in an acknowledgment or rejection of the content of that presentation—that is, following Brentano’s proposed reduction of all forms of judgment to the existential, an acknowledgment or rejection of the presented object as existing.

In both the *Investigations* and other writings from the same period, Husserl argues against this view by undertaking descriptive analyses intended to demonstrate that the constitutive characteristics of the experiences to which the word ‘assent’ (*Zustimmung*) in its ordinary sense applies cannot be generalized to cover all judgments, and that accordingly assent and dissent have to be subsumed as special cases under a more encompassing conception of judgment. The upshot of these analyses is that these judgments have a ‘higher-order’ character in the sense that they relate to what is held to be the case in ordinary, ‘straightforward’ (*schlichte*) judgments about the world, typically by *confirming* or *disconfirming* the latter, and that accordingly their natural environment is in the critical evaluation of already formed beliefs.

The experiential situations that Husserl takes as exemplary instances of genuine assent consist of hearing or reading statements made by others without initially taking up a position on the subject matter, and only after considering grounds for and against it deciding the question for oneself. Clearly, in such cases an experiential process with several stages is involved: first, the uptake of a spoken or written statement and the comprehension of its meaning; second, a process of deliberation; and finally, a judgment on the subject matter.<sup>167</sup> Now, the question can be raised as to what precisely it is in such

<sup>167</sup> As Husserl notes, what can here be characterized as ‘mere presentation’ consists of the stages of the process preceding the decision, and that the latter clearly ‘adds’ something new to the process. But this can no more than the previously considered perceptual illusions be proposed as support for the Brentanian

circumstances that gives the resulting judgment the character of assent or dissent bearing on the initially understood statement. Husserl considers this question primarily in two ways: *first*, as to the kind of relation the judgment has to the preceding process of deliberation, as a decision terminating it; and *second*, as to the characteristic structure of the resulting judgments themselves. Here, Husserl's analysis of the relation between the deliberative process and the assenting judgment is outlined on the basis of the idea that the relation is one of the *fulfillment* of a question in an answer, and by considering the nature of this relation, especially as to whether it can be understood by appealing to the *teleological* characteristics of the fulfillment of desires and wishes. Afterwards, the structure of assenting judgments is considered, with a focus on the idea that they relate to their subject matter in an 'oblique' manner through the judgments to which assent is given in them.

### 3.2.1 *Assent, deliberation, and fulfillment*

When one considers the relation between a judgment arrived at through deliberation and the stage of deliberation preceding that judgment, certain features come to the fore that suggest a characterization in broadly teleological terms. The judgment is not connected merely extrinsically to the preceding considerations for and against it in the manner in which the members of any series of experiences are connected by temporal succession within the same stream of consciousness, which would be the case if one were simply first uncertain about something and later convinced about the same thing. Instead, the judgment and those considerations are in some way *internally* connected within the whole deliberative process leading up to the decision. Husserl initially captures this connection by saying that the deciding judgment 'fits' (*paßt*) the considerations, and conversely, that the former are directed toward or 'aim at' (*abzielt*) a decision. However, Husserl's preferred manner of speaking in such cases is to talk of a relation of *fulfillment* (*Erfüllung*) and of 'intentions' (*Intentionen*) as experiences that can be—and, in a sense, aim at being—fulfilled (see LI2, 102; Hua19/I, 392).<sup>168</sup> In particular, Husserl takes it

view that judgment consists of something added to such presentation in the sense that the latter would be contained in the former; after all, the character of indecision of the prior stage is again *incompatible* with—and precisely what is superseded by—the decision (see LI2, 141; Hua19/I, 464; HuaMat5, 110).

<sup>168</sup> Husserl first made use of the terms 'intention' and 'fulfillment' in his 1894 "Psychologische Untersuchungen über die elementaren Logik", in the context of analyzing the nature of two basic forms of experience, *intuitions* (*Anschauungen*), in which—as Husserl analyzes them in that early text—the object is included within the experience as an 'immanent content' (*immanente Inhalt*), and *representations* (*Repräsentationen*) which instead 'merely intend' (*bloß intendieren*) their objects and in which some immanent content serves as a 'representant' (*Repräsentant*) of something not contained in the experience

that deliberating is a form of *questioning*, and that what is characteristic of an ‘assenting judgment’ (*zustimmende Urteil*) arrived at through deliberation is that the resulting judgment fulfills a ‘questioning intention’ (*fragende Intention*) constitutive of the process of deliberation and thus serves as an *answer* to what is questioned in the latter (LI2, 141; Hua19/1, 465; cf. HuaMat5, 111). Thus, the relation of the initial understanding of a statement to a judgment assenting to it is—disregarding practical characteristics relating to questions understood as interpersonal, communicative phenomena<sup>169</sup>—in essence an instance of the relation of a question to an answer.<sup>170</sup> Accordingly, Husserl takes it that at least some of the features constitutive of assent as the *terminus ad quem* of a process of deliberation can be clarified by considering the characteristics of experiences involved in answering or finding answers to questions, in particular ones that take the simple form of a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ as a response to a question of the schematic form ‘Is *S* *p*?’.<sup>171</sup>

Talk of ‘fulfillment’, as Husserl notes in the Sixth Investigation—in which the concept serves as the basis for a phenomenological analysis of knowledge—has its native habitat in the broadly emotional domain of desires and wishes.<sup>172</sup> Thus, the approach

(Husserl 1994, 154; Hua22, 107). Here Husserl’s primary aims were to demonstrate that the characteristics of these experiences are due to their specific modes of consciousness, and not due to external factors such as accompanying thoughts, and that each intuition corresponds to a possible representation which it would fulfill.

<sup>169</sup> In particular, it is clearly not the case that assenting to a statement should be understood as answering a question posed by the *speaker*. A statement or assertion as such involves no ‘questioning intention’ towards a response on part of the hearer; rather, when a process of deliberation sets off, hearing the statement serves only as an impulse for the questioning. The answer arrived at through that process answers a question posed by the *hearer* herself concerning the content of the heard statement, and thereby relates in an assenting or dissenting manner to the latter. In the *Investigations*, Husserl is unclear on this point, and suggests that in making a statement, the speaker “hopes to obtain assent” (*wünscht Zustimmung zu erlangen*) from the hearer (LI2, 142; Hua19/1, 465–6). Of course, such hopes can be part of the motivations of the speaker, but they are not pertinent to making statements as such, nor to the possibly elicited process of questioning on part of the hearer; moreover, statements are more often intended to convey knowledge or to convince one’s audience, and in such cases talk of assent in the sense of independent agreement would be nonsensical.

<sup>170</sup> This connection between judgments and questions has a long history; as mentioned in passing in the first chapter, in *Theaetetus* Plato characterizes thinking as a conversation of the soul with itself, in which it poses itself questions and answers them, and belief or opinion as a decision arrived at through such questioning (see *Theaet.* 189e–190a). To give one modern example, Herbart defined judgment as essentially a decision concerning an already formed question: when “two concepts meet in thinking [...] they initially form a question; the decision thereof yields a judgment.” (*ein Paar Begriffe begegnen einander im Denken [...] bilden sie zuvorderst eine Frage; die Entscheidung derselben wird ein Urtheil ergeben*) (Herbart 1834, 68).

<sup>171</sup> Clearly, the general problem of the forms of ‘fit’ of answers to questions involves various phenomena, including syntactic appropriateness of the answer to the type of question and its complete or partial fit with descriptions involved in the question. Within the phenomenological tradition, the general characteristics of questions were considered for example by Ingarden (1925) with a focus on what he called ‘essential’ (*essentiale*) questions of the form ‘What is (the nature of) *x*?’.

<sup>172</sup> See LI2, 217; Hua19/2, 583: “It is by a mere analogy that we extend talk of satisfaction, and even of fulfillment, beyond the sphere of emotional intentionality (*Gemütsintentionen*).”



suggests itself of analyzing the characteristic ‘fit’ of an answer to a question in terms of an analogy with the manner in which successfully reaching an intended practical goal fulfills or satisfies a desire on part of the acting person. Indeed, Husserl occasionally characterizes the phenomenon of fulfillment as what allows an act to ‘reach its goal’ (*sein Ziel erreichen*) (see e.g. LI2, 216; HuaI9/2, 582). Taken in a literal sense, such goal-directedness clearly captures at least part of the experiences at play in questioning, since the latter usually involves actively and consciously ‘seeking’ for an answer. However, it is not obvious that such teleological characteristics are constitutive of the relation of question and answer—and thereby, of the nature of assent—as such. In this respect, three features merit attention: *first*, the roles of interests and evaluative, broadly emotive experiences in the teleological directedness towards a practical goal; *second*, the future-directed temporal character of these experiences; and *third*, the role of identification in their fulfillment.

As Husserl notes, when statements made by others do not as such suffice to convince us, it is only if our own epistemic interests come to bear on the subject matter that we are not content with the mere understanding of those statements, so that the latter has relative to these interests the experienced character of a lack or deficiency—namely, what is lacking is the certainty that things really are as they are claimed to be (LI2, 140; HuaI9/1, 463; HuaMat5, 111). Where such interests are present, they often motivate the desire for deciding the matter for ourselves, which may then lead to a process of questioning aiming at such a decision as a practical goal. If the questioning then proceeds successfully to a judgment made with confidence, the latter is experienced in a positive light, as an accomplished goal or, as Husserl characterizes it, as the ‘resolution’ (*Lösung*) of a ‘tension’ (*Spannung*) (see LI2, 465; HuaI9/1, 141). In this sense, evaluative experiences can be said to be intimately tied with questioning as a goal-directed intentional process: such ‘directedness’ involves a positive evaluative attitude towards what is aimed at as in a broad sense suitable for one’s interests or desires, and where no such experiences are at play, uncertainty does not by itself move us to pose any questions and pursue them for ourselves.<sup>173</sup> However, regardless of playing in this way a *motivation-*

<sup>173</sup> For this reason Husserl characterizes the phenomenon of *theoretical interest* (*theoretische Interesse*) in his 1904–5 lectures on attention as the ‘motor of the epistemic process’ (*Motor des Erkenntnisprozesses*) that “urges the flow of perceptions and thoughts forward in directions [ . . . ] favorable to the realization of adequate perceptual or conceptual knowledge” (*drängt den Abfluss der Wahrnehmungen und Gedanken fortgesetzt in jene Richtung [ . . . ] welche der Realisierung adäquater Erkenntnis günstig sind*) (Hua38, 112). Within the ‘Brentano School’, emotions, desires, and acts of will were usually referred to as ‘phenomena of interest’ (*Interessephänomene*), following Brentano’s grouping of these experiences under one basic class of intentional experiences with the basic contrary forms of ‘loving’ (*Lieben*) and ‘hating’ (*Hassen*) (see

ally necessary role in questioning, these evaluative elements cannot be what determines the character of the answer as an answer to the question—after all, an answer can be positively evaluated *as* an answer only if it is already taken as one. Accordingly, the evaluative content pertaining to the desire to resolve a doubt is not what is essential for the character of an answer, and if the analogy with desires is to be of value in clarifying the directedness of a question towards an answer, such value has to be sought in the non-evaluative characteristics of the fulfillment of a desire.<sup>174</sup>

Besides involving the idea of what is aimed at as something that is taken to be—at least relative to some relevant interests—*good*, teleological descriptions naturally invite the idea of a temporally extended process tending towards completion. Here, the ‘directedness’ of the process involves a relation to something taking place in the future.<sup>175</sup> Both desires and wishes are in their ordinary forms future-directed in this sense: wishing is usually either wishing for something to *happen* or wishing to *acquire* something, while desires normally aim at the future *ownership*, *possession*, or—as in the case of hunger—*consumption* of what is desired.<sup>176</sup> Similarly, questioning or deliberation clearly involves

e.g. Marty 1908, 242, 365; cf. Brentano 1995a, 187).

<sup>174</sup> This fact was obscured in some of Husserl’s contemporary theories of judgment, in particular those of the ‘Baden School’ of Neo-Kantianism, Windelband and Rickert; Windelband took judgments to be emotive attitudes towards propositions with the aim of conforming to truth, itself understood as a ‘value’ in the axiological sense (see e.g. Windelband 1907, 53). Rickert, for his part, understood judgments as affirmations or rejections of a *demand* imposed on the judging subject by the subject matter of the judgment in the form of an imperative, a ‘transcendent Ought’ (*transcendente Sollen*). Rickert’s view seems to be based largely on confusing the motivational role of emotive experiences in questioning with the features constitutive of the deciding judgment: from the psychological observation that “cognition is a process determined by feelings” (*ein Vorgang, der bestimmt wird durch Gefühle*), Rickert draws the conclusion that “the attitude of approval or disapproval has a sense only with respect to a value” ([*n*]ur Werthen gegenüber has das [ . . . ] Verhalten des Billigens oder Missbilligens einen Sinn) (Rickert 1892, 57). Thus, Husserl later criticizes Windelband and Rickert of misinterpreting the connection and analogies between judgment and the emotions (see Hua28, 62–3; Hua37, 317). For a concise comparison of Husserl’s and Rickert’s views on judgment, see Staiti (2015); for the classical overview of Husserl’s relation to Neo-Kantianism, see Kern (1964).

<sup>175</sup> The idea that the teleological character of desire and its role in the motivation of action has to do with conceptions of the good has, of course, a long history; for a classical statement, see Aristotle’s characterization, in *De Anima*, of the object of desire (*ὁρεξίς*) as what motivates movement and as a “real or apparent good” (*τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*) (*De An.* III 432a29–30).

<sup>176</sup> Husserl makes both of these points in his 1904–5 lectures on attention. See Hua38, 109–10: “We say e.g. that we wish for a house, and actually mean that we wish to own a house. [ . . . ] When I desire for a dish, the desire is (in a certain sense) directed toward it. Nevertheless, the desiring intention goes rather towards the possession and consumption of the dish, which is simultaneously more or less vividly presented.” (*Wir sagen z.B., wir wünschen ein Haus und meinen eigentlich, dass wir den Besitz des Hauses wünschen. [ . . . ] Wenn ich nach einer Speise begehre, so ist (in gewissem Sinn) auf sie das Begehren gerichtet. Gleichwohl geht die begehrende Intention vielmehr auf den Besitz und Genuss der Speise, der zugleich, mehr oder minder lebhaft, vorgestellt ist.*) However, it is not always the case that wishes are directed towards the future, since it is possible to wish or hope that something has already happened; here, what is in the future is only the possible *ascertainment* that it has indeed happened, but this ascertainment need not be part of what is wished for.

aiming at an answer or a decision as the final step in the temporal sequence of experiences constitutive of the deliberative process. In the *Investigations*, Husserl refers to this future-directed character of many experiences aiming at fulfillment—that is, of ‘intentions’ in Husserl’s technical sense—as ‘expectation’ (*Erwartung*).<sup>177</sup> However, Husserl notes that not every intention is directed towards the future in this way: for example, the perception of a partially covered object with a uniform pattern usually involves a sense of the pattern continuing similarly in the covered parts—but this is not an expectation, but only something that can *occasion* possible expectations of what one would see by removing the cover (see LI2, 211; Hua19/2, 573). Accordingly, ‘expectation’ in the sense of directedness towards future events or experiences characterizes only the temporal shape of a special class of intentions, to which wishes and desires—at least in the usual forms characterized above—belong, and correlatively, the temporal shape of a transition from the intention to fulfillment is essential only where the intention itself is essentially future-directed.

In this connection, Husserl distinguishes between two senses of the word ‘question’ to which he refers, respectively, as a ‘wish-question’ (*Wunschfrage*) and a ‘theoretical question’ (*theoretische Frage*) (see LI1, 143; Hua19/1, 468). A wish-question is, as Husserl defines it, a wish aiming at an answer and, as such, exhibits the evaluative and future-directed characteristics of wishes: the answer is something positively evaluated and something that terminates the temporal process of questioning.<sup>178</sup> However, Husserl argues that in this sense, every question presupposes as its foundation a question in *another* sense: namely, what it is for something to be what the wish-question aims at is for it to constitute an answer to a question. But the ‘answer’ and ‘question’ in *these* senses cannot be analyzed, without circularity, by appealing to the fulfillment of the wish; instead, they involve a more basic sense in which the answer ‘fits’ the question and a relation of fulfillment independent of the answer being something wished for (*ibid*).<sup>179</sup>

<sup>177</sup> Husserl’s choice of nomenclature is here not entirely fitting: expecting something to happen involves the belief that it will happen, whereas wishes and desires as such do not.

<sup>178</sup> Again, Husserl’s choice of terminology is not entirely satisfactory in the *Investigations*: questioning is not simply ‘wishing’ for an answer, but actively *seeking* for it, and as such it involves what Kant calls the “representation of [its own] causality” (see Kant 2000, 65n)—that is, the idea of the ‘aiming’ for a goal as in itself at least potentially causally efficacious in realizing that goal. For this reason, Husserl later characterizes questioning with the appropriately active term ‘striving’ (*Streben*) (see e.g. Hua11, 62). Kant, curiously enough, attributed a ‘representation of causality’ also to wishes in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, but seems to have taken the sound view in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (see Kant 1996, 373–4).

<sup>179</sup> In particular, what a wish-question aims at is not simply a transition from uncertainty to certainty; although this would yield in the right way an independent characterization of what it is for the answer to fulfill the question—the proposal here would be that a question is a desire to be certain. Questions can be

Accordingly, wish-questions have a characteristic two-layered schema of fulfillment in that the fulfillment of the wish—which, again, has an evaluative character—depends on the fulfillment of a question in, so to speak, a ‘non-optative’, theoretical sense.<sup>180</sup> Now, the fulfillment of this underlying theoretical question can be analyzed by considering another basic feature necessarily involved in the experience of a wish or a desire being fulfilled—namely, identification.

Husserl’s characterization, mentioned above, of the fulfillment of the wish or desire involved in questioning in terms of ‘tension’ and ‘resolution’ may suggest the *hedonic* idea that such fulfillment has to do with a transition from an *unpleasant* state to a *pleasant* one. But regardless of whether pleasure—or the removal of displeasure—always plays some kind of role in the fulfillment of a desire, this is inessential in determining what is desired and what would in the relevant sense fulfill the ‘intention’ involved, in Husserl’s sense.<sup>181</sup> Even on the common assumption that desiring involves conceiving of something as in some way pleasurable, what is ‘aimed at’ in desiring for an object is not the pleasure presumed to accompany, say, the acquisition or consumption of the desired object, but the thing whose acquisition or consumption would on such an assumption be pleasurable—this is clear in the fact that if a pleasant state came about without the presence of what was desired, the desire would obviously not be fulfilled.<sup>182</sup> The fulfillment of a desire, as that of a wish, requires that the very thing desired comes about, and estab-

asked, and answers can be understood as answers to questions in the absence of any wishes, which means that the relevant sense of ‘fit’ is independent of the fulfillment of wishes.

<sup>180</sup> Later, especially in the 1920’s, Husserl considers such two-layered structures thematically under the title ‘epistemic striving’ (*Erkenntnisstreben*), in which one aims at knowledge as a practical goal. This, as Husserl notes, involves a layered structure of fulfillments: an underlying epistemic fulfillment in the sense of *verification*, and built upon it, the fulfillment of *striving* towards such verification, by virtue of which the established piece of knowledge is “characterized as an achieved goal” (*charakterisiert als erreichtes Ziel*) (see HuaII, 88).

<sup>181</sup> It may be observed that not every instance of a ‘tension–resolution’ distinction in our conscious lives need have a sensuous character like this. For instance, a conflict between two incompatible beliefs, both of which one has some inclination to hold, can be viewed as forming by itself an ‘intellectual’ tension which is resolved when one is in a position to reject one of them.

<sup>182</sup> In his lectures on ethics held in the early 1920’s, Husserl makes this point the basis of his critique of a basic assumption of hedonistic ethics, according to which pleasure is the only *conceivable* goal of any practical pursuits. The argument, as formulated by Husserl, takes two forms. According to the first, the end-point of a successful pursuit is always pleasurable, at least relative to the dissatisfaction of an unfinished task, so the goal of the pursuit has to be this state of pleasure in which the pursuit in the successful case terminates. According to the second, in striving for something one has to conceive of it as pleasurable, so the ‘taking-pleasure’ has to be, again, the goal striven for. Husserl argues that in both forms the hedonistic argument relies on a conflation of the pleasure as an *evaluative experience* with the object thereby *evaluated*. Moreover, the first form equivocates between the ‘pleasure of accomplishment’ (*Erzielungslust*) of reaching a goal with the pleasure of enjoyment (*Freude*) of, say, music. As Husserl notes, one can enjoy music without having pursued such enjoyment, so this hedonistic claim fails precisely in cases in which one *does* in fact pursue some kind of pleasure. See Hua37, 64–70.

lishing this is a matter of *identifying* the outcome with what was desired. For this reason, Husserl argues that the fulfillment of a desire or a wish necessarily has as its basis—or is founded on—an identification (*Identifizierung*) (see LI2, 217; Hua19/2, 583).<sup>183</sup> Identity of the objects of intentional acts is an objective relation which, in the theory of intentionality of the *Investigations*, corresponds with a relation obtaining between the *matters* of those acts, as the abstract elements determining their intentional direction; Husserl calls this relation one of *coincidence* (*Deckung*) (see LI2, 207; Hua19/2, 568). Thus, when it is seen that a wish is fulfilled, its object is identical or stands in a relation of identity with the object of another intentional act such as the perception of that object, and correlatively, the matters of these acts then coincide or stand in a relation of coincidence.

However, clearly not every such identification can serve as the fulfillment for an intention: for example, giving a concrete illustration or example of an abstract thought involves an identification but does not fulfill the thought in any way, even if such illustrations, as Husserl observes, can be made use of in solving problems and thereby play a certain role in the fulfillment of intentions involving those problems. It is only where the act whose matter coincides with that of the intention *confirms* (*bestätigt*) or *verifies* (*bewährt*) that things are as they were, for example, wished to be that the identification constitutes a fulfillment for the intention (see LI2, 262–3; Hua19/2, 650).<sup>184</sup>

<sup>183</sup> There is a certain caveat to be made to this view: namely, not every wish includes as a condition for its fulfillment the requirement that the person making the wish *know* that the wish has been fulfilled. In this respect, Husserl's analysis can be said either to apply to a special class of wishes in which this 'epistemic' condition is involved, or to provide an analysis, more precisely, of the *experience* of the fulfillment of a wish which need not be that fulfillment *itself*. This is of course related to the *phenomenological* nature of Husserl's analysis, for which it is of the essence that the relation of fulfillment obtains between intentional acts. As a further observation, it should be noted that the fulfillment of some wishes *precludes* the wishing person's knowledge about their fulfillment; this is the case for wishes in which what one wishes for is for something to happen without one's knowledge. Wittgenstein makes a related point in a text found in the *Big Typescript*: "[The person whose expectation is fulfilled] must surely know that his expectation is fulfilled.' — True, in so far as knowing is part of its being fulfilled. In this sense: If he didn't know that the expectation had been fulfilled then it wouldn't have been fulfilled." (Wittgenstein 2005, 285e) Some related remarks about the fulfillment of wishes and expectations made their way also to the *Philosophical Investigations* (see Wittgenstein 1958, 129–32).

<sup>184</sup> Moreover, Husserl argues that whereas for wishes and desires, an identification serves only as a foundation for their characteristic manner of fulfillment—in the sense that in the fulfillment of a wish also other things, such as their evaluative characteristics, come in play—for certain other intentional experiences, identification constitutes by itself the whole fulfillment. These are the class of acts that play one of the roles of Brentano's equivocal notion of 'presentation', namely, of simply making something the object of conscious experience without bringing in, for example, evaluative attitudes towards it; in the Fifth Investigation, Husserl gives such experiences the name 'objectifying acts' (*objektivierende Akte*) (see LI2, 159; Hua19/1, 498; cf. LI2, 217; Hua19/2, 539). As a special case, the fulfillment of a judgment or belief in a confirming identification is what Husserl takes to be the phenomenological core of the concept of *knowledge* (*Erkenntnis*) (LI2, 228; Hua19/2, 599).

Accordingly, in the most straightforward case fulfillment “sets directly before us” (*stellt direkt vor uns hin*) what the intention aims at (LI2, 227; Hua19/2, 597), which is an intentional characteristic of perception and, more generally, of *intuition* (*Anschaung*).<sup>185</sup> Such straightforward cases take the pride of place in Husserl’s analysis, which is why Husserl makes a stronger claim about the fulfillment of wishes to the effect that a “wishful intention can only find its fulfilling satisfaction in so far as the underlying mere presentation of the thing wished for becomes transformed into the corresponding percept” (LI2, 216; Hua19/2, 583). In other cases, however, this confirming function can clearly be served, for example, by the conclusion of a valid inference from already established premises.

Now, it is this epistemic or broadly *evidential* sense of fulfillment that is in Husserl’s view constitutive of the ‘theoretical’ relation of question and answer: in what Husserl called the ‘questioning intention’, what is at issue is whether things are as they are presented as being in a judgment or statement initially merely understood and taken up as the subject of deliberation, and only acts which have at least the putative character of evidence in favor or against this can serve as answers to the question. A positive answer ‘fits’ the question in the sense of confirming it which, again, rests on the identification of the subject matter of the answer with what was questioned: as Husserl puts it, the “decision says ‘It is so’, just so, in fact, as it was previously pondered over as being” (LI2, 141; Hua19/1, 465). Husserl notes that the questioning intention, in contrast to that of judgments, is ‘twofold’ (*zweifältige*) in the sense that a positive and a negative answer can both serve as its fulfillments. Conversely, the intention of a judgment is ‘frustrated’ (*enttäuscht*) when the judgment is disconfirmed. Furthermore, Husserl takes it that this contrastive structure of mutually exclusive alternatives—in the simple case, the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, but in other questions some other relevant class of possible answers that would fit the question in the right way—is a precondition for questions as such (*ibid*).<sup>186</sup> Thus,

<sup>185</sup> In Husserl’s technical use of the term, the ordinary meaning of ‘fulfillment’—in the sense in which one talks of the fulfillment of wishes—is combined with the metaphor of the ‘fullness’ (*Fülle*) of an intentional act, understood in terms of the extent to which it presents features of the object directly, and conversely, to what extent it has an ‘empty’ or symbolic or ‘signitive’ character and presents such features only indirectly, in the manner of a sign, or merely conceptually (see LI2, 233–4; Hua19/2, 606–8). For this reason, the sense of fulfillment as confirming identification is, in the *Investigations*, mostly restricted to the narrower class of situations in which such confirmation can be understood as involving ‘filling’ an act with intuitive content, although Husserl does mention also ‘mediated’ (*vermittelte*) fulfillments (see LI2, 229–31; Hua19/2, 601–4). This metaphor of ‘fullness’ and ‘emptiness’ goes back at least to Kant’s famous dictum according to which conceptual thoughts are, without intuitive content, empty (see Kant 1998, A51/B75); the contrast between ‘intuitive’ and ‘symbolic’ ideas and knowledge, on the other hand, was introduced by Leibniz (1989, 291–2).

<sup>186</sup> In his lectures on ‘passive synthesis’ held in the 1920’s, Husserl develops this idea and states that

although the process of questioning or deliberation ‘aims at’ the answer in a teleological manner, as a practical goal and something desired or wished for, such teleological features are not constitutive properties of the question and answer as such. What is essential for the answer is its putative evidential role in confirming one of the possibilities presupposed in the question—and, correlatively, the questioning intention as such ‘aims at’ an answer only in the sense of providing the basis for such possible confirmation.<sup>187</sup>

On this basis, Husserl further concludes that what gives a judgment the character of assent is the relational structure by virtue of which it bears upon what is claimed to be the case, in the judgment or statement occasioning the process of deliberation, as a confirming fulfillment for the latter. Thus, it is not the case that judging as such is assenting to something initially only understood, as claimed by Brentano and others; a judgment “is not intrinsically the acceptance of a previously given mere presentation: it is accepting (*aner kennend*), assenting (*zustimmend*) only in a context of fulfillment” (LI2, 142; Hua19/I, 467). What is constitutive of acts of assent properly speaking is their function as a decision in favor of one of mutually incompatible alternatives that are in some way presumed in advance—in the simplest case, by perceptually identifying things to be in accordance with one of the alternatives between which one attempts to decide. But the kind of weighing of alternatives required for such attitudes is clearly not necessary for judging as such, but rather something that occurs in relatively rare circumstances. Furthermore, the decision in favor of one of such alternatives that is necessarily involved in the relevant situations is itself a judgment, and a judgment which—when abstracted from its fulfilling function in this case—could be made just as well without

questioning presupposes a “unitary field of problematic possibilities”, but also notes that in a question, the presupposed range of disjunctive terms can either be merely *implied*, as in “Is that a wax figure?”, or form an explicit *theme*, as in “Is that a wax figure or a human being?” (Hua11, 59). What is important here is that Husserl argues that raising a question makes sense—except perhaps rhetorically—only where some such alternatives are already presupposed.

<sup>187</sup> The teleological aspects of questioning or deliberation were later analyzed searchingly and in more detail by Husserl’s student and colleague Adolf Reinach, especially in his 1912/13 article titled “Deliberation; its ethical and legal significance”. Reinach characterizes deliberation (*Überlegung*)—which he analyzes in both its theoretical and practical guises—as a teleological process with various stages that are non-independent relative to it and aiming at taking up some specific stance (*Stellungnahme*) towards a theme of deliberation on the basis of gaining *insight* into it. The deliberative process, in Reinach’s view, is permeated and unified by what he calls the ‘interrogative attitude’ (*fragende Einstellung*), a *sui generis* mental phenomenon distinct from belief, doubt, and uncertainty—although necessarily arising from uncertainty about the subject matter in question—properly expressed in the form of a question ‘Is *A* *b* (or *c*, etc.)?’ Reinach makes several insightful descriptive distinctions and notes that being in the interrogative attitude does not in itself suffice for deliberation, which is necessarily something actively carried out by the subject, since it is possible to be in such attitude while engaging in no deliberation for oneself, for example in passively following and ‘going along’ the solution of a problem during a lecture. See Reinach 1989, 280–90.

the preceding stage of deliberation. If the elements pertaining to the context of deliberation were removed, one would be left with a judgment that would not have the role of settling whether a proposal is right or not, or which one among some set of presented alternatives holds, but which simply or straightforwardly takes it that things are so and so. Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes between two kinds of judgments: properly assenting ones that relate to a judgment, presentation, proposal, suggestion, or the like by “recognizing [it] in an approving manner” (*in der Weise der Billigung anerkennend*), and those which instead straightforwardly ‘take in’ their object in a “simple act of belief” (*schlicht nehmend Glaubensakt*) (see LI2, 259; HuaI9/2, 645).

### 3.2.2 *The intentional structure of assenting judgments*

As seen above, Husserl’s analysis of assenting, acknowledging, or approving judgments in the *Investigations* was focused on the relation of ‘fulfillment’ in which they have their natural environment. In other writings from the same period, however, Husserl approaches the nature of assent from another direction, and argues that the occurrence of a judgment in this kind of context is not enough to give it the character of assent to an initially understood judgment. In the analyses discussed above, the essential point was the *relation* in which the resulting judgment stands to the prior stage of deliberation; in these other writings, Husserl focuses instead on the *intentional structure* of the resulting judgments. Husserl’s claim here is that assenting judgments differ in this respect from the structure what Husserl usually calls ‘straightforward judgments’ (*schlichte Urteile*) (see Hua22, 231; Hua40, 132; HuaMat5, 111). The focus of these analyses is on the fact that the primary object of assent, the thing accepted or assented to, is itself broadly speaking a judgment—or a claim, proposal, suggestion, or the like—and accordingly, assenting judgments have a ‘higher-order’ character—being judgments about judgments—and relate to objects in the world in a way that differs from straightforward judgments about those objects. Here, Husserl’s reflections on these points in these other texts are discussed and related to various parts of the conceptual machinery of the *Investigations*.

The most obvious characteristic of the intentional structure of assent is that in assenting to—and correspondingly, in dissenting from—a judgment, one is conscious both of that judgment and of the subject matter that the judgment is concerned with. This double structure can be discerned both in the stage of deliberation and in the assenting judgment in which it terminates. In understanding but not yet accepting a judgment expressed by another person—or likewise, in assessing the validity of a view I previously



held myself—I relate to what is held to be the case in that judgment *as* something figuring in a judgment, which depends on my being conscious of or ‘presenting’ both the act of judging and its objects.<sup>188</sup> Likewise, in assenting to the judgment one has to be conscious of both that judgment as what one assents to and the relevant subject matter itself. Accordingly, in a manuscript written shortly before the publication of the *Investigations*, Husserl writes that in deliberating we initially have a presentation of the subject matter of the understood judgment, and “in assenting to this presentation, we have two things, namely, the judgment into which this presentation passes, and on the other hand, the presentation with the character of being valid” (Hua40, 136)<sup>189</sup>. In the assent that follows deliberation, the presentation of the subject matter passes over into a judgment about that same subject matter, while the presented judgment is taken to be ‘valid’ or confirmed.<sup>190</sup> Thus, what an assenting judgment is intentionally directed at is twofold: on the one hand, the facts of the matter which confirm the judgment assented to, and on the other, the confirmed judgment.<sup>191</sup>

Husserl takes it that assenting judgments find their most appropriate verbal expressions in statements in which the content of the accepted judgment is expressed in a noun phrase that takes the place of a logical subject, for example in ‘The judgment that *S* is

<sup>188</sup> There is a certain complication on this point due to the fact that by ‘judgment’, one can mean either the act of judging or the ‘content’ in the logical sense, that is, the proposition as the “self-identical intentional unity set over against the dispersed multiplicity of actual and possible experience”, to use Husserl’s expression quoted previously (LI, 228; Hua19/1, 102); accordingly, assent can be understood as an attitude either to an *intentional act*—or to a verbal utterance in which it is expressed—or to an *ideal proposition*. Furthermore, assenting to a written rather than a spoken statement is not strictly speaking assenting to an *act* (of writing), but to the *product* of an act.

<sup>189</sup> „dieser Vorstellung zustimmend haben wir ein Doppeltes, nämlich das Urteil, in welches die Vorstellung übergeht, andererseits die Vorstellung mit dem Charakter der gültigen.“

<sup>190</sup> Husserl is not always entirely clear in distinguishing, in this context, between the presentation of the *subject matter* of an understood judgment and the presentation of that *judgment*. See for example a manuscript where it is said that in accepting a judgment, “I present to myself the judgment” („hier stelle ich mir das Urteil vor“) (Hua40, 132), and compare another manuscript where Husserl writes that in deliberating “we form the presentation “that *S* is *p*”, which corresponds to the judgment” („bilden wir eine Vorstellung, dass *S P* ist“, welche dem Urteil entspricht“) (*ibid*, 136).

<sup>191</sup> Brentano dealt with intentional relations with such double intentional directions, although not in connection with the interpretation of the nature of judgment, under the rubric of ‘modes of presentation’. In particular, Brentano distinguishes between presentation in a direct mode (*modus rectus*) from an oblique mode (*modus obliquus*). In supplements to the second edition of the *Psychology*, Brentano uses this distinction to clarify in what respect intentional relations are akin to relations ‘in the proper sense’, which presuppose the existence of the related objects. Brentano observes that in thinking of something as standing in a certain relation to something else, one has to think of both objects, one of them ‘*in recto*’ and the other ‘*in obliqua*’; for example, in thinking of someone who is taller than another person, the taller person is thought of *in recto*, the shorter *in obliqua*. As Brentano notes, the same is true in thinking of someone who, for example, loves flowers: the person is thought of *in recto*, the flowers *in obliqua* (Brentano 1995a, 212). Brentano also makes observations about identifying what is presented obliquely with what is presented directly, which could be made use of in analyzing the confirmation of a statement made by someone else (see *ibid*, 220).

*p* agrees with the facts' or '... is true' or '... is correct' (*richtig*) (see Hua40, 135; HuaMat5, 111–2).<sup>192</sup> As Husserl notes in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment, each such statement is clearly logically equivalent with a corresponding straightforward statement of the corresponding form '*S* is *p*'. However, Husserl argues that this equivalence should not be mistaken for *identity*. The statements differ in their 'thought-content' (*Gedankengehalt*) and in the way they relate to the relevant facts of the matter: one concerns those facts of the matter directly, the other a judgment about them. Moreover, the concepts of *truth*, *agreement with the facts*, and *correctness*—by means of which the acceptance is expressed in the statements above—make their first appearance in statements of this kind, in being predicated of the judgment serving as the logical subject. Husserl claims that these concepts are indeed in a certain way involved also in statements of the straightforward, first-order kind, but they only occur 'explicitly' (*explicite*) in statements and judgments with the higher-order structure.<sup>193</sup> Husserl's idea appears to be the following: to judge is in a certain sense to take something to be true, but there is a difference between a judgment most appropriately expressed simply as '*S* is *p*' and a judgment in whose most fitting verbal formulation *that* judgment is nominalized and truth is predicated of it. In one case, truth figures, so to speak, implicitly as part of the act of *judging* something; in the other, it is made explicit as part of what is *judged*.

These points now connect with Husserl's views of the intentional structure of assenting judgments. If by the 'explicitness' of the occurrence of the concept of truth in assenting judgments we understand the characteristic that is linguistically expressed by

<sup>192</sup> Clearly, assent is not always expressed by sentences of this form. Often, one expresses assent indirectly by *reporting* one's agreement, for example by saying "Yes, I agree (with your statement)". Direct expressions of assent conform better to Husserl's formulation: for example, in the response "That's true", 'that' refers to the statement assented to, and if substituted by the description 'The statement that ...', one ends up with Husserl's form. In his 1911 *Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils*, Adolf Reinach—taking as his starting point Husserl's observation that assent in the proper sense is involved only in situations where one understands a judgment, considers it, and decides the matter for oneself—took a slightly different view on this point: according to Reinach, the reply 'Yes' expresses the whole act of assenting which is not itself a judgment, but only an accepting attitude toward a judgment; thus Reinach distinguishes between what he calls 'assenting acceptance' (*Zustimmungsanerkennung*) in which one accepts a judgment and a 'judging acceptance' (*urteilende Anerkennung*) in which one 'accepts'—in a different sense—a state of affairs (Reinach 1989, 96). Husserl seems to have entertained a similar view at least in one preparatory manuscript for the *Investigations*: "I express beside the straightforward judgment an acceptance which is not authentically a judgment, or a rejection, which likewise is no judgment" („Ich drücke also neben dem schlichten Urteil eine Anerkennung aus, die eigentlich gar kein Urteil ist, oder eine Verwerfung, die ebenfalls kein Urteil ist") (Hua40, 132).

<sup>193</sup> See HuaMat5, 112: "In a straightforward judgment the thought of truth does not occur *explicitly*. [...] In the accepting judgment, the subject is what is expressed in the clause 'that *S* is *p*', and the predicate is now 'true'." („Im schlichten Urteil kommt nicht explicite der Gedanke der Wahrheit vor. [...] In dem anerkennenden Urteil ist das Subjekt durch die Satzform ausgedrückt, dass *S P* ist', und das Prädikat ist jetzt 'wahr'.")

the use of a truth-predicate in a statement, then this corresponds in Husserl's view with the fact that truth figures in the higher-order judgments 'objectively', on the side of the intentional objects. This can be distinguished from the sense in which the concept of truth figures 'implicitly' in straightforward judgments—namely, because judging can, in a certain sense, be appropriately understood as 'taking true' (*Fürwahrhalten*) (see e.g. LI2, 165; HuaI9/I, 509). This 'implicitness' then corresponds in Husserl's view with the fact that in straightforward judgments truth is not taken as an intentional *object*—specifically, as a relation in which one takes the judgment assented to as standing—but it pertains 'implicitly' to the kind or mode of relation in which the judging subject stands, or purports to stand, to the facts of the matter in making the judgment.

Assenting judgments are, if Husserl's view is correct, a special case of *relational* judgments, judgments bearing on a relation between a judgment and its subject matter. The question is, then, what is involved in becoming conscious specifically of the relation of 'agreement' of a presented judgment and the relevant facts of the matter. Now, Husserl's reflections on this point make it possible to articulate more clearly the claim alluded to above that the relation of fulfillment—on which the analyses in the previous section focused—is not by itself sufficient for a judgment to exhibit the constitutive characteristics of assent. Namely, as Husserl notes, not every experience of 'fulfillment' is an experience of a relation *of* agreement between a judgment and the facts of the matter. Instead, this kind of 'explicitly' relational experience requires a change of attitude from a straightforward concern with the experienced objects to a more distanced or reflective attitude—an attitude that is characteristic of the *critical evaluation* of judgments. In approaching Husserl's views on this topic, it is instructive to consider them in the context of the analysis provided in the *Investigations* of the way in which acts of *identifying* involve, without 'objectifying' it, a relation of *identity*, and of what, besides a straightforward identification, is involved in the 'objectification' of such relations.

As Husserl notes in the Sixth Investigation, although the fulfillment of an intention always involves an identification, and although a relation of identity consequently figures in some way in every fulfilling experience as the 'intentional correlate' of that identification, one is nonetheless ordinarily simply conscious of the identified object rather than the relation of identity between what was, say, previously expected and now perceived (LI2, 207–8; HuaI9/2, 567–8). So, when an expectation is fulfilled, it is not such a relation but simply the expected thing or event that plays the role of the intentional object in the fulfilling experience. Husserl articulates this point in terms of the theory of intentionality of the *Investigations* by saying that there is in every experi-

ence of fulfillment a relation of ‘coincidence’ that is part of the phenomenal make-up of that experience and that obtains between the intentional matters of the respective acts—which coincidence, as noted previously, is what corresponds on the side of the acts to the identity of their objects. In the fulfilling experience, this coincidence is ‘experienced’ in the sense of being consciously ‘lived through’ (*erlebt*)<sup>194</sup>, but it does not take on a role in an ‘objectifying apprehension’ (*objektivierende Auffassung*) by virtue of which the corresponding relation of identity would be ‘objectified’ or set up as an intentional object (LI2, 208; Hua19/2, 569–70). The act of identification, as it were, informs the sense in which the object is experienced—namely, as being the same—without being properly speaking intentionally directed at the relation of identity itself. Husserl argues against interpreting this simply as a difference in the *attentional prominence* of the object and the relation of identity, in which case the identity would already be present in the guise of an intentional object, but one that is currently at the background of one’s attention. Relations of identity are not simply found in one’s surroundings, as it were, ready-made in the way perceived objects and claims made by others are. Instead, Husserl argues, setting up the relation of identity as an intentional object requires a complex experience in which, in the case considered here, what was previously expected and what is now seen are considered separately and in some way connected. The consciousness of the relation obtaining between the things considered can, according to Husserl, take place only on the basis of these underlying acts.<sup>195</sup>

<sup>194</sup> The expressions ‘*erleben*’ and ‘*Erlebnis*’ entered German philosophical and psychological jargon in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, usually in a contrast with another German word for ‘experience’, ‘*Erfahrung*’. For example, Kant’s successor in Königsberg, Wilhelm Krug, and Lotze used the word ‘*Erlebnisse*’ to refer to ‘immediate’ elements of consciousness which serve as the basis of experience in the cognitively ‘higher’ sense of ‘*Erfahrung*’, the source of empirical knowledge (see Cramer 1972). In Husserl’s use, ‘*erleben*’ and ‘*Erlebnis*’ play at least three roles: *first*, in distinguishing the ‘real’ and ‘intentional’ constituents of intentional acts; *second*, in distinguishing the objectifying and non-objectifying function of some real constituents of an act; and *third*, in distinguishing intuitive and non-intuitive cases of such functions. In the *first* sense, Husserl notes the ambiguity in ‘*erleben*’, which is likewise present in the English ‘experience’, due to which one can talk of ‘experiencing’ either events in the external world or the conscious occurrences in which one ‘experiences’ those events in the former sense, and limits the phenomenological use to the latter sense (LI2, 85; Hua19/1, 362). The *second* sense is the one referred to here: in identifying an object, one usually experiences or ‘lives through’ an identification but does not objectify the relation of identity. In the *third* sense, Husserl distinguishes two kinds of identifications, exemplified, on the one hand, by the identification of a number as the same in two different symbolic expressions, such as ‘4’ and ‘2<sup>2</sup>’, and on the other, by the identification of two colors as the same in perception. In the latter case, the identity is ‘experienced’ (*erlebt*), whereas in the former it is usually only ‘meant’ or ‘thought of’ (*vermeint*) in an empty manner (LI2, 300–1; Hua19/2, 701). The senses are clearly different, since a perceptual and a symbolic identification of something are both *Erlebnisse* in the first sense and can involve a consciousness either of the identified object as the same or of the relation of identity itself.

<sup>195</sup> See LI2, 285; Hua19/2, 679: “Only when [...] we articulate our individual percepts, and relate their objects to each other, does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts [...] provide a *point d’appui* for a consciousness of identity.”

Husserl calls intentional acts of this kind, in which the relation of identity is itself taken as an intentional object, acts of ‘relational identification’ (*beziehende Identifizierung*), and states that every straightforward identification permits *a priori* a transformation into an act of this kind (*ibid*): whenever one identifies an object as the same in two instances, one could in principle also become conscious of the identity that obtains between what is present in those instances. This is because straightforwardly identifying an object in two instances is, again, in a sense appropriately understood as taking the object involved in those instances as being identical—but, once more, there is a difference between relating in an ‘identifying’ manner to an object and relating to a relation of identity in which the object stands to itself. Two further features on acts of this kind can be pointed out here. *First*, the setting up of the relation of identity as an object is something that in Husserl’s view *presupposes* the straightforward identification, and in a sense arises from it: the relation of identity, when considered as an object of its own, gives as it were an objective guise to what the identified object is presented *as* in identifying it ‘straightforwardly’—namely, as the same, as identical in the two instances. *Secondly*, in so presenting what the straightforward identification purports to establish, but now as articulated in an explicit, objective form, the relational experience makes it possible to subject the result of the former to *critical evaluation*. Accordingly, the natural environment for this kind of ‘objectification’ is in situations where doubts emerge, for example, about whether the object was *in fact* the same as expected, or perhaps merely in certain respects similar to it—that is, whether the putative relation of identity did not hold after all. Here, it is the relation of identity itself that forms so to say the focal point of one’s concerns, for which concerns it is relevant that one considers the relation specifically, that is, sets it up as an intentional object or ‘objectifies’ it in Husserl’s sense.

As was noted above, the confirmation of a judgment involves identifying what was judged to be the case with what is, in the simplest case, seen to be so; accordingly, these observations about acts of identifying something carry over to the case of confirming a judgment. So, when for instance a judgment that was previously made in the perceptual absence of its object is confirmed when the object comes in view, the ensuing experience of fulfillment need not have the explicitly relational structure in which the relevant relation of agreement would itself be set up as an intentional object or ‘objectified’. In fact, it should be clear that this is ordinarily not the case—instead, in the basic case one is again simply or straightforwardly conscious of the object or of the way it is, what characteristics it has, or so on. Thus, Husserl argues that although this agreement is necessarily involved in an experience in which a judgment is confirmed or verified—and

is in a sense consciously present in it precisely as what it establishes to hold—it nonetheless ordinarily figures in the experience of verification or fulfillment only as something ‘lived through’—that is, as a non-objectified correlate of the ‘identifying coincidence’ (*identifizierende Deckung*) between the intentional matters of the respective acts (LI2, 263; Hua19/2, 652). Accordingly, in verifying what is taken to be the case, one does not ordinarily make a judgment *about* the truth of the verified judgment; as Husserl puts it, in the verifying experience “*truth is experienced (erlebt) but not expressed (ausgedrückt)*” (LI2, 264; Hua19/2, 653), that is, not articulated in the form in which it would figure as a predicate in a statement.<sup>196</sup>

However, just as in the previously considered case of relations of identity, the truth of a judgment can also be ‘objectified’ in another act, and in particular in another judgment. Such ‘higher-order’ judgments—judgments about the truth of other judgments—again require on Husserl’s view a more elaborate experiential set-up than that of a simple or straightforward identification of what is—again, in the simplest case—currently perceived with what was previously judged to be the case. There are again, as Husserl observes, several preconditions for articulating the circumstances in which the judgment is confirmed in this way, so as to set up the truth of the judgment as an intentional object: *first*, one has to consider the judgment previously made in a manner that incorporates the awareness of how things were judged to be; *second*, one has to consider the facts of the matter themselves, as they are now taken to be, perceptually or otherwise; *third*, one has to grasp the latter as confirming the former or experience them as agreeing in the straightforward, ‘non-objectifying’ sense; only when these preconditions are met, the agreement of what was judged with the facts of the matter—as one now takes them to be—can then be itself set up as an intentional object. An assenting or accepting judgment arises, as Husserl argues, only on the basis of going through a sequence of experiences of this kind, at the end of which one has the truth or agreement with the facts

<sup>196</sup> Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of truth in the *Investigations* consists mainly of two steps. *First*, Husserl notes that the intuitive content of an experience—or the extent to which an object is given by itself or ‘in person’ in experience—admits of degrees that point to an ideal maximal limit in which all features of an object intended in an intentional act would be ‘given’ or exhibited directly and which would yield a ‘final fulfillment’ (*letzte Erfüllung*) for it (see LI2, 260–1; Hua19/2, 646–8). *Second*, Husserl distinguishes various elements and relations in such idealized experiential situation that can be understood as different concepts of truth: (i) truth in an ontological sense as the relation of agreement or identity between the *objects* meant and given; (ii) truth as the correlative relation of ‘coincidence’ between the intentional essences—that is, matters and qualities—of the relevant *acts*; (iii) truth in the non-relational ontological sense of what ‘truly’ is the case, and what is given as such in the experiential circumstances in question; and (iv) truth in Brentano’s sense of the ‘correctness’ (*Richtigkeit*) of judgment or, as Husserl puts it, the “adequacy to its true object” (*Adäquatsein an den wahren Gegenstand*) of an intention (see LI2, 263–4; Hua19/2, 651–3).

of the matter so to speak ‘before one’s eyes’ as an intentional object: in giving assent to a judgment, “I present to myself the judgment, and now the ‘agreement’ itself appears to me, and so I assent to it” (Hua40, 132)<sup>197</sup>.

Husserl notes in the preparatory manuscripts for the *Investigations* that passing through this kind of experiential process is “necessary for the purposes of critique” (Hua40, 136)<sup>198</sup>. In the attitude of critically assessing judgments expressed by others or previously formed by ourselves, our interest is not directed simply at adding to our knowledge of the world, but at separating genuine from spurious claims to knowledge, and this interest requires a kind of ‘layered’ attitude in which judgments or claims to knowledge and their agreement or disagreement with how things stand in the world, rather than simply those things themselves, figure among the objects of our inquiries. Accordingly, Husserl draws the conclusion that what has been here called the ‘apprehension–assent’ model of initially merely apprehending, conceiving, understanding, or presenting something and afterwards assenting to or dissenting from it is a characteristic of only a special class of judgments, namely those most commonly made in the context of critical assessment of previously made judgments, and whose typical function is to *confirm* (*bestätigen*) or *disconfirm* the latter. Husserl gives a succinct formulation of this conclusion in the 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment:

It does not pertain to the essence of judging in general that it either accepts or rejects; instead, accepting judgments are confirming judgments (*bestätigende Urteile*), they confirm an assumption, a hypothesis, a conjecture, or answer a question, or resolve a doubt. They have the form “The presupposition is right”, “The assumption is correct”, “The proposed judgment holds”, “The presentation that *S* is *p* corresponds with the truth” (HuaMat5, 112)<sup>199</sup>.

Furthermore, Husserl points out that what is judged in judgments of this kind can clearly be also ‘merely presented’—which would occur when, for example, one person expresses a judgment, a second person expresses their assent to that judgment, and a third person comprehends the assenting judgment without taking a position on the matter. But this means that what in Husserl’s view is the defining characteristic of assenting judgments—the ‘higher-order’ structural feature expressed in saying that a judgment is true—is inessential for explaining what makes them *judgments*, and separates them from

<sup>197</sup> „[In] die Anerkennung ‚*S* ist *p*‘ [...] stelle ich mir das Urteil vor, erscheint nun selbst die ‚Übereinstimmung‘ und so stimme ich ihm zu“.

<sup>198</sup> „Zu Zwecken der Kritik ist es erforderlich, diesen Prozess durchzumachen.“

<sup>199</sup> „Nicht gehört zum Wesen des Urteilens überhaupt, dass es entweder anerkennt oder verwirft; sondern anerkennende Urteile sind bestätigende Urteile, sie bestätigen eine Annahme, eine Hypothese, eine Vermutung, odr sie beantworten eine Frage, sie entscheiden einen Zweifel. Sie haben die Form ‚Die Voraussetzung triggt zu‘, ‚Die Vermutung ist richtig‘, ‚Das proponierte Urteil stimmt‘, ‚Der Vorstellung, dass *S P* ist, entspricht Wahrheit“.

acts of ‘mere presentation’, instead of only distinguishing them among a broader class of acts of judging. Thus, Husserl argues that the apprehension–assent analysis of judgment was in large part based on a conflation of two essentially different relations: on the one hand, the relation between a ‘mere presentation’ and a judgment, and on the other, the relation between *straightforward* and *assenting* judgments (see Hua22, 186; HuaMat5, 112)<sup>200</sup>. The former relation concerns the intentional qualities of the acts, the latter their intentional matter.

The conception of judgment as assent or dissent projected, so to say, the structure of critical evaluation on what ordinarily constitutes the *object* of such evaluation—namely, straightforward judgments or claims about the world—and accordingly interpreted the basic cognitive relation between the mind and the world in terms of the indirect relation to the objects ordinarily judged about that characterizes this kind of critical, reflective attitude. But, as Husserl argues, such ‘critical’ judgments themselves rely on straightforward judgments bearing directly on objects in the world, such as those in one’s immediate perceptual surroundings; it is only where the facts of the matter are in some way accessible to knowledge that the critical evaluation of the judgment about them makes sense. However, this is still largely a negative result: discounting the characteristic features of assent as a basis for a general account of judgment still leaves open the positive task of descriptively articulating the essential characteristics of acts of judging in general. Particularly, this result leaves open the task of providing a positive account of the *straightforward* judgments—which figure in the analysis of assent mostly as a contrast class—in which the relevant, direct cognitive relation to the world comes about. But before arriving at these issues, another central question concerning Husserl’s theory of judgment will first have to be considered: if, as Husserl has been seen to argue against Brentano, acts of judging are not built upon prior acts of ‘merely presenting’ something, how is the relation between the two types of intentional acts to be understood and theoretically articulated? This question forms the topic of the next section, where it will be seen that Husserl argues that instead of judgments being founded on mere presentations, the latter should be viewed as derived from the former, as ‘modifications’ of them.

<sup>200</sup> In both of the cited instances, Husserl’s criticism is directly addressed to Julius Bergmann, who had argued in his 1895 *Die Grundprobleme der Logik* that every act of judgment consists in three elements, (i) a presentation (*Vorstellung*) of an object, (ii) a predication, in the sense of a ‘mere presentation’ of a predicative determination of the object, and (iii) a critical attitude or decision concerning the validity of that predication (see Bergmann 1895, 78–9). Thus, Bergmann’s analysis exhibits in especially clear manner the attribution of the structures of critical evaluation of judgments to every act of judging, characteristic of the apprehension–assent conception.



### 3.3 'Mere Presentation' as a Modification of Judgment

As seen in the previous sections, the descriptive analyses carried out in the Fifth Investigation led Husserl to reject two of the basic tenets of Brentano's theory of judgment: *first*, the idea that the 'matter' of a judgment, the element that determines its intentional reference, is an act of mere presentation contained in it, and *second*, the idea that the 'quality' of a judgment is an act of acceptance or rejection superimposed on the presentation and relating to what is thereby presented. These two ideas formed, as was seen in the first chapter, the conceptual core of one of the main traditional conceptions of the nature of judgment, which was previously characterized as the apprehension–assent conception, in contradistinction to the Platonic-Aristotelian one centered on the notion of predication. Intimately connected with these ideas, a further characteristic of that conception was the idea of a *foundational relation* between presentation and judgment: on this view, in order to render a judgment concerning something, one has to first present, conceive of, or apprehend the same thing without judging. The implicit descriptive basis for this idea, as was argued above, was the conception of the basic cognitive situation as one of *deliberation* or critical assessment of already available claims or judgments which one then decides to accept or reject. To briefly recall the main points on these matters, the conclusions that Husserl drew from his analyses were, *first*, that the idea of judgments as necessarily based on mere presentations conflated the intentional matter as an abstract constituent or 'moment' of an experience with a complete act of presenting; and *second*, that the interpretation of judging as assenting conflated the 'qualitative' difference between merely presenting and judging with the essentially different relation between judging straightforwardly about some subject matter in the world and accepting a judgment after reflection upon it.

Accordingly, as part of the positive effort of formulating a descriptively sound analysis of the basic structures of intentional experiences, Husserl sets out in the Fifth Investigation to provide an alternative account of the relation between acts of mere presentation and judgment that aims to codify theoretically the results of these descriptive analyses. Here, the main elements of Husserl's analyses on this point are outlined in two stages, first as presented in the Fifth Investigation, and afterwards by incorporating certain results of Husserl's critical evaluation of that account in the years following the publication of the work. The account of the Fifth Investigation centers around the relation between two classes of intentional acts that Husserl calls 'positing' and 'non-positing' acts. Here, Husserl's analyses are discussed by first considering the character-

istics that Husserl attributes to these acts and the interest in a taxonomy of the intentional that underlies these analyses. Husserl's account of the relation between positing and non-positing acts is then discussed in terms of what he calls 'qualitative modification', an abstract operation that relates each positing act to a non-positing counterpart, and against the background of Brentano's and Twardowski's observations about 'modifying' adjectives and predicates. Afterwards, some critical points are raised about the descriptive support provided for this account in the *Investigations*, and Husserl's own revisions to the theory in his 1905 lectures on theory of judgment are discussed in terms of these points. The main upshot of the revised account is that mere presentations should, on the view defended in those lectures, be understood as 'quasi-judgments' or pretend judgments and as dependent as to their intentional characteristics on those of actual judgments. It is then argued that this view, although it requires certain changes to the account of the Fifth Investigations on questions of detail, is essentially in agreement with its core idea—the idea that judging and believing have a certain conceptual primacy over merely presenting or conceiving of something.

### 3.3.1 *Positing and non-positing acts and the question of their relation*

In approaching Husserl's characterization and analysis of the distinction between 'positing' (*setzende*) and 'non-positing' (*nichtsetzende*) acts it is again instructive to recall certain features of Brentano's theory of judgment. *First*, as was seen in the first chapter, Brentano undertook a reduction of all forms of judgment into the existential. The standard categorical form 'S is p', which the tradition took as the centerpiece of any theory of judgment ought, Brentano argued, to be seen as pertaining only to the accidental grammatical surface form that judgments take when given linguistic expression in statements.<sup>201</sup> *Second*, following in essence the Humean account of beliefs concerning existence, Brentano argued that the existence of the object judged about does not figure in the judgment as something *attributed to* or *predicated of* the object, but rather as part of the characteristic intentional relation to that object. That is, taking the object to exist is something pertaining to the quality and not the matter of the judgment. As a result, Brentano included among the class of judgments all experiences involving in their intentional quality a belief or 'affirmation'—or disbelief or 'rejection'—of the existence

<sup>201</sup> Again, as noted in a previous footnote, the radical appearance of this proposed reduction was later mitigated by the introduction of the category of 'double judgments' (*Doppelurteile*) to which 'genuinely' categorical judgments in Brentano's later view belonged (see Brentano 1956, 113–4). The focus here is on Brentano's initial theory, since Husserl's critical responses are mostly directed against it.

of their object, such as perceptions, memories, expectations, and so on. A memory or perception of, say, a red rose does not differ in any essential way from the judgment or belief that the rose is or was red. In this sense all judgments are, as to the articulation of their matter, logically akin to simple or complex *names*: the matter of a judgment to the effect that a rose is red is, just as that of a perception or memory of that rose, the presentation whose most direct linguistic expression is the noun phrase ‘a red rose’, and in the judgment only the intentional relation to the object so presented is changed from ‘merely’ presenting it to accepting its existence.

In the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl builds on these ideas—while subjecting them to various modifications and reservations—in the analysis of positing and non-positing acts. ‘Positing acts’, as Husserl uses the term in the *Investigations*, refers to those intentional experiences in which the presented object is taken to exist—that is, in Husserl’s locution, to “putative apprehensions of existence” (*vermeintlicher Seinserfassungen*) (LI2, 159; Hua19/I, 499). Conversely, non-positing acts are those in which no such position is taken, and which instead “leave the existence of their object unsettled” (*lassen das Sein ihres Gegenstandes dahingestellt*) (*ibid.*).<sup>202</sup> In line with Hume and Brentano, Husserl takes it that this distinction concerns only the manner in which one relates to the object of the experience, instead of pertaining to the characteristics attributed to that object: in taking an object to exist, one does not attribute existence as a property to that object but relates to it in an existentially ‘positing’ manner. Moreover, in agreement with Brentano, Husserl argues that the positing quality is not essentially tied to predication, or to an articulation of the intentional matter of an act in a subject–predicate form but is found also in acts that present their object in the simple manner of, for example, perception or, in the domain of linguistic expression, of names. In fact, the distinction between positing and non-positing acts is first introduced in the *Investigations* precisely in the context of a discussion of different types of names and of the intentional acts expressed in them, which Husserl calls ‘nominal acts’ (*nominale Akte*). As Husserl observes, many names in their normal use refer to their objects in a way

<sup>202</sup> The use of the metaphor of ‘placing’, ‘putting’, or ‘positing’ something in treatments of the concepts of belief and existence has a long history. In German philosophy, the connection of *Setzung* and *Sein* goes back at least to Kant, who at a certain point took them to be identical concepts (see Kant 1992b, 119). Likewise, the broadly doxastic word ‘thesis’ derives from the Greek verb ‘τίθεσθαι’, literally meaning placing an object somewhere, which was used in a doxastic sense by various Greek philosophers and then translated in Latin logic as ‘ponere’ and, in nominal form, as ‘positio’ (see Leinkauf 1995). Charles Kahn (2003, xxi) suggests that these metaphors derive from a ‘locative-existential’ sense of ‘to be’ as meaning ‘to be present somewhere’. In his later work, Husserl extends, by analogy with belief, the use of ‘setzen’ also to other types of acts, such as evaluations and decisions, in which something is then ‘posited’ not as existing but as, for instance, valuable. See e.g. Hua3, 241f.

that implies that the objects so named exist, or “intend and mean objects as actually existent, without thereby being more than mere names” (LI2, 150; Hua19/1, 481). Among names that are ordinarily so used, Husserl mentions proper names of non-fictional persons that the speaker knows and, in languages employing articles, noun phrases with a definite article.<sup>203</sup> Such ‘positing names’ (*setzende Namen*) do not differ from non-positing ones by virtue of *describing* the named object as something that exists—except, as Husserl notes, in the unusual cases in which existence *does* figure as part of a description, in the form ‘the existent *S*’<sup>204</sup>—and so the difference is not in the matters of the acts expressed but pertains to their quality. Accordingly, the positing nominal acts expressed in such positing names conform, both as to their intentional matter and quality, to Brentano’s account of existential judgments. Likewise, those acts that can provide an immediate basis for identifying what is referred to by a name, such as perceptions and memories—which Husserl consequently characterizes as having the ‘logical vocation’ (*logische Beruf*) of fulfilling nominal meaning-conferring acts (see LI2, 151; Hua19/1, 483)—can in Husserl’s view be correctly understood in line with these aspects of the Brentanian analysis.

As was noted in the first chapter, one of Brentano’s main interests in his *Psychology* was to establish a classification of the fundamental types of mental phenomena, based on the nature of and differences in their characteristic intentional relations. In Brentano’s classificatory scheme, what Husserl calls positing and non-positing acts were accounted for by the foundational principle for presentations and all other experiences: non-positing acts are presentations, positing ones are judgments built or founded upon

<sup>203</sup> In the Fourth Investigation, while discussing complex and simple meanings—meanings either admitting or not admitting of decomposition into further meaningful units—Husserl briefly outlines an account of proper names. According to Husserl, proper names, when they ‘function normally’ (*normal fungieren*), refer to their objects ‘directly’ (*direkt*) and in a ‘simple’ (*einfach*) manner, and not by means of a description of the object named, that is, by picking out the object in terms of properties attributed to it (LI2, 51; Hua19/1, 305–6). Nonetheless, the determinations by virtue of which one is able to distinguish the object from others figure in the presentation in some way; Husserl puts this by saying that those determinations are “presented *implicitly*” (*implicite vorgestellt*) (Hua19/1, 308n). By ‘normally functioning’ proper names Husserl means those of non-fictional objects known to the speaker; a proper name of, for example, a person unknown to the speaker can, Husserl takes it, function only in the indirect sense of a description such as ‘a certain person called ...’ (LI2, 53; Hua19/1, 309). As for referring phrases with a definite article, or what are usually called ‘definite descriptions’, Husserl takes it that it is part of the ‘semantic function’ (*Bedeutungsfunktion*) of the article to express the positing quality of the underlying intentional act, even if this ordinary function can be altered in certain contexts, for example in constructions such as ‘the imaginary *S*’ (LI2, 150; Hua19/1, 481).

<sup>204</sup> Husserl argues that even in such cases the attribute ‘existent’ does not by itself yield a positing name, and that the positing quality of the underlying act is expressed in the definite article. Again, Husserl seems to be in agreement with Hume’s view that the addition of ‘existent’ makes no difference to how an object is ‘conceived’ since, as Hume claimed, conceiving of an object as existent simply is nothing else than conceiving of that object (Hume 2007, 48).

the former. Although this interest in a taxonomy of the mental is not equally central in the *Investigations*, Husserl does take it that descriptive analyses of intentional acts should yield or be codified into an Aristotelian genus–species hierarchy in which each class captures an “essential genus of intentional experiences” (*eine wesentliche Gattung intentionaler Erlebnisse*) (LI2, 149; Hua19/1, 480). Now, since the descriptive arguments discussed in the previous sections led Husserl to conclude that the relation between positing and non-positing acts cannot be understood on the Brentanian ‘additive’ model of superposing another act on an underlying presentation, but has to be conceived of as a relation between acts with identical abstract matters and different, likewise abstract intentional qualities, Husserl is left with the problem of accounting for the *affinity* that nonetheless obtains between the two. Namely, as Husserl notes, the relation between merely presenting and believing, or understanding and judging one and the same thing is not simply an extrinsic relation that can obtain between any two types of experiences relating to the same thing and differing only as to their intentional qualities, such as imagining and wishing for it.<sup>205</sup> In Brentano’s account, each positing act or judgment necessarily *contains* a non-positing act of presentation, so that the relation between the two is a type of necessary part-whole dependence that Brentano called ‘one-sided separability’ (*einseitige Ablösbarkeit*) (Brentano 1995b, 15). In the *Investigations*, Husserl’s approach on this matter consists in an analysis of a specific kind of ‘modification’ of intentional quality which, as Husserl argues, applies only to positing acts and can therefore be made to serve as a criterion for distinguishing positing and non-positing acts from other kinds of intentional experiences.

### 3.3.2 *The theory of ‘qualitative modification’*

Husserl’s use of the term ‘modification’ (*Modifikation*) has a specific philosophical background in the broadly understood school of Brentano.<sup>206</sup> Brentano had observed a dis-

<sup>205</sup> Husserl puts this by saying that to pass from a positing to a non-positing act with the same matter, or vice versa, is “not to pass to a heterogeneous class, as in the case of passing from any nominal act to a desire or act of will” (LI2, 160; Hua19/1, 500).

<sup>206</sup> For an illuminating account of the ‘theory of modifications’ in the Brentano School focusing in particular on Adolf Reinach’s theory of social acts, see Mulligan 1987, 72ff. In another, traditional use of the word, ‘modification’ was often used as either a synonym for or otherwise closely connected with the notion of an accident, as something that depends for its existence on some substance, the latter being an ontologically independent entity. As an example, consider Leibniz’s definition in a letter to the Jesuit mathematician Bartholomew des Bosses: “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance. But a modification is connected essentially to that whose modification it is. So there can be no modification without a subject; for example, no sitting without a sitter.” (Leibniz 1989, 614). Husserl occasionally also uses the term in a manner that clearly connects directly with this traditional rather than the more narrow Brentanian use; consider for example a passage in the second volume of the *Ideas*, in which Husserl

inction between two ways in which adjectives can qualify the meaning of the noun to which they are attached. In most cases, adjectives merely add to, determine, or ‘enrich’ (*bereichern*) the meaning of the noun and thereby attribute to the object characteristics not already implicit in the noun itself, as in ‘a learned person’. In other cases, however, an adjective instead alters or *modifies* (*modifiziert*) the normal meaning of the noun, as in the expression ‘a dead person’ (see Brentano 1995a, 170–71).<sup>207</sup> Following Brentano, for example Twardowski distinguished between, on the one hand, ‘attributive’ or ‘determining’ adjectives, and on the other, ‘modifying’ ones that change the original meaning of the noun, among which he lists ‘false’, ‘artificial’, ‘forged’, and ‘former’. As Twardowski observes, a false friend is not a friend, so the inclusion of the adjective modifies the meaning of the noun (Twardowski 1977, 11–12).<sup>208</sup> Both Brentano and his followers were quick to apply the concept of modification as an analytic tool beyond the linguistic domain, and especially to the analysis of intentional experiences. For example, Brentano claimed that properties of the objects of perception can be said to be ‘part of’ the perceptual experience only in a modifying sense, and Twardowski argued that ‘presented’ should be understood as a modifying expression when talking of a presented *object* instead of the presented immanent *content* of an experience, similarly to the way in which ‘painted’ has a modifying function when one talks of a painted *landscape* instead of a

states: “The material thing fits under the logical category, pure and simple individuum [ . . . ] To it are referred the logical (formal-ontological) modifications: individual property [ . . . ] state, process, relation, complexion, etc. [ . . . ] It is from [the individuum] that all logical modifications acquire their sense-determination.” (Hua4, 34; cf. Hua3, 21).

<sup>207</sup> As Brentano observes, the modifying function of certain adjectives has logical significance, since without recognizing it otherwise valid syllogistic figures would appear to have invalid instances, for example in “All persons are living creatures; some person is dead; therefore, some living creature is dead”, which is *prima facie* simply an instance of the traditional ‘Dari’ form (Brentano 1995a, 171). Brentano’s original motivation in introducing the notion of modifying adjectives and predicates was to defend the reducibility of categorical to existential judgments from a point raised by J. S. Mill in his *System of Logic*. Mill had argued that ‘is’ in the sense of the copula cannot be understood as the existential ‘is’ in sentences such as “The centaur is a poetic fiction”, since the existential interpretation would mean that the sentence affirms the existence of centaurs (see Mill 1974, 79). Brentano’s defense is that ‘to be a poetic fiction’ is a modifying predicate, so that the judgment does not concern the existence of centaurs themselves, but only of *ideas* of centaurs (see Brentano 1995a, 170).

<sup>208</sup> In a later text on the ‘logic of adjectives’, Twardowski developed the Brentanian distinction into a fourfold classification of ‘determining’, ‘modifying’, ‘abolishing’, and ‘confirming’ adjectives. As Twardowski argues, whereas ‘determining’ adjectives have a *simple* function, of attributing further characteristics to the object, modifying adjectives involve a *complex* function, since they both *remove* part of the content of the concept expressed in the noun and *replace* it with something else. Thus, Twardowski first divides adjectives into those with a simple and those with a complex function; modifying adjectives are the only class Twardowski recognizes as having a complex function, but in addition to determining ones, he includes in the simple-function class ‘abolishing’ adjectives (of which his example is ‘alleged’) which remove from the original meaning without introducing anything new, and ‘confirming’ ones (such as ‘true’ in ‘true friend’) which confirm or strengthen the original meaning without changing it (see Twardowski 1979, 28–30).

painted *picture* of one (Brentano 1995b, 28–29; Twardowski 1977, 13).

Like Brentano and Twardowski, Husserl initially introduces the concept of modification in a linguistic context. In the Fourth Investigation, Husserl argued for the rationalistic view that the grammatical rules for combining words into phrases and sentences in any given language at least in part reflect the *a priori* possibilities of combination of the ideal meanings of those words, which for their part account for the rational aspect of language<sup>209</sup>. That is, meanings fall into different syntactic categories that impose restrictions on the ways in which they can be put together to form further meaningful wholes, and a combination not conforming to these restrictions can yield at most a list or a ‘heap of meanings’ (*Bedeutungshaufen*) which, taken as a whole, is not itself a meaning (see LI2, 62; Hua19/1, 326). However, as Husserl notes, in some cases meaningful expressions occur in grammatical roles that seem contrary to the idea of such strict categorization; among such cases, Husserl focuses in particular on what Scholastic logicians and grammarians called the *suppositio materialis* and *simplex*—the standing of a word, in a given sentence, for itself or for the concept that gives it its reference—for example in the occurrences of ‘and’, respectively, in the sentences ‘“And” is a conjunction’ and ‘*And* is a meaning’, in both of which it functions as a grammatical subject and a noun.<sup>210</sup> Husserl accounts for these ‘anomalous’ (*anomal*) uses of expressions by arguing that they involve a ‘modification of meaning’ (*Bedeutungsmodifikation*) due to which the expression functions in a way that differs from its ordinary role; namely, instead of connecting two phrases in a coordinate manner, as it usually does, the word ‘and’ refers in these cases either to itself as a *word* or to its *meaning*.

While these examples involve a modification pertaining to syntactic category and function, Husserl makes also more general observations concerning the phenomenon of modification. Husserl agrees with Brentano and Twardowski that when the meaning of an expression undergoes modification, the meaning is partially changed, while

<sup>209</sup> For a clear statement of this view in the Sixth Investigation, see LI2, 272; Hua19/2, 658: “There is at least a rough expression of the articulations and forms which are rooted in our meaning’s essence and the articulations and forms of grammar.” In the Fourth Investigation, Husserl explicitly connects this aspect of his project with traditional rationalistic theories of language, in particular Arnauld’s and Lancelot’s 1660 *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* or the ‘Port-Royal Grammar’, which he lauds for the effort of investigating “the ‘rational’ in speech, in the true sense of the word, and in particular [ . . . ] the ‘logic’ of speech or its semantic *a priori*” (LI2, 73; Hua19/1, 346).

<sup>210</sup> The typographical conventions of using quotes and italics are here used only to comply with common usage—they are inessential for the phenomenon that Husserl focuses on. The lexical item is the same whether or not it occurs within quotes or in italics used in this way, and there is nothing directly corresponding to these conventions in spoken language. For the medieval theory of the different *suppositiones*, see e.g. Meier-Oeser 1998a.

preserving an ‘essential kernel’ (*wesentlicher Kern*). In addition Husserl seems to hold that the ‘normal’, unmodified function of an expression is in a certain sense primary, and the modified, anomalous ones have to be understood in terms of it. Here, Husserl’s reasoning can perhaps be illustrated in terms of the analogy with the relation between a modifying adjective and the noun whose meaning it modifies. To take one of Twardowski’s examples, the expression ‘a false friend’, it is not enough—as Twardowski seems to think—to simply note that ‘friend’ in this context refers to someone who is *not* a friend, or to something that has *some* but not *all* of the characteristics of a friend. The expression also involves an intimate connection to the normal, unmodified meaning: without understanding what friends are, one could not understand what it is that false friends merely present themselves as being.<sup>211</sup> Having a grasp on the unmodified meaning is *part of* understanding the modified one. To adopt a phrase used by Brentano—in one of his applications of the theory of modification, his analysis of temporal predicates—one might say that the unmodified meaning is ‘modifyingly contained’ (*modifiziert enthalten*)<sup>212</sup> in the modified one. In Husserl’s terminology, it could be said that the unmodified meaning is not a ‘real’ (*reell*) constituent of the modified one, but part of the latter in an analogous manner to that in which the intended object was said in the Fifth Investigation to be part of the ‘intentional’ rather than ‘real’ content of the act which presents it (LI2, 112; Hua19/1, 411).<sup>213</sup> Similarly, in ‘“And” is a conjunction’, the nominalized conjunction is not simply a different name that designates the word ‘and’ in its ordinary sense and without relation to the latter. Instead, it is the same word in a modified function that is intimately connected with the unmod-

<sup>211</sup> This idea, that the modified meaning of an expression in a sense ‘points back’ (*zurückweist*) to the unmodified, as Husserl later puts it in the second edition of the *Investigations* (see LU2, 153; Hua19/1, 486), seems to have been overlooked in Twardowski’s treatment of the phenomenon. In considering the way in which ‘forged’ modifies the meaning of ‘banknote’, Twardowski simply states that it “removes from the content of one’s representation of a banknote those characteristics which are attributes only of non-forged banknotes, and replaces them by those characteristics which are attributes only of forged banknotes” (Twardowski 1979, 28), while the characteristics shared by both remain unchanged. But the relation between forged and genuine banknotes is clearly not simply the kind of partial sharing of characteristics that obtains between, for example, banknotes and newspapers; what defines counterfeit banknotes is that they attempt to pass off as genuine legal tender, and this property can only be understood in reference to the ‘unmodified’ sense of ‘banknote’.

<sup>212</sup> According to the view Brentano held in the *Psychology* and at least until his 1888–89 lectures on psychology, ‘past’ is a modifying predicate and therefore a past sound should not be understood as a sound that has a certain temporal attribute in the way a sound can have a certain pitch; instead, a past sound does not properly speaking have a sound as a constituent at all—sound “is not strictly but only modifyingly contained (*modifiziert enthalten*) in the past sound” (Brentano 1995b, 22).

<sup>213</sup> That Husserl views relations of modification as falling under part–whole relations in a broad sense is suggested by the fact that the *a priori* grammar of the Fourth Investigation is conceived by Husserl as an application of the general ‘formal-ontological’ theory of parts and wholes put forward in the Third Investigation (see LI2, 49; Hua19/1, 301).



ified one, as “a direct presentation of it, i.e. [with] an intrinsic reference to its original meaning” (LI2, 66; Hua19/1, 332).<sup>214</sup>

Given the theory of meaning put forward in the *Investigations*, the doctrine of modifications of meaning applies straightforwardly to the analysis of intentional acts, since as Husserl takes it, differences in meaning reflect differences in the meaning-giving acts in which the former, as universals or ideal species, are instantiated. In particular, the modifications due to which an expression refers either to itself or to its meaning—instead of serving its ordinary role, whatever it is—alter the intentional matter of such acts. In the analysis of positing and non-positing acts Husserl extends the theory of modifications to apply to the quality of intentional experiences. As noted above, Husserl’s proximal aim here is to establish that these acts can be viewed as belonging to the same basic class of intentional experiences—namely, the so-called ‘objectifying acts’ (*objektivierende Akte*)—that is circumscribed exclusively in terms of their intentional qualities. Husserl pursues this aim by arguing that these types of acts are related by virtue of an operation of ‘qualitative modification’ (*qualitative Modifikation*) that can only be applied to positing acts. Accordingly, Husserl’s analysis consists largely in contrasting the characteristics of this modification with others, and in particular with a modifying operation closely connected with the *suppositiones* mentioned above, which he calls the ‘presentative objectification’ (*vorstellenden Objektivierung*) of an intentional act.<sup>215</sup>

What Husserl’s analysis aims to demonstrate, then, is that every judgment or positing act is related to a possible non-positing act of ‘mere presentation’ so that the latter can be understood as a modification of the former and in a way that is unintelligible for

<sup>214</sup> G. E. M. Anscombe once put the problem to which the assumption that in ‘mentioning’ a word one does not make use of that word itself but rather *another* word as a name *for* that word would lead as follows: “It is impossible to be told anyone’s name. For if I am told ‘That man’s name is “Smith”’, his name is mentioned, not used, and I hear the name of his name but not his name.” (Anscombe 1981, 220). The same problem arises also in the case discussed by Husserl, of conjunctions: in saying, ‘“Und” is German for “and”’, both ‘und’ and ‘and’ are only mentioned, so on this assumption it could be at most a matter of convention that a synonymy is thereby claimed to hold between *those* words rather than the words for which they here serve as names. According to Husserl’s view, in mentioning a name, that name serves as a proper name for itself (see LI2, 66; Hua19/1, 332), in which case Anscombe’s puzzle does not arise: the name used to inform someone of a name is that name itself. It is, of course, in principle possible to give a name for one’s name, but that kind of extrinsic connection between two names differs logically from straightforward ‘mention’ or the Scholastic ‘*suppositio materialis*’.

<sup>215</sup> In characterizing modifications of meaning or intentional acts as ‘operations’ (*Operationen*), Husserl has in mind operations in the abstract sense in which addition and other arithmetical ‘operations’ count as operations, not as mental acts of counting things together but in the sense that certain truths hold *a priori* for numbers, namely that for any numbers *a* and *b*, the ‘operation’ of addition singles out a number *c* such that  $a + b = c$ . Likewise, the ‘operations’ bearing on intentional experiences are not *processes* that those experiences can undergo, but consist in abstract correspondences between in principle or ‘ideally’ possible types of experience (see LI2, 65; Hua19/1, 332).

other types of experiences. However, as Husserl notes, for *any* intentional experience there are various others to which it is related in a way that can be abstractly viewed in terms of an ‘operation’ that takes one from the one act to the other. For example, every conscious experience corresponds to a reflective consideration of that experience itself, and to each perception there corresponds a possible imaginary experience of the same object with the same sensible characteristics. These correspondences obtain ‘in principle’ and *a priori*, regardless of the capacities of existing persons to reflect upon or imagine various things as a matter of fact. Reflection on one’s current experiences, in particular, involves positing acts in which one takes those experiences as existing, namely, as part of the current composition of one’s mental life. But for each such act, there is a possible non-positing counterpart such as merely entertaining the idea of one-self as believing or wishing for something. Therefore, *every* intentional act corresponds in this way to a possible non-positing act, namely, a ‘mere presentation’ of that act. Accordingly, Husserl takes some care to distinguish this relation from that captured by the notion of qualitative modification.<sup>216</sup>

Husserl considers various differences between the two types of operations, among which it suffices here to focus on two. *First*, as Husserl argues, the presentative objectification of any intentional act and the non-positing qualitative modification of a positing act bear differently on the respective intentional matters of the acts. The presentative objectification of an act yields another act with a different object—namely, the original act itself—and thus changes the intentional matter of the act, similarly to the ‘self-presenting’ modifications of verbal expressions considered above. In the case of qualitative modification, on the other hand, an act and its counterpart have the same objects and intentional matters, for which reason Husserl calls it also a ‘conformative’ (*konformer*) modification (LI2, 162; Hua19/I, 504). *Second*, Husserl takes it that the act resulting from the presentative objectification of any act can itself be subjected to the

<sup>216</sup> It should be noted that Husserl’s notion of ‘presentative objectification’ does not include only the simultaneous reflective consciousness of one’s current experiences, but rather encompasses all acts in which what is ‘presented’ is another act, such as a recollection of a prior experience, anticipation of a future experience, or imagination of a possible one—of these, the first two are positing acts and the last a non-positing one. Husserl also considers more indirect forms of presentation of experiences as falling under the same concept, such as thinking of a someone as undergoing a certain experience, in which case the experience is involved indirectly in the thought by virtue of the necessary “relation of acts to the ego” (*Beziehung der Akte auf das Ich*) (LI2, 164, Hua19/I, 507)—that is, as Husserl understands the matter in the *Investigations*, by virtue of the fact that every individual experience belongs to what Husserl calls the ‘empirical ego’ (*empirische Ich*) as a connected unity of experiences, in contradistinction to certain neo-Kantian conceptions of a ‘pure ego’ as a center of conscious experiences that could be introspectively grasped by itself (see LU2, 91–2; Hua19/I, 372–74).

same operation—that is, the operation admits of recursive application or, as Husserl puts it, is ‘iterable’ (*iterierbar*), yielding the possibility of arbitrarily long series of Spinoza’s ‘ideas of ideas’ (*ideae idearum*)<sup>217</sup>. As Husserl notes, such series are most clearly present in the case of temporally disjoint experiences, such as in recalling a previous experience which, for its part, may also be a recollection of another experience, and so on (see LI2, 163; Hua19/I, 506). The qualitative modification of a positing act, on the other hand, results in an act directed at the same object in which only the stance towards the existence of that object is withheld or suspended. For example, the ‘modified’ counterpart of a memory is an experience about the subject matter of that memory in which the question whether the past event in fact occurred is left open. Now, Husserl argues that this operation cannot even in principle be iterated, and that for the act resulting from the qualitative modification of an act there is no experience to which it would be related in the same sense, since if “belief has been transformed into mere presentation, we can at best *return* to belief” (LI2, 164; Hua19/I, 507).

Again, as already noted, the central claim for Husserl’s classificatory interests at this stage in the Fifth Investigation is that the operation thus characterized—by ‘conformativity’ as to intentional matter and by the non-iterability of its application—exclusively captures the relation between positing and non-positing intentional acts, at least when one abstracts from differences in experiences not pertaining either to their matter and quality, that is, to their ‘intentional essence’.<sup>218</sup> That is, non-objectifying acts such as wishes, desires, and emotions do not, as Husserl argues in the *Investigations*, have ‘modified’ counterparts to which they would be related in the same manner. A wish, for

<sup>217</sup> ‘Ideas of ideas’ figure prominently in Spinoza’s discussion of self-consciousness, or the mind’s knowledge of itself, in the second book of the *Ethics*. Spinoza argues—or at least appears to argue, on the assumption that for Spinoza knowing something entails having an idea of it—that the mind’s knowledge of itself involves the presence in the mind of an infinite series of higher-order ideas: “For the idea of the Mind, i.e., the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object. For as soon as someone knows something, he thereby knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows, and so on, to infinity.” (Spinoza 1985, 467–8).

<sup>218</sup> Among differences abstracted from in the Fifth Investigation and specifically taken up for consideration in the Sixth, the central one is that pertaining to the intuitive content of an experience, which can vary independently of the ‘intentional essence’ of an act and *vice versa*. In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl takes some care to distinguish the class of non-positing acts from imaginary experiences in the sense of quasi-sensory visualizations and the such. As Husserl observes, a familiar setting in which non-positing acts figure prominently and can be readily understood as involving a kind of imagination is in reading fiction, in which one knows that the recounted events have not actually taken place, but this existential attitude is usually suspended or “remains inoperative” (LI2, 165; Hua19/I, 510) in the experience of reading in favor of a non-positing attitude. However, Husserl argues that the characteristic features of acts of ‘imagination’ (*Einbildung*) in the narrow, quasi-sensory sense—of conjuring visual, auditory or other mental ‘images’ in imagination or phantasy—are not connected to the positing or non-positing quality of an act, since such quasi-sensory acts can have either of these qualities. See LI2, 166; Hua19/I, 512.

example, corresponds to a ‘mere presentation’ of the wish, but the latter is simply the presentative objectification of the former and has a different object. On the other hand, the non-positing presentation of the object wished for relates to the wish itself in a way that differs from the relation of a positing act and its qualitative modification. As Husserl notes in the 1905 lectures on judgment, the basis for rejecting Brentano’s conception of the relation of mere presentation and judgment was the view—figuring prominently in the analyses of revealed illusions and assent—that simultaneous non-positing and positing qualities with the same intentional matter are mutually incompatible in a manner analogous to the relation of two colors on the same piece of surface (see HuaMat5, 110).<sup>219</sup> The qualities of non-objectifying acts, on the other hand, are related to objectifying ones exactly as Brentano took them to be. As Husserl argues, the quality of, say, a wish is *dependent* and as it were ‘built upon’ an objectifying act that gives it its intentional direction. In contradistinction to the case of a positing judgment and non-positing ‘mere presentation’, if the ‘optative’ qualitative character of a wish were removed, the underlying experience would not thereby change, since it is possible—at any rate, in principle—to conceive of the object of a wish with exactly the same characteristics without wishing for it.<sup>220</sup>

Accordingly, Husserl proposes a modified version of Brentano’s principle, according to which “[e]ach intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act” (LI2, 167; Hua19/1, 514). As for objectifying acts, each such act is either a positing act or a ‘qualitative modification’ of one. Therefore, ‘mere presentation’ and judgment are not, as Brentano argued, distinct basic classes of intentional experiences, but two subclasses of objectifying acts related by the fact that one can be understood as the qualitatively modified counterpart of the other. What Brentano’s analysis correctly captured, Husserl takes it, is that if by ‘presentation’ one understands an intentional experience in which one is conscious of a certain object with certain characteristics without taking up attitudes not bearing on this simple ‘objectifying’ function, then such further attitudes are indeed founded on presentations, since those attitudes presuppose that one is in some way conscious of their object. However, Brentano mistakenly assim-

<sup>219</sup> However, the analogy with colors used by Husserl suggests a weaker relation than the one for which Husserl argues. Red and blue on the same uniformly colored surface are only *contraries*—there are other colors besides the two—whereas positing and non-positing qualities are, as Husserl argues, *contradictories*, since “one or other of these qualities pertains to all [objectifying] acts” (LI2, 164; Hua19/1, 508).

<sup>220</sup> See for example Husserl’s characterization of the dependence of the joy taken at something one judges to be the case on that judgment: “The joy is not a concrete act in its own right, and the judgement an act set up beside it: the judgement rather underlies the joy, fixes its content, realizes its abstract possibility for, without some such foundation, there could be no joy at all.” (LI2, 116; Hua19/1, 418).

ilated to this model *another* sense of ‘presenting’—that of conceiving or understanding something rather than judging or believing. Husserl takes his descriptive considerations to have established that the qualitative difference between mere presentation and judgment is one obtaining *among* ‘presentations’ in the former sense of objectifying acts: belief or judgment in their elementary form are not a matter of adopting a superposed attitude of accepting something, but a non-composite experience in which the presented object figures as existing.<sup>221</sup> Accordingly, Husserl takes the proper descriptive grasp of the class of objectifying acts to be a foundational part of any sound theory of judgment; as he puts it in the 1905 lectures, “the essence of judgment can only be studied within the unity of the comprehensive genus”<sup>222</sup> of objectifying acts (HuaMat5, 101).

### 3.3.3 *Quasi-judgments and the primacy of belief*

Now, if the success of Husserl’s analysis as an account of the relation between judgment and mere presentation is to be assessed in terms of what it aimed to accomplish, two main points stand out. The *first* is the claim that non-positing acts or mere presentations should be understood as ‘modifications’ of positing acts or judgments, acts with the ‘character of *belief*’ (*Charakter des belief*). The *second* is the idea that this modification is intelligible only for positing acts and can therefore serve as a criterion for separating the genus of objectifying acts from other types of acts on the basis of their intentional quality, or that one can “assume a generic community (*Gattungsgemeinschaft*) among qualities coordinated by” the qualitative modification (LI2, 164; Hua19/I, 508). In the first regard, two central features were pointed out above in the general account of ‘modifications of meaning’, which Husserl had developed by building on and revising some of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s ideas: *first*, the relation of a modified meaning to the unmodified, ‘normally functioning’ one was taken to be asymmetric—that is, the converse relation would not in this sense count as a modification—and *second*, modifying something in Husserl’s sense does not amount to simply altering it in an extrinsic manner—broadly speaking, by replacing some of its abstract or concrete constituents by others—but involves a certain kind of dependence of the resulting phenomenon on the unmodified one. As will be seen below, Husserl’s closer reflections on the nature of this relation led to a conflict with the view about the *sui generis* nature of what was called in the *Investigations* the ‘qualitative modification’, and to the view that mere presentations

<sup>221</sup> Thus, in the 1905 lectures, Husserl summarizes the basic disagreement with Brentano by noting that in Brentano’s view judgments are not objectifying acts (see HuaMat5, 102).

<sup>222</sup> „Nur in der Einheit der umfassenden Gattung kann das Wesen des Urteils erforscht werden.“

should be viewed as ‘quasi-judgments’ or as pretend counterparts for actual judgments, judgments merely tried out but not actually carried out.

As noted previously, the idea of a dependence of a non-positing act on its positing counterpart was in fact part of the outcome of the descriptive analysis of the particular case of revealed perceptual illusions, in which Husserl argued that the ‘mere presentation’ of the illusory appearance, after the illusion has been revealed, is a dependent experiential phenomenon, capable of existing only in a broader context that—in the simplest case, at least—encompasses another, conflicting and more convincing perceptual interpretation or ‘apperception’ of the same perceptual givens. Accordingly, in that particular case, the analysis of the nature of the experiences in question gave some reason to take the relevant non-positing experience to be a secondary type of experience dependent on a primary phenomenon—that is, ordinary, ‘positing’ perceptual experience—and therefore to view the former as a ‘modification’ of the latter. However, Husserl’s characterization of positing and non-positing acts does not appear to give any reason why this should hold in the general case—there is no obvious sense in which “leaving the existence of an object unsettled” is asymmetrically related to, let alone dependent on, taking it to exist (cf. LI2, 159; Hua19/I, 499), perhaps save for the apparently contingent fact that in this verbal formulation ‘leaving something unsettled’ is phrased as a privation of settling it. Shortly after the publication of the *Investigations*, Husserl himself came to doubt the descriptive basis of the account given in the Fifth Investigation. These misgivings led to a revised analysis, first presented in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgment. Here, it will be argued that these revisions have two main results: *first*, they provide a certain degree of descriptive support for the general view of ‘mere presentations’ as secondary cognitive phenomena or as ‘modifications’ of beliefs or judgments. *Secondly*, they lead to a rejection of the idea that the relation so specified is unique to these experiences, and to its assimilation to a more general relation.

Husserl’s analysis in the Fifth Investigation was predicated on the idea that for a non-objectifying act such as a wish, the only non-positing counterparts for it are the non-positing ‘presentative objectification’ of the act—the mere presentation of the wish—and the non-positing, objectifying presentation of the object upon which the wish is founded. In the 1905 lectures, Husserl notes that this account disregards or is incapable of accommodating certain obvious experiential circumstances. Husserl observes that in addition to reflecting on the *experience* or *act* of wishing, it is possible to only ‘entertain’ a wish, or so to speak ‘immerse’ oneself in a wishing attitude in such a way that one relates to the *object* of the wish, but without in fact wishing for it:

I can experience a wish: I myself make a wish. I can present the wish, without myself wishing. But I can also immerse (*einleben*), feel myself into (*empfinden*) the wish, and this is something different from making it the object. I am not turned toward the wish, but toward the wished-for object (HuaMat5, 136).<sup>223</sup>

Clearly, such experiences—for which Husserl here tentatively uses the expressions ‘immersion’ (*Einleben*) and ‘feeling oneself into’ (*Einfühlung*)<sup>224</sup>—do not differ in their object, or in the characteristics in light of which one is conscious of that object, from actually undergoing or carrying out the wish. However, it is also clear that the relation between wishing for something and entertaining a wish—that is, relating to an object in the attitude of a merely entertained wish—does not involve simply changing the intentional quality of the wish in an extrinsic manner: the object figures in the new experience as something wished for, although one does not really wish for it. Immersing oneself in this way in a wish involves an attitude that could be characterized as a form of *pretense*—one does not wish for something but pretends to wish for it—and pretense is clearly impossible without understanding what it is that one pretends to be doing.<sup>225</sup> In this vein, Husserl characterizes such experiences as the ‘semblance’ (*Scheinbild*) of an actual wish (*ibid*, 137).<sup>226</sup>

<sup>223</sup> „Ich kann einen Wunsch erleben: Ich wünsche selbst. Ich kann den Wunsch vorstellen, ohne selbst zu wünschen. Ich kann aber auch mich in den Wunsch einleben, empfinden, und das ist etwas anderes, als ihn zum Gegenstand zu machen. Ich bin nicht dem Wunsch zugewendet, sondern dem erwünschten Gegenstand“.

<sup>224</sup> A terminological point: the word ‘*Einfühlung*’ is the origin for the English ‘empathy’, and in Husserl’s later analyses of intersubjectivity, especially in the second volume of the *Ideas* and in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the word is often used as referring to experiences in which another person’s experiences are given in a quasi-perceptual manner (see Hua4, 162ff; Hua1, 122ff; for an overview, see Zahavi 2015, 123ff). In the 1905 lectures on judgment, however, Husserl does not use ‘*Einfühlung*’ to refer to such interpersonal experiences, but as a tentative metaphorical characterization of the kind of entertaining of a certain experiential standpoint described above—although it may be noted that a common situation in which such experiences occur is indeed when one attempts to understand something from *another person’s* point of view. Since the interpersonal sense is not central in this context, the word is not translated here by the customary ‘empathy’ but by the artificial construction ‘feeling oneself into’.

<sup>225</sup> However, pretense often involves deceptive intent, and deceptive pretense is a far more complicated phenomenon than the kind of putting oneself in the standpoint of a certain kind of experience that Husserl is concerned with here. In deceiving another person, one has to intend one’s actions or their results to be interpreted in a certain false manner by that person, and accordingly the intent to deceive has to incorporate various beliefs about how things appear from the other person’s point of view. There are certainly also non-deceptive forms of pretense, for example in the context of play or theater. Dramatic pretense is interpersonal, usually second-personal, since it is typically addressed to an audience, whereas the pretense involved in play can be non-interpersonal. This last type of pretense, of pretending ‘by oneself’ without *addressing* the pretense to anyone is in essence the kind relevant for Husserl’s analysis. In his lectures in the 1920’s, Husserl indeed at one point calls experiences of this kind a ‘playful’ (*spielerisch*) form of consciousness; see Hua31, 12.

<sup>226</sup> A word of caution: since what is discussed here is a kind of primary–secondary distinction, it may be relevant to this easily invites the *evaluative* idea that the ‘secondariness’ in question amounts to being somehow *worse* or of less value than an original. The discussion here abstracts from any such evaluative ideas. What is important is the general idea that for something to be counted in this sense as the semblance of something, the original phenomenon has to be in some way presupposed. For instance,

As was argued above, relations of this kind were central aspects of the phenomenon of modification, as analyzed in the Fourth Investigation. In line with the characterization given above of Husserl's general account of modification, the complete 'unmodified' act of wishing could be said to be 'modifyingly contained' in the intentional make-up of the mere entertainment of a wish, analogously to the manner in which the meaning of 'false friend' was said to contain in a modifying manner the ordinary meaning of 'friend'. Namely, although false friends are not really friends and pretend wishes are not really wishes, the first term of each pair is dependent as to its nature on the second one. In this way, the actual experience can be understood as *primary* relative to merely entertaining it, and the latter as *secondary*, dependent on the former. Moreover, Husserl observes that such modified counterparts are in principle available for *any* intentional experiences—or at least for any in this regard 'unmodified' ones: just as it is possible to 'merely entertain' in this way an attitude of wishing, the same possibility obtains for any other act or experience, such as doubting, questioning, or feeling joy about something. For instance, in the case of doubting: even if I am completely convinced that something is true—perhaps due to having just gone through a simple proof—I can 'merely entertain' doubts about it, and this possibility has practical importance when, for example, I try to understand why someone else is not convinced by the same proof, or when I simply want to find other, independent ways of establishing the same thing. Accordingly, Husserl now takes it that the relation in question is a "modification that goes through every type of act and is everywhere analogous" (*eine durch alle Aktarten hindurchgehende, überall analoge Modifikation*) (*ibid*, 137).<sup>227</sup> The difference between the unmodified and modified acts concerns, as Husserl puts it, only the manner in which an intentional act is 'carried out' (*vollziehen*): either 'actually' (*aktuell*) or in a 'modified',

a mock promise can only be taken as one in relation to real promises.

<sup>227</sup> As Husserl observes, this view—that for each 'original' experience, there corresponds another which can be understood as a kind of 'secondary' form—bears a close resemblance to Hume's distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas'. In the 1905 lectures Husserl adopts this nomenclature, while departing in various ways from the substantial content of Hume's theory. For instance, Husserl disregards the explanatory aspect of Hume's theory—the view that ideas are 'copied' from corresponding impressions by mental operations following the laws of the 'association of ideas'—on methodological grounds as something belonging to empirical or 'genetic' psychology (see HuaMat5, 137) and objects to Hume's mixing of 'semantic' or intentional questions with genetic or causally explanatory ones (see LIr, 290–1; Hua19/I, 192). Likewise, Husserl rejects the idea that the defining characteristic of impressions is something analogous to intensity (see e.g. LIr, 291; Hua19/I, 192; cf. Hua23, 94–6). In Husserl's view, the sound descriptive core of Hume's distinction is simply the view that 'ideas' are a secondary form of consciousness whose nature depends on that of a primary one: "Every act is either an *impression*, the authentic, original judgment, feeling, wish, etc., or *idea*, i.e. the secondary phenomenon, the semblance, the modification" (HuaMat5, 137, emphasis added) (*Jeder Akt ist entweder Impression, das eigentliche, originäre Urteil, Gefühl, Wunsch, etc., oder Idee, d.i. das sekundäre Phänomen, das Scheinbild, die Modifikation*).



pretend manner (see HuaMat5, 138).

Since this distinction applies, as Husserl argued, to all forms of intentional experience, a special case of their relation is that between judging ‘actually’ and merely ‘immersing oneself in’ a judgment. Husserl again stresses the difference between, on the one hand, presenting in a non-positing manner either oneself as a person who judges or one’s acts of judging, and on the other, relating to the subject matter of a judgment in the attitude of a pretend judgment of this kind; in the latter case, “we do not judge, but live in a quasi-judgment (*Quasiurteil*)” (*ibid*, 137)<sup>228</sup>. In trying out in this way a judgment without actually judging, our attitude exhibits both the intentional quality and the matter of the corresponding judgment, but such judgment is not ‘actually carried out’ (*wirklich vollziehen*); instead, what occurs is only a feigned or pretend judgment—only a judgment ‘as it were’, a quasi-judgment.<sup>229</sup> But as Husserl now argues, this attitude of ‘quasi-judging’ is in fact nothing other than a ‘mere presentation’ in Brentano’s sense, the kind of intentional act which Husserl had classified under ‘non-positing acts’ in the Fifth Logical Investigation.<sup>230</sup> When, for example, I try to comprehend the beliefs of another person so to say ‘from within’, by imaginatively putting myself in their place and as it were viewing the world from their perspective—either simply in the interest of understanding them, or with the further critical aim of evaluating those beliefs as to their consistency and truth—I ‘merely present’ the world as being a certain way; likewise, when I recall beliefs which I previously held myself and which have since turned out to be false, I can ‘merely present’ how things appeared to me without partaking in that belief. But in both of these cases, the ‘mere presentation’ exhibits the ‘qualitative’ aspect of a judgment, but only in a *modified* form: I relate to the world as though I judged something to be the case, but the judgment is not actually carried out.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>228</sup> „wir urteilten nicht, aber wir lebten in dem *Quasiurteil*“

<sup>229</sup> As Husserl puts it in his 1904–5 lectures on phantasy: “[I]n the imagining of a judgment, therefore, I meet with the qualitative dimension that characterizes judgment as judgment, as well as with the entire really experienced judgment content” (Hua23, 97).

<sup>230</sup> In the 1905 lectures, Husserl arrives at this conclusion somewhat hastily, without paying much attention either to the way in which the resulting view differs from the traditional conception or to possible considerations in favor of the latter. See HuaMat5, 137: “But let us take the judgment that there are living beings on Mars and think away the belief; we would not judge but would live in a quasi-judgment, we would immerse ourselves in it, feel ourselves into it. What do we have then? Well, nothing other than the mere presentation.” („Aber nehmen wir das Urteil, das im Mars Lebewesen existieren, und denken wir uns den Glauben weg; wir urteilten nicht, aber wir lebten in dem *Quasiurteil*, wir fänden uns hinein, wir fühlten uns ein. Was haben wir dann? Nun, nichts anderes als die bloße Vorstellung.“)

<sup>231</sup> Husserl considers the latter case in his 1904–5 lectures on phantasy, in the context of analyzing the sense in which a memory ‘reproduces’ a prior experience, such as a belief. As Husserl notes, if the ‘reproduction’ were to be understood as simply recreating an experience of the same type, so that a memory simply contained the recalled experience, then the distinction between a memory of a belief

If this holds in the general case, as Husserl takes it to hold, it follows that a ‘mere presentation’ is, as to the nature of its intentional relation to an object, a kind of *pretend judgment*. Merely presenting something is, then, not an independent intentional phenomenon, but a secondary form of experience whose nature as an intentional act is essentially that of a modified counterpart for a judgment: a quasi-judgment, the semblance of an actual judgment.<sup>232</sup> Since essentially the same relation can be found for any type of intentional act, Husserl now argues that the relation between judging and ‘merely presenting’ ought to be understood simply as the special case of this general relation as applied to objectifying acts: on this view, “[j]udging in the broadest sense would therefore be to ‘actually’ carry out an objectifying act; merely presenting would be not to actually carry an objectifying act but only to feel oneself into it (*sich in ihm hineinfühlen*)” (*ibid*, 138)<sup>233</sup>.

This result has several consequences for Husserl’s theory and taxonomy of intentional experiences. Regarding the analysis of the class of objectifying acts, which Husserl took in the *Investigations* to be a foundational part of a descriptively viable theory of judgment, the considerations outlined above had the consequence that ‘non-positing’ acts—one of the two subspecies of objectifying acts—are not in fact a distinct class that could be placed on a par with positing acts, but a derivative type of experiences whose intentional characteristics are dependent on those of positing acts. In light of the analyses discussed above, they would be better characterized as ‘quasi-positing’ acts rather than acts from which an element of ‘positing’, the ‘character of belief’ is lacking. Objectifying acts are, then, intrinsically positing acts, acts that present their objects as existing—or, in

with and without currently participating in that belief would make no sense, since in recalling a belief we would *ipso facto* have that belief. As Husserl remarks, if that were the case, “we actually *would err* as often as we presented an error to ourselves in phantasy” (Hua23, 98).

<sup>232</sup> This view bears a close resemblance to a proposal made by Meinong in his 1902 *Über Annahmen*. In the book, Meinong argued for the existence of a class of intellectual mental phenomena, ‘assumptions’ (*Annahmen*), which he takes to have gone unrecognized in Brentano’s putatively exhaustive distinction between presentations and judgments, and which are akin to the former in lacking a ‘conviction’ (*Überzeugung*) but akin to the latter in that they come in the contrary forms of affirmation and negation. Among other things, Meinong argued that such attitudes are required for grasping the validity of an inference without accepting the premises; that is, one merely assumes the premises in order to see what follows from them (see Meinong 1902, 61ff). While outlining the conclusions of the book, Meinong proposes that assumptions be understood as ‘pseudo-judgments’ (*Scheinurteile*) which relate to genuine judgments in the same way that imagined feelings relate to genuine ones (*ibid*, 281–2). This suggestion may have been part of Husserl’s motivation for the revised view of mere presentations as ‘quasi-judgments’; in a letter to Meinong in April 1902 Husserl singles out this idea as interesting—while stating that he himself had at times held a similar view prior to the *Investigations*—and writes that Meinong’s differing decision “gives [him] occasion to study the question once again” (*Ihre von der meinen abweichende Entscheidung wird für mich Anlaß sein, die Frage nochmals zu studieren*) (HuaDok3/1, 139ff).

<sup>233</sup> “Urteilen im weitesten Sinne wäre also, einen objektivierenden Akt ‚wirklich‘ vollziehen; bloßes Vorstellen wäre, einen objektivierenden Akt nicht wirklich vollziehen, sondern sich in ihn hineinfühlen“.

the phrase occasionally used by Husserl, ‘acts of belief’ (*Akte der belief*)—and there is no separate element of belief whose presence or absence would serve as a specific difference that divides the genus of objectifying acts into two species, positing and non-positing acts.<sup>234</sup> If Husserl’s analysis is right, a ‘mere presentation’ in the sense appealed to in Brentano’s theory already exhibits everything characteristic of a judgment, but in a pretend, ‘modified’ way: a ‘mere presentation’ is, so to speak, an act of judging or a belief tried out but not actually carried out. In this sense, an account of the intentional nature of ‘objectifying acts’, of something being made an object of conscious experience at all, is in Husserl’s view *eo ipso* a theory of judgment, in the broad sense of ‘judgment’ as encompassing all positing acts.<sup>235</sup>

As was already suggested above, rather than taking this conclusion to yield a substantial revision of the views presented in the *Investigations*, it can be viewed as providing descriptive support for that view.<sup>236</sup> In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl had argued that every objectifying act is either an act of judging or belief in the broad sense of a positing act, or a “qualitative modification of any form of belief” (LI2, 171; Hua19/1, 521). It was argued above that while Husserl made some descriptive observations that spoke for this view in some cases, a general justification for it was largely lacking. In this regard, the analysis undertaken in the 1905 lectures can be seen as vindicating this basic tenet of the *Investigations*: ‘merely presenting’ ought to be viewed as a modification of judgment or belief, rather than as a basic cognitive phenomenon upon which the latter are built. But while in the Fifth Investigation Husserl had taken the modification relating a positing act to a non-positing one to be a *sui generis* phenomenon that is not found outside the

<sup>234</sup> This seems to be part of the reason why in the *Ideas* Husserl talks of ‘doxic’ (*doxische*) rather than ‘objectifying’ acts: experiences in which an object is ‘presented’ in a conscious manner are intrinsically experiences of ‘believing’, and it is only where such basic belief—what Husserl calls ‘primal belief’ (*Urglaube*) or ‘protodoxa’ (*Urdoxa*) (see Hua3, 216)—is specifically cancelled or neutralized that one has an experience of ‘merely presenting’.

<sup>235</sup> See HuaMat5, 140: “Thus it becomes intelligible and no longer objectionable, when a special concept of judgment is circumscribed, as a unitary genus of objectifying acts, without recourse to the concept of belief” (*Und somit auch ist es verständlich und gar nicht mehr anstößig, wenn ein spezieller Begriff des Urteils als einer wesentlich einheitlichen Gattung der objektivierenden Akte ohne Rekurs auf den Begriff des belief umgrenzt wird*).

<sup>236</sup> Husserl himself takes it that these considerations amount to “an important remark, which supplements our general discussion of acts in an illuminating manner, without seriously modifying it” (*eine wichtige Bemerkung [...] die unsere allgemeinen Erörterungen über Akte, ohne sie geradezu ernstlich zu modifizieren, doch in aufklärender Weise ergänzt*) (HuaMat5, 136). In the second edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl mentions “essential deepenings and improvements” concerning the positing–non-positing distinction, brought about by analyses following the first edition and refers to the way these were codified in the doctrine of the ‘neutrality modification’ in the *Ideas* (see LI2, 356; Hua19/1, 508n). In the *Ideas*, Husserl likewise states that the *Investigations*, “in the main, had already arrived at the correct notion” (Hua3, 227n).

narrowly cognitive domain, the considerations in the later analyses led to the contrary view that their relation is an instance of a modification that is found throughout the domain of the intentional—that is, in emotions, desires, and decisions just as well as in cognitive acts.

From the broader point of view of different philosophical conceptions of judgment, this analysis can be viewed as providing materials for defending a central element of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception against an objection which was historically often taken to be decisive: the objection that since one can understand a claim without accepting it, understanding—or apprehension, conception, or the like—must be considered as more basic than judgment or belief, and these latter must be viewed as built upon and adding something to the underlying mere understanding. Husserl's analyses provide an alternative way to view the relation between these mental phenomena: the experience involved in merely considering or 'presenting' a way the world *might be* involves, so to speak, trying out the point of view of someone according to whom the world really *is* that way. In such considerations, one does not undergo a structurally simpler experience, a conception lacking an optional element of belief, but relates to the world as though one believed it to be so and so. It is then judgment or belief that is to be considered the more basic cognitive phenomenon, and the attitude of understanding without taking a stand is to be viewed as parasitic on our grasp on what it would be to take a stand on the same issues—to actually carry out the relevant acts of judgment.

Our most basic cognitive relations to the world, on Husserl's view, are perceptual experiences, in which perceived objects simply present themselves as real, existing parts of our surrounding world. Likewise, when on higher levels of cognitive sophistication we consider the world in thoughts articulated into more or less complex logical structures, the most basic form in which this takes place is still in the mode of belief—in simply articulating in such structures what is already presented as existing, rather than as claims that would first have to be understood and only later accepted or rejected. Now, if a traditional view about what constitutes the most basic logical structure of thought fit for assessments of truth and falsity is accepted, this leads back to the Platonic-Aristotelian view that *predication* rather than *assent* or *dissent* is the essence of judgment—that is, 'judgment' considered in a narrower sense than that of Husserl's 'positing acts'. In the following section, this aspect of Husserl's theory is discussed in detail, by situating his theory of predication and of 'propositional acts' in his more encompassing theories of part-whole relations and of complex acts and meanings.

### 3.4 Judgment, Predication, and States of Affairs

One central point in the historical account outlined in the first chapter concerned the identification with one another of two functions of acts of judgment in the Platonic-Aristotelian conception: *first*, the combining of ideas, thoughts, or concepts into complex wholes with a structure akin to the grammatical form of declarative sentences, and *second*, the affirmation or rejection of what is so combined. In the tradition, this identification was intimately connected with the view of *predication* as a precondition for the applicability of the concepts of truth and falsity, and with the idea of the ‘categorical’ form of judgment, usually expressed in the formula ‘*S is p*’, as the elementary structure of thought.<sup>237</sup> Conversely, in the main historical rival for the Platonic-Aristotelian view, in what has been characterized above as the apprehension–assent conception, these functions were not only conceptually distinguished but were separated into two different mental *acts*, both of which were taken to be at play in rendering a judgment—for instance, in Ockham’s exemplary theory, in the formation of a complex judgeable content (*complexus*) in the mind in an act of apprehension, and the assent to or dissent from it in a subsequent act of judgment.

In the previous sections, Husserl’s critical analyses of some of the central conceptual constituents of the apprehension–assent conception were sketched out, especially in the form they took in Brentano’s theory and in terms of the distinction between the intentional quality and matter of a judgment. Husserl’s positive account of the former of these, formulated in terms of the relation between ‘positing’ acts and their ‘non-positing’ modifications, was considered in some detail in the previous section. The most striking aspect of Brentano’s theory, however, had to do with the interpretation of the structural articulation of the matter of a judgment. As seen above, Brentano argued for a reduction of all judgments into judgments of existence, which he conceived of in roughly Humean terms, as involving no subject–predicate structure, but only the idea—that is, the presentation—of an object, and a superposed attitude of acceptance or rejection. The distinction between subjects and predicates and their combination into propositions, Brentano holds, are of interest exclusively for the *grammarian*, and do not reveal anything of deeper logical significance—let alone their constituting *the* precondition for rationality in thought, as held by much of the tradition.

<sup>237</sup> Often, these ideas converged in the interpretation of the logical role of the *copula*—the ‘is’ as the so-called *tertium adiacens*, the third element of the categorical formula besides the subject- and predicate-terms—as in Aristotle’s classical account in which it both signifies a combination (σύνθεσις) of the subject and predicate and expresses affirmation or a claim to truth. See *De Int.* 16b25; *Met.* V, 1017a32.

Above, Husserl's analyses of acts of judging in and around the *Investigations* were treated largely in abstraction from this question. It was briefly noted that in the doctrine of 'positing names' and the 'positing nominal acts' underlying them, Husserl in effect adopted these elements of Brentano's theory in a limited form. The positing intentional quality, Husserl takes it, is independent of the formal articulation of the intentional matter, and accordingly the kind of structurally simple intentional reference given expression in a name can, by itself, 'posit' an object as existing. Thus, a wide notion of 'judgment'—encompassing also ordinary perceptions, memories, expectations, and the like, as in Brentano's theory—can be defined exclusively by recourse to that quality, as covering all "acts of belief" (see LI2, 166; Hua19/1, 513); and, if a 'theory of judgment' purports to give a general account of the basic cognitive relation between the mind and the world, such a wide notion clearly has its philosophical value. Nonetheless, as was seen in the second chapter, in the *Prolegomena* Husserl gave a logical pride of place to the idea of *propositions* as structured, complex entities that are expressed in statements and which make up the objective, 'ideal' content of thought and, when bound together by appropriate logical relations in systematically connected wholes, the logical content of scientific theories; furthermore, it was shown that a central aim of Husserl's phenomenological reflections on acts of judging was to clarify the nature of the intentional acts in which propositions—being conceived of as universals or ideal species—are instantiated. Accordingly, in keeping with these logical interests, Husserl insists in the *Investigations* on the importance of a *narrower* concept of judgment, understood as a 'propositional act', a complex intentional act structured in a manner corresponding to the logical articulation of the proposition that it instantiates.

In the following, the central elements of Husserl's analyses of acts of judgment, understood in this logically "*principal sense, which connects it with statements [Aussagen] (predications)*", and so excludes percepts, remembrances and similar acts" (LI2, 139; Hua19/1, 461), are discussed in four stages. In the *first* section, Husserl's general framework for the analysis of complex acts is first sketched out, with a focus on the idea of 'relations of foundation' as the basis of all unity of parts in wholes, after which the applications of this theory to the analysis of complex meanings and intentional acts are outlined on an abstract level, as conceptual preliminaries for the following discussion of different levels of analysis pertaining to the theory of judgment. In the *second* section, the basic structure of a simple categorical proposition as a complex ideal meaning expressed in a statement is analyzed on the basis of this general theoretical framework. Husserl's views on the structural articulation of a proposition are discussed by relating

them to two traditional conceptions, the *bipartite* analysis originally proposed by Plato and the *tripartite* one generally favored by Aristotle. In the *third* section, Husserl's analysis of the intentional nature of judgments as propositional acts and the question of their objective correlates is treated in some detail. Husserl's reasons for positing *states of affairs* as the 'total objects' of judgments and statements are discussed by contrasting this view with the one held by Bolzano, according to which a judgment has a structured proposition as its logical *content* or 'material' but no corresponding complex, structured *object*; afterwards, some of Husserl's reflections on the difference in intentional reference between a statement and a nominalized counterpart for one are discussed. Finally, in the *fourth* section, Husserl's analyses of predication in simple cases of perceptual judgment are outlined, by relating the structures constitutive of a propositionally articulated judgment to those features of ordinary perceptual experience on which the former, as a 'founded act', is in Husserl's view built.

#### 3.4.1 *Complexity and unity in meanings and intentional acts*

The idea that judgments, as well as the statements in which they find linguistic expression, always involve a combination, and therefore a *multiplicity*, of distinct elements brings with it the correlative notion that such mental or verbal acts also exhibit a characteristic kind of *unity*. Indeed, the latter idea has been present in traditional theorizing concerning these phenomena from the outset. As was seen in the first chapter, Plato construed his analysis of statements as a reaction against the Sophistic view according to which statements are functionally simple or name-like in that their role is simply to set forth or disclose (*δηλῶν*) an object, so that where an object with the given characteristics does not exist, a putative statement about it is not *false* but *senseless*. As Plato argued against such views, any statement has to contain at least two elements—in Plato's view, a name and a verb—that contribute in different ways to the overall function of the statement, which is therefore something essentially complex: in making a statement one has to at least name an object and claim something about it. Thus, in Plato's view, a basic prerequisite for understanding how true and false statements are possible is to understand the ways in which certain types of words unite or fit together (*συναρμόττει*) to form new meaningful units, while others produce at most a mere a list of words that, if considered as a whole, has no meaning.<sup>238</sup>

<sup>238</sup> See *Soph.* 262b–e: "For instance, 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps' and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that. [ . . . ] And again, when 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a

However, attempts at theoretically articulating the difference between a number of things on one occasion making up—as the idea is often put—a mere ‘list’, ‘sum’, or ‘aggregate’ and on another forming a unified whole—and, on a more general level, understanding the relation between any given multiplicity of things considered as a ‘many’ and as a unit or a ‘one’—quickly lead to problems that are familiar in various guises from the history of philosophy. In his 1896 lectures on logic, part of which formed a first draft for the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, Husserl presents the problem of analyzing complex linguistic expressions into their parts without losing sight of their unity in the context of one such problem that naturally arises in pursuing an explanation of what it means for words to ‘unite’ or ‘fit together’ in a meaningful whole. Husserl starts from the observation that ‘composite’ (*zusammengesetzte*) expressions are meaningful expressions that have parts that are themselves meaningful, for example complex noun phrases and sentences; in addition, they exhibit some kind of composition, by virtue of which the different elements form a unified whole. This composition, Husserl observes, is often expressed linguistically in the form of particles, prepositions, or in the inflection of the words combined—that is, in those expressions or elements of expressions that by themselves mean nothing but, when joined by appropriate kinds of words, contribute in some way to the meaning of the composite expression. Now, Husserl lays out the following problem:

Wherever there is talk of composition and of wholes and their parts, something manifold is in question, a multiplicity in a unity. In this manifold we have to distinguish the elements combined [...] and the combination itself, thus the links that form the parts into a unity, a whole. The parts without combination are not parts; they are particulars in a mere sum. On the other hand, the combinations [...] are themselves not further parts, not particulars beside other particulars; otherwise they would again make up a mere sum with them. Thus, we would need a new combinatory form for the linking of the form and the parts, and so *in infinitum*. (HuaMatI, 56)<sup>239</sup>

succession of words does not yet make discourse [...] So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.” (οἷον βαδίζει' τρέχει' καθεύδει,' καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κὰν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ' εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται. [...] οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγῃται λέων' ἔλαφος' ἵππος,' ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὐ' πραττόντων ὀνομάσθῃ, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδεὶς πῶ συνέστη λόγος [...] οὕτω δὲ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἥρμοττεν, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐ' σημεία τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἀρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπηργάσατο.)

<sup>239</sup> „Wo immer von Zusammengesetztheit und somit von einem Ganzen und seinen Teilen die Rede ist, da liegt ein Mannigfaltiges vor, eine Vielheit in einer Einheit. In diesem Mannigfaltigen müssen wir nun aber scheiden die Elemente, die zusammengesetzt sind [...] und die Zusammensetzung selbst, also die Verknüpfungen, die die Teile zur Einheit, zum Ganzen gestalten. Die Teile ohne Verbindung sind keine Teile, sind Einzelheiten in bloßer Summe. Andererseits sind die Verbindungen [...] nicht selbst wieder Teile, nicht Einzelheiten neben den anderen Einzelheiten, sonst bildeten sie mit jenen doch wieder nur eine Summe. Wir bräuchten also eine neue Verbindungsform für die Verknüpfung der Form mit den Teilen, und so in infinitum.“



As such, this statement is clearly not a *solution* to the presented problem, but only a statement of a *desideratum* for any viable solution: if what unifies the parts of a whole were itself something that could be understood as a further part, then one would be again left with a mere sum of parts, and the attempted explanation would be set off on a vicious infinite regress.<sup>240</sup> The solution—or at least the outline for an approach for solving the problem—that Husserl here tentatively provides makes appeal to the distinction between the independent parts and dependent moments of a whole, which, as was previously seen, later figures as a central analytical tool in the framework of the *Investigations*. Here, Husserl’s focus is on the idea that the ‘combinatory form’ that unifies a whole is a dependent moment of that whole—that is, something that “is nothing without the independent members which it links” (*ibid*, 57)<sup>241</sup>. Such a combinatory form can be abstractly considered on its own, but only in the sense that one leaves open which specific independent objects it serves to unify, in which case one is then left with the form together with a certain number of ‘places in need of completion’ (*ergänzungsbedürftige Stellen*)<sup>242</sup> each of which is in any given case to be ‘filled’ by some particular

<sup>240</sup> Arguments of this or closely related forms are of course familiar especially from the history of metaphysics, and go back at least to Plato’s *Parmenides*, where the eponymous interlocutor argues that an idea or form cannot be understood as an independently existing ‘one’ over the multiplicity of the particulars partaking in it, since this would yield another entity exhibiting the very same property for the instances of which the form was supposed to serve as a unifier, and thus a new form would always be required for the particulars partaking in a form and that form itself, and this would then yield an infinite regress (see *Parm.* 132a–133a). In more recent times, arguments closely related to the one sketched out by Husserl were formulated by the British idealist F. H. Bradley in his 1893 *Appearance and Reality*, especially in the context of discussing the unity that the qualities of a thing exhibit in that thing, or the relations that they have to one another. The most famous part of Bradley’s discussion concerns the idea that relations are something “more or less independent” in addition to the elements related; as Bradley argues, this would mean that for any two elements *A* and *B* in a relation *C*, one would have simply three independent elements, and a further relation *D* would be needed to explain how *A* and *B* relate to *C*, and thus an infinite regress would ensue. Bradley’s notorious conclusion is that “the very essence of [the ideas of quality and relation] contradicts itself”, and therefore neither can pertain to reality (Bradley 1893, 25).

<sup>241</sup> „[Die] Verbindung ist ein neues Moment, aber nicht ein selbständiges Objekt; es ist nichts ohne selbständige Glieder, die es verknüpft.“

<sup>242</sup> The idea of ‘empty places’ clearly refers to the argument-places of a mathematical function. In this sense, the notion of a ‘need of completion’ or supplementation (*Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit*) which Husserl makes use of here was famously used by Frege, first in his 1891 paper “*Funktion und Begriff*”, concerning which Husserl laments in a text from 1903 that it “unhappily has not found the attention it deserves from professional logicians” (Husserl 1994, 247; Hua22, 202). As noted in a previous footnote, Frege used as synonyms for ‘in need of supplementation’ also ‘incomplete’ (*unvollständig*) and ‘unsaturated’ (*ungesättigt*) (see Frege 1984, 140). As for Husserl, these notions serve also for Frege as a basis for explaining unity, in particular the logical unity between the names and predicative elements in a proposition. For example, in a paper on the foundations of geometry from 1903, one finds a statement that is quite similar to Husserl’s considerations, and in which the same looming danger of an infinite regress that would result from taking the unifying connections as themselves complete objects appears to be implied: “An object, e.g. the number 2, cannot logically adhere to another object, e.g. Julius Caesar, without some means of connection. This, in turn cannot be an object but rather must be unsaturated. A logical connection into a whole can come about only through this, that an unsaturated part is saturated or completed by one or more parts.” (*ibid*, 281).

object (*ibid*). This general account, Husserl argues, applies to meaningful expressions as well: a composite expression divides into independently and dependently meaningful elements, the latter of which have meaning only when completed by certain independent elements and serve to connect the former by virtue of their incomplete nature (*ibid*); thus, for example the suffix ‘-s’ in ‘Theaetetus sits’ is a dependently meaningful expression that requires a verb stem and a noun for its completion and serves to connect the two in a unified composite expression—here, a sentence—in which what is signified by the former is meant as applying to what is signified by the latter.<sup>243</sup>

In a broad sense, however, even dependent moments are ‘parts’ of a whole; accordingly, it seems doubtful whether the relation of ‘completion’ in which such moments appear to be required to stand to the ‘completing’ independent parts should not itself be understood as a further combinatory form and dependent moment of the whole that would connect the former to the latter, in which case the same infinite regress would again ensue. This is a question that Husserl takes up specifically in the Third Logical Investigation. Here, Husserl argues that what unifies any given whole are, indeed, not strictly speaking any dependent moments—although such moments necessarily figure wherever objects are unified into wholes—but rather ‘relations of foundation’ (*Verhältnisse der Fundierung*) which, for their part, are not parts of the whole even in an extended sense, but instances of ‘laws of essence’ that determine a given object as what it is.

As was previously seen, in the Third Investigation Husserl defined the dependence or non-independence of the moments or abstract parts of a whole in terms of their inconceivability apart from being united with appropriately complementing parts, and in more overtly ontological terms, by their impossibility to exist apart from being encompassed by a broader whole. This impossibility, Husserl stressed, should not be construed

<sup>243</sup> That is, the verbal inflection in essence plays the role of the copula in the statement. This point has often been made in the tradition; for example, Mill notes in his *System of Logic* that two juxtaposed ‘names’—in a broad sense that includes adjectives and verbs—do not make up a proposition without some indication that “one of them is intended to be affirmed or denied of the other”, and that such indication is usually given either by the inflection of a verb or by the word ‘is’ (see Mill 1974, 78). Cf. HuaMatI, 143–4: “In general, we can only say that in each complete grammatical sentence this type of predicative relation [viz. that symbolically expressed in ‘S is p’] is expressed in the grammatical congruence between the subject and predicate in the inflection of the noun and verb. But this congruence admits of different articulations. If I say, ‘The flower withers’, the word ‘withers’ includes the expression for the *p* here in question and likewise for what corresponds to the word ‘is’.” („Allgemein können wir nur sagen, dass in jedem vollen grammatischen Satz der hierher gehörigen Art die prädikative Beziehung ausgedrückt ist in der grammatischen Kongruenz zwischen dem Subjekt und Prädikat in der Nominal- und Verbalflexion. Aber diese Kongruenz lässt verschiedene Gliederungen zu. Sage ich: ‚Die Blume welkt‘; so steckt in dem Wörtchen ‚welkt‘ der Ausdruck für das hier fragliche *P* und zugleich für das, was dem Wörtchen ‚ist‘ entspricht.“) Of course, verbal inflection has other functions besides this ‘copulative’ one, such as indicating tense, as already noted by Aristotle (see *De Int.* 16b6).

in psychological terms by appealing to the subjective capacities of conscious beings for thinking of or imagining things, but as an objective phenomenon: that for example acceleration can, as a matter of necessity, only exist as a property of motion, or that a smile can only exist on a face, are facts about these kinds of entities as specific kinds of non-independent moments, facts that are objective in the sense that they obtain regardless of their being recognized by anyone. Furthermore, in Husserl's view, *necessity* and *law* are correlative concepts; accordingly, every statement to the effect that something holds as a matter of necessity is a statement of, or is at least based on a statement of a law. In particular, a non-empirical law that holds for an object by virtue of that which makes it an object of a specific kind is a *law of essence* (*Wesensgesetz*). Accordingly, as Husserl puts it, the non-independence of an object can also be characterized as its exhibiting an "ideal *lawfulness of combinations*" (LI2, 18; Hua19/I, 255). Husserl then makes use of such essential laws to define the equivalent notions of 'needing completion' and 'being founded on': wherever there is a law of essence such that an object of the kind or 'ideal species' *A* cannot exist unless an object of the kind *B* also exists, every particular *a* of the first kind is founded on, or needs to be completed by some particular *b* of the second kind (see LI2, 25, 34; Hua19/I, 267, 281–2).<sup>244</sup>

Now, Husserl argues that there is nothing more to the unity of parts in a whole than such relations of foundation, so that such unity means simply that some objects necessarily coexist by virtue of their nature; unity, in effect, is necessary coexistence.<sup>245</sup> Non-independent and independent parts stand, then, differently with regard to unity:

<sup>244</sup> Relations of foundation are, then, primarily based on the properties of the universals or 'ideal species' in the sense that particulars stand in these relations only by virtue of instantiating the relevant species. However, it is not the *species* but their *instantiations* that stand in the relations so defined—the 'laws of essence' have their *basis* on the level of the species, but the *content* of the laws bears on the particular instances. Husserl himself notes that in a secondary sense, one can talk of relations of foundation as obtaining between the species, but this involves an equivocation, even if it is mostly harmless (see LI2, 25; Hua19/I, 267). Simons (1994) has argued that this prioritizing of the species level leaves Husserl without an account of how particulars are founded on, and unified with, not only other particulars of the relevant *kind*, but with some *individual* particulars, and that in this regard Husserl does not clearly distinguish foundational relations that obtain by virtue of a dependence on the species level and those obtaining between *just these* individual instances.

<sup>245</sup> There is a certain *prima facie* implausibility to this view, as Husserl himself observes, since it appears to leave one with nothing but a multiplicity of disconnected elements that are only required to occur together but not in some sense 'genuinely' unified. However, Husserl argues that the intuitive pull of this objection draws its force from mistakenly thinking exclusively of *independent* parts, which indeed require something to bind them together—and in particular of spatially disjoint material objects, which are typically connected by a distinct, concrete link between them, such as a piece of glue or cement, this being an additional element of the whole (see LI2, 36; Hua19/I, 285). But this idea was precisely what engendered, when applied to all part-whole relations, the regress discussed above. Non-independent moments, for their part, are not 'disconnected' in regard their complementing parts, as charged in the objection, but connected to them by their own nature rather than by means of an external link.

non-independent moments are intrinsically unified by being *founded* on other parts, independent or non-independent, while independent parts are unified only extrinsically, namely, by serving in certain circumstances to *found* some non-independent ones. A whole can consist entirely of non-independent parts, as in the case of a surface considered as a visual phenomenon, which is composed of the ‘interpenetrating’ (*durchdringende*) moments of extension and color; or of both independent and dependent parts, as in the case of a two-body gravitational system composed of two independently existing celestial bodies that are bound by a non-independent interaction founded on the properties of those objects. In this sense, dependent moments can be understood as the unifying elements of a whole, since there can be no unity without such moments; but as elements or parts *in* that whole, they still count among the things unified, so that strictly speaking, the “*only true unifying factors* [ . . . ] *are relations of ‘foundation’*” (LI2, 36; Hua19/1, 286). As for these relations, they are not further elements of the whole in addition to the independent and non-independent parts—in the sense that one could raise the question of what has to be ‘added’ to the sum of those parts—since they are intrinsic to, or constitutive of, the nature of the non-independent parts themselves.

In the Fourth Investigation, Husserl then puts this general conceptual machinery to work in the explanation of the unified meanings of certain combinations of expressions, among which the declarative statement has the clear logical pride of place. As in the 1896 lectures, the account is based on the distinction between independent and non-independent meanings—corresponding on the level of linguistic expression to the traditional grammatical distinction between ‘categorematic’ and ‘syncategorematic’ expressions<sup>246</sup>—which is now articulated in terms of the idea of relations of foundation, or of necessary coexistence by virtue of essential laws. Meanings can, as Husserl argued

<sup>246</sup> In medieval grammar and logic, ‘categorematic expressions’ (*categoremata*, *dictiones categorematicae*) were those that signified something on their own and could serve as the subject or predicate of a statement; syncategorematic expressions (*syncategoremata*, *dictiones syncategorematicae*) were conversely those which—in the terms of Priscian, from whose *Institutiones grammaticae* the term was likely adopted to Scholastic theories—were only ‘consignificant’ (*consignificantia*) and could not take either of those roles in a statement. The ‘consignificant’ nature of these terms was usually understood in one of two ways: either *syncategoremata* were taken to have no signification of their own, so that only the composite expressions in which they figure signify something, but in a way to which the *syncategoremata* in some way contribute; or, they were taken to have a signification that is in some sense incomplete or indeterminate (see Kretzmann 1982; Meier-Oeser 1998b). The terms were revived in modern times by J. S. Mill (see Mill 1974, 26) and taken up by Anton Marty, who however preferred the terms ‘autosemantic’ (*autosemantisch*) and ‘synsemantic’ (*synsemantisch*) and adopted, in essence, the former of the medieval interpretations (see Marty 1908, 205f). In the 1896 lectures, Husserl likewise accepted that view (see Hua-Mat1, 56), but in the Fourth Investigation he explicitly considers both alternatives and adopts the second one: syncategorematic expressions have their own meanings, and these are of an ‘incomplete’ nature in the sense treated above (see LI2, 54–5; Hua19/1, 312–14).

previously, be combined into wholes only by virtue of ‘connective forms’ (*verknüpfende Formen*) which are themselves non-independent meanings; but what unifies the meanings so combined, among which these connective forms themselves figure, are properly speaking relations of foundation that are not distinct elements of the whole but constitutive characteristics of the non-independent meanings. Relations of foundation, as was seen above, were defined in terms of the notion of laws of essence, which for their part are general truths that bear on particulars by virtue of their being particulars of a specific *kind*; likewise, in the case of meanings, a relation of foundation always obtains between meanings by virtue of their being meanings of determinate kinds, or ones that fall under specific ‘semantic categories’ (*Bedeutungskategorien*) or categories of meaning (LI2, 62; HuaI9/I, 326). Such categories of meanings, and the laws obtaining by virtue of them, constitute the subject matter of what Husserl calls ‘pure grammar’ (*reine Grammatik*), a discipline concerned with the formal distinction between sense and nonsense (*Unsinn*). This distinction, as Husserl argues, is presupposed by the properly logical concern with purely formally obtaining truth or falsity; a combination of meanings can count even as a candidate for assessments of truth and falsity only when its constituents ‘fit together’ in accordance with the laws of pure grammar (see LI2, 74; HuaI9/I, 348).

However, there is still a certain respect in which this account requires a more careful formulation in order to consistently connect the theories of meaning and part-whole unity put forward in the *Investigations*. On the one hand, according to the theory of meaning previously outlined, the meanings of linguistic expressions—in the objective or ‘ideal’ sense of what is common to different individual instances of the same spoken or written word—are universals or ideal species of intentional, ‘meaning-conferring’ acts that are ‘intimated’ (*kundgegeben*) in those expressions; on the other hand, relations of foundation, according to the definition given above, bear on *particulars* instantiating a given ideal species. Accordingly, the relations of foundation that characterize non-independent meanings, and which unify the complex expressions in which the latter figure, obtain in a primary sense between these particular ‘acts of meaning’ rather than those meanings themselves. Therefore, when Husserl talks of non-independent *meanings*, and *eo ipso* of relations of foundation obtaining between meanings, this is strictly speaking shorthand for the non-independence of, and a foundational relation between, certain *intentional acts* as particulars instantiating those meanings: what a relation of foundation between ideal meanings amounts to is that any act of meaning instantiating one of those ideal meanings, such as that underlying a particular meaningful use of the conjunction ‘and’ in speech, cannot exist except in combination with other acts

instantiating the other meanings.<sup>247</sup> Or, in less elaborate but equivalent terms focusing on the side of the verbal expression on which meaning is ‘conferred’: the word ‘and’ cannot function meaningfully as a conjunction except in combination with other words expressing meanings of appropriate categories.<sup>248</sup> Before turning to the ramifications of this conclusion to the analysis of judgment, it is instructive to treat the matter briefly in the general case, by considering the nature of the intentional unity and objective correlates of any complex acts.

In a generic sense, ‘complexity’ can be understood as any composition from parts, and in particular from independent pieces, which are then relative to the whole something simple. But the sense in which Husserl talks of ‘complex acts’ is more specific: in this sense, an intentional act is complex only if it is composed of parts that are *themselves* intentional acts. Furthermore, a complex act is not only a whole made up of intentional acts unified in any manner whatsoever but requires a specific kind of unity that yields, instead of a complex *composed of* acts, a complex *act*. In Husserl’s view, every whole put together from intentional acts—or more generally of experiences of either intentional or non-intentional kind—of the same conscious subject is *eo ipso* a complex *experience* and exhibits a ‘unity of experience’ (*Einheitlichkeit eines Erlebnisses*) that has its ultimate basis in the manner in which individual experiences are connected in a single stream of consciousness, or in what Husserl calls in the first edition of the *Investigations* the ‘phenomenological ego’ (*phänomenologische Ich*), the connected totality of such experiences (see Hua19/1, 356n). In addition to this kind of generic experiential unity, a complex *act* has to be characterized by an intentional reference of its own that is founded on those of its parts; this kind of unity is then a specifically intentional ‘unity of act’ (*Einheit der Akt*) (see LI2, 115; Hua19/1, 417).

Now, in Husserl’s view, it is a basic prerequisite for something to be an intentional

<sup>247</sup> See LI2, 13, 59; Hua19/1, 245, 320–1. Thus, the relations between (1) a particular non-independent expression or the act of meaning expressed in it, (2) the corresponding ideal meaning, and (3) the semantic category under which the meaning falls, are exactly analogous to the relations between (1′) the particular rectangular shape of a visually presented surface as an individual non-independent moment of the surface, (2′) the rectangular shape as a universal, a property that can be instantiated in many such particulars, and (3′) the geometrical category or genus of a closed plane figure, under which the rectangle as a universal or species falls. Just as ‘and’ requires names (or sentences) to complete it, a rectangle (as a visual phenomenon) requires a color; in both cases, the particular requires for its completion a particular, or a certain number of particulars, instantiating some universal or universals of a certain category or genus under which many such universals fall.

<sup>248</sup> To the somewhat obvious objection that ‘and’ can in fact be understood even when it occurs on its own, Husserl responds that there are only two ways in this can happen, neither of which conflicts with the view that its meaning is non-independent: either the completing meanings are left indefinite, or the word has a changed meaning, and it functions as a nominalized modification of the ordinary conjunction, as when one responds, “And” to the question ‘What is “und” in English?’ (see LI2, 61; Hua19/1, 324).

act in the first place that it has a *single* objective correlate to which it is intentionally related; accordingly, as Husserl puts it, the “unity of an act corresponds in each case to the correlated objective unity of the ‘object’” (LI2, 147; Hua19/1, 476). The sense in which a complex act is ‘founded’ on its part-acts has, then, the two correlative aspects that its characteristic intentional reference could by necessity not exist or obtain, and that the object could not appear as it does, without the contributions of the partial acts. Moreover, a complex act clearly cannot be simply a third intentional act necessarily existing *beside* the part-acts; rather, as a whole composed of those acts, its intentional reference is established *in* them, by virtue of the manner in which they are bound together in a unified whole. Conversely, those part-acts have, in being so bound together, intentional functions that pertain to setting up the reference of the complex act (see LI2, 115; Hua19/1, 417). Such functions, in terms of the general theory outlined above, are the hallmark of non-independent intentional moments: for example, in presenting an object *a* as being to the left of an object *b*, the independent presentations of *a* and *b* are unified by the non-independent ‘relational form’ (*Relationsform*) *to the left of*, and in being so unified, the two presentations take up the functions pertaining, respectively, to the two ‘empty places’ of that form, or what were traditionally called the ‘fundament’ and ‘terminus’ of the relation.<sup>249</sup>

What is *complex* in a complex act is, in the first place, the formal structure of the intentional relation to the object—and therefore, the intentional matter of the act—rather than the object itself, which can be either simple or complex.<sup>250</sup> Moreover, when the objective correlate of a complex act is itself complex, Husserl distinguishes between two different senses in which its elements can be considered to be unified. In the *first* sense, the objects of the part-acts making up the complex act can themselves be unified into a whole, regardless of their figuring in this way among the partial objects of a unified complex act; as seen above, this is the case wherever at least some among the objects of the part-acts are non-independent moments founded on the objects of some of the other acts. However, even when the objects themselves constitute a whole in this way, they are also unified in a *second* sense, namely, as making up the unified correlate of the complex act. Objects united in the first sense are united, so to say, ‘in themselves’, while in the latter sense they are united only ‘in thought’. The unity of a whole whose parts are in themselves unrelated to each other and therefore do not constitute a whole on their

<sup>249</sup> Cf. HuaMat2, 113–4. For the traditional nomenclature, see for example Brentano 1995a, 211.

<sup>250</sup> As Husserl observes, the nominal act expressed in the noun phrase ‘a simple object’ is complex, but any object to which it refers must of course be simple (see LU2, 50; Hua19/1, 304).

own, but only by virtue of being broadly speaking combined in a unified intentional act, is what Husserl calls ‘categorical unity’ (*kategoriale Einheit*) (LI2, 38; Hua19/1, 289). Conversely, any form of unity that obtains independently of figuring as an intentional correlate of this kind is referred to by Husserl as ‘real’ (*reale*) or ‘material’ (*sachliche*) unity (LI2, 39; Hua19/1, 291). When a whole whose parts are united in themselves is taken up as an object in a complex intentional act that relates those parts to one another, one might say that a real unity is *categorially articulated* in thought.

The general idea of the unity of elements in a whole was preliminarily introduced above in terms of a commonly drawn contrast: that between a multiplicity of elements constituting a ‘mere aggregate’, ‘collection’, or ‘sum’, and those elements making up a genuinely unified whole. Clearly, however, even the phenomena of the former type exhibit *some* kind of unity, insofar as the sum of some arbitrary elements is something that can be characterized as *one* thing—namely, *a* sum. The notion of categorial unity now provides Husserl with a means for giving an explicit theoretical characterization of such phenomena: a sum of arbitrary elements forms a whole only as the correlate of a possible ‘collective’ thought, a complex intentional act in which those elements are thought together.<sup>251</sup> Now, it should be observed that this weaker form of unity is essentially *derivative* of the stronger, ‘real’ kind in the following sense: the ‘objective’ categorial unity obtaining among the *objects* is dependent on the unity of the complex intentional *act* whose partial correlates the former are. But the unity of the act itself must be a *real* unity—a complex act can in principle only be unified when certain relations of foundation obtain among the constituents of the act, for example when two independent perceptions are joined into a founded, categorial presentation of a collection or aggregate (*Inbegriff*) by the non-independent, ‘conjunctive’ intentional moment underlying the meaning of ‘and’ (see LI2, 291; Hua19/2, 688–89).<sup>252</sup>

<sup>251</sup> This view is similar to the one that Husserl held already in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, although it is reframed in a different theoretical context in the *Investigations*. In the former work, Husserl had classified what he called ‘collective combination’ (*kollektive Verbindung*)—the type of relation that unifies collections of arbitrary objects together, and from whose concrete instances the concepts *multiplicity* and *number* are, as Husserl argued, abstracted—as ‘mental relations’ (*psychische Relationen*) in the sense that their terms are related only by means of, and with regard to, a unified mental act directed at them (see Hua12, 69, 73). This classification was the chief point that elicited Frege’s charge, in a well-known 1894 review of the book, that Husserl’s theory was a symptom of the “widespread philosophical disease” of psychologism in the foundations of mathematics (see Frege 1984, 209). The new theoretical framing of in essence the same claim in the *Investigations* consisted, then, in the idea that categorial unities are not correlates of empirical psychological particulars, but of ‘ideally possible’ forms of thought that have their basis in the nature of ideal meanings; nonetheless, the claim persists that such wholes are unified only in relation to thought.

<sup>252</sup> This is one of the basic respects in which Husserl’s part-whole theory differs from the most well-known 20<sup>th</sup>-century formal part-whole theories, namely, Stanisław Leśniewski’s ‘Mereology’ and Henry



### 3.4.2 *The structure of a categorical proposition*

In applying the conclusions of the general account of complex meanings and intentional acts formulated by Husserl in the *Investigations*, and outlined above, to the special case of judgment, there are, then, three distinct—although intimately connected—levels of analysis to be considered. To summarize the essential points regarding, respectively, each of these levels: there is, *first*, the level of the objective, ‘ideal’ meanings that are identically shared—or rather, instantiated—by different individual instances of the same kinds of verbal expressions, and of the intentional acts intimated in those expressions. Every complex meaning contains as ‘connective forms’ one or more non-independent meanings, by virtue of which the part-meanings ‘fit together’ to make up a unified whole. The non-independent nature of these meanings points to relations of foundation that, Husserl argued, have their basis in ‘laws of essence’. Such laws, in the domain of meanings, prescribe that an instance of a meaning of a given category can only exist together with instances of meanings of some other specific categories. The non-independent meanings can be said to have, as it were, a certain number of ‘empty places’ that are to be filled by meanings of appropriate categories.

*Second*, there is the level of the intentional acts that are the instances on which those relations of foundation directly bear. In a complex intentional act, certain acts are bound together in a ‘unity of act’ by non-independent intentional moments that, by virtue of instantiating the ideal meanings of a given category, require for their completion certain specific kinds of acts. The ‘founded’ intentional reference of the complex act is established in those part-acts and in their manner of being combined. In being so bound together in a complex act, the part-acts take up specific intentional ‘functions’ that they can only have within such broader contexts—namely, the functions pertaining to setting up the intentional reference of the whole, for instance those of presenting the terms of a relation *as* such terms. Such functions can be understood as pertaining to the different ‘empty places’ of the non-independent intentional moments—or, on the level of meaning, those of the non-independent meanings—in the sense that an act takes up a

Leonard’s and Nelson Goodman’s ‘calculus of individuals’, which Simons (1987) groups together as the canon of ‘classical extensional mereology’. These theories were based essentially on the type of part-whole unity that Husserl called categorical unity, which is clear in the postulate of these theories that any two arbitrary individuals make up a ‘mereological sum’ that is itself an individual (see for example Goodman 1977, 36). The part-whole concepts in these theories are then of the ‘weak’, categorial kind; but if Husserl’s view is correct, arbitrary collections of this kind make up ‘wholes’ only in a sense that is parasitic on the stronger kind of wholes: they are unified only as correlates of possible thought, and their unity presupposes the stronger type of unity on the side of such thoughts themselves.

given function *in* filling such a place; therefore, one may say that those non-independent moments *assign* such functions to the part-acts.

Finally, a *third* level of analysis pertains to the intentional correlates of the complex acts. On this level, an important distinction in Husserl's theory was introduced above, the distinction, namely, between 'real' or 'material' unity that obtains between parts regardless of their figuring as the objects of acts bound together in a complex act, and 'categorical' unity—such as that of arbitrary sums or collections of in themselves unrelated objects—that obtains only as the correlate of a possible thought, that is, a specific form of complex intentional act. The special case of a whole that exhibits a real unity figuring as the object of such an act was then preliminarily characterized as involving the 'categorical articulation' in thought of such real unity.<sup>253</sup>

As Husserl noted in the *Prolegomena*, a 'judgment' in the sense directly pertinent to pure logic is not an intentional act, but the meaning of a declarative statement, a *proposition* (*Satz*)—that is, an entity belonging in the above distinction of levels of analysis to the first level, that of ideal meanings (see e.g. LI1, 112; Hua18, 178). Judgments or propositions in this sense form, in an important respect, the basic elements of logical theory as conceived by Husserl: as was seen in the second chapter, Husserl envisaged pure logic as a theoretical discipline underlying the traditional, practical guise of logic as a 'theory of science', the study and evaluation of the most general aspects of techniques for justifying claims about the world. All scientific theories, Husserl argued, consist in their 'objective' aspect of logically interconnected ideal propositions; accordingly, the first philosophical task pertaining to pure logic concerns the analysis and clarification of those 'elementary connective forms' (*elementaren Verknüpfungsformen*) that are constitutive of the unity of any theory in general, considered formally as a system of propositions.

Among such forms are those that connect propositions in, for example, a conjunc-

<sup>253</sup> A distinction resembling that outlined here on the basis of ideas worked out in the Third to Fifth Investigations is already put forward in the *Prolegomena*: "In all knowledge, and particularly in all scientific knowledge, one has to take heed of the fundamental distinction between three kinds of connections [*der fundamentale Unterschied zwischen dreierlei Zusammenhängen zu beachten*]: (a) The connection of cognitive experiences, in which science is subjectively realized, the *psychological connection* of presentations, judgments [...] (b) The connection among the *matters* (*Sachen*) investigated and theoretically known in the science, which as such make up the *domain* of the science [*die als solche das Gebiet dieser Wissenschaft ausmachen*] [...] (c) The logical connection [...] (the unity of concepts in a true proposition, of simple truths in truth-combinations etc.)." (LI1, 114; Hua18, 181–2). This distinction, however, is made in the course of criticizing psychologistic views on logic, so that the 'psychological connection' of experiences does not directly refer to questions of phenomenological interest, but rather to the possible task of an empirical psychology of scientific investigation.

tive, disjunctive, or conditional manner, or in relations of ground and consequence, that is, *inter*-propositional connective forms. On the other hand, there are *intra*-propositional forms that constitute the unity of the proposition itself as a complex meaning (see LI1, 153; Hua18, 245). Thus, a theory of logical forms, as Husserl states in his 1902–3 lectures on logic, can be viewed generally as an “anatomy of the idea of a proposition” (HuaMat2, 80).<sup>254</sup> It is the latter connections, those constitutive of a proposition, that are of concern for the logical aspect of a ‘theory of judgment’. Moreover, as was previously seen, Husserl argued that properly philosophical interests in logic have to take into consideration the bearing of the ideal logical structures on *knowledge*, and this requires connecting them with the essential structures of cognitive *experience*. It is now the three-level theory of complex meanings, acts, and their objective correlates that provides the conceptual machinery in terms of which Husserl proposes to undertake this task that he had laid out in the *Prolegomena*. In this section, the first of these levels is considered specifically, by focusing on the question concerning the basic structural articulation of an elementary form of proposition, the simple *categorical* proposition.

Perhaps surprisingly, considering the weighty programmatic proclamations of the first volume, Husserl does not set out in the *Logical Investigations* to provide a detailed analysis of the structure of propositions directly on the level of ideal meaning. Instead, Husserl primarily treats them indirectly, by way of analyzing the essential characteristics of the linguistic expressions and intentional acts—namely, statements and acts of judging—in which they find their concrete, particular instances. However, in the current context it seems preferable to treat the level of ideal propositions for itself, which requires turning among Husserl’s writings to other texts from the same period. The most detailed and comprehensive analysis of this kind, in writings from the period of the *Investigations*, is to be found in Husserl’s 1902–3 lectures on logic. The starting point of Husserl’s analysis here is the simple observation, already given theoretical prominence by Plato, that in every ‘categorical’ proposition something is claimed of some object (see HuaMat2, 84, 105).<sup>255</sup> Husserl also takes up, in its broad outlines, Plato’s approach for theoretically articulating this basic observation, namely, the idea that even the simplest form of a proposition involves an articulation into members that (*i*) are of essentially

<sup>254</sup> “[A] theory of logical forms is nothing but a morphology of propositions. It concerns a sort of anatomy of the idea of a proposition” („[E]ine logische Formenlehre [ist] nichts anderes [...] als eine Formenlehre der Sätze. Es handelt sich bei ihr um eine Art Anatomie der Idee Satz“).

<sup>255</sup> Husserl prefaces his analysis by bracketing the question whether the categorical form is the unique fundamental form of propositions in terms of which all others have to be understood, as held by much of the tradition, or merely one such basic form (see HuaMat2, 102–3).

different kind, (ii) have essentially different functions, or contribute differently to the overall significance of the proposition, and (iii) ‘fit together’ in a characteristic manner so as to jointly make up a claim about the world. Husserl’s analysis consists, then, largely in working these basic ideas or *Leitfaden* into a theory of the structure of simple categorical propositions in the general conceptual framework previously outlined.

In the tradition, the internal articulation of a categorical proposition was usually conceived of in one of two ways, which can be illustrated by the views favored by, respectively, Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s emphasis on the functions of naming and stating something led to the *bipartite* division into a noun and a verb, or subject and predicate. Although Aristotle on occasion expressed agreement with this division, especially his logical concerns led to favoring a *tripartite* division, reflected in the ‘*S is p*’ formula, in which one finds in addition to two *terms*—the subject-term and predicate-term—the ‘is’ that, as was previously noted, Aristotle took to signify the combination of those terms or of what they stand for.<sup>256</sup> In taking the basic Platonic observation as the starting point of his analysis, Husserl initially also adopts the bipartite view that is naturally tied together with it. In both the affirmative and the negative case, a categorical proposition exhibits a ‘two-memberedness’ (*Zweigliedrichkeit*), being divided into the two ‘functionally’ or syntactically distinguished parts, the subject as that of which something is stated and the predicate as that which is stated of it—that is, the ‘is *p*’ or ‘is not *p*’ (HuaMat2, 103).<sup>257</sup> Of the two functions, the predicative one is clearly non-independent relative to that of the subject: it is possible to make a statement *about* something only when an object is presented for something to be stated of it. But Husserl argues that also the function of the *subject* is dependent on the whole proposition. The object signified by

<sup>256</sup> For Aristotle’s agreement with the noun–verb analysis, see *De Int.* 19b12. However, the tripartite analysis is present even in *On Interpretation*, for example in Aristotle’s definition of contradictory opposition as obtaining between two propositions that have the same subject and predicate, which means that ‘predicate’ refers to ‘*p*’ in the ‘*S is p*’ and ‘*S is not p*’ schemata and does not include either ‘is’ or ‘is not’ (see *De Int.* 17a34). The definition of a premise in *Prior Analytics* is explicitly tripartite: a premise can be analyzed into the two terms, the predicate and the subject, together with the verb ‘is’ or ‘is not’ (*An. Pr.* 24b17). Englebretsen (1996, 4) emphasizes the importance of the three-part analysis for syllogistic term-logic: the validity of a syllogistic inference rests on the possibility for the same term to figure in both the subject- and predicate-positions in the different premises and the conclusion, which means that subject- and predicate-terms have to be logically of the same kind, and a distinct unifying element, the copula, is needed in addition to the two in order to distinguish a unified proposition from what would be in essence a list of names. Kretzmann (1982) reports that the paradigm of a categorical proposition in medieval logic was the two-word form.

<sup>257</sup> Cf. Hua22, 186: “If within the categorical statement (*kategorische Aussage*) we distinguish, following the natural articulation of meaning (*Bedeutungsgliederung*), between that whereof the statement is made (the subject) and that which is stated of it (the predicate), then not ‘*P*,’ but rather ‘is *P*’ or ‘is not *P*,’ is the predicate.”

the meaning in the subject-position is not only presented or named, but presented in a specific manner that is possible only within the unity of a proposition:

Every proposition contains at least one part-meaning that refers to the object about which the proposition states something. And the way in which this part-meaning fits in the propositional whole and is unified with the completing meanings is such that the object stands there in the propositional intention precisely as one ‘about’ which, as we tend to say, something is stated. (HuaMat2, 84–5)<sup>258</sup>

The subject and predicate, understood as the elements playing these functions, are then strict correlatives and phenomena that are possible only in the context of a proposition. Moreover, their individuating factors on this level are precisely those functions, which pertain to the meanings by virtue of the way they ‘fit in’ (*einfügen*) a proposition, in a specific position or ‘empty place’.<sup>259</sup>

The bipartite division of a categorical proposition reflects, then, its exhaustive articulation into two correlative functional-syntactic members, the subject and predicate. However, Husserl analyzes each of these members into two abstractly separable elements: the function or ‘meaning-form’ (*Bedeutungsform*) and the *bearer* of that function or form, a meaning of a certain kind. Every syntactic function of this kind points to a specific position within a proposition, a position that requires a meaning of a specific semantic category. In the case of a simple categorical proposition—and more precisely, one in which the predicate signifies a ‘determination’ (*Bestimmung*), broadly speaking a property, and the subject that which is determined or to which the property pertains—the meanings are of essentially different types, and belong to logically heterogeneous categories: the subject-function (*Subjektfunktion*) requires a ‘nominal’ (*nominale*) meaning, and the predicate-function (*Prädikatfunktion*) an ‘adjectival’ (*adjektivische*) one (HuaMat2, 105). These categories can, for the moment, be preliminarily characterized simply by reference to their usual linguistic expressions, as being the meanings, respectively, of

<sup>258</sup> „Jeder Satz enthält mindest eine Teilbedeutung, die sich auf das Gegenständliche bezieht, über das der Satz etwas sagt. Und die Weise, wie diese Teilbedeutung im Satzganzen eingefügt ist und sich mit den ergänzenden Bedeutungen eingt, ist eine solche, dass der Gegenstand in der Satzmeinung eben als ein solcher dasteht, über den, wie wir es zu sagen pflegen, ausgesagt wird.“

<sup>259</sup> Husserl agrees, then, with Brentano that a judgment lacking only a predicate or a subject—at least understood in this sense—but including the other, as existential and impersonal propositions were often interpreted, would be senseless. Brentano made this point clearly in a review written in 1883 of a work by the linguist Franz Miklosich on ‘subjectless propositions’ (*Subjektlose Sätze*) especially in Slavic languages; Brentano takes the basic theses of Miklosich to be essentially in agreement with his own theory, but objects to the expression ‘subjectless’ as misleading in that it invites the idea of a ‘predicate-only’ proposition. Brentano writes: “Subject and predicate are correlative concepts and they stand and fall together. If a proposition is truly subjectless, then, by the same token, it is also truly predicateless.” (Brentano 2009, 70).

nouns or noun phrases and adjectives.<sup>260</sup>

As was seen above, in Husserl's general account of complex meanings, the notion of 'functions' that are taken up by meanings by virtue of their fitting in specific positions within a complex meaning is a phenomenon pertaining to non-independent meanings as the 'connective forms' that account for the unity of the whole. With regard to a categorical proposition, the question is what element in the proposition has this 'connective' role and the relevant kind of non-independence or 'need for completion' (*Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit*) and therefore assigns the correlative functions of the subject and predicate to the meanings that make up the proposition. On this question—when abstracted from the specifics of its formulation in Husserl's theoretical framework—the most obvious answers were traditionally tied together with views on the two- or three-part nature of a proposition: according to most adherents of the bipartite analysis, the unifying element of a categorical proposition was the verb or predicate, and according to proponents of the tripartite analysis, it was the element specifically dedicated for that role, the copula.<sup>261</sup> Although Husserl's analysis initially yielded the two-part syntactic division, he provides at least two kinds of reasons for accepting the existence of an abstractly separa-

<sup>260</sup> Husserl gives three characterizations of the categories of 'nominal' and 'adjectival' meanings: the *linguistic* characterization given here that appeals to distinctions found in ordinary languages, and two characterizations directly pertaining to the level of ideal meaning, which could be called a *syntactic* and a *semantic* characterization. Nominal meanings are, (1) the meanings of nouns or noun phrases; (2) meanings that are 'qualified' (*befähigt*) for the subject-position; and (3) meanings that signify something relatively independent with respect to what is signified by the predicate, or what is determined by the latter. Likewise, adjectival meanings are (1) in the basic case, the meanings of adjectives; (2) meanings that are 'qualified' for the predicate-position; and (3) meanings that signify something relatively dependent with respect to what is signified by the subject (see *HuaMat2*, 87, 106–7; cf. *LI2*, 215; *Hua19/2*, 579–80). From the point of view of explaining the structure of a categorical proposition, the linguistic characterization is merely illustrative or heuristic, and the syntactic criterion by itself would be circular (the subject- or predicate-position requires a meaning qualified, respectively, for the subject- or predicate-position); it is therefore the *semantic* characterization that bears the explanatory weight of Husserl's analysis: in the basic case, the predicate of a categorical proposition signifies something that cannot exist without the kind of thing signified by the subject—that is, a dependent moment. This is, in essence, one of the two semantic characterizations of a verb given by Aristotle in *On Interpretation*: a verb signifies something that is either "in a subject" (*ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*) or said "of a subject" (*καθ' ὑποκειμένου*) (*De Int.* 16b10); and, as Aristotle explains in *Categories*, 'in a subject' should be understood in the sense that the thing meant cannot exist apart from the subject (*Cat.* 1a25). The 'said of a subject', for its part, refers to the relation of the 'secondary substances', species and genera, to 'primary', individual substances. In explaining the semantics of categorical statements, Husserl gives, then, a kind of priority, in traditional metaphysical terms, to the relation of *substance* and *accident*, whereas many others in modern times have favored the other Aristotelian relation, that between a *particular* and a *universal*; for a prominent recent example of the latter tendency, see Strawson 1974, 11f.

<sup>261</sup> Gaskin (2008, 131ff) provides a helpful, brief outline of the history between the bipartite and tripartite conceptions from this point of view, and especially with regard to Frege, the most prominent modern defender of a two-part analysis. Gaskin calls these the '*secundum adiacens*' and '*tertium adiacens*' views; historically, however, '*secundum adiacens*' did not refer to an arbitrary verbal predicate, but specifically to the existential 'is' in a statement such as 'Socrates is (i.e. exists)'; for the history of this distinction, partly with regard to the question of the basic structure of a categorical statement, see Nuchelmans 1992.

ble, logically ‘copulative’ component in a proposition as its unifying, non-independent connective form, rather than as simply a contingent linguistic device that happens to be found in some sentences of certain actual languages.

First, as Husserl notes, the distinction between a syntactic function and its bearer is based on the possibility for the *same* meaning to occupy different positions and take up different functions within a proposition (see HuaMat2, 86). A nominal meaning is by its nature ‘qualified’ (*befähigt*) for the subject-position and function, but it can also figure in other positions, for example as part of a *relational* predicate. In ‘*a* is to the left of *b*’, the predicate—in the sense of what is claimed of the subject *a*—is ‘is to the left of *b*’, where the meaning of ‘*b*’ is nominal and could serve as a subject, as in the converse ‘*b* is to the right of *a*’. Likewise, an adjectival meaning is ‘qualified’ for the predicate-position but can figure in a proposition without taking up the predicative function, in particular, as an *attribute* making up part of a nominal meaning. For example, in the statement ‘snow is white’ and the noun phrase ‘white snow’, ‘white’ has the same meaning, and what differs is “only the form of fitting in the context of meaning, only the different function in the whole” (*ibid.*, 107)<sup>262</sup>. However, if the predicative function were intrinsic to the meaning in the predicate-position, it would be impossible for the same meaning to occur in a proposition without it thereby making up a predicate. Therefore, Husserl concludes, the unifying, non-independent copulative component that assigns the function must be distinguished from the adjectival meaning that *can* bear that function but can also occur in other positions in a proposition.<sup>263</sup>

A *second* reason concerns Husserl’s view of the position and role of *negation* in a simple categorical proposition.<sup>264</sup> Husserl first observes that in ‘*S* is not *p*’, the ‘not’

<sup>262</sup> „nur die Form der Einfügung in den Bedeutungszusammenhang, nur die verschiedene Funktion im Ganzen“

<sup>263</sup> In the Fifth Investigation, however, Husserl argues that the predicative and attributive uses of adjectives are not logically on a par with one another, but the latter is a *modification* of the former. Husserl argues that ‘attributive names’ (*attributive Namen*) should be understood essentially as a sort of ‘acquisition’ that originates in predication and depends on it, which can be seen in the fact that any particular instance of an attributive expression depends for its justification on either a previously made statement or the availability of such a statement, and its meaning can only be clarified by recourse to such a statement; in Husserl’s example, justifying a use, or clarifying the sense of the expression ‘the transcendental number  $\pi$ ’ requires a statement—in the logically privileged case, the conclusion of a proof—in which the attribute figures predicatively, the statement, that is, that  $\pi$  is a transcendental number (see LI2, 153; Hua19/I, 486–7). By taking the attributive function to be a ‘modification’ of the predicative, Husserl aims to emphasize that the former is not *reducible* to the latter, for example by taking attributive expressions as involving implicit predication—as in the parenthetical form ‘ $\pi$ —it is a transcendental number’—but rather involves the kind of ‘modifying’ dependence that was treated in the previous section in connection to Husserl’s analysis of the modifying relation between positing and non-positing acts.

<sup>264</sup> Husserl’s discussion of negation takes place largely against the background of two previous conceptions of the function of ‘not’ in the formula ‘*S* is not *p*’. According to one view that was defended

clearly belongs in, and forms part of, the predicate understood in the functional sense discussed above—that is, the ‘is not  $p$ ’ as that which is claimed of the subject. Husserl calls this the ‘full predicate’ (*volle/ganze Prädikat*), or the whole ‘predicate meaning’ (*Prädikatbedeutung*). Husserl now argues that negation does not in the basic case bear on ‘ $p$ ’, which Husserl calls the ‘predicate-concept’ (*Prädikatbegriff*) (see *HuaMat2*, 189–190; cf. *Hua22*, 185–6). There are indeed propositions in which a negation figures as part of a negative predicate-concept; Husserl gives two examples of such propositions, ‘The soul is immortal’ and ‘Wood is a non-conductor of electricity’.<sup>265</sup> However, these are, as Husserl takes it, secondary derivations from corresponding negative predications such as ‘Wood is not a conductor of electricity’. In general, Husserl argues, clarifying the sense of a negative predicate-concept of the form ‘not- $p$ ’ requires appealing to statements in which  $p$  is predicatively denied of some objects.<sup>266</sup> Negative predication has to be, then, distinguished from predication involving a negative predicate-concept, which means that in the former case the full predicate contains in addition to the predicate-concept another component to which the primary form of negation attaches.<sup>267</sup> This

among Husserl’s contemporaries and immediate predecessors by Bergmann and Lotze, negation bears on the *copula* and has the role of expressing a rejection of the predicative combination of the subject and predicate, which the copula was taken to signify; in effect, then, ‘ $S$  is not  $p$ ’ is to be understood as the rejection of the statement ‘ $S$  is  $p$ ’, or as the second-order statement ‘The statement that  $S$  is  $p$  is false’. According to another view, which was held by Bolzano, negation belongs in the *predicate*, so that in the negative categorical statement what is predicated of the subject is a ‘negative property’, not- $p$ , or the *lack* of the property  $p$ . See *HuaMat2*, 184–5.

<sup>265</sup> In a traditional nomenclature, predicates of this kind were called ‘infinite’ or ‘indefinite’ (*infinitum*, *ἀόριστον*). See *De Int.* 16b15. Kant still called judgments of the form ‘ $S$  is not- $p$ ’ ‘infinite’ (*unendliche*), and argued that for the purposes of a formal or ‘general logic’ that abstracts from the content of the terms, they are simply an instance of the affirmative form of judgment, but in a ‘transcendental logic’ that is concerned with the cognitive value of judgments, they should be viewed as a distinct class (see Kant 1998, A71–2/B97).

<sup>266</sup> See *HuaMat2*, 188: “Compare ‘Wood is not a conductor of electricity’ and ‘Wood is a non-conductor of electricity’ [...] in general: ‘ $S$  is not  $p$ ’ and ‘ $S$  is a not- $p$ ’. The latter is of a more complicated thought-content. What does ‘a not- $p$ ’ mean? It means, ‘something that is not  $p$ ’. [...] The idea of a proposition with a negative [full] predicate is already implied in it.” („Vergleichen Sie ‚Holz ist nicht ein Leiter der Elektrizität‘ und ‚Holz ist ein Nichtleiter der Elektrizität‘ [...] allgemein: ‚ $S$  ist nicht  $P$ ‘ und ‚ $S$  ist ein Nicht- $P$ ‘. Das Zweite ist von einem komplizierteren Gedankengehalt. Was heißt ‚ein Nicht- $P$ ‘? Das heißt ‚etwas, das nicht  $P$  ist‘. [...] Die Idee des Satzes mit negativem Prädikat steckt schon darin.“) In Husserl’s view, negative predicate-concepts are, then, related to corresponding negative predications in an analogous manner to how attributively functioning adjectives are to predicatively functioning ones: ‘is not- $p$ ’ has broadly the same kind of modifying dependence on ‘is not  $p$ ’ as the attributive ‘white ...’ has on the predicative ‘is white’.

<sup>267</sup> This is basically the old Aristotelian distinction between predicate denial and term negation. In Aristotle’s logic, however, ‘ $S$  is not  $p$ ’ and ‘ $S$  is not- $p$ ’ (which difference in Greek is marked by word order rather than a hyphen) do not differ only in their syntactic structure, but are not even equivalent. The predicate denial ‘ $S$  is not  $p$ ’ is the contradictory of ‘ $S$  is  $p$ ’, so that whenever one is true, the other is false, and *vice versa*. But ‘ $S$  is  $p$ ’ and ‘ $S$  is not- $p$ ’ are in Aristotle’s view merely contraries: they cannot be both true, but both of them can be false. In particular, when the subject does not exist or is of a kind to which the predicate  $p$  is by its nature inapplicable, ‘ $S$  is  $p$ ’ and ‘ $S$  is not- $p$ ’ are according to Aristotle both false, while the proper contradictory of the former, ‘ $S$  is not  $p$ ’ is true. See Horn 2001, 14f.



component, Husserl takes it, is that expressed in the standard categorical formula by ‘is’. What the ‘not’ in a simple negative proposition denies is the subject *being* as it is claimed to be in the corresponding affirmative proposition, the ‘is’ as signifying the ‘predicative belonging’ (*prädikative Zukommen*) to the subject of what the predicate-concept signifies (see HuaMat2, 176; cf. HuaMat5, 123). The full predicate consists, then, of the predicate-concept, in Husserl’s basic case an adjectival meaning, together with an abstractly separable copulative component to which negation in the primary case of negative predication is attached.<sup>268,269</sup>

In this sense, Husserl’s view *combines* the two- and three-part analyses of simple categorical propositions: namely, the different conceptions are not mutually exclusive, but rather reflect different levels of structural articulation within a proposition. On the highest level, a proposition is indeed to be exhaustively analyzed into two elements, a subject and a predicate, these being in the elementary case a nominal meaning functioning as the subject of predication, and its correlative, a full predicate. But the latter consists, further, of an adjectival meaning functioning as a predicate-concept and a copula as the non-independent connective form that assigns this function to it and which sometimes finds linguistic expression only in verbal inflection (see HuaMat2, 104). Thus, the view resulting from the previous considerations appears to be as follows. The connections—that is, relations of foundation—that are constitutive of the unity of a categorical proposition obtain, on the one hand, between the non-independent copulative component and the *predicate-concept*, and on the other, between the *full predicate* and the subject: the copula requires for its completion an adjectival meaning which, in filling that position, takes up the functional role of a predicate-concept, and the full

<sup>268</sup> See HuaMat2, 190: “There is a negative copula, and the negative copula is the denial of the affirmative one. The copula however is nothing for itself, it is a non-independent moment that [ . . . ] presupposes the predicate-presentation. When the presentation is negated, the copula with the predicate-concept, that is, the full predicate, is before one’s mind, and the ‘not’ directs itself against the full predicate, and specifically against the ‘is’ [ . . . ]” („Es gibt eine verneinende Kopula, und zwar ist die verneinende Kopula eben Verneinung der affirmative. Die Kopula ist aber nichts für sich, sie ist ein unselbständiges Moment, das [ . . . ] die Prädikatvorstellung voraussetzt. Die Kopula mit dem Prädikatbegriff, also das volle Prädikat, schwebt in der Vorstellung, wenn negiert wird, vor, und gegen das volle Prädikat, und speziell gegen das ‚ist‘ [ . . . ] richtet sich das ‚nicht‘“).

<sup>269</sup> Incidentally, this is very close to the way Gaskin (2008, 135) presents the view of verbs or predicates in the traditional *tripartite* conception of categorical sentences: “For convenience let us call a verb or verb-phrase that includes the copula (e.g. ‘is wise’, ‘runs’), a full verb, and a verb or verb-phrase from which the copula has been stripped (‘wise’, ‘run’, where this latter is understood to be an uninflected core to which inflections, including the null inflection, are superadded) a verb radical. A full verb might then be said to be composed of a verb radical together with the copula.” Gaskin then locates the essential difference between Frege’s bipartite view and this view in the fact that Frege refuses to analyze verbs into further logical elements in this way: “For Frege, it is the *full verb* (the concept-expression) taken as a whole, and not merely part of it, that is unsaturated, and so responsible for the unity of the sentence.” (*ibid*, 137).

predicate constituted by the two requires for its completion a nominal meaning, which thereby takes up the function of a subject of predication. The tripartite analysis reflects, then, the articulation of such proposition into its ultimate meaningful elements, at least when the subject and the predicate-concept do not themselves contain further complexity; but the three elements are not logically on par with one another—rather, they are organized into a hierarchical structure.

Further, this latter, tripartite analysis reflects in Husserl's view the distinction between the logical *form* and *matter* of a categorical proposition: the nominal and adjectival meaning make up the material content of the judgment, and the copula together with its 'empty places' makes up the form that pure logic is concerned with. In this sense, 'S' and 'p' in the categorical formula are *variables*—that is, placeholder terms arbitrarily variable within their respective semantic categories (see LI2, 68; Hua19/I, 337)—while the copula is a *constant*, that is, an element constitutive of a proposition of this form and therefore invariably found in such propositions. As Husserl writes in a manuscript from 1899:

Namely, in this sense form is everything that makes up the general character of the unity of judgment (*Urteilseinheit*), and matter the independent variables, and indeed what can be varied without limit without abolishing the specific unity of the judgment and thereby making the judgment senseless. More precisely: in each judgment we distinguish between relatively independent parts, which could also be thought outside the unity of the judgment [ . . . ] Considered from the point of view of these material constituents, the judgment is a combination of presentations, and what makes up the 'plus' over this mere sum is the form of judgment. (Hua40, 130)<sup>270</sup>

On this basis, Husserl objects to Brentano's notion of the 'matter' of judgment from a new point of view. As Husserl argues, Brentano assimilates two essentially different phenomena under the same notion. There is, *first*, 'matter' in this logical sense of the *material content* of the variables, the independent constituents of a proposition as opposed to its *logical form* constituted by the non-independent connective components, the constants. *Second*, there is the 'matter' in the sense of the 'what' (*Was*) of a judgment—that is, what is judged in a judgment or stated in a statement expressing or instantiating the proposition (*ibid*, 130), the "unity of what is believed" (Hua22, 247;

<sup>270</sup> „In diesem Sinn nämlich ist Form all das, was den allgemeinen Charakter der Urteilseinheit ausmacht, und Materie das selbständige Variable, und zwar das schrankenlos Variable, ohne die spezifische Einheit des Urteils aufzuheben, das Urteilsmäßige also sinnlos zu machen. Genauer: In jedem Urteil unterschieden wir relativ selbständige Teile, die auch außerhalb der Urteilseinheit gedacht werden können [ . . . ] Vom Gesichtspunkt dieser materiellen Bestandteile betrachtet, ist das Urteil eine Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen, und was das Plus ausmacht über die bloße Summe hinaus, das ist die Urteilsform.“

cf. HuaMat2, 176).<sup>271</sup> Matter in the latter sense is the *intentional* matter of an act of judging—and therefore a phenomenon belonging mainly on the level of the acts—which contrasts, once more, with the intentional quality of a judgment and can likewise figure as the matter of a mere presentation or non-positing act. Matter in this latter sense encompasses *both* the matter and the form in the former, logical sense. The ‘what’ of a judgment contains both the material components and their formal articulation, the non-independent connective forms and the corresponding empty places filled by, and functions assigned to, the material components. This is clear in the fact that the same components can make up non-equivalent judgments depending on which positions they fill, as in ‘ $a > b$ ’ and ‘ $b > a$ ’.

### 3.4.3 Propositional acts and their objective correlates

Following the distinction between the three levels of analysis sketched out at the beginning of the previous section, the above account of the basic structural articulation of a simple categorical proposition—an entity on the level of ideal meaning—has its counterparts, first, on the levels of intentional acts and the linguistic formations giving expression to them, and second, of the objective correlates of these phenomena. The intentional acts in which ideal propositions find their concrete instances are in the basic case *predicative judgments* as an elementary form of what Husserl calls ‘propositional acts’ (*propositionale Akte*), while the objective correlate of a propositional act is, Husserl argues, a *state of affairs* (*Sachverhalt*)<sup>272</sup>. Here, Husserl’s views are first outlined by con-

<sup>271</sup> Husserl extends his criticism of Brentano also to the later theory of ‘double judgments’, in which a Brentano admits a complexity of structure in the act, unlike in straightforwardly existential judgments; but as Husserl argues, the question of what is judged in the double judgment as a whole—its unified logical content and intentional matter—is not raised: “[a categorical judgment] is not only a ‘double’ judgment (*Doppelurteil*): i.e. a peculiar sort of interweaving of elementary judgments. It is quite certainly at the same time *one* judgment. As a whole, it ‘believes’; and it believes something. Thus the distinction of quality from matter, of acknowledgement from content acknowledged, must therefore find its place here as well as anywhere else.” (Husserl 1994, 292; Hua22, 247; cf. HuaMat5, 122).

<sup>272</sup> The term ‘*Sachverhalt*’ was originally the German translation for a term in traditional legal rhetoric, ‘*status rerum*’, which referred to the subject matter under dispute in a trial, except when what was disputed was the legal standing of a person, in which case ‘*status hominum*’ was used instead. In philosophy, Julius Bergmann and Lotze were probably the first to use the term in approximately the same sense as Husserl: Bergmann occasionally used the term as referring to the *res* side of the *adaequatio* definition of truth, and Lotze similarly used it for what corresponds in the world to the predicative connection within a true subject–predicate statement (see Bergmann 1879, 2; Lotze 1884, 494). Since Husserl was well-acquainted with these works, they may have contributed to his adoption of the term. However, a common view has it that Husserl’s proximate source for his use of the term was Stumpf, who used it in his 1886–7 lectures on psychology and logic in Halle—which Husserl attended, and of which the only surviving documentation is Husserl’s hand-written transcript, preserved in the Husserl Archives—to distinguish the ‘matter’ (*Materie*) of a judgment from its ‘content’ (*Inhalt*). In Stumpf’s example, the judgment ‘God exists’ has as its matter, in line with Brentano’s analysis, God, while the content is the

sidering how they arise from the broader theoretical framework presented above and how they relate to Brentano's views. Afterwards, Husserl's arguments for introducing states of affairs as the objects of judgments are considered from a more theory-external point of view, by contrasting this with an alternative conception—defended among others by Bolzano—in which the structural articulation of the proposition expressed by a statement does not correspond to a similarly structured object.

In approaching Husserl's treatment of these questions, it is worthwhile to start by taking stock of the crux of Husserl's disagreement with Brentano on the structure of the logical content of statements and judgments. As previously noted, the most radical part of Brentano's theory of judgment was the proposed reduction of the subject–predicate articulation of simple affirmative and negative judgments—as well as ultimately all other syntactic forms characteristic of propositions—into a *nominal* form in which the content of the grammatical predicate-expression is incorporated into that of the subject-expression in the form of a more or less complex attribute. Thus, the correct analysis of the content of a judgment typically expressed in a subject–predicate form, such as 'a rose is red', is simply the name 'a red rose'. In Brentano's view, all statements are then logically speaking what Husserl called 'positing names', and their underlying intentional acts are 'positing nominal acts', acts in which an object presented in a name-like fashion is 'posited' as existing, similarly to how for example ordinary perception presents its objects as actually existing denizens of one's spatiotemporal surroundings. What Husserl in the first place objected to in this view was based on his conception of the nature of logical laws: Brentano's analysis, Husserl argued, neglects the very elements in the logical content of statements on which logical laws as formal principles of valid inference bear—namely, the formal connective components that account for the logical unity of propositions and are the constants in the formalized propositions.<sup>273</sup> The logical content or the meaning of a statement has a characteristic unity and formal articulation that, as Husserl took it, cannot be eliminated without losing sight of the ultimate basis for the rational aspect of language and thought.

This disagreement with Brentano as to the articulation of the logical content of judgments and statements is reflected in Husserl's analysis of the intentional structure

existence of God (see Rollinger 2009, xx–xxi). For the history of the term '*Sachverhalt*', see Smith 2007.

<sup>273</sup> See LI2, 63–4; Hua19/I, 328–9. Cf. Hua40, 130: "All logical law is based on form, i.e., each law displays the distinction between the variables of the law (the indeterminate elements whose determination yields the concrete applications) and the form of the law." (*„Alle logische Gesetzmäßigkeit beruht in der Form, d.h., jedes Gesetz zeigt selbst den Unterschied zwischen den Variablen der Gesetzmäßigkeit (den Unbestimmten, deren Bestimmtheit den konkreten Anwendungsfall ergibt) und der Gesetzesform.“*)

and objective correlates of acts of judging and stating or asserting. Accordingly, in the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl analyzes judgments in the logically central sense of intentional acts intimated in declarative statements as complex intentional acts with a propositional content—in the two correlative senses of ‘content’ as the intentional matter as a moment of the act and the corresponding ideal meaning as a species—that is, as *propositional acts*. As was seen above, in Husserl’s general theory of complex meanings and acts, unity on the level of the ideal meanings was explained by appealing to relations of foundation that obtain primarily on the level of intentional acts, namely, between particular meaning-conferring acts as instantiating meanings of the relevant kinds. These relations, it was argued, obtain on the basis of the properties of the instantiated species, but the terms of the relations are in the primary sense not those species themselves but their *instances*: it is particulars, not the species, for which it makes sense to say that one cannot exist without the other, which formulation was the centerpiece of Husserl’s definition of the notion of foundation. Furthermore, the unity corresponding on the level of acts to the logical unity of a complex ideal meaning is, as Husserl took it, an intentional ‘unity of act’ in which a founded, higher-order intentional reference is constituted to an object which at least generally differs from the objects of the part-acts composing the unified complex act.<sup>274</sup>

Seen in light of this model, a propositional act—in the case treated by Husserl as basic, a categorical judgment—is a complex act whose intentional reference is built upon other intentional acts. Applying the principles of the general theory, the outlines of the analysis are as follows: in the propositional act, the ‘founding’ acts are bound together by non-independent intentional moments in a way corresponding to the articulation of the ideal proposition—or rather, giving the latter its concrete instances—and in occupying the dedicated positions within the structure made up by the founding acts together with the non-independent connective forms, the acts take up the correlative functions of presenting something as a subject of predication and something as the predicated characteristics. Moreover, in being combined into a single unified intentional act, the combined acts set up a founded intentional reference to a new object, the ‘total object’ (*Gesamtobjekt*) of the judgment or the objective correlate corresponding to the judgment

<sup>274</sup> See LI2, 114; Hua19/I, 415. Husserl does not provide examples to justify his qualification that the objects of partial acts are only ‘in general’ (*im allgemeinen*) not identical with the object of the complex act. Künne (2017, 43) suggests that what Husserl has in mind are thoughts of a form in which another thought about the same object is ‘embedded’, such as a thinking of a person *A* as the person whom a person *B* admires—here, the embedded thought ‘the person whom *B* admires’ is about the same person as the whole thought, namely, the person *A*.

as a whole, which Husserl calls a state of affairs.<sup>275</sup> In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl provides a succinct statement of these ideas as follows:

The subject-member of a categorical assertion is an underlying act, a positing of a subject, on which the positing of a predicate, its attribution or denial, reposes. [...] The total experience is [...] plainly one act, one judgement, whose single, total object is a single state of affairs. As the judgment does not exist alongside of, or between, the subject-positing and the predicating acts, but exists in them as their dominant unity, so, on the correlative side, the objective unity is the state of affairs judged (*geurteilte Sachverhalt*), an appearance emergent out of subject and predicate" (LI2, 115–6; Hua19/1, 418).

More precisely characterized, a categorical judgment is then a *positing propositional act* (LI2, 160; Hua19/1, 500), a complex act with a special kind of structured object and built up from at least relatively independent acts that are generally themselves positing as to their intentional quality. Thus, Husserl objects against Brentano that the latter's proposed reduction of judgments to the nominal form distorted the sense in

<sup>275</sup> States of affairs and similar structured 'total objective correlates' for judgments and statements figured prominently in various ontological, logical, and epistemological theories around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and re-emerged in somewhat different guises in later ontology. At least four classes of different theories can be distinguished:

(1) Meinong, in his 1902 *Über Annahmen*, postulated what he called 'objectives' (*Objektiven*) as the objects of acts of judging and assuming (see Meinong 1902, 150ff). In Meinong's theory, no clear distinction is drawn between objectives as the objective correlates and propositions as meanings of statements and as the subject-matter of pure logic. In this regard, Moore's and Russell's early theories of 'propositions' were similar: in Moore's (1993) view, a proposition is a timelessly existing complex composed of 'concepts', but concepts are also what makes up the world; and in Russell's early Moore-influenced view, a proposition is a complex of 'terms', which notion Russell uses synonymously with 'individual' and 'entity', so that a "man, a moment, a number [...] or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term" (Russell 2010, 45).

(2) States of affairs famously figure as prominent elements of Wittgenstein's 'picture theory' of language in the *Tractatus*, and the English term was made common currency by its translation: a state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) or fact (*Tatsache*) consists of objects, is something that 'is the case', the world consists of obtaining states of affairs, and states of affairs are what is pictured by (at least logically elementary) sentences or 'propositional signs', which are themselves states of affairs or facts—facts that certain elements, such as words, are configured in a certain way (see Wittgenstein 1974, 1.1; 2; 2.01; 3.14; 4.1). Wittgenstein later criticized this view on account of its understanding facts as 'complexes' having simpler entities for their parts: "It is [...] misleading to say the fact that this circle is red (that I am tired) is a complex whose component parts are a circle and redness (myself and tiredness) [...] The fact [...] isn't 'composed' of anything at all." (Wittgenstein 1975, 302–3).

(3) In the phenomenological tradition, detailed accounts of states of affairs were formulated particularly in Reinach's 1911 *Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils* and in the second, 1948 volume of Ingarden's *magnum opus*, the *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (see Ingarden 2016, 267ff). Reinach gives the following list of putatively sufficient characteristics for states of affairs: they "are that which is believed and affirmed, which stand in the relation of ground and consequent, which possess modalities, and which stand in the relation of contradictory positivity and negativity" (Reinach 1982, 341; Ingarden adds to this list that states of affairs can stand in causal relations (see Ingarden 2016, 297–300).

(4) Later, different theories of states of affairs or facts have been formulated, especially by D. M. Armstrong and Gustav Bergmann, for whom the driving theoretical interest has been to explain what exists besides a universal *P* and a particular *a* when the particular instantiates the universal, or what provides an 'ontological ground' for this instantiating, to which the answer provided, in its basic outline, has been: the fact that *a* is *P*. For both Armstrong and Bergmann, 'ordinary objects', the instances of universals, are then states of affairs or facts (see Armstrong 1997, 124–5; Bergmann 2004, 10).

which predication involves an articulated unity of several acts encompassed by a ‘unity of act’. In construing the content of judgments in a form that constitutes only *part* of a complete categorical judgment—namely, in the form of a name, a possible *subject* of a proposition—Brentano ended up overlooking the unified total content as what is thereby judged. And, as Husserl puts the matter in his 1905 lectures, “when the total representation (*Gesamtrepräsentation*) passing through the judgment is overlooked, it can be understood, by the necessary correlation between representation and represented object (*Repräsentationsobjekt*), why [...] the object of the total representation is overlooked” (HuaMat5, 122)<sup>276</sup>.

Thus, the core of Husserl’s analysis lies in two claims: *first*, that acts of judging are complex, propositional acts, and *second*, that in order for a complex *composed of acts* to constitute a complex intentional *act*, it has to have as a whole a single objective correlate that is in some sense set up by the constituent acts and their manner of being combined, which objective correlate is in the case of a judgment a state of affairs.<sup>277</sup> While these views develop organically within the context of Husserl’s broader conceptions of intentional acts and the general theory of complex meanings and acts, it is instructive to consider them also from a somewhat more external point of view, without the support of the broader theoretical apparatus developed in the *Investigations*. In particular, while the conception of judgments and statements as propositional acts with states of affairs as their characteristic intentional correlates arises naturally within Husserl’s theory, considered in abstraction from this broader theoretical context it is not the only possible, and perhaps not even the most obvious view. In this regard, one may consider as a foil for Husserl’s view the kind of conception defended by Bolzano, in which—

<sup>276</sup> „Wird dabei die durch das Urteil hindurchgehende Gesamtrepräsentation übersehen, so wird es bei der notwendigen Korrelation zwischen Repräsentation und Repräsentationsobjekt auch verständlich, warum [...] der Gegenstand der Gesamtrepräsentation übersehen bleibt.“

<sup>277</sup> Künne (2017) objects to this latter idea on the basis that false judgments do not have such unified correlates, echoing Russell’s 1910 criticism of Meinong’s view—and by implication, Russell’s own earlier views as well as those of Moore—of ‘objectives’ as the objects of judgments on account of its requiring the existence of what Russell calls ‘objective falsehoods’ as entities in the world (see Russell 1992, 118–9). But this objection is based on a misconstrual of Husserl’s position: a state of affairs is in Husserl’s view the necessary intentional correlate of a predicative judgment in the same sense that a material object is the necessary intentional correlate of sense-perception—namely, the act is so constituted as to putatively refer to such an object, whether it exists or not. Künne himself construes Husserl’s theory of intentionality instead in ‘relational’ terms, but in such a way that the relation obtains not between the act and its intentional object (which in some cases does not exist) but between the act and its ‘sense’, which he furthermore identifies as the matter of the act, but treats instead as an analogue for Frege’s *Sinne*. This role is however played in Husserl’s theory (at least approximately) not by the intentional matter but the ideal meaning; but neither the *whole-part* relation between an act and its intentional matter nor the *species-instantiation* relation between the meaning and the act is the *intentional* relation between an act and its object which is the relevant factor in Husserl’s treatment of judgments and states of affairs.

contrary to Brentano—a judgment does indeed have a unified propositional *content* but no special *object* standing in an intentional ‘correlation’ with the former. As was seen in the first chapter, in Bolzano’s theory, every act of judging has as its ‘material’ (*Stoff*) an objective *Satz an sich*, which ‘appears’ (*erscheint*) or is ‘grasped’ (*aufgefaßt*) in making the judgment. However, the object of the judgment as a whole, in Bolzano’s view, is simply the object or objects falling under the subject-idea that together with a copula and a predicate-idea makes up the basic form of a proposition.<sup>278</sup> The main point of controversy is then in the question whether a special, ‘founded’ type of object is to be postulated for whole judgments and statements.<sup>279</sup> Thus, in the following, the less theory-internal among Husserl’s arguments in favor of states of affairs as the ‘total objects’ of judgments and statements are first outlined. Afterwards, closer attention is given to Husserl’s analysis of the difference between the way in which these total objects ‘appear’ in, on the one hand, judgments and statements, and on the other, in *naming* them by means of nominalizations that Husserl takes to be derivations from the more basic propositional acts.

In the *Investigations*, Husserl provides at least three kinds of considerations for the view that judgments and statements have states of affairs for their objects: the *first* is based on an analogy with co-referring names, the *second* on a comparison with other kinds of intentional acts or attitudes, and the *third* on the observation that what is stated in a straightforward declarative statement can also be expressed by logically nominal expressions, such as that-clauses, that are in some cases most plausibly understood as referring to facts or states of affairs in the world. The first two have certain short-

<sup>278</sup> Although, as seen in the second chapter, Bolzano’s theory was among the main influences of Husserl’s own theory together with Brentano’s and Lotze’s, Husserl does not set out to argue in detail against those aspects of the former that differ from his own views, in the manner in which painstaking considerations of this kind are made in relation to Brentano’s theory in the *Investigations* and elsewhere. In a manuscript from 1899, Husserl criticizes Bolzano of a lack of clarity concerning the relation of acts of judging and propositions, and especially on the unclear notions of a proposition as the ‘material’ of a judgment and of a judgment as the ‘appearance’ of the proposition, the latter of which suggests to Husserl that the proposition is the object of the judgment in the sense of something in the world—namely, a state of affairs—which Husserl however rejects as an interpretation of Bolzano’s views (see Hua40, 138–9).

<sup>279</sup> In the more recent ontological debates about states of affairs, this has been a recurrent point of controversy. In these debates, states of affairs are often viewed as ontological ‘truth-makers’ for propositions—an expression that incidentally originates in Husserl’s phrase ‘*wahrmachende Sachverhalte*’ in the Sixth Logical Investigation (see Hua19/2, 654), as noted in an influential paper on the notion (see Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984). Sceptics about the existence of states of affairs have often argued that entities of some other ontological category, such as abstract particulars, serve as ‘truth-makers’, and have accordingly opted, on the grounds that this makes states of affairs ontologically redundant theoretical posits, for the Bolzanian view that judgments and statements do not correspond to a special class of objects, but have only a propositional content (see *ibid.*; cf. Simons 2009). The objection that Husserl needlessly postulates propositionally articulated special objects where only propositional content is needed is raised by Künne (2017).



comings if viewed as purporting to provide independent grounds for the acceptance of states of affairs as the objective correlates for judgments and statements—rather than as simply illustrations intended to clarify the view or give it intuitive plausibility. The third deserves more merit and is also the one which Husserl himself devotes the most care to formulate.

The first time Husserl raises the question of the objects of statements is in the First Investigation, in the course of a discussion of the relation of the meaning and object of an expression. As was seen in the second chapter, Husserl distinguished between the two primarily on the grounds that the same object can be referred to by expressions differing in meaning, as in the two descriptive names ‘the victor at Jena’ and ‘the vanquished at Waterloo’, which differ in meaning but refer to the same historical person, Napoleon. Although names are the clearest example of this lack of a one-to-one correspondence between meaning and object, Husserl argues for extending the distinction to other kinds of expressions as well, and in particular to complete statements. Husserl distinguishes between two possible interpretations of what the object of a statement is:

If we consider, e.g., statements of the form ‘*S* is *P*’, we generally regard the subject of the statement as the object about which the statement is made. Another view is, however, possible, which treats the *whole* state of affairs which corresponds to the statement as an analogue of the object a name names, and distinguishes this from the meaning of the declarative sentence (*Bedeutung des Aussagesatzes*). (LI, 198; Hua19/I, 54)

Husserl proposes as an analogue for the relation between different descriptions referring to the same object the relation between the two statements ‘*a* is greater than *b*’ and ‘*b* is smaller than *a*’: the statements clearly differ in meaning, but in some sense state the same thing. On this basis, Husserl then concludes that on the second interpretation of the object of a statement, this ‘sameness’ can be understood, following the analogy with the two descriptions of Napoleon, as the statements having a common object, which is merely “predicatively apprehended (*prädikativ aufgefaßt*) and asserted in two different ways” (*ibid*).

While there are some doubts to be had about whether Husserl sets up the elements of his analogy in the right way<sup>280</sup>, there is a more basic problem if Husserl’s discussion is

<sup>280</sup> Tugendhat (2005; 1982, 113f) has noted that the criteria for establishing a sameness of object in the two pairs in Husserl’s analogy are in fact not analogous in the manner apparently presumed by Husserl. The statement ‘*a* is greater than *b*’ is analytically equivalent with ‘*b* is smaller than *a*’, so that the fact that they in a sense state the same thing can be established *a priori* simply on the basis of understanding the concepts ‘greater than’ and ‘smaller than’; on the other hand, the fact that the descriptions ‘the victor at Jena’ and ‘the vanquished at Waterloo’ name the same thing is something that has to be established empirically. The kind of relation between two statements that would correspond in the right way to the

understood as intending to offer independent grounds for the view that statements have as their objects states of affairs: in the case of comparing two names, the fact that both of them at least putatively refer to some object is not something that can be established by the comparison, but is *presupposed* in it. What is in question is merely what the relation between the objects named is—for instance, whether or not the object is one and the same. Likewise, interpreting the ‘sameness’ of the statements as an identity of object already presupposes that each statement in the first place has a ‘total object’ differing from the object of the respective subject-terms—which are different for the two statements, one having for its subject ‘*a*’, the other, ‘*b*’. If one instead took the object to be that which the statements at any rate have in common, then in the absence of an antecedent basis for accepting states of affairs as the corresponding objective elements, one might conclude that Husserl’s example statements have as their object either the *truth-value* or the conditions for truth that they, being logically equivalent, necessarily share.<sup>281</sup> The analogy with co-referring names is, then, most charitably viewed not as an argument in support of the view that statements have states of affairs as their objects, but an illustration made on that assumption.

Husserl again considers the different senses in which a judgment can be understood to refer to an object in the Fifth Investigation, in the context of the discussion of complex acts. Here Husserl draws a similar distinction to that made for statements in the First Investigation—or rather, a generalized form of the same distinction: every complex act refers in a ‘secondary’ sense to the objects of its part-acts, but the ‘primary’ objective correlate is that to which an intentional relation is set up in the act as a whole. This

relation of the example descriptions would then be one in which the fact that the statements ‘state the same thing’ is something that has to be established by other means than understanding the meanings of the terms; the relevant relation would be, Tugendhat suggests, that of any two statements that are both, as a matter of contingent fact, true or both false. As Tugendhat observes, if this were made the criterion for the sameness of object, then every statement would have as its object its truth-value, which would yield Frege’s position (cf. Frege 1984, 163).

<sup>281</sup> This would again lead to a view similar to Frege’s. It seems that at least in the period of the *Investigations*, Husserl did not arrive at a very firm conception of the criteria for individuating states of affairs. In a preparatory manuscript for the *Investigations*, Husserl rejects the idea that equivalent statements correspond to the same state of affairs and suggests that only ‘immediately equivalent’ statements have the same objective correlate. But Husserl himself notes that he is unable to give criteria for the ‘immediacy’ of an equivalence without appealing to the sameness of the state of affairs (see Hua40, 82–3). Furthermore, in another manuscript from the same period, Husserl argues that not even all immediate correlative statements stand for the same state of affairs: for example, ‘*a* is to the left of *b*’ and ‘*b* is to the right of *a*’ correspond in Husserl’s view to different states of affairs (see Hua40, 134). Starting from his 1908 lectures on the theory of meaning, Husserl distinguished between ‘factual situations’ (*Sachlagen*), which are the identical objective elements underlying, for example, correlative statements of this kind, and states of affairs, which are different categorial articulations of factual situations and differ for the respective, differently articulated correlative judgments or statements (see Hua26, 97f; cf. EJ, 239–42).

distinction is applied to the judgment ‘The knife is on the table’, which has among its parts the presentations of the knife and the table. But these, Husserl argues, are only the object of the subject of the proposition expressed, and an object presented in the object-position of a relational predicate, as an object relative to which something is predicated of the subject; the *primary* object of the judgment is the state of affairs of the knife being on the table (LI2, 114; HuaI9/I, 416; cf. HuaMat2, 86; 113). Husserl adds the following observations in support of this interpretation: the same thing that is judged can also be wished, questioned, or doubted—that is, the object of judgment can likewise figure as the object of these other intentional acts or attitudes. Furthermore, each of these attitudes has as an object in one sense the knife, but it cannot be what is wished or questioned:

The wish that the knife were on the table, which coincides (in object) with the judgement, is concerned with the knife, but we don’t in it wish the knife, but that the knife should be on the table, that this should be so [ . . . ] Just so there is a corresponding question regarding the knife, but the knife is not (nonsensically) what we ask; we ask regarding the knife’s position on the table, whether this actually is the case. (LI2, 114; HuaI9/I, 416)

Here one may again doubt whether these considerations provide, or are even intended to provide, independent grounds for the view argued for or simply illustrate it. It is clearly true that, by itself, the fact that a wish for something to be the case involves a reference to the subject of the relevant proposition does not exhaust what is thereby wished; otherwise, wishing that the knife were on the table and wishing that the knife were on the floor would amount to wishing the same thing. But this observation on its own does not compel one to construe a ‘total object’ for the wish rather than settling for an interpretation along the lines of the Bolzanian view on judgments: on such a view, the object of the wish would simply be the knife, and the content of the wish as a whole would be the proposition that the knife is on the table, for which no additional objective correlate is to be assumed, but which would be true if the knife were on the table. The conclusion to which this seems to point is that also the comparison with other kinds of propositional intentional acts is better viewed as illustrating a view held on other grounds rather than as an independent justification for the postulation of states of affairs as objects of judgments.

Considered on a general level, the problem with the comparison with these other intentional acts can perhaps be put in the following form: in *statements* such as ‘She wishes that the knife were on the table’ and ‘I asked whether the knife is on the table’, the subjunctive that-clause and the whether-clause indeed express ‘what is wished’ or

‘what is asked’ in the acts in question, and in this sense they are ‘objects’—namely, the *grammatical* objects of the *verbs* ‘wishes’ and ‘asked’; but Husserl gave no clear grounds for understanding these phrases as standing for something in the *world* rather than—if anything—for the ‘contents’ in the sense of the propositions expressed. As seen above, in the framework of Husserl’s own broader theoretical views, such grounds are provided by various connections between views about the nature of meaning and reference. A proposition, on Husserl’s view, is a complex meaning whose unity finds its concrete instances on the level of particular intentional acts, in the unity of part-acts composing complex acts, and the unity of act constitutive of the latter necessarily corresponds to a correlated unity of object. But without a theory-independent basis for applying this model to statements and judgments, these connections in the broader theory can just as well be made to serve as materials for rejecting, by *modus tollens*, some of the assumptions of the theory—such as the basic underlying view that linguistic meaning is to be explicated in terms of intentional relations to objects.<sup>282</sup> Later on in the Fifth Investigation, however, Husserl turns to this very question, and argues that that-clauses and similar constructions indeed refer to something and that in certain cases they should be understood specifically as referring not to the contents but to corresponding ‘total objective correlates’, states of affairs or facts in the world.

In order to make Husserl’s reflections on this matter somewhat more explicit, it is useful to start by mentioning two principles that figure in the background of the argument formulated in the Fifth Investigation. *First*, as was seen in the previous section, Husserl’s basic criterion for a nominal meaning was that it can take the subject-position in a categorical proposition without being ‘modified’, in the sense in which the adjectival *red* is modified when one of its nominalized forms occurs as the subject of a proposition such as *red is a color* or *redness is a property*; likewise, then, an expression is in a logical sense a name if it expresses a nominal meaning and can thereby function as the subject of a statement (see LI2, 150; Hua19/1, 481). *Second*, while discussing the ontological status of species or universals in the Second Investigation, Husserl gave a broad criterion for something being an ‘object’ (*Gegenstand*), in the sense of something that exists. Overlooking certain necessary restrictions, the criterion is, at least to a first approximation: anything that can be named by an expression serving as the subject of a true categori-

<sup>282</sup> This is, indeed, Tugendhat’s response: the basic objection that Tugendhat raises against Husserl concerns the ‘object-orientated’ approach to linguistic meaning that, as Tugendhat takes it, forces Husserl to appeal to theoretical constructs such as states of affairs in explaining the semantics of statements (see Tugendhat 2005, 107ff).

cal statement is an object.<sup>283</sup> These principles underlie the third kind of consideration concerning states of affairs as the purported objects of judgments and statements. The basic outlines of Husserl's argument are as follows: Husserl notes that certain linguistic constructions that express what someone judges, or that at any rate could be judged, can figure in the subject-position of true subject–predicate statements and therefore—being names in the logical sense—stand for objects. Husserl then argues that in certain cases they cannot be plausibly viewed as having for their objects propositions as the ideal meaning-content of the corresponding statements, but rather refer to facts or states of affairs in the world. Therefore, since the phrases in question give expression to what can be judged, the latter must be viewed as having as their total objects those facts or states of affairs. Since the main point of controversy here is about the correct theoretical understanding of what is stated in a statement or judged in a judgment as a whole, it is useful to have a term that is neutral with respect to the question; accordingly, the term 'subject matter' of a judgment or statement will be employed here. The dispute, then, revolves around the question whether the subject matter of a judgment or statement is to be understood exclusively in terms of the logical content or what Bolzano called the 'material' of a judgment—the ideal proposition expressed—or by also allowing for an interpretation in terms of an object-like counterpart in the world.

Given one of Husserl's central charges against Brentano in the Fifth Investigation, that statements differ in a logically significant sense from names as to the articulation

<sup>283</sup> See LI, 250; Hua19/I, 130–1: "[There is] a supreme unity in the concept of an object (a subject), [and a] correlated concept of a categorical [*kategorischen*] propositional unity. In either case something (a predicate) pertains or does not pertain to an object (a subject), and the sense of this most universal pertinence, together with the laws governing it, also determine the most universal sense of being, or of an object, as such". That the principle is in need of refining is clear when one considers true statements of the form 'S does not exist'. Husserl himself is concerned in the cited section to distinguish ideal entities from fictitious and absurd object which are likewise something that can be named and 'thought of' but do not exist. Husserl rejects the construal of such objects as existing but having a 'merely intentional' mode of being (see *ibid*); this is connected with Husserl's general theory of intentionality, according to which in such cases only the act exists, with—as noted on several occasions above—an intentional matter so constituted that the act at least putatively refers to an object of the specified kind. The opposing view was famously held by Meinong in his 1904 "*Über Gegenstandstheorie*", where he divided objects (*Gegenstände*) into those that exist or have existence (*Sein*), those—such as objectives—that subsist or have subsistence (*Bestand*), and those, such as absurd and contradictory objects, which are 'indifferent to being' or 'outside of existence' (*ausserseiend*), or have what he called '*Aussersein*' (see Meinong 1960, 83–6). A less permissive view that nonetheless accepted fictitious and other 'merely intentional' objects was elaborately defended by Ingarden in many of his works. In Ingarden's extensive conceptual distinctions drawn for clarifying the idealism–realism dispute, fictitious and other merely intentional objects are characterized as 'existentially heteronomous' so that they have their 'existential foundation' in other objects, namely certain intentional acts, and would not exist were it not for them (see Ingarden 2013, 113); besides fictional objects, for example negative states of affairs are in Ingarden's view heteronomous—they exist, but only by virtue of connected, 'autonomously' existing positive states of affairs and certain intentional attitudes of subjects (see Ingarden 2016, 300).

of their ‘semantic essence’ and cannot serve unmodified as subjects in other statements (see e.g. LI2, 154; 156–7; Hua19/1, 488–9; 493–4), it follows that the criteria mentioned above for establishing a reference to an object—which was based on the possibility for an expression to function as a subject—are not directly applicable to whole statements. Accordingly, Husserl’s reflections take a more indirect route through a consideration of expressions appropriately *related* to statements. As Husserl observes, corresponding to every statement there are various other expressions with the same subject matter that *are* qualified to function as logical subjects in statements; among these, Husserl considers principally two kinds, that-clauses of the form ‘that *S* is *p*’ and gerundial phrases such as ‘the being *p* of *S*’ (*das P sein des S*).<sup>284</sup> Now, Husserl takes it that when one of such phrases functions as the subject of a statement, as in the case of the that-clause in ‘that *S* is *p* is delightful’, it stands for the subject matter of the corresponding statement and can accordingly be understood as a name for it (see LI2, 148; 155; Hua19/1, 477; 491). On the ‘Bolzanian’ conception, considered here as a foil to Husserl’s, of what the subject matter of a judgment or statement as a whole is, expressions like this would therefore have to be understood as naming the logical content of the statement, the proposition *S* is *p*. In certain circumstances this interpretation is indeed appropriate, as in ‘That *S* is *p* is true’, since on the assumption that there *are* ideal propositions, they are

<sup>284</sup> It is instructive to pay a certain degree of attention to the different types of nominal counterparts for statements, since the different constructions considered on their own suggest somewhat different interpretations. As seen below, Husserl argues that a that-clause can refer both to a propositional content and an object-like counterpart in the world; but this dual interpretation is not as plausible in the case of a gerund such as ‘the being red of a rose’, which in German is expressed by an infinitive construction, ‘*das Rotsein der Rose*’; accordingly Husserl treats the ‘objective equivalence’ between a that-clause and the gerund as evidence that when using the latter is admissible, the former also refers to a state of affairs in the world (see LI2, 148; Hua19/1, 479). On the other hand, the gerundial phrase is not as clearly sentence-like, and fairly easily lends itself to the interpretation that the significate or referent of the phrase is a *moment* of the rose—the particular instance of redness found in the rose—rather than a state of affairs with a sentence-like structure—as ‘the running of Socrates’ can be understood as referring to a particular instance of running, the one performed by Socrates; interpretations of the semantics of statements along such lines have indeed been proposed by some sceptics about states of affairs (see e.g. Simons 2009). In the phenomenological tradition, Reinach favored the gerundial phrase as the canonical expression for states of affairs, and was followed in this by for example Ingarden (see Reinach 1982, 336; Ingarden 2016, 269). Historically, in Scholastic logic and grammar, the usual way to nominalize a statement involved employing accusative-infinitive constructions such as ‘*Socratem currere*’ (that Socrates runs, the running of Socrates), which were interpreted in various ways as standing for a mental or verbal statement or something in the world (see Nuchelmans 1982). A view similar to the later state-of-affairs theories—as observed for example by Smith (1992)—was defended in these medieval debates especially by Gregory of Rimini, according to whom (the fact, the circumstance) that Socrates runs (*Socratem currere*) is the ‘total significate’ (*significatum totale*) of the statement ‘Socrates runs’, and is also the kind of thing that constitutes the object of knowledge and of acts of judgment; furthermore, it is something ‘signifiable only in a complex way’ (*tantum complexe significabile*), and a ‘thing’ (*res*) or ‘entity’ (*ens*) in an extended sense relative to standard Aristotelian categories, not being either a substance or an accident (see Nuchelmans 1973, 227f).

clearly at least one among the items of which truth can be predicated, as Husserl and Bolzano both agree.<sup>285</sup> But as Husserl observes, in other cases this conception yields implausible results. On the straightforward understanding of ‘That *S* is *p* is delightful’ as predicating delightfulness of the subject matter in question, the interpretation would be that a certain proposition occasions delight in the speaker; but save for exceptional circumstances in which, say, a mathematician is delighted about a theorem holding, in which case it is indeed the ideal proposition whose validity is the topic of delight, this is surely not the case—what is delightful is rather, as Husserl puts it, something in the world, “that such and such is the case, the objective state of affairs, the fact” (LI2, 148; Hua19/1, 477). Likewise, in another example given by Husserl, in the statement ‘That rain has set in at last will delight the farmers’, the *that*-clause names what the farmers are delighted about, which is clearly not the relevant proposition but a change in weather. Since what is here named is the subject matter of the corresponding statement ‘Rain has set in at last’, Husserl concludes that this statement has for its subject matter “a *state of affairs*, which in particular is an empirical fact” (LI2, 155; Hua19/1, 491)—that is, the fact of the rain having set in as a ‘total objective correlate’ of the statement as something existing or ‘obtaining’ (*bestehend*) in the world.

It is then the simple observation that states of affairs can be named, and are indeed named in many everyday statements, that provides Husserl with a largely theory-independent basis for taking them to be objects<sup>286</sup>; and, while statements and the judgments intimated in them are not themselves name-like, it is by virtue of the possibility of rearticulating them in a nominal form that their intentional character can be made explicit.<sup>287</sup> What speaks in favor of the view considered here as the main foil to Husserl’s,

<sup>285</sup> See Bolzano 1973, 53–8; LI2, 263–6; Hua19/2, 651–5. Bolzano distinguishes between truth (*i*) as a property of propositions either asserted, thought, or ‘in themselves’, (*ii*) as the true propositions themselves, (*iii*) as judgments expressing or ‘containing’ such propositions, (*iv*) as a set of truths expressed in the singular as ‘the truth’, and in addition (*v*) the sense of the adjective ‘true’ as a synonym for ‘genuine’ or ‘real’, that is, in what Twardowski (1979) called its ‘confirming’ function.

<sup>286</sup> In this regard, Husserl’s view differs from that of at least the late-1910’s Russell, who claimed that facts cannot be named: “You can never put the sort of thing that makes a proposition to be true or false in the position of a logical subject.” (Russell 1986, 168). Russell’s main rationale here, as usual, is to avoid reference to non-existent entities, which leads him to paraphrase apparent cases of facts figuring as subjects to some in this regard less problematic form. But disallowing in this way the possibility of naming an object whose existence is already accepted, essentially by a theoretical *fiat* is implausible—it seems like an arbitrary stipulation that, supposing a statement *p* refers to a state of affairs, the phrase ‘the state of affairs to which *p* refers’ is not a name for that state of affairs and something of which predications can be made. Husserl’s more plausible view is that statements and judgments indeed differ logically from names—as Russell argues in the quoted paragraph—but they can be nominalized, and a nominalized statement refers—at least in certain cases—to the same state of affairs as the statement itself.

<sup>287</sup> Husserl gives a succinct statement of this point in a preparatory manuscript for the *Investigations*: “Is a ‘state of affairs’ an object? [...] Why it has to count as an object: here one can only point to

that a statement or judgment does not have anything for its object besides the ‘subject-object’ (*Subjektgegenstand*) about which something is stated and in addition merely ‘expresses’ or otherwise relates to a *proposition* as its logical content, is that in *some* cases the nominalized counterpart for a statement can be understood as referring to the proposition; but as Husserl argued, in other cases this interpretation is not plausibly available. Nominalized statements are then, Husserl takes it, systematically ambiguous, which ambiguity has contributed, as Husserl put it in the passage of the 1905 lectures quoted above, to previous philosophers “overlooking the object of the total representation” of statements and judgments (see HuaMat5, 122).<sup>288</sup>

Although this link between statements and their nominal counterparts is important for the purposes of justifying the view that statements refer to states of affairs, Husserl’s main interest in the *Investigations*, as noted above, is rather to emphasize *differences* between statements and names, in particular against Brentano’s program of reducing the former to the latter. Although Husserl agrees with Brentano that a name-like intentional act can have a positing quality and thus present, by itself, its object as something that exists, such acts and their linguistic counterparts—Husserl’s ‘positing names’—are not judgments or statements in the logically pertinent sense and, in particular, not *existential* judgments as Brentano would have it.<sup>289</sup> Accordingly, Husserl tries to establish that the way in which a state of affairs ‘appears’ or is presented is essentially different when making a statement or judgment whose total objective correlate that state of affairs is, and in referring to it in a name-like manner, typically as the subject of another statement. Husserl’s main claim in this regard is that the name-like reference to a state

the fact that also nominal presentations can present the same object.” (Hua40, 82) („Ist ‚Sachverhalt‘ ein Gegenstand? [...] Warum er als Gegenstand zu gelten hat: Hier kann man nur darauf hinweisen, dass nominale Vorstellungen denselben Gegenstand auch vorstellen können.“)

<sup>288</sup> See also HuaMat5, 131: “Now it is clear that the sentence in the subject-position functions on one occasion as a presentation of a judgment, as when we say, ‘That *S* is *p* is a justified judgment’, and on another as the presentation of a state of affairs, as when we say, ‘That *S* is *p* is a fact’ [...] The sentential expression in the subject-position is ambiguous.” (Nun ist es klar, dass der Satz an Subjektstelle einmal als Vorstellung des Urteils fungiert, wie wenn wir sagen: ‚Dass *S P* ist, das ist ein berechtigtes Urteil‘, und ein andermal die Vorstellung des Sachverhalts, wie wenn wir sagen: ‚Dass *S P* ist, ist eine Tatsache.‘ [...] Der Satzausdruck an Subjektstelle ist vieldentig.) Husserl typically distinguishes that-clauses as names for states of affairs and as names for judgments as acts rather than propositions; but due to the species conception of meaning, this extends to propositions as well: “Judging *about judgments* differs from judging *about states of affairs* [...] It makes no difference in this connection whether we mean by ‘judgment’ the individual act, or the proposition or judgment *qua* Species.” (LI2, 148; Hua19/1, 478; cf. HuaMat5, 130).

<sup>289</sup> See Husserl 1994, 290; Hua22, 245–6: “‘The king’, ‘this house,’ and the like, are no existential propositions, because they are not propositions *at all*, neither grammatically nor logically. They posit objects nominatively, not states of affairs assertively.” Of course, this extends also to positing names that *name* rather than *assert* states of affairs: the name ‘that the rain has set in’ is not the statement ‘the rain has set in’.



of affairs is derived from that of a straightforward judgment, and is a phenomenon that in paradigmatic cases involves turning one's attention to a state of affairs of which a judgment or statement has already been made: in naming a state of affairs it is presented in a manner that requires its being already available for conscious regard as a 'completed' object, whereas in predication the appearance of the state of affairs is built up in steps, the outcome of which is the intentional reference that can subsequently be articulated in a nominal form.

The kind of contrast that Husserl draws between the way a state of affairs is set up as an intentional object in, respectively, a predicative judgment or statement and in a nominal counterpart for one is perhaps more readily apparent in a different but related phenomenon—in thinking about, or generally presenting in conscious experience, *collections* or *multiplicities* of objects. As Husserl observes, a collection of any given objects *A*, *B*, and *C* can be thought about and referred to in two principal ways, which may be characterized respectively as a *plural* and a *collective* reference.<sup>290</sup> On the *one* hand, one can think of the collection in the way linguistically expressed by combining the names for those objects pairwise by 'and', in the form '*A and B and C*'. Here, what the whole phrase refers to is indeed the collection of those objects, but this reference is built up in steps, in the sequence of acts referring to each of the objects: the named objects are as it were collected together by the two instances of the conjunction in a form in which they can make up the composite subject-term of a single plural predication of the form '*A and B and C are p*'.<sup>291</sup> Husserl also calls a predication of this kind 'distributive' (*distributiv*): in a plural predication, the predicate distributes over the elements combined in the subject-position. On the *other* hand, the collection can be thought and named collectively as *one* thing, in the form 'the collection of *A*, *B*, and *C*'. Here, what is referred to is the same collection of objects, but the reference is set up differently: the collection itself is named, and the former conjunctive phrase serves only to determine the content of the name. In this case, when the phrase is put in the subject-position of a categorical statement, the predicate applies to the collection itself rather than distributing over its

<sup>290</sup> See e.g. HuaMatI, 99; 194; HuaMat5, 153; Hua24, 75; 306.

<sup>291</sup> See HuaMat5, 153–4. Husserl rejects the understanding of a plural predicative statement such as '*S<sub>1</sub> and S<sub>2</sub> are p*' as consisting of a conjunction of statements, as in the equivalent composite statement '*S<sub>1</sub> is p and S<sub>2</sub> is p*'. In Husserl's view, 'and' is not exclusively a sentential connective, as for example Frege viewed it (see Frege 1984, 393), but can connect expressions belonging to various categories and occupying different positions in a statement—for example in the converse case to the former, '*S is p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub>*', in which two adjectives are combined in the predicate-position and thereby two predications are made of the subject in a single statement. Plural predication is not separately discussed in the first edition of the *Investigations*, but a passage added to the second makes note of it, precisely in connection to the presentation of collections (see LI2, 160–1; Hua19/1, 501–2).

elements; in saying that the collection has three elements, it is the collection, not the elements, of which this holds. Furthermore, whereas in the former case, the collection appeared in a ‘stepwise’ manner and only in the sense of being the total correlate of the unified sequence of acts relating to its elements, in this latter case, the collection is presented as an object of its own, and as it were as the *finished product* of such a sequence, as the outcome of ‘collecting’ the elements together.

A similar relation obtains, Husserl argues, between a predicative judgment or statement and a corresponding nominal expression such as a that-clause: the state of affairs referred to is the same, but the intentional relation is set up in a structurally different way. In making a judgment or statement, the state of affairs appears similarly to the way the collection appeared in the case of simply ‘collecting’ the individual objects together in the successive construction of the conjunctive phrase—that is, in individual steps in which the objects making up the state of affairs are successively referred to.<sup>292</sup> Conversely, in naming a state of affairs—as in the collective reference to a collection of objects—the reference is made directly to *it* rather than the objects making it up, and it appears as it were ‘in one blow’ (*in einem Schlag*) rather than the reference being built up in steps.<sup>293</sup> In this regard, Husserl observes, nominal counterparts for statements have the same kind of affinity to *perception* as all names do: “Just as the object in a straightforward percept directly confronts us (*uns direkt gegenübergesetzt ist*), so too does the state of affairs in the act which names it” (LI2, 290; Hua19/2, 686; cf. LI2, 148; Hua19/1, 478).<sup>294</sup> In predication, the state of affairs figures as the total objective correlate of the

<sup>292</sup> See LI2, 155–6; Hua19/1, 491: “In the straightforward statement (*Aussage*) we judge about the rain, and about its having set in: both are in a pregnant sense objective to us, *presented*. But we do not enact a mere sequence of presentations, but a *judgement*, a peculiar ‘unity of consciousness’, that binds these together. In this binding together the consciousness of the *state of affairs* is constituted”. Clearly, Husserl’s contrast here is not between any sequence of acts and a judgment but between a ‘mere succession’ (*bloße Nacheinander*) of otherwise disconnected acts and a unified complex act accomplished in steps that are themselves intentional acts.

<sup>293</sup> This analogy of naming states of affairs with the ‘collective’ reference to a collection is made more straightforward by Husserl’s view that when ‘that *S* is *p*’ names a state of affairs, the appropriate explicit rendering of its meaning is ‘the fact that *S* is *p*’ (*die Tatsache daß S P ist*) (see LI2, 156; Hua19/1, 493). Here, the whole phrase is clearly a name of a fact or state of affairs which is the object referred, usually in a ‘positing’ manner, and the that-clause only serves to determine the content of that name.

<sup>294</sup> In the second edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl assigns nominalized statements, like perceptions, to the class of ‘single-rayed’ (*einstrahlige*) acts and statements to ‘many-rayed’ (*mehrstrahlige*) acts (see e.g. LI2, 156; Hua19/1, 491). Husserl is not entirely consistent in the use of this terminology: in this part of the Fifth Investigation, nominalized statements are classified as ‘one-rayed’ on the syntactic basis that they are *names*, that is, fit for the subject-position of a statement without modification; but in other places, Husserl treats the distinction as synonymous with the distinction between simple and complex, or ‘articulated’ (*gegliederte*) and ‘unarticulated’ (*ungegliederte*) acts and meanings—for example, in the second-edition Fourth Investigation, Husserl classifies the meanings of proper names as single-rayed but ‘explicative’ names of the form ‘the *S* which is *p*’ as many-rayed (LI2, 52; Hua19/1, 308; cf. LI2,

complex act—which claim, as seen above, Husserl principally based on the possibility of articulating the same subject matter in nominal form—but is not separately ‘presented’ for itself. What is presented and posited—that is, made intentionally objective in positing objectifying acts—in the judgment are the subject and what is predicated of it, and the state of affairs makes its appearance only as the unity pointed to by the fact that the relevant objects are conceived of in the correlative functions of subject and predicate. Husserl gives a concise characterization of the contrast between statements and their nominalizations in a preparatory manuscript for the *Investigations*:

In the nominal presentation the state of affairs is so to say a finished object, it is presented as a unitary object, and now the whole presentation is the foundation for a simple positing. In predication, the presentation and positing are constituted stepwise. Instead of a presentation with a similarly simple positing, we have steps of positing coinciding with steps of presentation. (Hua20/2, 330)<sup>295</sup>

The primitive intentional reference to a state of affairs is therefore, Husserl argues, something that has to be set up in distinct, successive and interrelated steps, and the unified reference to that state of affairs is the outcome of carrying out the whole predicative sequence. A nominal reference to a state of affairs, on the other hand, is derivative of the former in the sense that in it the state of affairs is already presupposed as a ‘finished’ object.<sup>296</sup> The kind of situation in which names for states of affairs find their paradigmatic use is therefore in Husserl’s view one in which a judgment or statement has already been made, and the state of affairs has thereby already been made available as an object to which one can simply turn one’s attention and make further statements directly concerning it; in these further statements, the state of affairs is then not only set up as an intentional object but figures as a logical subject or as a term in a relation.<sup>297</sup>

161; Hua19/1, 502). But on the syntactic criterion, an explicative name would count as a perfectly well-behaving name and therefore should be classified as single-rayed on that criterion; on the other hand, if explicative names are counted as many-rayed, then Husserl’s distinction between nominal and propositional acts—a centerpiece of his criticism of Brentano—becomes blurred.

<sup>295</sup> „In der nominalen Vorstellung ist der Sachverhalt sozusagen fertiger Gegenstand, er wird als einheitlicher Gegenstand vorgestellt, und nun ist diese ganze Vorstellung Grundlage einer einfachen Setzung. In der Prädikation konstituiert sich die Vorstellung und Setzung schrittweise. Statt Vorstellung mit gleichmäßig einfach Setzung haben wir Schritte der Setzung deckend mit Schritten der Vorstellung.“

<sup>296</sup> See LI2, 290; Hua19/2, 686: “The gradual constitution (*allmähliche Konstitution*) of the [state of affairs] has been completed, as a finished object it becomes a term in a relation”. Cf. HuaMat5, 132: “If on the other hand we say, ‘the fact that *S* is *p*’, this fact stands objectively before our eyes as the completed product of predication; the state of affairs that was first constituted stepwise in predication stands there as completely constituted, and now becomes the object-about-which (*Gegenstand-worüber*) of a new statement and predication”. ( „Sagen wir andererseits: ‚die Tatsache, dass *S P* ist‘; steht diese Tatsache als fertiges Ergebnis der Prädikation uns gegenständlich vor Augen; der Sachverhalt, der sich in der Prädikation schrittweise erst konstituierte, steht als fertig konstituierter da, und nun wird er in einem neuen Aussagen, Prädizieren zum Gegenstand-worüber.“.) See also Hua40, 129–131.

<sup>297</sup> This kind of situation is the one that Husserl uses to illustrate and analyze the difference between

This kind of situation is clearly closely connected with what was, in a previous section, shown to be the natural environment of *assenting* (*zustimmende*) or *accepting* (*aner kennende*) judgments: also in that case, the relevant factor in the situation was in Husserl's view a previously made judgment that provides in a way the occasion for the relevant intentional act. It was previously argued that assenting judgments are in Husserl's view *relational* judgments that involve an awareness of the agreement of a judgment with the relevant facts of the matter. This can now be formulated more precisely in the framework just outlined. An assenting judgment in Husserl's sense is an instance of a state of affairs figuring as a term in a relation, which, as Husserl has just been seen to argue, involves articulating the reference to that state of affairs in a nominal, name-like form; this is reflected also in the grammatical structure of the statements that Husserl took to express in explicit form the assent given to a judgment, such as 'The judgment that *S* is *p* agrees with the facts', where 'the facts' is a name for the relevant state of affairs. A nominal presentation of a state of affairs is, then, a constituent in the circumstances from which an assenting judgment can arise; and assenting judgments are, as to their intentional structure, a special case of acts in which a state of affairs, conceived in a nominal manner, is taken to stand in a relation.

This connection with the discussion of assenting judgments now naturally leads to the long-postponed topic of what Husserl called 'straightforward' (*schlichte*) judgments and contrasted with assent and dissent in the proper sense. A straightforward judgment, in the case Husserl considers as basic, involves the articulation in a subject-predicate form of a perceived object and some of its perceptual characteristics. Following the views extensively treated above, the resulting experience is a positing propositional act, built upon perceptual experiences, which are themselves positing acts, and the object of this resulting act is a state of affairs with the perceived object and its characteristics as its constituents. It is then, according to Husserl, and as already held by Plato and Aristotle, *predication* that forms the essential function of acts of judging. Furthermore, Husserl argues that the structure of a predicative judgment in a sense 'grows from' and is based on the structure of perceptual experience. These ideas form the topic of the next, final section of this chapter.

a predicative and nominal reference to a state of affairs in the Fifth Investigation: "It sometimes happens that we first assert something absolutely, and then proceed to name the state of affairs: 'Rain has at last set in. That will delight the farmers.'" (LI2, 155; Hua19/I, 491).

#### 3.4.4 *The perceptual roots of predication*

In addition to drawing this contrast between a nominal and a predicative or propositional reference to a state of affairs, Husserl undertakes in the Sixth Logical Investigation a closer analysis of the intentional nature of predication, and the way a state of affairs ‘appears’ in carrying out the unified sequence of acts making up a predicative judgment, by means of *another* contrast—that between *perceiving* an object and predicating something of it in a *perceptual judgment*. In this regard, Husserl’s main interests are, *first*, to characterize more precisely the sense in which propositional acts such as predicative judgments are founded or higher-order acts whose intentional reference differs from and is dependent on other acts of which they are composed; and *second*, to give an account of the relation between the founded and the founding acts. On both points, Husserl’s argument relies on a descriptive analysis of certain features of ordinary perceptual experience. On the first point, Husserl contrasts the complexity of a founded act with various kinds of complexity present in perceptual experience. On the second point, Husserl argues that the element of a perceptual judgment by means of which the formal structure of the state of affairs—that is, its *categorical unity*—is set up as part of its objective correlate is in a sense already present in our perceptual relations to objects. Below, this latter point gives occasion to discuss Husserl’s view of the role of the *copula*—the formal, connective element in the corresponding ideal proposition—in a categorical perceptual judgment and the way its contribution to the intentional reference of the whole predicative judgment is based on perceptual experience.

The difference between perception and predicative judgment on which Husserl focuses is perhaps best approached by recalling certain features of Husserl’s broader theory of complex acts. As was seen above in the general outline of that theory, a complex intentional act is one whose intentional reference is founded on other acts: the acts are combined in such a way that the resulting whole is itself an intentional act. The connective elements that bind acts together, according to Husserl’s even more general part-whole theory, are non-independent moments which, for their part, are *internally* related to their complements and could not exist without them, rather than being externally connected to those complementing parts by further connective elements. If an intentional act is complex in this sense, its intentional reference can only obtain together with part-acts that take up characteristic intentional functions in the resulting whole. Such functions, it was previously argued, are assigned to those acts by the connective forms: for instance, two names or nominal acts ‘A’ and ‘B’ take up the functions of

presenting their objects as elements of a collection in being bound together by the connective ‘and’. In this way, a reference to the collection is set up, and such reference could not obtain without elements so combined. Thinking of a collection in this plural or distributive way is, then, essentially a *founded act* (*fundierte Akt*) or an ‘act of a higher level’ (*Akt höherer Stufe*) necessarily built on acts of a ‘lower level’ in a hierarchy of founded and founding acts (see LI2, 282; HuaI9/2, 674). The case of a predicative judgment is somewhat more involved, but laying the details aside for now, such judgments are likewise founded acts that require part-acts that present something as the subject of which something is predicated and something as what is predicated of it; without these elements combined in the appropriate way, the predicative reference to a state of affairs could not obtain.

In contradistinction to such acts, Husserl argues that perception is a ‘straightforward’ (*schlichte*) intentional act—or an act of single ‘act-level’ (*Aktstufe*)—and that its intentional relation to its object is therefore not in this way founded on other acts (see LI2, 282; HuaI9/2, 674). A correct understanding of Husserl’s account of this contrast between founded and straightforward acts requires turning to certain elements of Husserl’s analysis of perception, which elements then furthermore serve as important conceptual material in the closer descriptive characterization of perceptual judgment. As Husserl observes, we perceive various kinds of objects that exhibit even from an abstract point of view notable differences: we perceive, among other things, concrete *things*, their sensible *characteristics*, and *processes* in which they are in one way or another involved.<sup>298</sup> However, among such categorial variety among possible objects of percep-

<sup>298</sup> See for example Husserl’s sampling of various perceived objects in the 1904–5 lectures on perception: “I see a house, I see the flight of a bird, the falling of leaves, I see also the color of the house, the form of the roof, the movement-pattern of the leaf, I hear the rustling of trees, I hear the tone of a violin, or a melody, I also hear the singer or the violin perform the melody, and likewise in the other so-called ‘senses’. We perceive things at rest and determinations of things, we perceive also changes and movements, in short, processes.” („Ich sehe ein Haus, ich sehe das Auffliegen eines Vogels, das Fallen der Blätter, ich sehe auch die Farbe des Hauses, die Gestalt des Daches, die Bewegungsform des Blatters, ich höre das Rauschen der Bäume, ich höre einen Geigenton oder eine Melodie, bzw. ich höre die Sängerin oder den Geiger die Melodie vortragen, und ebenso bei den anderen so genannten ‚Sinnen‘. Wir nehmen ruhende Dinge wahr und Bestimmtheiten der Dinge, wir nehmen auch Veränderungen, Bewegungen wahr, kurzweg Vorgänge.“) (Hua38, 8). The inclusion of hearing a singer perform a piece of music in this list is somewhat curious, since Husserl clearly intends the list to include only different forms of sense-perception and not propositionally articulated perceptual judgments such as ‘That singer is singing that melody’. What Husserl has in mind is presumably an idea to the effect that just like visually perceived actions are seen as moments of a perceived acting person, auditively perceived actions such as singing are heard as wholes in which the agent is somehow involved—we hear the singer ‘in’ the singing. On this interpretation, the case in question would not be a predicative perceptual judgment but what might be called the auditory explication of an ‘agential’ moment in the perceived object—the singing—which is presumably a species of the genus, perception of objects as involved in processes.

tion, a case reasonably considered as paradigmatic is nonetheless that of concrete things such as the three-dimensional material objects that we encounter in—although not exclusively in—visual perception. Such objects generally exhibit various sensible characteristics organized in more or less complex ways, or have many ‘constitutive properties’ (*konstitutive Eigenschaften*) that determine them as objects of such and such kind (see LI2, 283; HuaI9/2, 676). Now, a defining characteristic of perception, Husserl argues, is that all such constitutive properties—insofar as they are indeed constitutive of what the object is perceived as—have to figure in some way in the perceptual experience: perception “purports to grasp the object itself; its ‘grasping’ must therefore reach to all its constituents in and with the whole object” (LI2, 287; HuaI9/2, 682). Among such constituents of the perceived object are clearly, in the first place, those features that are visible and attended to, but also the currently occluded sides of an opaque object, and furthermore, those features in the visible side that contribute to what the object is perceived as but are not attentively singled out in the perception.<sup>299</sup> With some reservations, the perception of the whole object can be understood as being ‘composed’ of the awareness of each of such constitutive features. However, Husserl argues that the whole perception is not properly speaking a complex built up of parts whose intentional references would be prior to the whole. Instead, one primarily sees the whole object, and its sensible parts and features are only ‘implicitly given’ (*implizite gegeben*) in the sense that they figure in the perceptual experience as something that can be *explicated* by attending to them specifically. Even when this is done, Husserl notes, the perception is not as it were ‘split’ (*zersplittert*) into various unrelated experiences. Rather, the explicated features are seen in the whole object (see LI2, 284, 286; HuaI9/2, 677, 680)—that is, such ‘explicating’ (*explizierende*) perception is still a way of perceptually relating to the same object, only in a different manner.<sup>300</sup>

<sup>299</sup> The precise sense in which the consciousness of occluded sides figures in perceptual experience without having a direct basis in sensation need not be considered here; it was the subject of extensive descriptive analyses of ‘empty intentions’ (*Leerintentionen*) that Husserl undertook especially during his attempts in 1913 to revise the Sixth Investigation for its second-edition publication (see Hua20/1, 85ff) and revisited for instance in his 1920’s lectures on ‘transcendental logic’ (see HuaII, 7f). It suffices to point out here that if one sees an object *as* three-dimensional and some of its sides are occluded, then the perceptual experience necessarily involves some kind of consciousness of those unseen sides; likewise, seeing a side of an object as a side presupposes the existence of the three-dimensional thing (see e.g. Hua38, 28–9). Mulligan (1995) provides a detailed and insightful account of Husserl’s early analyses of perception that includes a concise overview of alternatives that Husserl rejects on this point: *first*, understanding the consciousness of the currently unseen sides as *expecting* to see them; *second*, explaining it in terms of *judgment*, for instance judging that there is a unique three-dimensional object to which the seen side belongs; and *third*, taking the unseen sides to be something *imagined* alongside the perception.

<sup>300</sup> Husserl considered the common objection that moments such as colors cannot be perceived and only colored objects can, already in the 1896 paper titled “*Psychologische Untersuchungen zur elementaren*

Husserl summarizes these observations by saying that every perception is “a web of partial intentions, fused (*verschmolzen*) together in the unity of a single total intention” (LI2, 211; Hua19/2, 574). In the Sixth Investigation, the closer analysis of what is involved in this ‘fusion’ (*Verschmelzung*)<sup>301</sup> serves both as a means for characterizing more precisely the ‘straightforward’ nature of perception and as a basis for the account of perceptual judgment. The kind of phenomenon Husserl has in mind is most clearly observed when considering perception not as a momentary act but as a temporally extended state; indeed, as Husserl notes in his 1904–5 lectures on perception, the idea of a perception without a duration is an abstraction from enduring perception (see Hua38, 63). Even the limiting case of a simply enduring perception in which nothing changes—either in the perceptual circumstances or in the perceived object—can be considered as a whole that admits of segmentation into independent temporal parts, each of which would itself be a perception. On the other hand, there is clearly a sense in which the perception is *not* in fact so segmented, but rather forms a single experience that is simply extended in time. Likewise, in looking at an object successively from various sides, there is a continuous series of perceptions that together make up a whole, so that the latter can be understood as a ‘composite’ perception. Still, as in the case of a perception that endures without change, the whole perceptual series in an important respect again

*Logik*” in the context of seeking a definition of the concept ‘intuition’ (*Anschauung*); there, Husserl rejected such “preference of the concrete over the abstract” on the basis that the concept-pairs *concrete-abstract* and *independent-dependent* do not belong in the definition of the concept of intuition (see Hua22, 106–7; Husserl 1994, 152–3). Husserl also provides as a diagnosis underlying the objection the traditional conflation of the two senses of ‘abstractness’ as *dependence* and as *ideality*; this diagnosis is then repeated in the Second Logical Investigation (see *ibid.*, cf. LI2, 308–9; Hua19/1, 218–20). For an overview of Husserl’s views about perceiving various kinds of dependent moments, see Mulligan 1995.

<sup>301</sup> Husserl took up the notion of ‘fusion’, as he notes in the Third Investigation, from Stumpf’s descriptive-psychological analyses, especially those pursued in the latter’s 1883/90 *Tonpsychologie* (see LI2, 15; Hua19/1, 249). ‘Fusion’ (*Verschmelzung*) was initially introduced by Stumpf as one of elementary relations between ‘absolute contents’ (*absolute Inhalte*) of consciousness—that is, sensations—among three others, ‘multiplicity’ (*Mehrheit*), ‘increase’ (*Steigerung*), and ‘similarity’ (*Ähnlichkeit*) (see Stumpf 1883, 96). In the second volume of the work, Stumpf considered particularly the manner in which tones separated by certain intervals—especially an octave—become ‘fused’ so that the tones are no longer simply self-contained individuals but something that admit only an ‘imperfect’ separation; Stumpf argued that this effects an intrinsic change in the ‘sensational material’ (*Empfindungsmaterial*) of perception rather being an incidental change that could for example be overcome by attention (see Stumpf 1890, 127). The phenomenon is then generalized as a basis for unifying elements of conscious experience in general, as “the relation between two contents [ . . . ] whereby they make up not a mere sum but a whole” (*„dasjenige Verhältnis zweier Inhalte [ . . . ] wonach sie nicht eine blosse Summe sondern ein Ganzes bilden“*) (*ibid.*, 128), and connected with the notion of ‘interpenetration’ (*Durchdringung*) that, as previously seen, Husserl took up as a characterization of non-independent moments (see *ibid.*, 130). Stumpf’s notion of fusion and the example of hearing simultaneous tones at a consonant interval, for their part, originate in Aristotle’s discussion in *De Sensu* of the possibility of perceiving multiple objects simultaneously; Aristotle concludes that a complex perception of many objects is possible, in which the objects ‘blend together’ (*μύγνυνται*) and thereby form a unity (*ἥν*), which according to Aristotle presupposes that the things have contrary properties such as the different pitches in two tones (see *Sens.* VII, 447a–b).



simply extends temporally the perception of the object: “Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see *this book*.” (LI2, 284; Hua19/2, 677).<sup>302</sup>

Two important characteristics can be gathered from these considerations, these being the ones that Husserl attempts to capture by the notion of ‘fusion’. *First*, these temporally extended perceptual experiences *have* temporal parts that could be considered as independent perceptions on their own, but the parts are not experienced as distinct intentional acts but are phenomenally *continuous* with one another. *Secondly*, the continuity in question is an enduring consciousness of one and the same object, a consciousness of *identity*—or rather, a continuous perceptual identification (LI2, 285; Hua9/2, 678). What the ‘fusion’ of the parts in a normal case of perceptual experience amounts to, then, is a phenomenally unbroken consciousness as of an identical object.<sup>303</sup> The priority of perceiving the whole object during the whole series of observing it from various sides provides Husserl with a basis for contrasting more clearly the ‘straightforward’ nature of perception with founded acts: even when perception can be considered

<sup>302</sup> In the 1904–5 lectures, Husserl discusses various types of ‘composite’ (*zusammengesetzte*) perceptions: *first*, simply enduring perception; *second*, the successive perception of an object from various sides; *third*, the perceptual explication of parts and moments in the object; and *fourth*, the perception of ‘complexions’ (*Komplexionen*) such as flocks of birds that are seen as multiplicities of objects—rather than simply wholes with parts—united by intuitive characteristics such as similarity and spatial proximity (Hua38, 63–7). In *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl famously discussed the last type in connection with the theory of the so-called ‘figural moments’ (*Gestaltmomente*) by virtue of which multiplicities can be grasped without counting the elements separately (see Hua12, 203f).

<sup>303</sup> Husserl discusses phenomenal continuity and discontinuity specifically in the Third Investigation, in the context of drawing a distinction between intuitively *separated* (*gesonderte*) and ontologically *independent* elements of what is perceived—and, correspondingly, between intuitively *fused* and *non-independent* ones—which are easily confused with one another. As Husserl notes, ontological independence need not involve phenomenal separateness: for instance, a part of a uniformly colored surface is an independent piece, but not intuitively separable in the perception of the surface (see LI2, 14; Hua19/1, 247–8). Husserl distinguishes phenomenal continuity from the exact mathematical sense of continuity and discontinuity (see LI2, 15; Hua19/1, 248) and makes several general observations about the preconditions for a phenomenal discontinuity between two intuitively presented elements, using the case of discontinuities of color on a surface as the primary example. A phenomenal discontinuity—between, say, adjacent black and white squares on a checkerboard surface—depends, Husserl argues, on a ‘context of covering’ (*Deckungszusammenhang*), which involves an internal relation between moments of color and spatial extent on the surface: the surface has a continuously segmentable spatial extent, and every segmentation of it produces pieces, each of which has its moment of color that is ontologically dependent on the piece—in a word, the color ‘covers’ (*deckt*) the extent. A discontinuity of color further requires a phenomenal ‘distance’ (*Abstand*) between two moments of color (as it were, a distance in a ‘color space’). The discontinuity can arise only because of the continuous nature of the spatial extent that is ‘covered’; and, Husserl observes, such discontinuities obtain primarily between not the *colors* but the ‘concreta’, in this case colored parts of the surface—in the checkerboard case, what we see are discontinuities between white and black squares. As a contrasting case, two simultaneous tones—say, a perfect fifth apart—have a certain phenomenal ‘distance’, but they lack the covering relation to adjacent parts of a continuous extent, so they are not in this sense discontinuous; conversely, a single tone that suddenly changes in pitch would count as a case of phenomenal discontinuity because such ‘covering’ obtains between the moments of pitch and parts of the temporal extent of the sound. See LI2, 15–17; Hua19/1, 248–52.

as being ‘composed’ in this way of parts that are themselves intentional acts, the intentional reference of the whole does not differ in essence from that of the parts. Both the series considered as a whole and its parts considered on their own are perceptions of the same object, and the whole series is furthermore experienced as one continuous, temporally extended experience rather than as a sequence of discontinuous experiences of that object, as when the same object is seen in separate instances over a period of time. There is, then, no difference in ‘act-level’ between the ‘composite’ perception and its parts: no new type of intentional reference is set up that could not obtain without underlying acts (see LI2, 284–5; Hua19/2, 678).<sup>304</sup>

This analysis of the ‘fusion’ of partial perceptions in a single perceptual experience can now further be made use of in clarifying the way a founded intentional reference to a state of affairs is set up in a ‘stepwise’ manner in a perceptual judgment on the basis of the underlying perception. The unity characteristic of a temporally extended perception, as Husserl argued, is a ‘unity of identification’ (*Einheit der Identifizierung*); but the intentional object of the perceptual experience throughout its temporal phases is simply the perceived concrete thing and not in addition a relation of identity (see LI2, 285; Hua9/2, 678). The situation is then of the kind that was already previously discussed in a previous section, in the context of considering the role of identification in the fulfillment of an ‘intention’ in Husserl’s broad sense. It was pointed out in that context that every perceptual fulfillment of an intention—for instance, the fulfillment of an expectation in perceiving what was expected—involves identifying what is ‘intended’ and what is perceived; but, it is nonetheless in the basic case only the perceived thing or event that plays the role of an object in the ‘fulfilling’ experience. Husserl called the relation that obtains between the acts involved in an experience of this kind a ‘coincidence’ (*Deckung*) of the respective intentional matters—the acts ‘coincide’ in terms of what they refer to intentionally and as what they refer to it—which coinciding is in such cases ‘experienced’ or ‘lived through’ (*erlebt*) but it does not play an objectifying role in setting up an intentional relation of its own. Rather, the coinciding of the intentional acts as it were informs the way the perceived object figures in the experience. Now, essentially the same holds already *within* perceptual experience itself: there is a

<sup>304</sup> See LI2, 284; Hua19/2, 678: “In the continuous running on of individual percepts we continuously perceive the single, selfsame object. Can we now call this continuous percept, since it is built out of individual percepts, a percept *founded* upon them? It is of course founded upon them in the sense in which a whole is founded on its parts, not however in the sense here relevant, according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character, grounded in the act-characters that underlie it and unthinkable apart from these.”

continuously identifying consciousness that informs the sense of what is perceived in that the object is not merely the same ‘as a matter of fact’, but is perceived *as* the same throughout the experience or throughout its changing profiles. Perceptual experience is not in the basic case indiscriminate as to the identity of the object, but purports to present a selfsame object throughout the course of the experience.

Conversely, in a perceptual *judgment of identity* founded on such circumstances—that is, in seeing an object and making a judgment that could be expressed in the statement ‘This object is the same I saw before’—one does not merely identify the perceived object as the same in this way. Instead, on the basis of the perception a different intentional reference is set up—namely, a propositionally articulated reference to the *state of affairs* that the object that was initially perceived *is* the object still perceptually present. In this case, the identity of the object does not only inform the perceptual relation to that object, but figures as a formal constituent of a state of affairs—namely, as the unifying *categorical form* of that state of affairs (see e.g. LI2, 303; Hua19/2, 707). Nonetheless, the judgment clearly has an intimate, internal connection to the perceptual experiences on which it is based: in a sense, it simply renders objective, in a claim explicitly bearing on it, a feature already constitutive of the straightforward perceptual relation to an object—that is, the purported sameness of the thing perceived. Accordingly, Husserl draws the conclusion that in such judgments, the element by means of which the categorial unity of the state of affairs is set up as an intentional object is the relation of ‘coincidence’ that, in the descriptive analyses outlined above, was found as a constituent of the continuous perceptual experience. In the judgment, the coincidence is not merely ‘lived through’, but instead the identity of the perceived object is specifically established as an intentional object on its basis:

Identity itself is now made objective, the moment of coincidence linking our act-characters with one another, serves as *representative content for a new percept, founded upon* our articulated individual percepts. This brings to intentional awareness that what we now see and what we saw before are one and the same. (LI2, 285; Hua19/2, 679)

However, in the account given of the structure of a simple categorial proposition in a previous section, it was not propositions of identity but *name-copula-adjective* propositions that were treated as the central case. Within such propositions, as was shown above, Husserl discerned a structural hierarchy with a top-level syntactic articulation into a nominal meaning functioning as a subject and a ‘full predicate’; the latter was then divided into an abstractly separable copula as a formal, connective element and a ‘predicate-concept’, typically an ‘adjectival’ meaning in a broad sense that Husserl ap-

pears to have considered as including also the meanings of verbs, or rather uninflected verb stems such as ‘sit’ in ‘Theaetetus sits’. Accordingly, in the Sixth Investigation, Husserl extends the above analysis of the relation between perceptual experience and a perceptual judgment founded on it to judgments expressing or instantiating propositions of this form. This is done by considering in more detail the special kind of perceptual ‘fusion’ that takes place in the perceptual *explication* of a perceptible feature—in particular, a dependent moment such as a color—that is already ‘implicitly given’ in the perception of the whole object.

As was noted above, attentively singling out such features in an object—for example by specifically considering the color of the object—is still a way of perceptually relating to the same object: the phenomenal continuity of the perceptual experience is not broken in the explication, and the explicated features are not “torn out of the total appearance (*Gesamterscheinung*)” of the object but rather seen ‘in’ the object (LI2, 287; Hua19/2, 682).<sup>305</sup> Following the above analysis, this means that the initial perception of the whole object and the latter ‘particular perception’ (*Sonderwahrnehmung*) of one of its parts or moments are in a characteristic manner ‘fused’ into a single, continuous perceptual experience of one and the same object. On the other hand, here the relevant relation cannot be understood strictly speaking as an identification, since the object is not *identical* with the feature present in it, and so the two experiences do not directly ‘coincide’ as to their intentional matters. Instead, there is only a *partial* identity between the perceived object and what is attended to in explicatively singling out, for example, its color—the explicated feature is part of, and therefore identical with something in the object.

Husserl articulates this point by relying on the idea that the content of a perception of an object can be viewed as though it were composed of separate intentional acts individually relating to each of the constitutive features of the object. As noted above, such partial perceptions are properly speaking not distinct parts but only ‘implicit’ in the straightforward perception. Nonetheless, Husserl takes it that a perception can in

<sup>305</sup> Cf. HuaMat5, 143: “I see a piece of chalk and live in the perceiving. [...] I can likewise, purely on the basis of the intuition grasp the chalk, and on the chalk the moment of white. I initially regard the chalk as a whole, then the moment of white. But not only this: both intuitions in a certain manner enter into a unity. The intuition of chalk does not fall away when I grasp the white; the chalk still stands before me in intuition as an object and the white appears *on it*.” („*Ich sehe ein Stück Kreide und lebe im Wahrnehmen. [...] Ich kann ebenso rein aufgrund der Anschauung erfassen die Kreide, an der Kreide das Moment der Weiße. Ich achte zunächst auf die Kreide im Ganzen, dann auf das Moment der Weiße. Aber nicht nur das: Beide Anschauungen kommen in gewisser Weise zur Einheit. Die Kreideanschauung ist nicht fortgefallen, während ich das Weißerfasse; immer noch steht mir anschaulich der Gegenstand Kreide da und an ihm erscheint das Weiß.*“)

a certain sense be ‘analyzed’ into part-acts and taken as a whole composed of them. For instance, in the perception of a red-tiled roof, there are various such partial intentions directed at the independent parts and dependent moments of the roof such as, respectively, the individual tiles and their shapes and colors. An explicative perception directed at some of those parts and moments then coincides as to its intentional matter with some of these partial intentions implicit in the perception of the whole object (see LI2, 214; Hua19/2, 579). Husserl calls the relation that obtains between the respective acts in this kind of partial identification a relation of ‘integration’ or ‘subsumption’ (*Einordnung*), a relation that integrates or “subsumes the part in the whole” (*ibid*).<sup>306</sup> In this kind of perceptual explication, which starts from perceiving the whole object and then singles out some of its perceptible characteristics, those characteristics are, as Husserl put it, seen ‘in’ the object—or better, in the case of color, seen *on* it. What this explicative seeing-on involves, then, is a partially identifying perceptual consciousness of, for example, a singled-out color and the colored object, and the phenomenally continuous unity of the perceptual experience is again a form of ‘fusion’ by virtue of the consciousness that the whole object, to which the color belongs, is the same throughout the experience.

These characteristics of perceptual explication now relate, Husserl argues, to a perceptual judgment of the name–copula–adjective form in an analogous way to how the judgment of identity related to the temporally persisting perception in the previous case. Here, it is instructive to first consider in somewhat more detail some elements in Husserl’s analyses of the performance of a categorical judgment as a complex act carried out in ‘steps’ and the way in which its structure relates to the corresponding ideal proposition, as previously sketched out. In a perceptual judgment that could be expressed linguistically in a categorical statement such as ‘That roof is red’, a founded intentional reference to a state of affairs is set up—as previously seen—in the way in which the subject and the predicate are combined into a unified judgment, a positing propositional act. The judgment is carried out, and its intentional reference built up, as Husserl argued, in an essentially ‘stepwise’ manner. Husserl further claims that these

<sup>306</sup> The term ‘subsumption’ is not very fitting here, since it invites the idea of subsuming an object under a general concept, whereas as seen here, what Husserl has in mind is a phenomenon that pertains to simply attentively singling out features in a perceived object, which is not—at any rate, not on Husserl’s view—a matter of conceptualization. In his 1896 lectures, Husserl specifically uses the term ‘*Subsumtion*’ for the subsumption of objects under concepts, and separates it from the *subordination* (*Subordination*) of concepts under other concepts (see HuaMat1, 128–9), perhaps under the influence of Frege, who often emphasized the logical importance of this distinction and complained that the linguistic subject–predicate schema obscures it (see e.g. Frege 1980, 100–101).

steps in the carrying out of the judgment correspond more or less directly with the basic syntactic articulation of the proposition expressed—that is, the bipartite division into a subject and a full predicate:

[J]udgment in its primitive and simple form first of all posits *S*; and upon the basis of that posit, intended to assign to the object the status of something existing, the supplementary and non-independent act “is *p*” is carried out. (Husserl 1994, 229; Hua22, 184)

This latter act of ‘predication’—here understood not as the whole carrying out of a predicative judgment but as the intentional ‘step’ corresponding to the full predicate—is by its nature non-independent in the sense that it could not be performed on its own, outside the unity of the judgment: predication requires something of which the predication is to be made.<sup>307</sup> Likewise, within the dependent act of predication in this sense, one can abstractly separate the intentional act expressed in the predicate-concept ‘*p*’—in the example above, ‘red’. The object of this act is, however, not presented as a second, independent object beside the subject, but as something ‘belonging’ (*zukommende*) to that subject—for instance, as the moment of red ‘on’ the roof.<sup>308</sup> In the act of predication—specifically, in the kind of predication of something ‘adjectival’ that is here in question—one can then notionally distinguish the idea of non-independence, relative to the subject, of the predicated characteristics and their ‘predicative belonging’ (*prädikative Zukommen*) to it. As Husserl argues, these two are reflected, respectively, in the ‘adjectival form’ of the presentation—the form characteristic of the semantic category of the meaning instantiated by it—that functions as a predicate, and in the copula.<sup>309</sup> In the whole predicative judgment, the presentation of characteristics predicated of the subject and their predicative belonging to that subject come necessarily together

<sup>307</sup> See HuaMat5, 124: “The ‘is yellow’ cannot be performed on its own without a modification of sense; to it belongs the supplementing presentation of *something* that is yellow, and this must have the position of an underlying presentation that is made into a subject (*subjizierten Vorstellung*).” („Das ‚ist gelb‘ ist nicht ohne Sinnesmodifikation für sich vollziehbar, es gehört dazu die ergänzende Vorstellung von etwas, das gelb sein soll, und dies muss die Stellung der unterliegenden, der subjizierten Vorstellung haben.“)

<sup>308</sup> See HuaMat5, 123: “[The ‘yellow’ in ‘gold is yellow’] does not relate to the ‘yellow’ for itself, as if now a second independent presentation, ‘yellow’, were performed; rather, the yellow is meant as the yellow on the gold, as belonging to it.” („[Das ‚gelb‘ in ‚Gold ist gelb‘] geht nicht auf das gelb für sich, als ob nun eine zweite selbständige Vorstellung gelb vollzogen wäre, vielmehr ist das Gelb als das Gelb am Gold, als das ihm Zukommende gemeint.“)

<sup>309</sup> See HuaMat5, 123: “The adjectival form reflects the non-independence of this property-presentation, and the ‘is’ the belonging” („Die adjektivische Form prägt die Unselbständigkeit dieser Eigenschaftsvorstellung aus und das ‚ist‘ das Zukommen“). Here, Husserl does not seem to be entirely clear in distinguishing between non-independence of the object presented and the broadly syntactic non-independence of the act or meaning. A moment of yellow color is ontologically dependent on the material ‘on’ which it is found, while the predicate-concept is dependent as to the syntactic function that is constitutive of it on the proposition in which it is found, and likewise for an ‘act of predication’ and a whole predicative judgment.

as one unit, as the consciousness of the subject's 'being *p*'—for instance, the roof's being red—which is the objective correlate of the full predicate. Here, the 'being'—or predicative pertaining—is, as Husserl states in the Sixth Investigation, a *categorical form* constitutive of the unity of the state of affairs to which an intentional reference is set up in the judgment (see LI2, 277; Hua19/2, 666; cf. LI2, 279; Hua19/2, 669).

Husserl now argues that these structural features of the founded intentional reference to the state of affairs, in the basic case in which this reference is directly based on what is given in perception, arise from the characteristics of perceptual explication described above. As in the previously considered case of a perceptual judgment of identity, the categorical perceptual judgment 'This roof is red' in a sense 'renders objective' a feature already constitutive of perceptual experience but not 'objectified' in the latter. Namely, Husserl takes it that the 'predicative pertaining' to the subject of what is presented by an adjectival predicate-concept is simply the relation of *partial identity* that was found in the analysis of perceptual explication. Accordingly, the basic function of the predicative judgment is to articulate in an objective form the result of what Husserl called the 'integration' or 'subsumption' (*Einordnung*) of the explicated features into the perceived object, that is, the partially identifying consciousness that characterizes the perceptual explication.<sup>310</sup> In perceptually explicating the features of an object, the consciousness of partial identity between what is explicated and the whole in which they are found merely 'informs' the sense in which the explicated feature is taken, as something 'in' or 'on' the object. In the categorical perceptual judgment, on the other hand, that partial identity is itself set up as an intentional object—namely, as the categorical form of the state of affairs, the element corresponding to the copula.

The core of Husserl's analysis is, therefore, in two ideas. The *first* is the distinction between 'explicatively' seeing, say, a moment of red *on* a roof—which is still a mode of perceptually relating to that object—and making a predicative perceptual judgment to the effect that the roof *is* red—in which a propositional reference to a state of affairs is set up on the basis of the perception. The *second* is the claim that the obviously close

<sup>310</sup> Husserl draws, further, the stronger conclusion that 'is' in a categorical statement *always* corresponds to a purported "objective identity", complete or partial (see LI2, 215; Hua19/2, 579). It is striking how matter-of-factly Husserl makes this *prima facie* implausible claim, especially when one compares it with Husserl's own 1896 lectures on logic, in which he criticized theories of predication—in particular, those of Lotze and an English logician named Stanley Jevons—that attempted to reduce all statements to statements of identity. In these lectures, Husserl stated more carefully: "In many cases [...] the word 'is' serves simply as an expression for the relation of identity. [...] But it is futile to construe all other cases in accordance with this one as cases of identities." („In vielen Fällen [...] dient das Wörtchen ‚ist‘ geradezu als Ausdruck der Identitätsbeziehung. [...] Aber vergeblich ist es, nach Maßgabe dieser Fälle alle anderen als Fälle von Identitäten zu deuten.“) (HuaMat1, 152).

connection between the two consists in the fact that they share a common element that functions differently in the two cases: namely, it is the experienced relation of ‘coincidence’ as to intentional matter between the explicative perception of a color and a partial perception implicit in the perception of the colored thing that, as Husserl puts it, takes on a “representative role” in the perceptual judgment and sets up as an object the formal element of the state of affairs, the ‘belonging’ (*zukommen*) to the subject of the predicated characteristics (see LI2, 287; Hua19/2, 682). In the resulting judgment, this ‘predicative being’ (*prädikative Sein*) (see LI2, 279; Hua19/2, 670), the objective correlate of the copula, is not referred to as an independent or ‘finished’ object, as in a nominal act in which it is subsequently *named*, for instance, in the gerundial phrase ‘the being red of the roof’. Such nominal acts, as previously seen, are in Husserl’s view subsequent derivations from the more basic case of predication, in which a propositional reference to the state of affairs is built up in steps.

Now, an observation can be made to connect the outcomes of these analyses to some of the more general considerations above. In presenting the outlines of Husserl’s theory of complex acts *in abstracto*, a distinction was drawn between two kinds of unity. The first was the ‘real’ or ‘material’ (*sachliche*) unity that obtains between a non-independent moment and its complementing parts. The second was what Husserl called the ‘categorical unity’ that obtains between objects as “the correlate of a certain *unity of reference*” (LI2, 38; Hua19/I, 289), namely as the correlate of an ‘ideally possible’ complex intentional act, whose possibility has its basis in the *a priori* possible combinations of ideal meanings that Husserl’s ‘pure grammar’ was meant to investigate. In that connection, a special case was mentioned in which such ‘categorical unity’ obtains between elements already ‘materially’ united with one another; such situations were characterized by saying that a real or material unity is ‘categorially articulated’ in thought.

The analysis of a predicative perceptual judgment can now be viewed in terms of this characterization. The unity of a perceived object is a ‘material’ unity in Husserl’s sense—it is something that can be given in straightforward perception and obtains independently of thought. For instance, the moments of color or shape present in it are ontologically dependent objects—their existence as something ‘in’ a concrete thing is intrinsic to them, since without being incorporated into the unity of such a thing they could not exist. In a predicative perceptual judgment, this ‘material’ unity is presupposed as something constitutive of what the perceptual experience underlying that judgment presents its object as: the ordinary perception of a concrete material thing is a conscious experience as of a whole with many perceptible characteristics that are unified



‘materially’ in that thing. In a perceptual judgment, a *different* unity is then set up on the basis of this material one: a categorial unity between the already materially united elements by virtue of which they set up a new, ‘higher-order’ object—a state of affairs. The unity between these elements *as* elements of a state of affairs is now ‘categorial’ in the sense given by Husserl: it obtains only as the correlate of an ‘ideally possible’ complex intentional act—namely, in the basic case, the predicative judgment that the object is such and such or has such and such characteristics. In themselves, elements of this kind make up the material unity of a concrete thing, which unity then, in being categorially articulated in a predicative judgment, yields a state of affairs.<sup>311</sup> In the basic case, then, a state of affairs is built on an underlying material unity, by virtue of the way such unity figures in the intentional structure of the perceptual experiences in which the predicative relation has its basis.

In the Sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl states that judgments of the form ‘*S* is *p*’ have their ‘intuitive origin’ (*intuitiver Ursprung*) in predicative perceptual judgments of the kind analyzed above (LI2, 287; Hua19/2, 681). In a certain sense, then, predicative thought ‘grows’ from the structures of perceptual experience. But it also essentially *outgrows* them: the same categorial structure is found, for instance, in the abstract statements of mathematics, which often have no counterpart—and no ‘intuitive fulfillment’—in perception. The basic predicative connection constitutive of the logical unity of elementary forms of a proposition—and, correlatively, of a state of affairs—may ultimately have its roots in straightforward perception. However, when such roots are

<sup>311</sup> For the purposes of the kind of ‘bottom-up’ analysis of predication with which Husserl is concerned in the Sixth Investigation, the basic case of a predicative judgment and of a state of affairs is, then, one in which what is predicated is straightforwardly a *part*, independent or non-independent, of the subject. But there is a certain tension with this kind priority with Husserl’s usual approach, discussed above, of treating name–copula–adjective propositions as the logically central case. In a statement such as ‘This paper is white’, it is implausible to claim that the predicate singles out individually and directly the moment of white on the paper. The relation obtaining between that moment and the paper may well be the ontological basis for the truth of the statement; but ‘white’ is a *general* term that relates to its object conceptually. Husserl himself states in his 1906–7 lectures on logic and theory of knowledge that a “*full state of affairs in the logical sense*” as the objective correlate of such statement involves a relation between an individual object and a general *property*, not the moment that ‘particularizes’ the latter (see Hua24, 302). The relation between the conceptual predicate *white* and its objective counterpart and the subject is then more complicated than the straightforward partial identity with which the analysis given in the Sixth Investigation is concerned: “It is *quasi* a partial identification, but yet not in the authentic sense. [ . . . ] The object is white. It has, to paraphrase, a constitutive moment that is the particularization of the universal white.” (*ibid*). Husserl’s view, however, is that the basic predicative relation should not be explained in terms of such conceptual relations, but in terms of the part–whole relation of which the traditional accident–substance relation is a special case; this view of the independence or notional separability of predication from conceptual thought is still held in Husserl’s 1920’s lectures on ‘transcendental logic’, where he characterizes predicative judgment as “*the determining process found prior to conceptualization*” (Hua31, 69).

in place, the predicative relation growing from them makes available, to the person judging, the categorial richness of logically articulated thought and the possibility of knowledge about the world structured in all of the logical forms that have their basis in the idea of propositional thought—and in particular, of predicative judgment.

In conclusion, this analysis of predicative perceptual judgments can now be viewed as constituting, together with the analysis of the ‘positing’ intentional quality discussed in the previous section, the core of Husserl’s views on the most basic case of a straightforward judgments about the world. The distinction between straightforward and assenting judgments was, as seen above, a central element in Husserl’s rejection of the apprehension–assent conception of judgment, of which Brentano’s theory was a clear instance. On Husserl’s view, acts of judging do not in their primary, most basic form relate in an assenting or dissenting manner to something initially presented, conceived, or apprehended, in the way one relates to a claim, suggestion, or proposal previously made when one’s interest is in the critical assessment of the validity of such claims. Instead, judgments are typically directed toward what is the case in the world. The analysis of predication in perceptual judgments now provides an essential element in Husserl’s positive contributions to this topic. Even when it comes to thoughts articulated in the sentence-like syntactic structures that are of direct importance for pure logic, such thoughts do not initially face us as ready-made claims that would first have to be ‘grasped’, on the basis of which grasping an acceptance or rejection—a consideration of the claim’s truth or falsity—could first come in question.<sup>312</sup> Instead, predicative thought in the basic case builds upon experiences in which objects in the world are already straightforwardly taken to exist, and in which this ‘positing’ characteristic is again not something added to an underlying neutral presentation. What appears in those perceptual experiences is, in a judgment based upon them, articulated in a ‘categorial’ form that, as seen above, in a sense renders explicit or objective features that already figure implicitly in the perceptual relations to those objects—such as the putative identity of an object throughout the phases of a perceptual experience, or the belonging to that object of its perceived characteristics and parts.<sup>313</sup>

<sup>312</sup> Cf. Frege 1984, 355–6: “Consequently we distinguish: (1) the grasp of a thought—thinking, (2) the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought—the act of judgement, (3) the manifestation of this judgement—assertion.” If taken as meant to indicate a hierarchy, this passage speaks in favor of taking Frege as endorsing the apprehension–assent conception, as well as the view that the two psychological phenomena are more basic than the verbal act of assertion.

<sup>313</sup> The above presentation of Husserl’s analysis has the obvious limitation that it only concerns *affirming* judgments and disregards Husserl’s views on the nature of ‘negative’ judgments. On this point, an important corollary of Husserl’s analyses, on the one hand, of the ‘positing’ and ‘non-positing’ in-

As suggested above, this now yields a conception of the nature of judgment that in essence reinstates the conceptual core of the Platonic-Aristotelian view as the correct basis for a ‘theory of judgment’: *predication* is the essential function of acts of judging. The element of belief in the subject matter of a judgment or the acceptance of what results from predication is not something that would have to be added to the latter, but rather occurs *in* predicating. As Husserl puts it in a letter to Anton Marty in 1905: “Belief (*Glaube*) is not attached to predication, rather, it is that mode (*Modus*) of predicating which we have in view when we speak simply of predicating” (HuaDok3/1, 90)<sup>314</sup>. Predication on its own does not yield a ‘mere thought’, but in the basic case results in a judgment, and it is only by virtue of the capacity to articulate in propositional form what we directly encounter in the world—and in particular, in our perceptual surroundings—that a distanced consideration of how things merely might or might not be, and which claims hold or do not hold, acquires for us a sense. Although the capacity to merely entertain thoughts structured in logical forms is essential for the purposes of critically assessing claims, of making assumptions and conjectures, of pursuing the consequences of views we are not convinced by and finding out whether they lead to absurdities or to secure grounds for acceptance, all of this in Husserl’s view nonetheless derives from and refers back to the basic capacity to directly grasp the world as articulated in such forms in the ‘mode of belief’; and to be an exercise of this capacity is the essence or nature of judgment.

tentional qualities and, on the other, of the formal articulation of the matter of propositional acts, is the rejection of the traditional view that there are two distinct ‘qualities’ of judgment, understood as two different *acts* or *attitudes*; this view was particularly prominent in Brentano, who tried to substitute this opposition of attitudes for any occurrences of negation in the ‘matter’ or content of a judgment. In this regard, Brentano’s view is diametrically opposed to Frege; and Husserl aligns closely with Frege’s position. According to Husserl, the only ‘qualitative’ contrary of a judgment is a ‘mere presentation’—that is, the corresponding non-positing act; and all opposition between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ judgments pertains to the matter of the judgments, and specifically the formal articulation of their logical content—every judgment is qualitatively an ‘affirmation’, but some judgments affirm that something is not the case. Husserl also develops an account analogous to the one treated above of negative perceptual judgments, where the guiding idea is an experienced ‘conflict’ (*Widerstreit*) rather than simple identification of presumed characteristics with what is presented perceptually. See LI2, 267; Hua19/2, 656; cf. Husserl 1994, 232–3; Hua22, 186.

<sup>314</sup> „Der Glaube tritt zur Prädikation nicht hinzu, sondern er ist jener Modus des Prädizierens, den wir im Auge haben, wenn wir schlechthin von Prädizieren sprechen.“ Marty had asked Husserl a series of questions, of which one was whether by ‘judgment’ Husserl means predications combined with belief, to which this was Husserl’s qualified positive response—belief and predication are the relevant factors, but they are not two distinct elements that would be put together in a judgment (see HuaDok3/8, 89–90).

## Conclusions

The aim of the present work has been to discuss the theory of judgment that Husserl developed and defended in the period of the *Logical Investigations* in a way that not only presents as a series of claims the main tenets of that theory, but displays the manner in which they develop in the context of broader philosophical views and pursuits and on the basis of detailed considerations of the nature of the relation between beings capable of thought, such as us, and their surrounding world. This aim has been pursued in part by following in detail the analyses and arguments through which Husserl arrives at his theoretical claims, and in part by placing them in a broader philosophical context. In this latter regard, the main approach here has been to use historically prevalent philosophical ideas as the background against which Husserl's views have been discussed. The underlying view here has been that reflections on large-scale patterns in historical views on how a given phenomenon should be understood often provide a better foothold for attempts to get to the conceptually basic ideas underlying philosophical views than a straightforwardly 'systematic' approach, adopting which often simply means casting one's analysis in terms of whatever theoretical prejudices are currently fashionable. Furthermore, the hope here has been that such broader historical background can serve to make the philosophically important ideas stand out from the more technical considerations of detail.<sup>315</sup> In the present work, the primary background for discussing Husserl's views has been, proximally, Brentano's theory of judgment, and from a broader historical perspective, a distinction between what have been characterized here, respectively, as the Platonic-Aristotelian and the apprehension–assent conception of the nature of judgment. By way of conclusion, some general, synoptic reflections can now be made on the results of the discussions in the preceding chapters in relation to these points.

Concerning the distinction between the two broad historical conceptions on the nature of judgment, some critical points are perhaps in order here. In the present work, Husserl's theory has been viewed, as was preliminarily stated at the end of the first chapter, as a "critically vindicated" form of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception, and the preceding chapters mostly presented this point in a way that showed the Platonic-

<sup>315</sup> In this regard, the underlying sentiment here has been largely in agreement with the statements with which Wilfrid Sellars opened his lectures held in 1965–6 under the title *Science and Metaphysics*: "The history of philosophy is the *lingua franca* which makes communication between philosophers, at least of different points of view, possible. Philosophy without the history of philosophy, if not empty or blind, is at least dumb." (Sellars 1968, 1).

Aristotelian view in a positive light; this now calls for some remarks. The basic idea underlying the apprehension–assent conception certainly had a sound core to it: there is an obvious difference between merely entertaining the view that something is the case and judging it to be so, and any viable theory of judgment must be so formulated as to allow for drawing this distinction in a clear way. On this point, Plato’s and Aristotle’s views about the nature of judgments and statements, as presented in the first chapter, were not entirely without fault; specifically, it is not unreasonable to charge Plato and Aristotle of failing to draw a clear conceptual distinction between the ‘logical functions’ of affirmation and predication. In particular, the Aristotelian doctrine that ‘is’ in a categorical statement expresses both the combination of the subject and predicate and a claim to truth certainly contributed in the later tradition to a lack of a clear understanding of predication as it occurs, respectively, in judging and in for instance merely forming a hypothesis, or in making a disjunctive judgment, where the disjuncts may involve predication but are not affirmed individually. Charitably, the Platonic-Aristotelian conception may be understood as being formulated under the outlook that belief is the default mode of relating to the world, so that under normal circumstances no separate ‘operation’ is needed to account for it, in addition to the operations that determine what it is that one believes—for instance, the predication of something of an object. Such a qualification, however, appears not to be present in the discussions of predication and affirmation in Plato’s *Sophist* and Aristotle’s *On Interpretation*.

Conversely, in the apprehension–assent view, as presented here, the basic observation led not only to a conceptual distinction between predication and affirmation, but to a view about the psychological structure of judgment, in which these functions correspond to two different acts, apprehension and assent, of which the latter presupposes the former. Here, a weaker interpretation might be possible according to which those who explicitly state—as for instance Bolzano did—that judgment is always built upon a prior or underlying conception of the same subject matter do not after all intend this to be interpreted strictly in a psychologically real way. The image of judgment as always involving a two-stage process of deliberation and decision, or a two-level structure of understanding and taking-true, would then be only a heuristic expedient introduced in order to make the relevant logical features stand out: the cases where such acts are clearly present, as in a sequence of deliberation and decision, would be viewed as paradigmatic and in other cases the purely conceptual distinction between the ‘operations’ involved in the specification of the content of the judgment and the attitude of taking it to be true would be merely illustrated by the image of two successive or superimposed acts.

However, although this weakened interpretation might be available as a reasonable alternative in some particular cases, it is difficult—given the historical prevalence of such ideas—to avoid the conclusion that the apprehension–assent conception has indeed been usually put forward as a genuine analysis of the structure of acts of judging, and not only as a heuristically useful image.

In light of these observations, Husserl’s critical rehabilitation of a form of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception can be understood as a defense, within certain limits, of a version of that conception that both makes explicit the central point in the ‘charitable’ interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and incorporates the sound aspects of the apprehension–assent conception into itself. The basic feature of the Platonic-Aristotelian view, as presented above, was the idea that affirmation takes place *in* predication, in predicating something of an object in an affirming way; but if this is understood as entailing that predication is *necessary* for affirmation, Husserl does not accept it. As was pointed out on various occasions throughout the last chapter, Husserl accepts in a limited form the Humean-Brentanian view that there are also structurally simple, name-like acts that lack a subject–predicate articulation but can be called ‘affirmations’ in the broad sense that in those acts the corresponding objects are taken to exist. These were Husserl’s ‘positing nominal acts’, under which concept for instance ordinary perception was subsumed. In addition, Husserl also rejects the Aristotelian view that the copula in a categorical statement expresses an attitude of affirming; instead, as seen in the last chapter, the copula belongs to the *logical form* of a proposition, which in the matter–quality distinction falls on the side of the matter, the content of a judgment.

Therefore, the form in which Husserl can be viewed as defending a Platonic-Aristotelian conception involves various reservations and limitations. *First*, there is in Husserl’s theory a clear conceptual distinction between the aspect of a judgment that determines what is judged in it—to which aspect also predication belongs—and the aspect that makes it an act of judging—that is to say, an ‘affirmation’—rather than some other type of act. These aspects are, respectively, the intentional matter and the positing intentional quality of the act. As Husserl was seen to argue in the last chapter, these two are dependent parts or moments of the act: in particular, the element of a judgment that determines its subject matter is not an underlying, independent act of merely apprehending or presenting that subject matter. *Second*, there is the limitation to judgments considered specifically as what Husserl called ‘positing propositional acts’, where ‘propositional’ refers to the formal articulation of the intentional matter that distinguishes these from ‘nominal’, name-like acts. In the case of propositional acts, Husserl indeed considered

the subject–predicate form to be at least one of the logically elementary forms. *Third*, instead of saying that affirmation takes place in predication, it would perhaps be more fitting to say that predication normally takes place in an ‘affirming context’ or a context of belief. In the phrase used at the end of the last chapter, predication on Husserl’s view is in the basic case carried out in a ‘mode of belief’—in a believing manner—which in Husserl’s view is not only the default mode of relating to the world as a matter of fact, but *intrinsically* so. There are various contexts in which this default mode is ‘modified’, but Husserl argued that all of these are dependent on belief. Such ‘modifying contexts’ can be highly diverse and perhaps differ in important respects from one another: there is, for instance, the suspension of a judgment in the face of evidence both for and against it, the acceptance of a claim merely for the sake of an argument, and there is the holding of belief-like attitudes about non-existing objects in reading fiction. Husserl, however, took it that there is a common feature shared by such phenomena, so that one can subsume them under a generic notion, which in the *Investigations* is the class of ‘non-positing acts’. This common feature, as Husserl took it, is the non-positing intentional quality, the leaving undecided of the existence of the object. In the 1905 lectures, Husserl then argued for viewing such phenomena as ‘quasi-judgments’ or as pretend judgments, judgments that one so to speak only tries out without actually carrying them out. In both of these analyses, the guiding idea was that, contrary to the considerations that seem to invite the apprehension–assent conception, judgment does not consist of an apprehension together with a superimposed, optional element of assent; instead, the putatively simpler phenomenon of apprehending or merely entertaining something is parasitic on judgment and belief, a modification of these more basic phenomena.

It was suggested in the previous chapters that the main obstacle in the apprehension–assent conception to distinguishing between what Husserl calls ‘straightforward’ and ‘assenting’ judgments—judgments directly relating to objects in the world and those relating to them obliquely through claims whose validity one tries to establish—was an underlying, tacit interpretation of the basic cognitive situation as one of *critical assessment* of already available claims. On such a view, it is essential for judgment that it arises from a process of deliberation in which a claim is initially merely entertained, and a judgment could not be what it is if it did not involve a process of this kind. On this point, Husserl’s view is not that such assenting judgments, and the attitude of merely entertaining that they presuppose, are not real and important phenomena in our pursuit of knowledge about the world. Indeed, the ability to critically assess claims to knowledge without endorsing or rejecting them is, among other things, essential for an understand-

ing of the *objective purport* of such claims, which presupposes a grasp on the distinction between something being *taken* to be the case and it actually *being* the case. This was, in effect, one conclusion of the discussion in the preceding chapter of assenting judgments as having for their characteristic function the *confirmation* or *disconfirmation* of previously made judgments, in which the idea of truth as something independent of those judgments comes to the fore. But the reflective capacity to consider critically our judgments, beliefs, or convictions—and likewise, those of others—so to say as ‘takes’ on how things are in the world builds, on Husserl’s view, upon the more basic capacity simply to *take* those things as being so and so. The attitude of critical evaluation depends on the capacity to make judgments directly bearing on the world, rather than only on other, already available judgments—and, without the capacity for such straightforward cognitive relations to the world, our critical pursuits could at most amount to assessments of the internal coherence of different systems of beliefs.

Historically, the oblique cognitive structure that was typically taken as a universal characteristic of judgment on the apprehension–assent conception naturally lent itself—as was seen in the first chapter—to the ‘mediated’ epistemological outlook that was accepted in early modern philosophy by most rationalists and empiricists alike. If all we can know in some sense ‘directly’ are our mind-internal ideas, and if the world existing independently or outside of these ideas is known—if at all—‘indirectly’ through them, it is natural to take it that judgments about the world always take the form of, as Descartes had it, affirming or denying the existence of things corresponding to our ideas. Things in the world, on this view, first present themselves to us through the medium of ideas that are, so to speak, claims that such and such objects exist, and it is the role of the mind or intellect to adjudicate the validity of these claims and to decide whether there are sufficient grounds for accepting or rejecting them. In this regard, Husserl’s views about judgment can be taken to align with the general realistic philosophical outlook of the *Logical Investigations*. Two salient aspects of this outlook—discussed in the second chapter—were, first, the defense of the objectivity of truth, of a proposition’s truth being independent of whether it has or will be thought about or accepted by anyone, and second, the rejection of attempts to distinguish ontologically between the ‘intentional’ and the ‘real’ objects of experience in such a way that the former would be something contained in the experience. The outcomes of the analyses of the nature of judgment now connect in a natural way with this realistic outlook.

On the view defended by Husserl, our basic cognitive relations to the world do not take the form of a mind-internal tribunal in which we would relate in the role of a



judge to ideas in which the relevant facts of the matter themselves would figure only indirectly. The starting point of all cognition, as Husserl argues, is in perceptual experience, in which perceived objects are in the basic case simply encountered as existing inhabitants of our surrounding world. The simplest forms of predicative judgment are then, as seen in the last chapter, those that are directly built upon perception and which in a sense articulate in explicit form features that already figure implicitly in the underlying perceptual experience. Among the features discussed above were the identity of the perceived object throughout the temporal phases of a perceptual experience and the ‘belonging’ to that object of its perceivable characteristics; these kinds of relations are part of the intentional make-up of perception, but they are not set up as objects or ‘objectified’ in the perceptual experience itself. The basic form in which the latter takes place, Husserl argued, is in the propositional form of making the judgment that the object *is* the same or *has* such and such characteristics. Such judgments, according to the theory discussed in detail in the last chapter, are complex intentional acts that express or instantiate structured ideal propositions and have as their objective correlates similarly structured states of affairs. As seen above, it is in the form of the unifying ‘categorical forms’ of these states of affairs that the relations in question—the identity of a perceived object or the belonging to it of its characteristics—can in Husserl’s view first become the objects of our cognitive attitudes. The guiding idea throughout Husserl’s elaborate analyses of these phenomena was that the operations involved in predication never completely cut us off from our immediate perceptual ties with the world but only articulate those ties in a logical form.

In this respect, Husserl’s views are clearly continuous with specifically Aristotelian ideas about predication: as was pointed out in the first chapter, Aristotle saw a close connection between the subject–predicate form of a statement and the structure of the perception of an object as having certain attributes, which idea was then extensively developed in the essentially Aristotelian analyses of Aquinas, who discussed predication mainly in terms of abstracting sensible features from a perceived object, articulating them in a conceptual form, and then so to speak seeing the object in light of the resulting ‘*species intelligibilis*’. Husserl’s analyses of predication can, then, be reasonably—although with reservations, some of which were discussed above—placed in a broadly understood Aristotelian family of views in which predication is taken to be closely connected with, or even as an outgrowth of, perceptual experience. This conclusion, as was noted in the introduction, is essentially in agreement with views previously presented in articles by Richard Cobb-Stevens (2003) and Andrea Staiti (2015).

Finally, some remarks can be made here about the limitations of the present work. Some of these limitations are due to features of Husserl's theory and the methodological commitments in the period that has been discussed here; others are due to the scope of the questions around which this work has been structured. Of the limitations springing from aspects of Husserl's thought in the period of the *Investigations*, probably the most striking, in terms of the analysis of the nature of judgment, concern two aspects of conscious experience from which Husserl for the most part explicitly abstracts. The first concerns differences in the temporal shape of acts or experiences, the differences between, for instance, persisting mental states, occurrent mental events, and processes with a beginning and an end. The second concerns the distinction between acts in the sense of something actively carried out and those experiences that one merely undergoes in a passive manner. Husserl's interest in the intentional properties of conscious experiences in the *Investigations* was mostly focused on features that are independent of these distinctions, such as the intentional matter and quality of an act. In the case relevant for the analysis of judgment, this resulted in a view that treated all positing acts as essentially of the same kind, as 'acts of *belief*'. But when considered apart from these methodological restrictions, there is clearly reason to distinguish between belief and judgment in terms of very the distinctions that Husserl laid aside: belief in the ordinary sense is a persisting state that a conscious subject is in, while judgment is most plausibly an event, an act that the subject at some specific moment carries out. Furthermore, the lasting state of belief or conviction is often something that results from a judgment. These aspects, differences, and relations between judgment and belief were not discussed above, since they are not part of Husserl's analyses in the period that this work has focused on; a treatment of Husserl's views on these topics would have to turn to later writings, in which they are indeed analyzed in detail.<sup>316</sup>

Of the limitations that can be attributed to the scope of the questions pursued in this work, at least one can be pointed out here. The focus here has been on questions about the nature of judgment itself, its structure, and its relations to its objects; especially in the final sections of the last chapter, these questions then led also to discussing some of the ontological implications of Husserl's theory. However, a central part of the broader philosophical interest in both judgment and belief is instead *epistemological* in nature: it is essential for a full philosophical treatment of judgment to incorporate an

<sup>316</sup> For Husserl's later views about persisting convictions as results of judgments, see for example Hua4, 111f. For a treatment of the distinction between judgment as active 'position-taking' (*Stellungnahme*) and passive belief or '*doxa*', see Hua11, 51f.

account of how judgments are justified and under what conditions they yield knowledge. These tasks, however, have not been pursued here. Nonetheless, one remark is in order in the present context: Husserl's analyses in the Sixth Logical Investigation of predication in perceptual judgments were specifically formulated as part of an account of how predicative judgments as propositional acts can be justified on the basis of perceptual experience, of how they are 'fulfilled' on the basis of the latter (see LI2, 272; HuaI9/2, 657–8). In the present work, these analyses have instead been discussed from the point of view of a theory of predication, as an integral part of a theory involving a structural parallelism between predicative judgments as complex acts, propositions as complex ideal meanings, and states of affairs as complex objects. This means that an important part of Husserl's own motivations for these analyses has been downplayed, and a more complete treatment would have to take this epistemological dimension properly into account.

Questions about the nature of acts of judging, their objects, and the kinds of relations that obtain between the two are perennial topics of philosophical inquiry; they are unavoidable in any comprehensive effort to make transparent the conceptual structure of our thoughts about the world and our place in and relations to it. At most, such questions can be reformulated in a different guise—as they often were in different strands of 20<sup>th</sup>-century philosophy, due to the misgivings about psychological and 'intellectualistic' notions in philosophy that were briefly discussed in the introduction. Such programs have indeed occasionally brought to light otherwise unnoticed theoretical prejudices and, in systematically avoiding appeals to judgment and related concepts, resulted in insightful analyses of those aspects of their substitute notions—such as the primary linguistic counterpart of judgment, assertion—that are not properly understood in terms of the suspect 'mental acts'. But on the whole, proposals to completely dissolve all philosophical interest in the nature of cognitive judgment, or to redirect it exhaustively into questions about some suitable substitute phenomena, have not turned out to be compelling. If this assessment is correct, judgment retains its importance as a topic of philosophical concern; and one of the outstanding contributions to this topic, in terms of descriptive acuity, systematic coherence, and depth and breadth of analysis, is the theory of judgment developed by Edmund Husserl around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and presented, for the most part, in the *Logical Investigations*.

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